this is cnn breaking news. hello, outpost in jordan near the border with syria and iraq. this is the first time u.s. troops have been killed by enemy fire in the middle east since the beginning of the war in gaza, october 7th. it also marks a significant escalation of an already precarious situation in the middle east. president biden reacting a short time ago, vowing the u.s. will hold those responsible to account. we have got full coverage of this breaking story, natasha bertrand is in washington, priscilla alvarez is with president biden in south carolina, and ben wedeman is in beirut. natasha, you first. what are we learning about the attack? >> reporter: a very serious moment for the u.s. military, for president biden, for the administration writ large because this is the first time u.s. service members have actually been killed from hostile fire since the war in

gaza began. and sparked all of these tensions throughout the middle east. now, we're learning that these three u.s. service members were killed after a drone struck a base in northeast jordan right on the border of syria, and it also wounded, we are told now, upwards of 30 other u.s. service members. that number is likely to continue to rise as the service members seek treatment for symptoms that are consistent with traumatic brain injury, according to two u.s. officials that we spoke to in the last hour. now, this is a really high number of individuals killed and wounded in this kind of attack. previously, when these kinds of attacks by these iran-backed militias have occurred, targeting u.s. and coalition bases in iraq and syria, there have been a number of injuries but most of them have been minor. the most extensive of those injuries being traumatic brain injuries for example, but never before and since these attacks started in october have we seen u.s. service members actually be

killed in one of these drone and rocket attacks that have been launched by these militant groups that are supported by iran in iraq and syria. the u.s., of course, taking this extremely seriously. we got a statement from central command and also a statement from president biden and kamala harris. remains to be seen how the u.s. is going to respond, but we're told as of right now, of the u.s. service members who were wounded at least three of them were evacuated for medical treatment so their injuries serious enough to be removed and medevaced out. >> natasha, what are the options on how the u.s. might respond? >> reporter: well, previously, in the kind of over 150 attacks on u.s. and coalition bases in iraq and syria that we have seen since october by these iran-backed militant groups the u.s. has responded a number of times by striking these militant groups in iraq and syria, kind of on an individual basis, targeting their infrastructure, targeting certain militant

groups, killing several of those militants in strikes that the u.s. military has carried out. it's unclear whether the u.s. is going to feel like it has to go further this time, simply because three u.s. service members were killed, again, in a first we have seen since this war began. >> priscilla alvarez, traveling with president biden, how has he reacted to this? >> reporter: president biden releasing a statement this morning in which he said the administration is still gathering the facts, but also suggesting that the u.s. will retaliate. let me read part of that statement to you. it says, quote, today, america's heart is heavy. while we're still gathering the effects of this attack, we know it was carried out by radical iran-backed militant groups operating in syria and iraq. he goes on to say, the three americans service members we lost were patriots in the highest sense and their ultimate sacrifice will never be forgotten by our nation. together, we will keep the sacred obligation we bear to their families.

we will strive to be worthy of their honor and valor and carry on their term to fight terrorism in a time and manner of our choosing. we know too from the white house that president biden had a brief this morning by his national security team about the attacks, that includes by defense secretary lloyd austin. and of course, u.s. officials have been increasingly concerned about escalating tensions in the middle east, as there has been an increase in attacks in iraq, syria, yemen, and lebanon. this morning, we heard from president biden's military adviser saying there were concerns and they were trying to avoid broadening any conflict in the middle east. and he said that his advice to the president up until this point was to protect u.s. forces and take away hamas' capability. now, again, president biden suggesting that they will retaliate. what that looks like in the days to come is unclear, but this is certainly a concerning development for the white house.

