involvement in afghanistan. three years ago, western troops pulled out. the taliban regained power. my guest was there when it happened. sir laurie bristow was the last british ambassador in kabul. now he's ready to reflect on the significance of failure in afghanistan. sir laurie bristow, welcome to hardtalk. thank you. three years ago, you were a key player in the chaotic western withdrawal from kabul. many people would choose

to move on, to try to forget about it. you have chosen to write a book, to dig deep into your memories of that chaos, that desperate time. why? there are really two questions that people asked me when i got back from kabul in august 2021. one was, why did any of this happen? why did it happen after a 20—year campaign there, the expenditure of thousands of lives, the expenditure of trillions of dollars? how is it that this came to be back in the control of the taliban? the other question i was asked was just what was it like? what was the human element of this? what was it like dealing with desperate people trying to flee their country, you know, with their lives in a carrier bag? what was it like for the people on the ground? and what was it like for the soldiers who had invested so much for so little over that 20 years?

you are very candid about the degree of trauma that you felt and that many of those around you felt. would you say that, sitting here with me now, that trauma is still very real within you? yeah. it wasn't an easy book to write, and it wasn't meant to be easy to read. the point here, though, is that i wanted to make... ..to get my own thoughts clear on those two questions, what had happened and why, and what sense could i make of it, but also to try and make a bit of a contribution to broader understanding of what that episode meant for us. let's go into a bit of detail about what happened. simple question — do you, looking back on it, do you feel you were, in a way, set up as something of a fall guy sent to be the british ambassador, just for, as it turns out, a matter of three months, when it was frankly quite clear that you were taking over a terrible mess, and a mess that was likely to end in some sort of disaster?

well, let's go back over the decision—making process. so when i arrived injune 2021, the withdrawal of the us, uk and other nato troops was in full spate, so the decision had been taken under donald trump to withdraw all foreign forces. that had been confirmed by president biden when he came into office. after a short review, the decision was taken to press ahead. so there was a ticking clock? there was a ticking clock. the military withdrawal was set. there was no way any decision about that was going to be reversed, and you were sitting in an embassy which very quickly was not going to be protected. yeah. so that was the really big conundrum that we were facing through the beginning of 2021. and before going out to kabul, i was running a little cell in whitehall, trying to work out how we would fulfil my direction from the prime minister to keep that embassy open. maybe just worth reminding why we had an embassy there. we'd been there for 20 years to help the afghan state counter al-qaeda, the threat to us that produced the 9/11 attacks. of course, we also needed to do the planning for what would

happen if it went wrong. and my expectation was that it would probably go wrong on my watch. but that was the task. interesting. so your expectation was that this mission you'd been set to keep the embassy open was impossible? so from the very beginning, you clearly had deep foreboding. to say the least, very difficult. impossible, you know, that's a big word. but our...my intention was to give it our best shot. but was there a lot of wishful thinking amongst those who were your masters and bosses in london, thinking of, you know, the foreign secretary, thinking even of the prime minister? was there, in your view, a political wishful—thinking mindset? yeah, so i think that's a question that really characterised much of the 20—year campaign. and one of the things i've reflected on a lot

since leaving kabul, since leaving the foreign office, and i think one of the benefits that i bring to this discussion now is the ability to ask exactly that question. so when we're dealing with really big, first—order problems of this nature, how do we support decision—makers to deal with the facts as they are rather than as they would like them to be? we'll come back to that, because learning lessons is clearly an important part of why you've written this book. yeah. but i do really want to have you describe for me the personal pressures you were under. you've described how, in a sense, you, as the ambassador, the senior british representative on the ground in kabul, as the embassy was closed and you moved to a hotel near the airport when it was clear the embassy could no longer be protected, the taliban were moving into the capital city. you then had this task of, as you put it, playing god, deciding who would be facilitated to safely get out of this fallen capital city. yeah. so that task of evacuating afghans at risk really started from the point that we'd worked

