better to do of that. mm hmm. have you gotten surprising responses yet to book or responses that have been people listening to you who you thought might not be listening? um, i mean, yeah, i've heard from a i did get a note from like a i did get a note from a raging source and he said it like it. i was a bit shocked. what am a little shocked when anyone says they like it. >> well, don't think you should be shocked. thank you for writing this wonderful book and thankpo you l for coming. thank you for hosting us. >> thank you, guys. [applause] >> and you have been watching booktv every send on c-span2, watch nonfiction authors discuss their books, television for serious readers, , and watch thm all online anytime at booktv.org. you can also find us on twitter, facebook and youtube at

booktv. >> i'm robert rowland from university of kansas. what a great place to reassess ronald reagan's rhetorical legacy. and we got such great reasons to do that. i think reagan is routinely recognized as an same class for eloquence as franklin delano roosevelt, and only slightly behind abraham lincoln. that's the such ahi bad thing to will it be slightly abraham lincoln. he used his words to win two overwhelming presidential victories, and his words helped shape what is been called by many authors the age of reagan. we have four analysts today, and and a go to introduce them now and then we are simply going to go in the order that's listed here and we've agreed welcome to take no more than 15 to 60 minutes each, leaving sometime discussion at the end.ere

i know there are very distinguished scholars in the room and we will all look forward to that. the first presenter is allison prasch from the university of wisconsin. the world has its stage come reagan's foreign policy record and the implication of these, and she's talking about research done as part of her outstanding new book. randall fowler of abilene christian university is going to talk about the great communicator and the great satan, revisiting reagan's approach to iran. elizabethth spalding from the victims of communism memorial and pepperdine is going to talk about that the evil empire and sti, the more rhetoric of peace through strength, and with some depth trepidation i'm going to bat cleanup and talk about the art of reagan's soviet writer, a grand strategy for the cold war. allison.

>> thank you all very much. i had a brief title change at the last minute, so apologies that it did not let you know that. but the world is a stage, scenes from reagan's rhetorical legacy. if the cold war was the trauma impacted in various places and moments on the world stage, ronald reagan played a starring role. his was the marquee name, the actor who appeared on set at junctures in this jew political contest. and, in fact, for many years americans the 40th president of the united states spoke of the ultimate cold war europe, reagan cultivated, embodied in an embrace. a hallmark of reagan's rhetorical skill lay in his ability to make complex policies proposals and ideas come quite literally to life by using images, bodies and places to bolster his argument. aristotle once defined rhetoric as the ability to see in each particular case all the available means of persuasion.

this description positions rhetoric as a radically contingentto exercise, one that requires the order to first identify and then to address the complexities of the political and historical moments what also attending to the overlapping and often conflicting expectations of multiple audiences. no small task. but as a detail in my recent book, and other published work, some of the most important means of persuasion reagan deployed cannot just through his words but to the images, the stories, and the people and the places he gestured to rhetorically. in so doing he invited his audience to see themselves as participants in the narrativein that he recounted. and, in fact, i would go so far as to argue that this invocation of images, bodies and places is what made him t great communicator. to be sure, his language was toquent, moving, and able help members of the u.s. public see themselves as part of the national narrative he describes. but it was also physical,

tangible and material, laid in with elements, vivid pictures he displayed, the ordinary civic actors he featured and the symbolic places from which he chose to speak. this is whate made his image oa nation come to life. and so in today's talk i revisit three specific scenes in which reagan used his rhetoric to bring people and places before the eyes of his audience. although the specific episodes are i would imagine well known to many in this room, i draw on these examples not just to demonstrate how the centrality of images, bodies and places in reagan's rhetorical practice created a lasting template for all future presidents to use it also to demonstrate how future presidents after he can utilize these strategies and the come to shape, how we think about, talk about about our expectations for presidential rhetoric. seen one, visualizing the landscape of u.s. history. when reagan defeated jimmy

carter in theti 1980 presidentil election more than 8 million votes come in many cell victory as a direct rejection of carter's policies at home and abroad. paul fessler notes that when ronald reagan took office in early 1981, the united states appeared to be weekend faltering in foreign affairs the united states still reeling from defeat in vietnam, faced not only a soviet union expanding into afghanistan but also a major hostage crisis in iran. it seemed as if america's self-image as a strong, confident international superpower was fading into a distantem memory. ca in his inaugural address, pledging that as a nation took the steps to, quote ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world and be exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom. as john and robert roland have argued, reagan's first inaugural

