this is "gps," the global public square. welcome to all of you in the united states and around the world. i'm fareed zakaria. today on the program, a major shake up in the biggest war in europe since world war ii. as ukraine's president zelenskyy fires his commander in chief and installs a new one. the key question is, will it change the state of battle? i ask "the wall street journal's" chief foreign affairs correspondent, yair slof troughamove. zpst been four months since the october 7th attack and more than 100 hostages believe to remain in hamas' custody. i'll talk to the editor in chief

about the sentiment on the ground in israel as the war rages on. then, the u.s. military killed a militia commander on the streets of baghdad this week in retaliation for the three troops killed in jordan. now iraqis are again clamoring for america to get out. i ask an expert about the politics at play. but first, here's my take. i've been arguing for a long time that the democratic party needs to recognize that the crisis at the southern border is real, that it is the result of a totally broken asylum system, and that it needs to be fixed urgently. i got lots of pushback from people telling me that i was wrong and cruel and that i was buying into republican rhetoric, but this week the biden administration and senate democrats finally acted to fix the system along the lines republicans have been pushing for. only to find republicans have

now changed their minds. a new republican argument is that there's no need for any change in laws relating to asylum, that president biden can simply use executive authority to solve the problem. thus the view now articulated by donald trump, house speaker mike johnson, texas governor greg abbott, florida governor ron desantis as well as elon musk and other influential figures. this is a complete turnaround for republicans. in 2019, representative steve scalise explicitly argued, it takes congressional action. you need to change the law. that same year, donald trump also said, you have to change the loopholes. you have to change asylum. not anymore. the arch conservative oklahoma senator james langford, who was the republican negotiator of the senate bill noted in amazement. a year ago, they said, we need a change in the law. now the conversation is, just kidding, we don't need a change in the law. trump was right in 2019.

in fact, he knows it because he tried to use executive authority when he was president, but it either didn't work or was altered or blocked by courts. he was able to turn away people one secret invoked title xlii during the covid pandemic, which allows for that action during a public health emergency. biden did allow that authority to lapse, but were he to try to invoke it today, courts would almost certainly rule that there is no public health emergency right now. america still a country of laws and the president cannot misuse his authority without being checked. the conservative commentator david frum explained the situation last thursday. most people have an image of the problems that come from the 1990s and 2000s. hoards of undocumented immigrants crossing the border and evading law enforcement authorities. but that is not what is happening now. today, people come from the border and rather than running away from the law, run toward

it. many have figured out that if they apply for asylum, they are legally allowed to enter the country and go through anne adjudication process that lasts from five to seven years. during that time, they slip into the country and start working. the problem is that the laws need to change. it's not just the laws. the reality is that border authorities are totally overwhelmed with about five times as many apprehensions on the southwest border in fiscal year 2023 as there were a decade earlier. even deporting them requires people and funds. i.c.e., the agency that actually does the deportations, is so low on funds that it will start cutting back on its kactivities within a few weeks. the senate bill was a serious effort to solve many problems. it would have provided funding for a large increase in staff,

4,300 additional asylum officers and support staff and thousands of other new hires in immigration and security. it would have given them much greater authority to make quick determinations about people's status. crucially, it would have shortened the five to seven-year adjudication process to a first hearing within a target of 90 days, and a final determination in another 90 days. it would have given the government the authority to declare an emergency if the number of arrivals rose beyond certain thresholds, allowing it to turn people away. if the numbers rose to an average of 5,000 people a day over a week, that authority would have kicked in automatically. it's not perfect, the basic standard to determine whether someone qualifies for asylum is still too low. it has been raised a notch, a senior white house official told me, and conceded that the ic left resisted raising it more. house republicans could play a useful role by raising it even higher. but again, that requires changes

to asylum laws. the most obvious proof that trump realizes that this bill would give the administration powerful tools to address this crisis is that he is so dead set that it should not pass. were it to pass, it might well solve large parts of the border problem, which would not serve him politically. he wrote on social media, this bill is a great gift to the democrats. the rest of the west is facing a similar challenge, and is grappling with how to adjust immigration and asylum laws. many countries have taken significant steps. yet in america, one of its major political parties is determined to enflame the crisis rather than douse it. fiddling while the country burns, hoping that at least it can inherit the smoldering ruins. go to cnn.com/opinions for a link to my column this week. and let's get started.