with afghans for 20 years on that campaign. of course, military interpreters, members of the afghan military, people like womenjudges who had been trying... people therefore seen as the enemy by the taliban. the people who we had relied on and who had relied on us to deliver what we were there to do, that was the job. so if you strip away all of the noise and the detail from that, that was what we needed to do. it was, ithink, a moral imperative, but it was also a political imperative, in the sense that if we want to work with people like those afghans, we need to be with them when things go wrong. you held other people's lives in your hands, because ultimately you and your team were responsible for saying, "yes, you're authorised." others, you turned around, turned away and said, "go back to your homes." yeah. today, as you consider what you did, are you aware that there are people you turned away who suffered terribly as a consequence? that's undoubtedly the case. i would say there are also people who we needed to get out, but we weren't able to get

them out because they weren't able to get to the baron in time before the evacuation ended. one of the purposes of writing the book is to explain to a wider public what that was like, not only for people like me, but for very, very brave soldiers and civil servants, members of the diplomatic corps who volunteered to go into that place in those circumstances and help people get out. i don't think any of us who were there will ever forget the things that we did, and i think we will all continue, probably for the rest of our lives, to ask whether we got it right in every case. "there are things you cannot unsee," you write. yes. "a teenager forcibly ejected from the baron hotel..." which was your base, "..by a stony—faced british soldier, "kicking and screaming." yeah. i wonder what happened to that child. he, i'm sure, will have gone back out into kabul

and we will not know what happened to him since. and that hangs heavy on you today? yes. i think it hangs heavily on everybody who was in that evacuation. and you talk about the political directives you were receiving. you say, "we were directed to use any spare capacity..." that is, after taking care of british staff and those immediately involved from afghanistan, "..to use spare capacity to evacuate others "who ministers in london decided "were the highest priority." now, it seems to me immediately alarm bells are ringing. i mean, politicians are making decisions in london, very, very farfrom afghanistan, which are going to affect your operation and which you may decide are deeply unwise. so, let's maybe go into a few of who those categories of people were. one very well documented one, of course, was afghan journalists who'd reported on the story, you know, in some cases for many years. some of them had worked for western news agencies. there was another category of female judges, people who we had trained, we'd supported and we'd worked with to put very, very violent people into prison,

taliban and other extremists. i have no concern at all about the rightness of us trying to get those people out. there were other individuals, other groups, who i would say fell more into the special interest category of people back in london. but the... ah, well, let me stop you. special interest categories you talk about and you refer to the people that they wanted out. bizarrely, they also, it seems, wanted animals out. yeah. there's the one very well—known case of the animal sanctuary run by a former british soldier, pen farthing, where it seems these animals were prioritised for airlift out of afghanistan. well, the people who were involved in that decision can answer for themselves on that. as i make clear in the book, the... did it include borisjohnson,

the prime minister? because sources inside the foreign office suggested that borisjohnson was personally involved. he has denied it. what can you tell us? i was in kabul. erm, as i said... receiving the cables and the messages. 0ur priority in kabul was to focus on people and the people at highest risk. that's what we did. so when it came to the animals being evacuated right at the end of the evacuation process, i'm clear that no people who should have been got out, who were ready to be got out, didn't because of that decision. are you really sure about that? because it must have taken time and effort to sort out the paperwork, do the administration, and, of course, collect these animals amidst all of the chaos outside your base near the airport.

as sure as i can be. but if i could just go back to a point we were discussing earlier about, you know, how the prioritisation was done. one of the issues that we were dealing with throughout is, of course, there's a case to be made for group x or group y, you know, different sorts of people, different individuals to be got out. and doubtless in the case of many of those people, you know, that was a pretty strong case. the reality on the ground was that it wasn't an orderly queue. it was miles and miles of chaos and desperate people, and the job of the people doing the evacuation was to try to identify those who needed to be brought forward for evacuation, but bearing in mind that there was little that we could do outside the perimeter of our own control. this is a powerful and a difficult word to use, and i don't use it lightly, but is there an element of shame when you look back at what happened? i'm just looking at a times newspaper report from november, that is a few months after the desperate evacuation, the times reporting that an afghan soldier who was told