address offered, a foundational statement of his governing and of contemporary conservative ism. by offering we the people as the antidote to big government, the heroes of this moment, reagan argued, ordinary americans who went about their lives and their livelihoods with quiet determination, a form of patriotism. but reagan also used the or location of his address to remind his audience of a shared historical narrative, one he believed would inspire a renewed sense of national identity. in so doing, he also established a new norm for presidential inaugural addresses. for the first time, the ceremonies were held on the west front of the u.s. capitol, allowing the assembled audience to look out over the national mall as new president spoke. photographer and news organizations also captured and circulated images of the scene and those watching television coverage at home were transported to the through vivid imagery and depiction. and so you're now going to see

in clip which was broadcast on c-span and what viewers at home may have seen. you're missing sound. i'm just showing you the images as i talk about it. toward the end of his speech, reagan emphasized the significance of this view, and he said, standing here one faces a magnificent vista. opening up on this city's special beauty and history, the president went on to reference sites as the washington monument, the jefferson and the lincoln memorial, and then across the potomac arlington national cemetery. reagan said that inspired by those giants on his shoulders, we stand, he asked his audience to see themselves as a living, breathing between past, present and future, a nature, a nation of individual actors who could, with their best effort and their willingness to believe in themselves and to believe in their capacity to perform great deeds that they could confront. the problems facing the nation. reagan's depiction of these people, places and moments that

comprise the nation's history was made possible by his direct references to the markers on the symbolic landscape before him. later, u.s. followed suit with, the exception of reagan's second inaugural, which was held indoors due to bitterly cold temperatures. all successive inaugurations have been held on the west front of the u.s. capitol building. several presidents, including barack obama and joseph biden, have also rhetorically gestured to the scene set before them to evoke a shared historical narrative. most recently, in january 2021, and just two weeks after the attack on, the u.s. capitol building, biden repeated point at his audience to various places on the national mall to remind his audience the sacred nature of the space. and in so doing, he also noted resiliency of the american project. like reagan, biden reminded his audience of other moments in u.s. democracy had been tested and yet endured. this was a history that was not

certain, not guaranteed. the democratic experiment was. one that required collective commitment. a respect for. and a conservation of the nation's most foundational and principles. the challenge now, biden said, was whether the nation could meet this moment and write the next great chapter in the history of the united states. and it is a challenge that remains a scene to elevating ordinary american heroes. one year and six days after his first inaugural address on january sixth, 1982. ronald reagan delivered first state of the union address. in his speech, he cast a hopeful vision for american renewal, even as he addressed the weak economy and proposed cuts to the federal budget. but what made reagan's 1982 state of the union address notable transformative even was his salute to lenny's sputnik during the final moments of his speech just two weeks earlier,

sputnik dived into the frigid waters of the potomac river to a passenger of an air florida that crashed into the 14th stre bridge during takeoff from what was then known as washington national airpo. we now know it, of course,s the ronald reagan airport. sputnik became overnight celebrity and thmea replaye heroic chant for millions of americans on the evening news, the white hoe invited sputnik and his wife linda to sit next to first lady nancy reagan in the house gallery during reagan's address and, the president concluded his speech by identifying sputnik as an example of the spirit of american heroism at its finest. even as he honored publicly, reagan also the young government employee, to represent what he called the, quote, quiet, everyday heroes, unquote, who sacrificed their time and their energy to revitalize the american spirit by pointing out sputnik to those in the house gallery and to millions of

americans watching at home. reagan helped his audience visualize what. he was describing the ideals of a modern american hero were now reflected in the person of lenny sputnik. this salute to inaugurated a new generic norm for the state of the union address. prior to 1982, presidents relied on strategies of language to deliver their report to congress. but reagan's featuring of one ordinary civic hero a new rhetorical strategy by which presidents now display individuals as evidence for their argument. beginning with reagan this now expressed expected invocation of a sputnik offers the opportunity to display both rhetorically and physically. the civic ideals they wish to laud, the national issues they deem important, and the policy proposals they wish to. these scott notes then provide a physical representation of the overall body politic living, breathing, metaphor, testifying that the state of the union is