on thursday, ukraine's president zelenskyy fired his top general, valory zaluzhnyi. it comes at a time as western benefactors worry about a stalemate and increasingly look towards a negotiated piece. joining me now is yaros l.a. v trofimov. his new book is a gripping account of that country's fight for survival. y y yaroslav, let me ask you about your opinion to the news that zelenskyy fired zaluzhnyi. that he fired a good general,

who repulsed the originally russian invasion, but also a very popular man, who often ranked about as high as zelenskyy in his popularity. what's going on? >> well, thank you, fareed. you know, there was tension between president zelenskyy and general zaluzhnyi for many, many months, neurosurgeon a year. and it's true that general zaluzhnyi played a pivotal role in the first month of the war. he organized this nimble, mobile defense that allowed the much smaller and weaker ukrainian army to really beat back the russians around kyiv in the first month, saving the country. but as zelenskyy said, the new approach requires new blood. people who believe in victory, and, you know, the actual nature of the disagreements between the two of them has not been clarified, but what ukrainian commanders in the field they zelenskyy was pushing to keep fighting for the city of bakhmut last year, when zaluzhnyi was proposing to pull back and save

lives. >> so is it fair to say that there is now a debate, a division in ukraine, between people who say, look, let's consolidate what we have is, let's make ourselves impregnable, and you know, if we end up 84% of the ukraine that we had in 1991, that's fine, and there are others who say, no, we have to keep fighting until we get everything, including crimea? >> i think there is no division on the strategy. also, because russia still wants it all, it's not that russia is happy with the clirnt current l control. this year is a difficult year. ukraine has suffered tremendous losses in the counteroffensive last year. there is a shortage of ammunition, of men, of material. and russia is on the offensive, taking advantage of the fact that american funding for ukraine has dried up. and so, i think there is agreement that this is a year to consolidate, to try to hold off

the russians and to preparing for a new push, maybe next year, once ukraine gets the f-16s, you know, the modern air force that it doesn't have until now and other technological advances that would allow to beat back the russia in super majority numbers. >> but isn't it fair to say that the russians are really just hoping for a trump victory in the election, a deal that they can cut with trump and that's, you know, the russians are expectin ing or hoping that tha will be the big change in dyn dynamic. >> absolutely. and if you watch russian television, that is the strategic hope that they have. that once trump comes, then the western resolve will falter and ukraine will be left to its own devices. but, you know, that's in a collapse. fu first of all, the european

countries have a much more direct state in ukraine's survival and ukraine is already seeing an increase in european military and civilian economic assistance. the european union just a few days ago passed 50 billion in aid for ukraine. and at the same time, ukrainians just don't have a choice but to keep fighting. it's hard to see what kind of deal president trump, if he's re-elected to the white house in november, could really impose on ukraine if the ukrainians are not willing to surrender >> what do you think explains the delays in weaponry that have been -- you know, that have been part of the whole story that you tell in your book so well? it seems to me that the united states, when i talk to american officia officials, they say, look, we're getting them what they need as fast as we can get it to them. there's stuff that they can't -- that they need to be trained to use. there's stuff that we don't have in supplies that we can get to them. so that's their story of what the delays -- but you've

reported this din a very detaild way and point out that it's cost ukraine a lot, these delays. what do you think the story is? why was washington -- was washington reluctant to give the military stuff fast, and if so, why? >> i think there are several reasons. one of them, of course, is since the very beginning, ukraine was underestimated. nobody believed that it could use these weapons efficiently or it would really survive. you know, ukraine was predicted to collapse in a few days, by western intelligence, as well as we the russian intelligence. but i think the biggest reason is the fear of russia's response, of russia's so-called red lines. and i think even though these nuclear threats have failed to completely deter american western assistance to ukraine, putin's nuclear brinksmanship has succeeded in throttling that assistance. so i think this sort of self-imposed, self-deterrence, if you will, self-imposed red lines were a major factor in why so many capabilities came to

ukraine too late, and things that were considered to be provocative and acceptable at western tanks, like the f-16s were only deemed to be okay a year or so later. >> yarislov, assist it's a plea have you on. it's a really excellent book and your reporting has been superb. thank you. next week on "gps," we've marked four months since the attack on israel. why the war is deeply self-destructive for israel, when we come back.