there was no room for him on one of the last raf flights out of kabul was then murdered as he tried to flee, as he'd been instructed to do by your staff. he's a man who had served alongside the british, ended up dead. is shame a relevant word? i don't know the details of that particular case, but i think... looking back on that period, i think, you know, we all have to look very clearly at what we did and didn't do and whether we could have done more in the circumstances. but the fact remains that the people on the ground had to deal with the situation that they had. they had to deal with trying to get out people who were absolutely desperate, in some cases couldn't even get to the front of the queue. and in the background, the clock was ticking. the taliban had made it very, very clear that they were prepared for us to do what we felt we needed to do, but we had to be out of there by the end of august. and to bring it up to date, of course, promises were made to those who didn't get to the front of the queue who had an association with britain but were not put on an emergency evacuation flight. promises were made that, "you know what? there will be "a process by which you can get to britain later." it was an authorised immigration programme.

the truth is, as we talk to each other today, that the numbers who've been offered resettlement in the uk on that official programme is dwarfed by the numbers who have felt the need to flee afghanistan, try to get to britain on small boats across the channel, unauthorised means, and who are now trying to claim asylum in the uk. does it stick in your throat that the numbers of those authorised to come since have been so small? well, as you know, i no longer work in government... i'm asking for your personal opinion. you're asking my personal opinion. er... as regards our obligations to afghans who worked with us, of course, you know, thejob has been continued since the end of the evacuation and a significant number have been got out. but so many feel betrayed. so many feel betrayed. some of them have a claim on the uk, some of them don't. i think the thing, though, for us to focus on in the future is around why what happened in 2021 matters to the uk in 2024 and beyond.

i think what's tended to happen in recent years is, because there are other things going on — you know, bigger problems closer to the news — there's been a tendency to forget about afghanistan and think about it as, essentially, yesterday's business. what i see when i look at afghanistan now is a failing state. bad things come out of failing states — violent extremists and, of course, you know, people who are desperate to flee that country. if i may say so, it was a failing state even during the 20—year deployment of nato forces and of diplomats like yourself. i just wonder, now that we go to the big picture, whether you feel that, in retrospect, the whole afghan project — the sort of building of a free, democratic nation, as was imagined in 2001, 2002 — whether that was doomed from the beginning, or do you think it was doomed only when the americans basically decided they were going to pull the plug on their commitment? i think there are lots of things going on here. i mean, afghanistan for much of that 20 years was pretty dysfunctional. but if you compare it to what it was before and after that 20 years — so the taliban in charge after the civil war, after the soviets pulled out, and the taliban as they are now — it starts to look a little different.

sure, but the roots of that, you know, civil society, a place where, for example, women had rights that they hadn't had before under the taliban regime, the roots were very shallow — as we saw as soon as the government collapsed. it fled, it collapsed. the army, most soldiers deserted as soon as they could. and of course, the taliban is now back in power. so in the end, i come back to the question — was it a doomed project from the beginning? is it impossible to build nations in the way that perhaps in the early 2000s, people in the west believed was possible?

so that, i think, is one of the things that we really must focus in on and why i think it's important to keep talking about what happened and why in afghanistan in �*21. so you're right — the roots were shallow. the roots were not nonexistent. a whole generation of women, girls, young men, boys knew something different as a result of that period. the fact remains, though, that we were there initially to eradicate al-qaeda, the threat to us from al-qaeda. over the years, a number of other strategic objectives came into play, including a counterinsurgency war against the taliban that, in my view, pretty much guaranteed that we would not be able to reach a viable political settlement. look at it this way. the taliban, the pashtun large minority, possibly majority, from which they're drawn, they are afghans. so my point here is that if we don't want to be there in perpetuity, if we want to hand control over to afghans, we needed to create the circumstances that would enable us safely to do that and to withdraw our forces. and one of the problems,