fact strong. the presidential deployment of scott next can also provide a cautionary tale, one that can be used to galvanize members of congress and, by extension, the u.s. public. such was the case in 2018, when donald warned of the threat north korea's nuclear arsenal posed to the united states and its allies. to underscore the point, the president featured several individuals who had direct experi ence with the depraved character of the north regime, and one of them included ji sung hu, a north korean defector who escaped to south korea in 20. and so you can see in this image, the crowd is applauding and mr. sung ho is holding up his crutches because he had lost two limbs as part of his escape. and prior to h life in north korea,resident trump heralded mr. sung ho's and sacrificas, quote, a test, admit to the yearning of every human soul to live in freedom, unquote. this trump argued the same desire that had inspired early americans to declare

independence from great britain and to form the united states. and, like reagan, had first done in 1982. trump the u.s. public to recognize quote the heroes who lived not only in the past but all around us defending hope, pride and, the american way. the task, he said to his audience, was, quote, to respect them, to listen, to them, to serve them, to protect them and, to always be worthy of them unquote. and this is the task remains. scene three commemorating d-day, reagan's deployment of bodies in place continued two years later when he commemorated the 40th anniversary of d-day. in his speech at point, a hawk, reagan told the story of the mission that 225 u.s. army rangers undertook on the morning of. 6th of june 1944. their mission, he said, wasne of the most difficult and daring of the entire invasion for these u.s. army rangers were to uphe sheer and desolate cliffs behind

him. and you can see those the image on the right to take the enemy guns that could have decimated re of the allied warships ferrying troops across the english channel. throughout his 13 minute speech, reagan repeatedly referenced the 62 surviving u.s. army rangers who enacted the narrative he had described and who were seated before him. and he reminded his audience that were here together in the very place where these events unfolded. now, to be sure, the text of speech is moving eloquent, beautiful. it's a rhetorical masterpiece. but what made it stand out? an exemplar of presidential commemoration, was how reagan repeatedly pointed his audience to physical material evidence the boys of point, a hawk and, the sheer and desolate cliffs behind him to encapsulate his argument, the decision to feature these people and places was not some mere flourish. instead was a deliberate rhetorical strategy supported by reagan's white house

speechwriting team, most specifically. peggy noonan, secretary of state. short schultz and a number of white house advance staff. indeed, as materials from the reagan library here make plain. officials saw the president's featuring of the boys of point a hawk and his rhetoric in place as a central of his overall commemoration. numerous u.s. presidents followed his example. but i think it's important to note how reagan reagan's commemorative action extended well beyond the 40th anniversary of d-day and also influenced his reelection campaign. in fact, the retelling, the normandy invasion, became a central part of the 1984 convention film the producers of the convention documentary that was shown in dallas. that fall explained in one memo to the campaign that their goal was to position reagan as a narrator of a shared. they wrote that, there would be no interviewer or narrator, only the voice of the president. and i quote from their memo he is our guide. in effect, the film as the

president speaks, we begin to dissolve through and see those actual elements of which he speaking the verbal images become, visual images we see and hear those moments the president is talking about. and we begin to relive those events and experiences on film, unquote. on the final evening, the 1984 republican national convention in dallas the u.s. public encountered these striking images in an 18 minute campaign film. and what up on the screen is the of the film that uses reagan's speech at point hawke. entitled a new beginning. the striking video montage featured snippets of speeches at point of hook, including panoramic shots of the cliffs at point of hawk and endless road rows of white crosses and stars. david in the normandy american cemetery, the most poignant aspect of this section was how the campaign interspersed reagan's speeches with actual of

the men storming the beaches on june six, 1944. the video also featured close shots of the 62 boys of pointe a hawk that were present reagan's address and as the listened to reagan's narrative of allied landings landings at normandy, they watched and white footage of soldiers swimming to shore. when reagan recounted the courageous climb of the u.s. rangers 40 years earlier, the camera zoomed in on the faces of the aged veterans. this juxtaposition of text and image provided a striking tribute not just to the men who fought at normandy, but it also reinforced reagan's image as a focused, patriotic head of state dedicated to protecting us democracy at home and around the world. conclusion reagan's rhetorical legacy as these scenes make plain reagan's skill was not due to alone. the president used his spoken oratory to bring people, places and historical events literally before the eyes of the audience,