this week, israel marked four months since the october 7th attack. it's also been four months of captivity for what are believed to be more than 100 hostages and

four months of war. my next guest wrote a powerful piece for foreign affairs on the war and prime minister netanyahu's execution of it. it's called, israel's self-destruction. aluf ben is the editor in chief of the left-leaning newspaper, har-aritz. let me start by asking, where do you see the state of play right now. w you have bibi netanyahu's government pushing further into gaza, now asking for plans to enter rafah. the secretary of state is openly saying that he thinks this is a bad idea. president biden is now talking about how israel is engaging in indiscriminate bombing and how hard he's trying to get a cease-fire. why does prime minister netanyahu think that he can so openly defy american pressure? >> well, i think he looks at the american electoral calendar and

even more so, he looks inwards towards his political base. and israeli right-wing always loves a clash with the american government, especially with the democrats in power. be it bill clinton or barack obama, and now joe biden. now, i don't think that any american president in history has been so supportive of israel and gave such strong backing to israel than joe biden, but still, for political expediency, it's good for netanyahu to campaign as if he's standing up against the pressure to build a palestinian state in gaza or to bring the palestinian authority there. z and it's good for him politically. and it's good for biden politically, vis-a-vis, to show it's not the path of israel. >> and do you think that the coalition that is holding

netanyahu together, is it stable? is it entirely behind him? give us a sense of, what is the state of the israel government? >> no coalition in israel is ever stable, and this coalition has been more stable than ever, because it's unified by the right wing and the ultra-orthodox parties and netanyahu's party at the center. with the beginning of the war, be benny gantz, the centrist party, joined the cabinet without any operational portfolios, or only executive jobs, only to be part of the handling of the war. so netanyahu can play, he has one cabinet with the far-right ministers, a different war cabinet with only the centrist ministers, and his own party, so he's playing between both. his main risk is from the far-right, ditching the

coalition. if they disagree with what they might see as too far reaching cease-fire compromise with hamas, they support fighting the war to the end, and they threaten to leave the coalition if netanyahu starts. >> why do you describe in that foreign affairs essay, is israel's self-destruction. explain what you mean. >> well, the main argument in this article is that if we want to keep living peacefully and prosper, we need to come to terms with an understanding that the palestinians live with us and that we have to share the land with them in butter and to strive for much better coexistence, rather than what netanyahu tried to do was to play gaza against ramallah, to play the different parts of palestinian society gooagainst h other, to cooperating to some

extent with mahmoud amaus in the west bank, while fighting them diplomatically as well. and hamas, that is aimed as destroying israel. netanyahu allowed them, although they were under siege, allowed qatar to fund the hamas government with israeli support, with israeli and he boasted that, by doing that, he's standing up to the international pressure for palestinian statehood. so told right-wing members of the knesset, if we keep hamas in power in gaza, we can hold the palestinian authority in check and prevent a peace process that we don't like. >> but the view that israel has the got, you know, needs to make a deal with the palestinians, is today even more of a minority view than it was, right? what you're describing is -- i mean, i don't want to call you a voice in the wilderness, but this is not a popular position

in israel right now. >> no, in israel right now, even people who and parties in the past who supported the two-state solution would not say it now. would not even say that the palestinian authority should be returned to gaza, and there's a strong fear in israel, which, you know, you cannot underestimate, that any territory given to the palestinians would just be the launching pad for the next october 7th. which is the main right-wing argument. that's the worst calamity in israel's history. it's going to take very long years to understand exactly what happened. how we were taken by surprise, how the idf failed to respond in the critical first hours. how to bring back the, you know, the israeli population to the village, to the abandoned villages in the south and in the north, where they escaped fearing hezbollah.

that is still imminent. that still might happen. >> thank you for having us. >> thank you. next on "gps," anger in iraq after the u.s.' brazen strike in baghdad on a senior militia leader who u.s. officials say was responsible for the attack that killed three american troops in jordan. we'll take a close look at this situation when we return.