>> priscilla alvarez, thank you so much. to ben wedeman now in beirut, ben, what does this add to an already very tense situation in the region? >> reporter: really, this just reemphasizes just how dangerous the situation the united states is put in. it has troops sprawled across the region. it's got several thousand troops in jordan. it's got 900 troops in syria, 2,500 in iraq. we have seen that since the 17th of october, there have been with the exception of not counting the one today, 158 attacks on u.s. forces. and the u.s. is basically engaged in a low-intensity regional war. it has attacked targets in syria, in iraq, and in yemen. and this is probably only going to intensify. you have basically four very dangerous flashpoints.

you have the border between lebanon and israel, where since the 8th of october, israel and hezbollah have been exchanging fire. today, as well. you have syria where we have seen u.s. forces targeted multiple times. iraq and of course the situation in yemen where the houthis are targeting navigation in the red sea. the united states clearly has three of those four flashpoints, the united states has become directly involved, targeted by its foes and responding to them. this is significant given that three u.s. service people were killed. that's the first time, although two u.s. service people were killed in the red sea in an operation, but it's not clear if that was due to hostilities or an accident. but certainly, the stage is set for an escalation. and keep in mind that from the perspective of this part of the

world, the united states because of its very close ties with israel, because of the fact it provides monetary support, diplomatic support, and weapons to israel in this war in gaza, that many see it as an active participant in that war. and rather, for instance, if you're a militia in iraq, trying to hit israel, it's much easier to hit the closest ally of israel, and that's the united states. and they are a very easy target given how many u.s. troops are in the region, where they're deployed. for instance, in syria, they're essentially surrounded by hostile forces. isis, the syrian government, iranian-backed militias, and in iraq, it's not dissimilar. therefore, the united states is in a very precarious situation. and as we heard president biden say that the united states will respond at a time and in a

manner of its choosing, no matter what that response will be, it will probably only make the situation even more dangerous. fredricka. >> bed weideman, thank you so much. back to you, natasha, in washington for a final question. a recap, three u.s. troops killed. 30, up to 30 wounded. it's a very sizable attack. the largest that we have seen since the conflict began october 7th. how might this impact whether there might be any more deployments of u.s. personnel to the region? >> reporter: you know, it's a great question that has to be something the biden administration is now considering, although we have to remember that the u.s. actually surged u.s. personnel to the region following the october 7th attack on israel because precisely, they envisioned that tensions could continue to rise and they explicitly warned other countries, other entities not to

get involved in this conflict. you had an aircraft carrier there, u.s. personnel surged to the region, and it doesn't appear at this point like there are any imminent plans to pull these u.s. forces out. but of course, that is something that the pentagon is going to have to be weighing here as they decide how to move forward with their response. >> we'll leave it all. thanks to all of you. and of course, i'll be back at the top of the hour with much more on this breaking news. "fareed zakaria gps" starts now.

this is "gps" the global public square. welcome to all of you in the united states and around the world. i'm fareed zakaria coming to you from new york. today on the program, the growing fear that the war in gaza will spread. could it happen? is it likely? i'll ask "the new yorker's" robin wright and general mark birkeland. also, a.i. it's what everyone is talking

about from davos to detroit, shenzhen to silicon valley. i'll talk to two of the smartest brains in technology who will tell you what you need to know now. first, the man behind chatgpt, sam altman, the ceo of openai. then bill gates, the co-founder of microsoft. but first, here's my take. for all of the focus on the many geopolitical crises across the globe, the one that is potentially the most dangerous has actually been trending in a positive direction. ian bremer, the founder of our eurasia group, said to me, the biggest upside surprise of recent months has got to be the stabilization of u.s./china relations. jake slven's meeting with china's top diplomat for private talks this week is one more sign of a thaw in relations that in

2021 had both sides yelling at each other in anchorage. military-to-military talks have resumed. ian janet yellen and gina raimondo have had constructive trips to china. since the biden/xi summit, chinese military planes seem to have stopped their dangerous maneuvers. over the prior two years there have been nearly 300 such incidents against u.s. aircraft and partners. and the taiwan elections while going against china's hopes were handled maturely by both sides. this is all to the good. the mistrust, miscommunication, and lack of contact that characterized the relationship for the first two years of the biden administration was dangerous. this rivalry could easily spiral into an unconstrained arms race in everything from artificial

intelligence to space weapons, splinter the global economy, and descend into the first great power war since 1945. both sides have adjusted their attitudes but the largest shift has come from beijing. xi jinping came to wake in the wake of the global crisis convinced the u.s. was waning. he has said the east is rising and the west is declining. he wanted china to lessen its economic dependence on the u.s. and make the technologies of the future at home. he negotiated a more ambitious and aggressive foreign policy. flash forward to recent months. xi publicly declared to an audience of american business executives that china has no intention or desire to replace america as the global hedge mon. he and wang yi have said cooperation between the u.s. is imperative. he courted american business in san francisco and the premier did the same at davos.