helping them to see or imagine the policies events he sought to describe. throughout his presidency, reagan relied on such imagery to make complex proposals tangible and relatable to the ordinary citizen. his vision for what the nation had been, what it was and what it could be came to life on the national mall. his hope for an active, engaged u.s. public was embodied in the person of lenny slotnick, an everyday american hero, and his enduring in the u.s. commitment to defending democracy in europe was encapsulated by physical presence of 62 u.s. army rangers, 40 years after they scaled the cliffs. pointe a hawk. but examples also demonstrate how the words and actions of u.s. presidents shape the norms of presidential public address, not just what we expect a president do or say within a particular context, but also how their speech and contributes to the nation's character, its ethos, its overarching narrative and sense self. when the president speaks,

people listen and they respond. kind. what a president says and how they say it matters. the choices of individual chief executive. a precedent for what the public can and should expect to hear from their leader. past choices dictate present expectation ones and the rhetoric of past presidents. the choices current and future chief executives make for good or for ill. as president reagan understood the significance of, these rhetorical norms and even more importantly, his sacred responsibility to protect and defend the institution, the u.s. presidency and the u.s. constitution. as we reflect on reagan's legacy, rhetorical and otherwise, we would do well to consider what the 40th president's vision of the nation and his fundamental respect for the presidency as an institution might teach us and what it might require of us in the present and in the future. thank you very much.

[applause] >> well, let me say, slightly taller, it's an honor to have you all here, especially knowing that taylor swift is performing down the road this evening. so very glad you all here. i learned that this morning at the hotel. okay. so my talk is over reagan and iran. typically when we think about reagan and the middle east oftentimes we think of lebanon, perhaps the airstrikes in libya or the iran-contra scandal. what i want to refocus us on a topic that isn'ts often discussed, and that is reagan's relationship with the islamic republic. so to begin i'll set the scene for you. see if i can get this to work. there we go. in 1979, much changed in the middle east. i'm just going to highlight three events that you may or may not be aware of.

number one, the soviet union invaded afghanistan bng their tenure occupation of the country. mber two, several islamist radicaupy the grand mosque cand they held it for two weeks until frank special forces were able to evacuate them from tmise and third, of courseou had the iranian revolution andhe hostage crisis that it resulted in. so during the 1980 campaign reagan did necessarily raise the issue but it was of course dominant in media narratives and on the evening news. in december 1977 jimmy carter very regrettably said the shop was an island of stability and one of the more troubled areas of the world, as late as august 1970 he received a cia report thatio said iran is not n a revolutionary or even prerevolutionary state. november the next year use ambassador and iran cabled back to washington the authority of the shaw has been considerably sure, his support among the

general public has become almost invisible. we need to think in thinkable at this time. and, of course, the unthinkable that occur and ronald reagan, during october 1980, made this one remark where he said i just don't why these hostages are still there. and, of course, this has been described as a germinal media event. with walter cronkite, ted koppel going on the air every single night saying it's been this many days since the hostages have been taken. it dominates the airwaves and car grievances i wish if i had seen one more reelection i would want -- this primed american public review the islamic republic and very negative way, that americans ever hostile attitudes towards iran as a result of this but it's not clear what meaning this'll t tae within reagan's larger foreign policy dramas. and he casts a vision of a two sided conflict, both globally and the middle

east, in the vehicle through which articulated that was strategic consensus. strategic consensus was primarily the catchphrase of alexander haig, who is reagan's secretary of state. and they said, we're going to go to the region, we're going to unite all of our allies there in. recognition of a common threat, the soviet union and the region. and so al haig departed on a diplomatic and he went to jordan, he went to cairo, he went to riyadh. and he went and spoke with u.s. allies across the region and said, you know, why don't we set our differences and all recognize that the soviet union is the greater threat? it did not go well. he did not. let's say success. in fact, a kuwaiti newspaper that i have the joy reading thought that it was all a plot for him to lead marines to occupy an oil field. so you have a situation where. the reagan administration retreats from strategic

consensus idea. but i think that there's three elements of this basic premise. number one, that middle east is a battlefield. number two, that that battlefield has two sideshat are ghting it out. and number three, thathe us will lead this battle in some form or fashion. and so i think these three themes continue on. so i'm going to pivot to my manuscript here, but i want to set scene for you and discuss the three acts of reagan in iran. so you might have noticed i've been talking lot about the soviet union and not as much about iran in this drama. and the reason for is because iran did not fit well within this picture painted by reagan administration. it's it's awkwardly as a noncommittal state, but still hostile to the united states. and so my claim is that treatment of iran was a tale of two terms. during the first four years of the reagan presidency, he depicted iran in criminal