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this week, a u.s. drone attack struck a car in a residential neighborhood in baghdad, killing a senior leader of the iranian-backed militia. the u.s. said the targeted man was responsible for last month's attack in jordan that killed three american troops. the strike in iraq's capital

prompted angry reactions from the country, from top officials to people in the street, and the iraqi military said it is more compelled than ever to terminate the united states' mission in iraq. it may surprise you to learn, there are 2,500 american troops still stationed in that country. i wanted to bring the director of the conflict resolution and track two dialogues program at the middle east institute. rana, welcome. first, just tell us, what is the group? >> they are brigades. they were founded in 2003 by who was killed in a u.s. drone attack in january of 2020. and their objective, at the time, was to fight the u.s. forces, who were present in iraq between 2003 to 2011. their agenda is to advance and protect iranian interests in iraq, in the region. they were involved in quelling the citizen uprising against

bashar al asad in syria. they were involved in upending citizen protests in iraq in 2019, killing, you know, a lot of iraqi youth protesters, and since the war in october of, in october of last year, they have been upping the ante of their attacks on u.s. forces, claiming that they are doing in support of the palestinians. their objective of expelling from iraq pre-dates the war. >> so just so people understand, this militia also supports the shias -- the shia political parties in iraq, right? so they have -- they have close ties with the iraqi government. >> the iraqi government right now is ruled by a governing coalition, that includes people that are, you know, leaders of some of these militias. hezbollah is one of four big

paramilitary groups, shia groups, and one of these militias is in the governing coalition. but also, the iraqi governing coalitions headed by the prime minister includes other people, shia, you know, leaders of political factions, who do not necessarily share the objective of kata and hezbollah in terms of expelling u.s. forces from iraq or prompt withdrawal of u.s. forces from iraq. >> so, to explain the dynamic that you were just describing, what this militia is doing, it's attacking american troops, almost designed to bait them, to get america to attack its forces, which then places the iraqi government in an awkward position, because the united states is attacking iraqi soil, it is attacking allies of the government, and there will be

greater popular calls, and there will be calls within iraqi shiite elite circles to say, get these americans out. has the u.s. fallen for an iranian trap by responding? >> exactly. i think what, you know, what the iraq prime minister is trying to do now, he is really trying to carry a very difficult balancing act, between these hard-liners and his governing coalitions, who want the prompt withdrawal of u.s. forces, and between other members of the governing coalition, who do not want to see a hasty withdrawal, who do not want to see a ruptured u.s. iraq relationship. so what he is trying to do right now, and what the u.s. is trying to do is to get engage in a political dialogue or military dialogue between security forces, iraqi security forces, and u.s. military called higher joint military commission, to start examining how to transition, orderly transition of the mission of the u.s. forces in iraq. however, if we have more attacks

from these militias, if we have more counterattacks from the u.s., then that balancing act becomes almost unsustainable. >> and the iranian goal is to be able to say, we dislodge the united states from iraq. u.s. thought it had influence with this major arab country, and look, that arab country, iraq, is now asking, demanding that american forces leave, and the expulsion of american forces will be the kind of symbolic end of america's influence in iraq and the complete takeover of iraq by iranian forces. at least, that is the iranian goal. >> i think, i think, definitely, that's the iranian goal, but iranians also know, if you have a quick withdrawal of u.s. forces, there will be a security vacuums, and the parties that are best-positioned to occupy the security vacuum, and strengthen their footprint,

strengthen their whole on the country's security dynamics, are going to be these pro-iran militias, including hezbollah. and that's what you see, for example, major segments of the iraqi public, kurds, sunnis, but also shias, who do not want to see this quick withdrawal will happen, you know, although they see it as inevitable. but they would like to see an orderly transition, an orderly withdrawal, and a longer timetable, because they are hoping that in the interim, the iraqi security forces become more capable, more equipped, the political dynamics on the ground change in order to prevent that scenario of more pro-iran forces strengthening their hold on the country's politics. >> thank you so much. that is a very helpful guide to a very complicated situation. thanks again. >> thank you. next on "gps," as inflation comes down, the unemployment numbers look great, the economy looks strong. will all of that help joe biden? we'll ask nate cohen of the "new york times."

the stock market is high, unemployment is low, and inflation has slowed. so why do president biden's poll numbers look so bad? joining me to explain is nato cohen, chief political analyst for "the new york times." so, nate, let's start with the question, the economy is clearly better, inflation is clearly down. is this just a time lag or why is it that people don't seem to feel that when they are asked that question, do you think the economy is good? >> well wing that the biden campaign has to hope it's a time lag. it's certainly possible it's a time lag, given just how recently all of these economic story lines have come together to sort of unequivocally point towards a soft landing. it's worth remembering that just back in october, fareed, the stock market was 20% lower than it is today.