much of the shift in rhetoric probably stems from beijing's recognition that its own economy has been foundering while the u.s. is booming. more generally, it must see its wolf warrior diplomacy has failed, alienating people from india to australia and germany. a recent pew study showed 22 of the 24 countries surveyed viewed the u.s. more favorably than they did china. washington for its part came to realize that u.s./china relations were veering badly off course and could lead to dangerous spirals, crises and conflict. if taiwan in particular were badly handled, everyone would suffer, including the taiwanese who by large majorities want the status quo to continue. there's also an upside to better relations between the two powers which remain deeply intertwined economically. many u.s. allies are made clear to washington while they seek america's security help, china

will remain their largest economic partner. none of this is to suggest that things are now warm and friendly. new crises will emerge as china's affordable evs flood the markets, expect a big debate in some western countries over how to respond. for germany, china was the great savior for its auto industry absorbing a large share of german exports but today chinese cars are the greatest threat to that same industry. there will be new tensions over pharmaceuticals, biotech products, but they will now happen in the context of a working relationship between washington and beijing, which is reassuring. part of what has allowed the shift in washington's attitude is the realization that china is not ten feet tall. just as with japan in the 1980s, policymakers projected china's growth forward and panicked. as the german proverb goes, trees don't grow to the sky. china's growth has slumped

substantially, made worse by many bad policies over the years. the demographics and productivity, main two components of economic growth, are both weak. china remains a powerful force but it is not going to take over the world. a crucial attribute of the age of hegemony which began 18 years ago was that washington created a security system in which other countries would grow and prosper. as long as they did not disrupt the international order, they could thrive economically, politically, socially, and culturally. this was rooted in a confidence that the united states could compete and do well with rivals but it insisted the rivalry not turn into a geopolitical one where there is no win-win solution and the global system would break down. if china plays by these rules, washington should give it some space.

as america's economy powers ahead, the country would do well to maintain confidence in itself and design a foreign policy based on that accurate premise rather than one that is forged on doom and despair. go to cnn.com/fareed for a link to my washington post column this week. next on "gps" the international court of justice has a ordered israel to take all measures to prevent a genocide in gaza, but will that translate into a swifter end to the war? i'll ask general mark hertling and the new yorker's robin wright when we come back.

the international court of justice on friday ordered israel to take all measures to prevent a genocide in gaza. where israel's siege has led to what it called a catastrophic humanitarian situation. it should be noted this is not a ruling confirming south africa's allegation that israel's actions in gaza constitute genocide. and the court notably stopped short of calling for a cease-fire.

the court will continue to hear south africa's arguments and israel's defense in a trial that could take years. meanwhile, cia chief bill burns is meeting with top israeli and qatari officials to try to broker a deal between israel and hamas that could lead to hostage releases and a potential cease-fire. joining me now is retired u.s. army general mark hertling who is a national security and military analyst for cnn and robin wright is a contributing writer for the new yorker and a distinguished fellow at the wilson center. mark, let me begin by asking you, israel has this international pressure to either cease or scale back its operations substantially. there's also fears of a widening war. in the midst of all of this, is israel achieving its objectives? which netanyahu keeps saying is the total destruction of hamas. you know, that's the military objective, i'm not sure what the

political objective is. i just wand to hear from you, from a military point of view, are they succeeding and can they succeed? >> indicators state that israel has disabled about 20% to 30% of the hamas network so far. the early comments about destroying hamas, destroying an ideology or what we've talked about it or what the israeli military has done is destroyed a significant portion of the terrorist network in gaza. it's fascinating because by the standpoint of time and alliances, time is not on israel's side. hamas is using time as part of their strategy, as well as using the underground tunnels, which are built underneath the civilian population to draw israel in. this is something that really puts the israeli military at a disadvantage while they do try and destroy the hamas

infrastructure. they have a long way to go. they have cleared a lot of area in northern gaza but there's still a lot that remains in the south. >> robin, that's striking to me what mark hertling is saying. they've only destroyed 20, 30 percent, and as far as i can tell, they have leveled northern gaza. they're inflicting pretty severe damage in the south now. is all this to destroy the 20% or 30% of hamas fighters, is it worth it politically? what do you make of the political fallout? or is it the price they have to pay? because at the end of the day, there's no way around this. >> well, hamas if it can survive politically will think it has won a significant battle to show israel is weak. israel on the other hand faces serious political challenges.