language, using metaphors of misconduct to depict the revolutionary regime as a violator of international law. this picture of iran as a miscreant fit well. one on one, not as well within the overall strategic consensus campaign which read the soviet union as source of all regional disorder by second term. however, the administration had come to view iran as a major threat to u.s. oil access, and it shifted from the rhetoric of criminality to that of enemy ship drawing overt between the menace posed by iran in the soviet union. in the persian gulf. reagan borrowed from language he had used earlier describe communists to vilify regime in tehran in the picture painted by reagan's rhetoric. iran sought to impose its tyrannical rule as a would be hegemon, cutting off the needed oil supplies to the united states and its allies. this found purchase and press coverage, which malign the revolutionary islamic republic. and in the process, these outlets also circulated. this equivalence between iran

and the soviet union and persian gulf security and us access to the oil in the region. so act one as neither a u.s. nor a communist state. tehran did not feature prominently in the administration's early efforts to rally regional allies against the soviet union. instead reagan described the country as a criminal, said iran should have a government quote that would abide by international unquote if it wished for better relations. the united states. when asked if would permit u.s. oil companies to return to operate there eventually, he questioned whether iran could even enforce its own laws. reagan highlighted delinquency again when hostages returned, saying that it should be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution, unquote. in a statement honoring, the freed hostages he contrasted dignity, determination and quiet courage with the abuse of their captors. implying that heroism was quote, something the iranians not

understand. to reinforce this characterization, reagan commonly accused iran of acts of terrorism. he did that during 1980 campaign. weeks into presidency, he thanked margaret thatcher for british to bring the american prisoners home from iran. and in the next breath he said together, we will work to continue to confront the scourge of international terrorism. indeed, reagan invoked the threat of international terrorism rather often in relation to iran. in a 1982 address, he called for a political settlement in the iran-iraq conflict and then immediately exhorted here is to continue the fight against international terrorism. other times, reagan referenced the threat international terrorism presents to the free world and the dire peril that terrorism and intimidation in the gulf posed. this was he continually characterized the persian gulf as a perilous region. these references worked to isolate tehran, both in terms of coverage and the treatment of the administration but also on the world stage. brian mccann writes that criminal criminality is not a static state, meaning but highly

contingent rhetorics of law and order inscribe markers of fear. those markers, in turn, work to justify criminals, surveillance and confinement by invoking fears associated with khamenei's regime, terrorism and the hostage crisis. reagan's utterances rationalized a policy of isolation, portraying it as a rogue, felonious state policing, not military confrontation. was the logic of the rhetoric of criminality. and of course, since khomeini hardly a communist. this rhetorical formula a way out of the strategic consensus. reagan didn't need say that iran was on the side of the soviet union, merely that it was an outlaw state. in an early outworking of the rogue state idea so that it was ruled by fanatical theocracy that was beyond the normal rules of the cold war and. so he continually summoned, like being a sheriff, a cop. so the united should treat iran like did all squalid criminals and lawbreakers.

he said, we're going to bring the full weight of the law them. ultimately this worked to subordinate iran to the soviet union as the primary threat that reagan identified in the persian. and i'll skip all the examples i have of u.s. media coverage. we do not have time for that. all right. act two, enemy ship. this assessment of iran began to change near the end of reagan's first term as the administration started to modify its internal its internal evaluation of the gulf in may 1984, in a c report reveals this shift in thinking titled politically sensitive approach to enhanced military cooperation with the key gulf arabs. the paper first reiterated the administration's elusive goal of organizing a truly multilateral effort to defend western to the gulf. it's an enumerated the various threats to western access to the gulf. and it said, although the continuing soviet occupation of afghanistan a constant reminder of the larger menace, it said the stalemate in attrition,

warfare in afghanistan had made that less immediate, less poignant. consequently the paper argued a new danger had started to be on par with the soviet union. iran and its particular brand of islamic fundamentalism has become the most immediate threat to the moderate. the nsc report said by formally arguing that iran a more direct security threat to the american allies in the gulf and the soviet union. this report captured a broader shift from a strict fixation on and reagan had long course called the revolutionary regime a danger and he characterized as this lawless, malevolent actor on the world. he had denounced the barbaric persecution of the baha'i in iran. he regularly said that tehran, quote, a place where international and common decency were mocked. so while it was common for him to use these in his public utterances, at no time prior to this that i was able to find in the archives did the or the nsc say that tehran was as dangerous