just four months ago. the federal reserve was not ready to signal that rates were going to come down next year. all of that added up to a tremendous amount of uncertainty about where the direction of the economy is going. it's really only the last 45 days or so that those questions have begun to ease. and now people are looking towards sustained lower levels of inflation, higher stock markets, lower interest rates and so on. given that, they can hope for things to get better from here, but if they don't, obviously, there are some tougher questions for joe biden about what's really holding back his ratings. >> over the last three presidencies, obama, trump, and biden, there has been a disconnect between one of the most closely connected couplings in american history. if you go back in polling, economy doing well, people feel the economy is doing well, always translated into high approval ratings for the president. ever since obama and the recovery from the '08 crisis,

that has not been true. what's happening? >> tough to say, fareed. there are two basic theories of the case. one theory is that the economy hasn't been that strong for most of the period since the end of the financial crisis. that obama's ratings were sort of appropriately low, given the tepid rate of economic growth. and that donald trump is really the only exception here. that, yes, in 2019, the economy started to get strong, but by then, you know, donald trump was sort of this uniquely polarizing figure who was probably not going to be especially popular, given his penchant to offend large sections of the electorate. then joe biden becomes president, inflation takes hold. that's theory number one. for most of the last 15 years since the financial crisis, the economy has been bad, and there isn't as much of a disconnect as it looks. theory number two is that this is about partisan polarization. that we no longer live in a country where 65% of americans will have a favorable view of the president as they did during the 19 090s, when bill clinton s the last president to ride a

sustained economic boom to broad levels of popularity. the next years will put that to the test. because joe biden is not donald trump. the country doesn't hate him. he has not offended huge swaths of the electorate. this is the kind of president that in theory ought to be able to ride broad economic prosperity to broad sport in the polls. >> do you think there are people in the middle, because for the second theory to work, you have to have people in the middle who are slowly going to gravitate toward biden because of generally better times, or is the country really divided at this point, and i would argue, divided on larger economic issues, cultural issues, identity issues. so really, people talk about indep independents, but independents basically like to call themselves independents. they like to be the left-wing independents or right-wing independents. >> there are more persuadable voters than people give credit for. for one, millions of americans are not part of deeply polarized partisan politics. they don't vote in most elections. the turnout rate in even a

midterm election is less than 50%. there's a huge chunk of people who are on the sidelines of these big cultural fights, who have the opportunity to swing one way or another. and also note that even though electorate as a whole looks really stable, we consistently have close elections, we often see a lot of movement under the surface. we've seen white working class voters in the midwest swing decisively one way. we've seen college-educated voters in the suburbs swing the other. we've seen trump make gains among latino voters and perhaps black and young voters as well. there are a lot of voters who are up for grabs in this political moment, even though the country is as partisan as it is. so i think that at least on paper, the opportunity to be broadly appealing ought to exist. >> when you look at those polls where trump is leading and he's leading in the swing states and things like that, do you view that as, you know, should democrats feel like this is a five-alarm fire or is, you know, romney was leading obama a year before and these things don't necessarily reflect what is going to happen in the voting

booth in november. >> still a long way from the election, so it's harder for it to be a true five-alarm fire. there's a lot of precedent. you alluded to some of them for the race to change over the next ten months. i have to say that on paper, the conditions for joe biden ought to be pretty good here. we've talked about the growing economy. we haven't talked very much about donald trump, who is just as unpopular as he was four years ago, and now faces a litany of criminal indictments. on paper, a president running for re-election with this kind of economy against this kind of opponent ought to lead in the polls right now. if that doesn't start to change quickly, with the economic news, then i do think that will be a lot of democrats thinking about this as something of a five-alarm fire and beginning to ask serious questions about the source of joe biden's weakness and i think joe biden's age would rank number one on that list, and that would be a huge problem for the democrats, if true. there's just not much that joe biden about that concern if that's what's holding him back. and the other possibility is almost bleaker in a sense. the possibility that the country

is so deeply divided that no democrat regardless of what they do and how they handle the office will be able to build a broad coalition in this partisan political environment that we've been talking about. and that would suggest that donald trump still has a very real chance to win this election, even though by all accounts he shouldn't. >> nate cohen, always a pleasure to talk to you. >> always great to be here, fareed. thanks. next on "gps," how do american presidents adjust to life after that exalted office. j jared cohen will join me to talk about his new book on seven men whose lives after the white house were arguably just as remarkable as their tenures inside of it.