particularly around the doha agreement between the trump administration and the taliban, and then the military withdrawal in 2021, was that we never achieved a situation where we could safely withdraw those forces, and that's what led to the disaster of �*21. as a diplomat, when you look at afghanistan today, with the taliban fully in control, do you believe that the right policy is a form of engagement with that government? there is no british diplomat there right now. there's no formal recognition from britain or the united states of the taliban regime. does that have to change? so this is one of the great conundrums that we have. of course, the uk has a representative... ..to afghanistan. he's a former colleague, friend of mine, based in qatar. the question here, though, is that... the heart of the question is that you've got a group of men of a certain disposition, a certain ethnicity, who have seized control of the country by military means. their approach to governing it is highly repressive. it excludes women and girls — half of the population — from any form of political say, economic opportunity. girls over the age of 11 are not even allowed to go to school. you've got half the population under food stress. you've got 3 million people — 3 million children — going hungry.

this is a disastrous humanitarian situation. so is the answer to fully isolate or to find different ways to engage? so this is... this is the problem. how do you engage? how do you support the population of afghanistan without supporting and strengthening and legitimising the taliban, as long as they're not prepared to change their behaviour? so where we're at is that the un, the united nations, is convening a series of meetings based in doha. the third one of those meetings took place at the beginning of this month. it was a step forward, in that the taliban actually showed up, which they hadn't done for the second of those meetings... of course, but they wouldn't. .. they wouldn't dream of allowing female members of nongovernmental organisations to show up. but their conditions were that there would be only the taliban, there would be no women on their delegation, no—one from other ethnic groups, and they would not be challenged on their human rights obligations. but in short, your message is, "that sort of engagement, "we have to continue"?

engagement, yes, as long as we are clear about what we're trying to achieve. legitimacy and recognition, that's a wholly different question. my personal view on that is that the taliban only get recognition when they have earned it, when their behaviour has changed. and in terms of what behaviour change looks like, it's a clear commitment to a more inclusive form of governance in afghanistan. before we end, i want your perspective as a senior former british diplomat on the big picture lessons, geopolitically, of what happened in afghanistan. you used to be british ambassador in moscow. do you think that what happened — as you put it, the failure in afghanistan — was a key signal to vladimir putin about the west's, nato�*s weakness? yeah, so my first thing to say there is that there's a curious fact here that i think we shouldn't lose sight of, which is that what happened in afghanistan, in some ways, is a problem for the kremlin, as it is for us.

it's their part of the world. they, too, have problems with violent extremism, the heroin trade and so on. looking back, though, at what conclusions mr putin will have drawn from that, i don't think it made his decision to invade ukraine, but i certainly think it helped him conclude that the west — and particularly the us — was weak—willed, it wasn't prepared to do what was necessary to look after its interests, and that that had an impact on his calculation about how we would respond to him going into ukraine. fundamentally, the west lacked staying power. now, if we do talk about ukraine — and as ijust said, nato�*s marking its 75th anniversary and all sorts of noises are being made about the commitment to ukraine — isn't the truth that we do not see a coherent, long—term strategy on ukraine? they've only been able to agree on new military and financial assistance for the next year, because there's a recognition that everything might change if donald trump comes back into the white house. there are other nato

member states which worry about escalation, as they put it. nato�*s in a mess, isn't it? well, there could not be a better time for the new british prime minister to be going out on his first major international engagement than the 75th anniversary of nato. this is absolutely at the heart of the uk's security and the key relationships with the us and our european partners, on which that depends... well, let me stop you right there. surely one lesson you learned is that the uk's special relationship with the united states is asymmetric and ultimately doesn't work. you knew that the decision to completely withdraw from afghanistan was going to lead to chaos, was going to lead to failure, but you couldn't influence that decision. that's the nature of the uk—us relationship — it's one way. i wouldn't describe it as one way, but the asymmetrical nature of the relationship, i mean, this is not news. i think one of the things for any... no, but you've just resorted to saying, "oh, well, nato at this particular time, "we have to discuss the importance "of the us—uk relationship." i mean, surely we've learned a lesson that that's not good enough any more?