as moscow in the persian gulf. this, in the administration's thinking, shown most clearly in weinberger's june 1987 report to congress on gulf security. the 28 page document was intended address legislative fears that reagan had made an open ended, unilateral american commitment to all non belligerents shipping in persian gulf. this is during the iran-iraq war. the us started escorting oil tankers through the gulf and clearing mines as a way to make sure that oil access continued and was not hampered by the war. ultimately, what this report the free world was heavily dependent on oil, which meant it was our vital national for our vital interests are at stake in the and this meant that the of iranian hegemony over the gulf presented an equal hazard the soviet union. when it came to the free flow of oil. and so this report marked an like haig weinberger distilled an image of the gulf as under

terrific from an imperialistic aspirant regional dominance. unlike haig, weinberger identified iran, not the soviet union, as this dangerous foe. this portrayal of iran as an equal, if not greater threat than the soviet thus grew out of the original image put forth by the reagan administration of, a two sided conflict with an imperialistic power seeking to gain advantage over the region. the body of the report went into more detail. it said since the gulf is a region vital economic importance, we have strategic interest in ensuring that it does not come under dominion or hegemony. a power hostile to the united. and so this is an echo of the carter doctrine, but it takes a step further by identifying iran not the soviet union as the country at threat. and so the magnitude of this development can be in how the report described gulf domination by moscow or tehran as equally either, quote, soviet or iranian hegemony. the gulf, in, quote, it stated, would represent a serious

strategic setback. and so for the first time since the beginning of the cold war, since all the way back to truman, u.s. defense planners talked about a country than the soviet union as a power might be able to dominate the gulf and its oil. and so on a rhetorical level, this was marked by a shift to enemy under an enemy ship framework. rhetoricians make an active and ongoing construction an enemy who must be vanquished. jeremy engels observes in his book enemy rulers can bolster their authority, manufacture consent in such a way to provide rhetorical cover for leaders to prosecute aggressive policies against those identified as enemies the nation. that was certainly the case in this instance. once we get to intervene. can we have the united states taking active steps to, confront iran militarily and to, as reagan said, let me find my quote. reagan promised to find ways to end this scourge once for all. so i'll skip through my other

quotes that reagan had and we'll get to intervention by show of hands as heard of operation praying mantis. okay, we have a couple hands. all right. this move to describe iran as an enemy. took place in the midst of hostile engagements between two countries. these clashes built on earlier actions taken by the administration in the iran-iraq after become to share after it had begun to share geospatial intelligence. iraq in 1982, for example. the administration launched operation staunch, which was a global effort to halt conventional weapons to iran in 1984. u.s. ships started escorting oil tankers through the gulf from 84 to 86. iranian and mines damaged 67 oil tankers, which significantly global gas prices and maritime insurance rates. and so reagan reacted, ordering the u.s. navy to conduct more minesweeper escort missions, reflecting operations and retaliatory strikes, which culminated on april 18th, 1988, when u.s. warships sank over half of iran's navy in operation praying mantis.

days later, reagan followed up this action by commanding the navy to use military force, defend neutral ships from iran. and then, of course on july 3rd, the trigger happy quote, uss vinson's shut down iran air six, five, five. a civilian plane carrying 300 passengers. reagan attributed this tragic incident to the ongoing war, which he blamed iran for continuing. and so operation praying mantis still ranks as the largest u.s. naval battle since world war two. portrayal of iran as an enemy, therefore not simply a matter of words. his function to legitimate actual military against khamenei's regime. in this regard, reagan's characterization of iran as an enemy that demanded active intervention to stop and as a danger to gulf security. and u.s. allies there prompted a pivotal step towards the united states not only articulating a responsibility to protect the gulf, but also asserting a military of intervention to

exercise duty as it saw fit. iran contra doesn't fit nicely in this story when, of course. the united states was caught selling weapons to iran. but i would argue, and i'll end with this, that iran-contra operates as evidence for the thesis that iran underwent a under reagan's presidency after the 79 revolution. it was unclear what iran's relationship to the united states be, especially coming from a president focused so much on the rhetoric of cold on the soviet union, the overarching threat by the end of his presidency of these top boy, he had applied to communist countries that they were aggressive, imperialistic that they sought to dominate their. neighbors have been transferred to iran. the fact the iran-contra scandal happened and it generated such outrage is a testimony to how much this vision was accepted by the american people.