there's a division inside the country about its military priorities. should it try to free the hostages first and go after hamas. or should it destroy gaza with the hopes it will eventually lead to the freedom of these human beings? hamas has enormous leverage over israel in the fact that hostages are the largest issue for the israelis. it's very hard to see that hamas is going to release all of these people in some sort of temporary cease-fire. hamas will want to hold on to human beings. because for the long term, because that's the way you pressure israel to do more, to release palestinian prisoners, to allow hamas to continue to exist in gaza. >> mark, looking at this situation. as i said, there's a military objective. there are also political objectives. is there another path? people are saying it should be a much more targeted operation, go

after the leadership, or do you think at the end of the day you have to kind of -- because it does feel like it's a very costly way, if you're right and they just destroyed 20% or 30% of hamas fighters that means there's months more of very intense fighting with lots of civilian casualties to go. is that the only way? >> i think interestingly enough, fareed, a great young retired major in the army, john spencer, wrote an article recently talking about hamas is using both time and the tunnels as their strategy. but those purposely built tunnels and the knowledge that hamas has that israel will continue to use their military advantage to destroy them, and at the same time, they can't get to these underground tunnels, and so much effort has been placed in building these tunnels, that it makes it very difficult for israel to even achieve their complete military objective, much less their

strategic objective of destroying hamas without destroying part of the palestinian infrastructure throughout gaza. >> fascinating to hear because it makes you realize despite the fact that israel is so much stronger than hamas, you know, if you look at the numbers, it has capacity to dwarf hamas, it is still at a kind of disadvantage. stay with us. when we come back, i want to ask whether this war will spread. robin wright says it already has spread. i'll ask her to explain when we come back.

we are back with retired u.s. army general mark hertling and robin wright of the new yorker and the wilson center. robin, you say this gaza operation has already spread in the sense that it has involved, it has kind of intersected now with lots of different things going on in the middle east. can you explain what you mean? >> before october 7th there were ten different conflicts playing

out in the middle east on a local agenda involving diverse rivalries, different goals, different agendas. since october 7th, they have all had a kind of common thread. various conflicts have intersected. for example, before october 7th hamas and hezbollah will fighting different conflicts with israel. they shared a common strategic goal in pressuring israel or eliminating israel but they had their own local agendas. the same is true of the houthis who were fighting a civil war since 2014 which became regionalized after saudi arabia attacked yemen in 2015. only after october 7th did you see the houthis becoming an international element capable of lopsided leverage over international shipping, 30% of which goes through the red sea and the suez canal. then you have the different american components based in syria and iraq fighting the remnants of the islamic state.

suddenly you find that the kind of occasional pot shots that the iranian backed militias in both of those countries would take against american troops being -- kind of merging because of gaza, in sympathy with gaza. then you see the bigger thread that plays out through all of them now that pit the united states against iran. ironically, no one wants a bigger war. there's so much momentum. it's hard to see how the united states can contain it. even if there is a cease-fire between israel and hamas. >> that's fascinating, it does seem like there are two kind of trends that are widening the war. one is the israeli issue. all these militias and proxies feel like they want to do something in sympathy of the palestinians. but the other one is that all of them, almost all of them, are in some way supported by iran.

mark, do you think the biden administration has been doing a good job trying to prevent this from getting out of hand? >> yeah, the intent of the administration is to deter any future war. but it's very difficult, fareed. two simple things always have to be part of the consideration of warfare. time and alliances. for any country to win a war, their military must remain strong while they strengthen and keep their alliances intact. at the same time, they must continuously weaken their enemy's forces and counter their enemy's alliances. what we've seen is the alliance between israel and other countries to include the united states and western allies is declining because of what we already stated, the unfortunate humanitarian disaster in palestine. at the same time, as robin just said, the hamas alliances are growing in strength. they are bringing those alliances together of the