so my point here is that in order to work effectively in the alliance, with our us and other european partners, a number of things are necessary. one is a very, very clear and common view as to what our first order interests are. what is at stake here? what is at stake here is the security of our country, i would say the us, certainly our european allies, against a violent, imperialist russia, which is going down the route of fascism, essentially. but what if the next elected president of the united states doesn't believe that? the best advice i've been given recently by a former senior us official is, "look at what mr trump does, not at what he says." so of course, there will be an election, many things have been said, will be said about that. the really key point, though, here for the uk is to make it very clear what our understanding is of our security, how it fits with the security of our allies. but the most important thing of all is, what are we prepared to do to guarantee that security, including in terms

that bring the confidence of our allies — above all, our most important ally, the united states? simple yes or no answer — post—afghanistan and the lessons learned, are you confident that the west has the resolve necessary? post—afg hanistan, it's difficult. the reaction to the russian invasion of ukraine in february �*22, though, ithink is rather more positive. so, some really important things happened there. one is that most governments saw pretty clearly, pretty quickly what was at stake for us here, and most of them acted on it. laurie bristow, we do have to end there. i thank you very much forjoining me on hardtalk. thank you.

hello there! the best way to sum upjuly so far this month has been rather wet at times and disappointingly cool. average temperatures at this time of year generally between 18 and 23 degrees. just take a look at the next few days — temperatures below par for the time of year, all due to the direction of the wind and the amount of cloud we're going to see. now, let's take a look at the pressure chart a little more detail, explain further. we've got this high pressure out to the west but circulating around that high. the wind direction comes in a clockwise fashion and so, that means a northerly wind. it will continue to drive in plenty of cloud across exposed east coasts, maybe thinking of a spot or two of drizzle as we go through the day, and perhaps a few sharp and thundery downpours breaking out across south wales and south west england. best of the sunshine, perhaps, on friday will be across parts of southern scotland

and northern ireland. brisk northerly wind, particularly out on those exposed east coasts. temperatures will struggle mid—teens but we could see highest values of 20 degrees in western scotland but generally, those temperatures a little bit subdued. the high pressure tries to hang on in there as we go into the start of the weekend, staying out to the northwest, and this area of low pressure could just influence eastern areas, spilling in, once again, a little more in the way of cloud and some drizzle. so, double figures to start the day on saturday. still some showery outbreaks of rain around for some and as we go through the day on saturday, sheltered western areas will see the best of the sunshine. a feed of cloud and some showery rain just drifting in across east yorkshire. so here, temperatures once again mid—teens at very best. we might see highest values of 20 degrees. now, as we move into sunday, there is a potential for that low pressure to just pull away a little bit further and allow for more sunshine to come through, particularly across england and wales, and as a result, the sunshine is strong at this time of year. we'll start to see those temperatures recover

just a touch. and that's going to be the trend as we move into next week. we've got low pressure pushing across the country which could bring some showery outbreaks of rain at times. but then, the weather story looks set, fingers crossed, to quieten down. so, a few scattered showers around monday, possibly tuesday, but by wednesday onwards, drier and warmer.

live from london, this is bbc news. 0na on a critical diet in washington, president biden stands a defiant immediate calls for him to step down but gaffes against his fightback. now i want to hand over to the president of ukraine who has as much courage as he has determination, ladies and gentlemen, president putin. although the summit — the us

and a new $225 million security package for but president zelensky tells leaders his forces need to hit targets in side russia. police in bristol continue to search for a key suspect after two suitcases containing human remains were found on the historic clifton suspension bridge. and a team of explorers prepared to return to the site of the wreck of the titanic. welcome to bbc news. the us president has said that he is in good health and the best candidate to beat donald trump despite making occasional mistakes in a key avalon press conference. president biden spoke at the end of the nato summit in washington which saw

countries agree tens of billions of dollars in aid