and so i think to conclude my talk. i would say that observers who saw iran-contra at the time were left with one of two conclusions. either reagan administration had lied about iran being an enemy or it had dealt weapons to a nation. it described as a threat to the flow of gulf oil and, by extension, u.s. national security. that reagan chose to admit a lapse in judgment rather than argue that iran was not quite so bad, is instructive, for it shows how salient the image iran as an american enemy was in the eyes of the administration and perhaps the public. by the time the iran-iraq war had ended, the u.s. navy had shot down two civili by the time the iran-iraq war had ended, the u.s. navy and shot at the sibling pawlenty, disabled or platforms come to for the bulk of iran's navy and, of course, had cleared thousands and thousands of minds. these actions barked a stark contrast from the administration early day of proclaiming the soviet union lurked behind all the middle eastt bills, where hs reagan started arguing the

persian gulf was partly the wider coldd war. by 1988 his team was making the conditions unique to the gulf most of all the threat iran allegedly posed to the free flow of oil mandated military operations be undertaken for reasons disconnected from the larger cold war. ironically reagan fulfilled the carter doctrine splayed the trend would prevent a hostile power from seizing control of the gulf not by targeting the soviet union but by authorizing air and naval strikes against the nation's former gulf ally. [applause] >> thank you to the reagan library and to the ronald reagan presidential foundation in institute, and all the other partners including one on the philly with, pepperdine university school of public policy. it is stating we meet to discuss and analyze all things reagan especially during the ongoing

40th anniversaries of his presidency. i am one of the participants here focus on the meaning and significance of president ronald reagan'sag key speeches and how they help us understand his strategic and moral thinking. my questions, how did reagan get the 1983, especially march 1983? what made reagan reagan? and what did he you bring toe white house with him? what was the end of this cold war strategy of peace through strength, expressed in pursuit of president especially in two central speeches at a moment reagan both saw and helped to make. did he stay the course so to speak? what, if anything, can we learn from the strategy for today and some of these questions obviously will have to be saved for discussion here and help throughout the conference. in in a year that was in retrot i key inflection point in the cold war, march 1983 1983 a

critical month for reagan. the strategic defense initiative, sdi, is often dismissed as technologically unfeasible, or it is presented as either an aspirational idiosyncratic element of reagan's defense buildup or as a bargaining chip that he stubbornly refuse to use in later cold war summitry. such interpretations devalue and ignore reagan's own thinking that informs his visionary project.t. this thinking is best understood especially in the proximate setting by examining reagan's announcementme of sdi in his mad national security in combination with his more famous statement just over two weeks earlier. in the profound long-term context this thinking is best understood by examining how reagan got to march 1983. the evil empire speech of march 8 distills a lifetime of reflection on human nature,,

theology, politics and freedom. as the eye should be seen as a practical manifestation o of reagan's political, strategic, moral and religious understanding of the cold war which he describes in the evil empire speech as part of the struggle between right and wrong, and good and evil. and the time here i would like to briefly go through these four areas, political, strategic, moral and religious come to understand how reagan got to march 1983 and how we understood what he was saying and doing. political, reagan placed the cold war and the necessities requirements and contingencies and codes by the central conflictct of his time in his framework for politics overall. justice was central as was freedom, a good in and of itself and the necessity to the exercise of justice. he wanted to be a man of peace, not war, instead this privately

and publicly. and i've seen in my week of research, my days of research are many examples of this. so it's good at something confirmed when you come to the archives, right? for reagan peace followed from justice and freedom and should be defined by those with a similar outlook. this is a key reason that a recovering reagan theme concerns the importance of and need for the unity of the west against soviet totalitarian communism. the principles inspiring a government mattered to him as did its structuring institutions and attitude toward the individual, family and community. raking viewed etiology a single fixed worldview that carried within a revolutionary plan to transform man, state and society as a perversion of politics. in the 20th century ideology brought forth totalitarianism in two species, communism and nazism. from the 1940s on reagan spoke

