there was no magchymastsi, i have to hand it over to you, you need to dismount, the sun is setting early. senior lieutenant vladimir karpov completed the task and managed to deliver valuable information about the enemy’s defense to front headquarters. true, when crossing the front line i had to run into a german sentry. the fight was short, but he managed to wound the scout, overcoming the pain. he still got to his people, well volodka, well done, a report personally to the front commander chernyakhovsky, information of the highest degree of importance. at headquarters a meeting was being prepared for which, apparently, the decision to attack would be made, was carefully expected from the front commanders. operational information, the famous

writer karpov, he was an intelligence officer on the first baltic front, he was awarded the high title of hero of the soviet union, until the year forty-four he acquired, personally and with his intelligence officers, 79 languages, of which approximately a third were officers . on the night of may 31, 1944, behind closed doors...

the supreme commander makes a decision, the decision to conduct an operation on the central section of the front. at the beginning of april , the commanders of the troops in the western direction received instructions from headquarters to temporarily switch to defense and develop their proposals for military operations for the summer. the most important decisions were made on the conduct of the operation at the very headquarters of a particular front. the commander himself. first of all, he determined

the strategic line of development of the operation, both defensive and offensive. all opinions were listened to, primarily those of the front commanders. disagreed with something, had to do something to defend, this was the case during the famous stalinist attack, which we call the lvov-sandomier operation, a grandiose operation in 1944, which ran almost in parallel with the operation we call bogration. the conversation at headquarters with the front commander ivan stepanovich konev was tough. staley said: "no, this plan is not good, because you offer two strikes, we never."

proposed by the command of the first belarusian front recently in april at headquarters also raised questions, it was not too fit into the canons of military art, risky, according to no, we have such memories, such a proposal that was expressed by the military council of the front, two powerful blows from two different directions, the members of the headquarters did not like it, zhukov and antonov were against it and they said that it is not possible for two identical blows to strike, there must be one... and stalin’s proposal to rakosovsky go out into the next room and think about everything again, he went out into the other room twice, there he thought,

somehow, i don’t think he i thought, of course, because this had already been thought out dozens of times, he came and proved that no, i believe that this is how it should be, and it will be correct, and it will lead to the best. after the report of the commander of the first belarusian front, konstantin rakosovsky, a detailed plan of the operation in the bobruisk direction was reported by colonel general malinin, the front’s chief of staff, at the map. it is expected that two blows of approximately equal strength will be delivered to kobrinsko. and kovel directions, this will create the possibility of encircling the enemy at an operational depth of 50-60 km from the front edges with subsequent encirclement and destruction.

my grandfather worked on the map, my grandfather had this feature, since he was more often on the front line than at the headquarters, so... stalin treated his grandfather with great respect, stalin’s lifetime biography of 1953, he was one of the 8 legendary commanders indicates the surname malinin. the plan was bold, but the main question was how to ensure the interaction of troops and create operationally effective command and control. in conditions of complex terrain of wooded and swampy terrain, this is not mentioned in military textbooks wrote. the front command presented convincing arguments about the feasibility of the proposed plan. well, here stalin again showed his such qualities, he

weighed everything, so to speak, realized that the perseverance of the front commander shows that the operation was worked out very carefully, and one can hope for great success. ikonev and rokosovsky, after thinking carefully in the next room, confirmed the correctness of the decisions made. carrying out two strikes in the lviv-sandomierz direction, one from lutsk, the other ravo-russky district, and two equal in strength converging blows in the bobruisk direction. there is such a true story, it was told by stalin’s personal secretary in skrebyshe. he said that when rakosovsky and malinin were leaving, joseph vesarionovich called out to mikhail sergeevich, grandfather turned and stalin said to him: “mikhail sergeevich, i’m counting on you.” any remark from the mouth of joseph serionovich stalin, it is absolutely clear that

it could have stunning consequences for a person, both good and bad sense. it's already may 20th. deputy chief of the general staff, general antonov, he presents to the supreme commander a map with an explanatory note and the supreme commander-in-chief: already on may 30, after minor clarifications, he accepts the plan as a basis and the next day directives are given to the troops. on may 31, 1944, at a meeting of headquarters , directives were signed by the commanders of four fronts, which were to operate in the area where army group center was located, the adopted fundamental documents.

under the leadership of the supreme commander-in-chief. it was assumed that the operations of the fronts were interconnected and should be carried out in such a way that the results achieved in the previous one created the preconditions for the success of subsequent ones.