how do you move on after holding the most powerful office in the world? donald trump, of course, seems to be shuttling between campaign events and courtrooms these days, but what about less anomalous examples? thomas jefferson founded the university of virginia. william howard taft became the

chief justice of the supreme court. herbert hoover presidency was considered a resounding failure. according to my next guest, one of the most influential post presidential term in history. joining us now, life after power, seven presidents and their search for purpose beyond the white house. jared, welcome. >> thank you. >> this is a terrific book. i've read the whole thing. and what i love about it is you're asking a question that kind of applies to everybody, which is what happens after some moment of triumph, of climax. and i'm wondering, given the size of this job, is there a common theme, which is do all of them at some level get depressed? >> so look, it's the most dramatic transition in the world going from president of the united states back down to earth. and i pick seven presidents that each found a greater sense of purpose, following a totally different model. the common threat across all of

them, each of them exuded something that was deeply principled about. while they may not have realized about it until after they were president, they doubled down on it. what they ended up doing after the white house was a reflection of something that they were disciplined and dogmatic about. >> and so what i think about it when i think of the presidency, the ones that suddenly the public seems to have been the most successful. in our memory, it's jimmy carter. why do you think that one was so successful? >> look, he's basically the father of the modern post presidency. and what he actually wanted was to never have an ending presidency. when he was voted out of office in the 1980s, after he's a million dollar in debt from his peanut farm. in 42 plus years into his post-presidency, a partner and a nuance to his successors on both sides of the aisle. >> the other person who i think

you argue had a successful presidency. and to me, at least, they would have a deep sense of mission and the sense of purpose. neither was interested in it at all on making money, which seems to be another pattern that they have. the sense of having something that will animate you seems to be very powerful? >> after he served basically every single job in the private sector except the house of representatives. he gets elected to the house because there is no public sector job. he doesn't know what his purpose is. overtime in his nine terms, he finds himself becoming the leader of at the time, an abolitionist movement and mainstreams it. he dies in 1848. again, a man appointed in his first public sector job serving for george washington dies in 1848, serving alongside a freshman congressman from illinois named abraham lincoln.

>> and he reviewed him? >> i'm convinced had he not born witness to this very fragile strange looking thing in the house, i'm convinced it may have actually delayed the sort of inspiration that ignited his political career and made him a champion. >> one of the ones that i thought was fascinating was william howard taft because in a sense, you point out this is a guy who actually never really wanted to be president. the president job is the one he always wanted. >> and so he's a great example for anybody who has always had a dream job, and they couldn't take it because the circumstances weren't right. the timing wasn't right. maybe they had an issue with their family. and all he ever wanted was to serve on the supreme court. but his brothers and mentor and friend, theodore roosevelt and his wife, nelly, wanted him to be president. so he turns down the supreme court three times. as president of the united states, he appoints a record six justices including a chief justice in single term. and there is this joke, you

know, that william howard taft's son gets asked the question, is he going to be president or is he going to serve on the supreme court. and his son basically tells the reporter that ma wants him to be president. but he's persistent, right? it shows him that the dream deferred could still be a dream that's achieved. and the last decade of life is his happiest where he finally becomes chief justice of the supreme court. at the end of his life, he says i hardly remembered that i was ever president. >> jack cohen, a real fun book. it makes us think about, you know, what happens when the lights go off and the crowd stops sharing. thank you for writing. before we go, i have something exciting to share. my new book, "age of resolutions, progress and backlash" from 1600 to the president will be published on march 26. i'm extremely proud of this book, taking me almost 10 years to complete. in it i lay out the revolutions in technology and economics and

politics and identity that are shaping the world today. and how revolutions throughout history shed light on our present moment. it's a deeply research book about changes we are living through, but it is full of great stories and lighter moments that i think you will all find very accessible. you can preorder a copy now in hard cover, e-book, or audio book read by me. there are links on my website fareed zakaria. i'll be posting on social media. please order now and tune in on sunday, march 24, when i will have a lot more to say about my book in a special segment. thanks to all of you for being a part of my program this week. i'll see you next week.