houthis, hezbollah, the pmf forces from iran and countries like syria and iraq. all of those things are growing in support of hamas. we're seeing one side deteriorate, the other side grow in strength. so it will be very difficult for the united states to continue to deter a growing alliance that's supporting hamas. but that is the intent. >> since i have both of you, i want to ask about another u.s. ally facing some challenges, very quickly. robin, what do you think the situation for ukraine is with regard to its alliances? keep trying to insure that the west stays resolved. how do you read the situation? is it dire? >> i think it is dire. the united states has gotten to a point where it can't provide the weaponry ukraine needs to fight off the russians. it's going to make it much more difficult for a ukraine

politically, diplomatically, and militarily to hold back vladimir putin's intention of taking more ukrainian territory. once the united states backs away, the question is can europe compensate? so far, there are indications it either can't or won't. the problem is the war in israel has complicated, has diverted attention. where are american interests in weaponry? where are they going to go? i think the two wars are kind of being conflated as well in terms of where does the united states use its energy, leverage, and armors. >> mark, you were early on very strong and prescient that the ukrainian military would do a lot better than people thought. what do you think right now, because they do seem to have the cover offensive didn't go as well as they thought. the russians in some ways have the momentum. eric schmidt has an article saying the russians are winning the drone war right now. what does it look like on the

battlefield for ukraine? >> i'll go back to my two themes of this morning, time and alliances. ukraine is continuing to hold their own right now. i watched the daily situation reports from ukraine, and they seem to be doing very well. and in most areas have gone on the operational defense, which is smart for them for this current situation. they can't attack right now. they don't have the strength. russia has learned some lessons in the last two years but they are still in my view ineffective in offensive operations and they're trying to do that. due to the russian approach to combat today, they ignore massive casualties and they will continue to bleed their army. the key is, how will alliances fit in? russia has north korea, iran, and likely china supporting them with equipment. ukraine, on the other hand, has the united states, as mitt romney said, baffling why we're not continuing to support them, because they have done such a

great job, and they are a partner in freedom and attempting to regain their sovereignty. the truth is, fareed, right now, i think ukraine is holding their own. but unless there's some relief from the u.s. congress and others to continue to provide arms and ammunition, it will be troublesome, it will be troublesome for the rest of 2024. there are some that think they can build the potential for a counterattack and more offensive operations in 2025, but that's a four-year war at that point. >> mark hertling, robin wright, really interesting conversation. thank you so much. next on "gps," a conversation with the leading tech figure of the moment, sam waldman, whose company, of course, is behind chatgpt.

artificial intelligence was the phrase on everyone's lips at davos this year. i had the opportunity to

moderate a panel with several major players in the technology field. one of the panelists was openai's ceo sam altman. his company is the creator, of course, of chatgpt which has sent shock waves through the world, that's why it was such big news last year when altman was abruptly fired as ceo then very quickly rehired. we talk about ai and that board room drama. >> i think most people are worried about two opposite things about ai. one is it's going to end humankind as we know it and the other is why can't it drive my car? where do you think realistically we are with artificial intelligence? for you, what are the things it can do most effectively and what are the things we need to

understand it cannot do? >> i think a very good sign about this new tool is even with its very limited current capability and its very deep flaws, people are finding ways to use it for great productivity gains or other gains and understand limitations. so, a system that is sometimes right, sometimes creative, often totally wrong, you don't want that to drive your car. you're happy for it to help you brainstorm what to write about or help you with code that you get to check. >> the thing that i think people worry about is the ability to trust ai. at what level can you say i'm really okay with the a.i. doing it, whether it's driving the car, writing the paper, filling out the medical form? and part of that trust, i think, always comes when you understand how it works. and one of the problems a.i. researchers have, a.i. engineers

have, is figuring out why it does what it does. you know, how the neural network operates, what weight it assigns to various things. do you think that we will get there or is it getting so inherently complicated that we are at some level just going to have to trust the black box? >> so, on the first part of your question, i think humans are pretty forgiving of other humans making mistakes but not really at all forgiving of computers making mistakes. people who say things like well, self-driving cars are already safer than human driven cars, probably has to be safer by a factor of i would guess like between 10 and 100 before people will accept it, maybe even more. i think the same thing is going to happen for other a.i. systems. i also think that what it means to verify or understand what's going on is going to be a little bit different than people think right now. i actually can't look in your brain and look at the hundred