late in june, at hitler's residence , the wolf's lair, where the fuhrer's main headquarters was located and from where he directed all actions on the eastern front, a meeting in a narrow format was about to begin. in the reception room it’s already on... as soon as his steps were heard from below, jonna wolf, hitler’s chief secretary, adjutant, immediately stood at attention, greeting the high-ranking officer. everyone is here. behind closed doors, a discussion began

on an issue that was important at that time. the meeting participants, bending over a map laid out on a large table in the center of the room, analyzed the situation. hitler was as irritated as ever. no one could answer the question of where the russians would strike the main blow, north or south. the dispersal of equipment and human resources is taking place along the entire front line. ernst von. bush insists on the impossibility of an offensive in the area of ​​army center group, forests, impenetrable swamp. these are not the conditions for a large group. and the assumption of the head of the twelfth department of the general staff , gehlen, who in his notes addressed to the fuhrer insists on precisely this direction, is groundless. and the state of the army, together with the adjacent formations of neighboring army groups, totals 63 divisions and three infantry brigades. and... stronger than ever, and also a powerful defensive system, impregnable fortresses in the area of ​​bobruisk and

vitebsk. bush's arguments were supported by schelenberg. according to intelligence data, in this direction active construction of defensive facilities by russians continues. everything indicates that they are not going to attack here. the agent confirms this. the number of groups deployed has been significantly increased; they work along the entire front line. bush told the truth at hitler's headquarters. the army group center was very powerful. in addition, it had a well -branched network of railways and highways . in the event of an offensive by units of the red army, it could launch flank attacks on them to the north or south. all these moments bid. a front

more than 100 km long was finally formed in the belarusian direction. it passed along the line of lake nischerda, east of vitebsk, orsha, mogilev, zhlobin, along the pripyat river, forming a huge ledge, its top facing the east, the belarusian balcony. during the preparation of the operation, secrecy measures were unprecedented. information in the troops. and no, no information about what happens after donbass, zaporozhye, crimea. will follow, suddenly there was no operation related to the liberation of belarus, the word bogration was not used, we and they didn’t inquire, it didn’t make sense, everything was in extremely great secrecy, and the demand

of the rate, to accept the toughest measures... chernyakhovsky, on the eve of the report to stalin

, proposed a counter plan from the commander of the first baltic front, bagramyan, who was to act in... in this direction, he proposed to attack the detour, this with the help, undoubtedly, of the partisans, those who knew it there, those places where it was possible to pass in this swampy area, and another non-standard decision was made that the attacks would go by detour. stalin chernyakhovsky already reported how two equal blows were delivered. in the bagushevsky and borisovsky directions, that is, adjacent wings of the third belarusian and first baltic. true, they did not have time to indicate the second direction on the map, but the commander was not taken aback and noted that the second direction could be drawn provided that the front was reinforced by another artillery division, a reserve of the supreme

high command and a tank army. the role of tankers, according to grandfather, was great in the operation.

it is also known as ticks, it was necessary with deep strikes on four fronts to defeat the main forces of the army group center; this involved breaking through the enemy’s defenses simultaneously in six sectors. the task is to dismember his troops and defeat them piece by piece. already at the end of june forty-four the ticks will begin.

the summer offensive of the soviet troops, organized in accordance with the agreement at the tehran conference, will begin by mid- june on one of the important sectors of the front. the general offensive of the soviet troops will unfold in stages, through the sequential entry of armies into offensive operations. we have always

responded to these requests. and churchel constantly imposed some conditions. the opening of a second front if there are no more than twelve german divisions there. if there are more in normandy, then these are very large casualties, we will not open it. then we will open it if at the same time a major offensive is launched on the eastern front. the soviet union fulfilled its obligations: to begin military operations on the eastern front after the opening of a second front by the allies on the western direction.

the squad made an ambush, fought off this salt, stalin is kaput, rus is kaput, moscow is kaput, everything is kaput, she came running from her children, fever, well, if you’re not his, then he’s yours. kostko, viktor fedorovich, field, village of novy gorodok, kirov district, magelevsk region, military rank, private, position, air defense operator, has been in the ranks of the working peasant red army since 1944, i grew up in a disciplined family, with a strict father and a very caring, kind mother; my father was a forester in the forestry. have worked,

my mother was on the collective farm, my older brothers and i were studying. at school, young people receive the comprehensive education necessary for a citizen of a socialist society. i had a good memory, i knew all the surroundings, the forests, the lines in the stitches of the paths, from the age of 6 i already had the task of herding calves or bees. koraulic, i graduated from seven classes with honors in 1941, on june 22 of 1941, it was a hot day, i was in the forest together, which means my older brother and a neighboring boy, when we were returning somewhere

to... the war we found out already on june 26, 1941. from crowds of refugees walked from babruisk to magilev, mostly jews and members of the command

staff there. it was then that we realized who was coming to our homeland, because shooting civilians is immediately obvious atrocity, well , we heard this song: get up, huge country, get up, mortal combat, and this song really entered the soul, that we must stand up for mortal combat, the country is huge!

the song was first performed on june 26 , 1941 at the belarusian railway station by a group of the red banner ensemble of the red army song and dance of the ussr. since october 15, 1941 the holy war began to be heard daily on the all-union radio.