trillion synapsises and try toness what is happening and say i really understand why he's thinking what he's thinking. you're not a black box to me, but what i can ask you to do is explain to me your reasoning. i can say, you know, you think this thing. why? you can explain, first this, then this, then this conclusion and that one and then there's this. i can decide if that sounds reasonable to me or not. i think our a.i. systems will also be able to do the same thing, they'll be able to explain to us in natural language the steps from a to b, and we can decide whether we think those are good talked earlier and one of the things you emphasized, ai could be very friendly, very benign and very empathetic, and i want to hear from you, what do you think is left for a human being to do if the ai can out analyze

a human being, can out calculate a human being, a lot of people means what we will be left for is our core, innate humanness will be our emotional intelligence, our empathy and our ability to care for other, but do you think ai could do that better than us, as well, and if so, what's the core competence of human beings? >> i think there will be a lot of things. humans really care about what other humans think. that seems very deeply wired into us so chess was one of the first, like victims, and kasparov, or whatever that was a long time ago and all of the commentators said this is the end of chess now that a computer can beat it nobody will bother to watch chess again, it's over. chess has never been more popular than it is right now and no one, almost no one watches two arc is play each other and they're very interested in what

humans do, but we're very focused on each other, and i think we will do things with better tools, and i admit, it does feel different this time. general purpose cognition seems to be what we treasure about humanity that it feels different and of course, there will be the human roles and even without that, like, when i think about my job i'm certainly a great ai researcher and my role is to, like, figure out what we're going to do. think about that and work with other people to coordinate and make it happen and i think everyone's job will look a little bit more like that and we will operate at a level of distraction. >> sam, when i look at technology my fear is often what will bad people do with this technology, but there are many people who fear this much larger issue of the technology ruling over us, right?

you've always taken a benign view of ai or a relatively benign view, but people like you and elon musk and sometimes bill gates and other very smart people who know a lot about the field are very, very worrieded. what is it -- why is it that you think they are wrong? what is it that you think they are not understanding about ai. >> i don't think they're guaranteed to be wrong and this is a technology that's clearly very powerful and we cannot say with certainty exactly what's going to happen, it could go very wrong. the technological direction that we will try to push it in is one that we think we can make safe and that includes a lot of things and we believe in iterative deployment and we put it out into the world, and people get used to it and we have time and our institutions have time to have these discussions and figure out how to regulate this and put

guardrails in place. >> can you technically put guardrails in, while you're constitution for an ai system. will that work? >> if you look at the progress from gpt3 to gpt4 about how well it can align itself to a set of values, we've made massive progress there. there's a harder question than the technical question and who gets to decide what the values are and what the defaults are and how does it work in this country versus that country and what am i allowed to do with it versus not. that's a big societal question and i believe and the world now believes that the benefit here is so tremendous that we should go do this, but i think it is on us to figure out a way to get the input from society about how to make these decisions and not only about what the values of the system are, but what the safety thresholds are and what kind of global coordination we need that it does not super negatively impact the other. so i like that people are

nervous about it. we have our own nervousness, but we believe weigh ca can manage h it and let society and the technology co-evolve and step by step with a tight feedback with the course correction and there will be the systems that deliver tremendous value while meeting the safety requirements. >> sam, you were involveded in what is perhaps the most widely publicized boardroom scandal in recent decades. what lesson did you learn from that? >> a lot of things. i'm trying to think that i can say. one thing that i sort of observed for a while is every one step we take closer to very powerful ai, everybody's character gets, like, plus ten crazy points. it's a very stressful thing, and it should be because we're trying to be responsible about very high stakes and so i think

that as -- i think one lesson is as we -- the whole world get closer to very powerful ai and i expect more strange things and having a higher level of preparation, more resilience, more time spent thinking about all of the strange ways things can go wrong, that's really important. >> the best thing i learned throughout this, by far, was about the strength of our team. like, the company will be fine without me. the team, either the people that i hired or how i mentored them they were ready to do it and that was such a satisfying thing, that was my best learning of the whole thing. >> thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. i will see you next week. to duckduckgo on all your devie

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