against totalitarianism and often interchanged use of totalitarian and communist when referring to the soviet union. in general, raking to totalitarianism as a vehicle with its rotten core rate up of radical ideology and an illegitimate regime. for reagan, as for other students of totalitarianism, the ideology and the lies upon which it is based informs the-ism. strategic, reaganle typically operated at the level of printable looking at the cold war at its highest level does not his goal to go to war but there was always the risk of hot war. reagan saw the cold war as a real conflict. he didve not believe in their stability or a a long piece between what he viewed as two worlds at complete odds. he thought détente was not only

politically and morally mistaken but also strategically incorrect because it enabled soviet repression and aggression, and extended the cold war. in this sense the u.s. defense buildup and economic and technological strangulation of the ussr were tools, not ends. so we're diplomacy and dialogue. in the correct circumstances reagan could and would use various tools at the level of strategy he spoke of a forward strategy for freedom to achieve peace through strength. to help eliminate mistakes of the cold war reagan quoted lannon. example, it is inconceivable that the soviet republic should continue to exist for a long time side-by-side with imperialistic states. ultimately, one for the other must conquer. and i found yesterday in files are at the that reagan knew a variation on this phrasing from linen at least as early as 1962.

reagan decided brezhnev about the correlation of forces being unkind on time to some site and the understood that linen said the same and the communists did not define coexistence as détente did. for reagan at the level of grand strategy, the cold war cannot be wished away. idealism, or made into a keen balance of power politics,, realism. as early as 1961 reagan stated that can only be one end to the war we're in. it won't go away if we simply try to outweigh it. wars and in victory or defeat. this is the strategic context in which to place reagan's famous we when they lose through peace through strength. moral, as if they can lenin serves as a strategic thinker, reagan to the american and soviet regime seriously. the united states form of government was built on natural and god-given rights, the consent of the governed, the rule of law, and limited

government. rights were secured not created by this republican form of government reagan said all this for decades. in opposition the soviet union system required the abolition of individual rights, the false promise and subsequent negation of collective rights, , lack of consent and the repression of dissent, tyranny and unlimited state and party. when reagan referred in the 1975 radio commentary to a disease like communism, he offered a regime judgment. and due to this understanding of the regime reagan distinguished betweenil legitimate and illegitimate governments. the soviet union, although a superpower and world affairs by dint of its military natural resources, was in reagan's of you and illegitimate regime. if they could go it should go. this is the moral context in which to put reagan's we when they lose through peace through

strength. for reagan the ussr was not only illegitimate with respect to its government and its treatment of the peoples within his legally recognized borders, but it was also an illegitimate empire with respect to the peoples and nations enslaved and threatened outside is legally recognized borders. for him no moral equivalence could or should be made between the opposing regimes in the cold war. religious, reagan's deepest well inspiration, his religious faith, is intertwined with the political, strategic and moral. how did you look at god and the human condition? at grace and flaws, at problems ultimately conquered by faith, hope and love? in researching here this week ai asked archivists if there arere more letters to become like the one karendi discovered five or o years go from reagan to his dying father law. of thehe theological virtues, reagan was a man of hope with faith and love turkey believe in

the triumph of good, not passively, not holistically. with men and in practice americans and others of goodwill doing their part in gods divine plan. part of thehe reason the cold wr was winnable for reagan was that the total turnout including it's a soviet communist species was evil. this meant it should not and ultimately could not stand forever your communism aimed to overturn what god had made, all of creation including the highest part of his creation human beings. for reagan, it mattered that man was made inke image and likeness of god. as a result, human beings were not to be reduced to a matter as in marxism. god was undefeated so power could be used for good purposes, although reagan deeply agree with lord acton of absolute power in the hands of human beings corrupts absolutely. for reagan, there was goodness

propelling the exercise of power in peace through strength because he believed that freedom was morally right and communism was wrong. those to dismiss sdi as star wars did not nothing reagane of either possessing expressing a spiritual anthropology. reagan presidency scholarships a strain runs a disturbing the antinuclear reagan rather than seeing that reagan never liked war or nuclear destruction. he was a committed cold warrior so that there would be no world war iii or nuclear destruction. he held these points of principles simultaneously. yet, critics regard to reagan as a warmonger. and dive instructor at theli library this week at how dominant this criticism of reagan was att the time. it's all over the place in the files. and sometimes these are the same commentators who see a reagan one and reagan two rather than analyzing reagan as a whole person who wassa president prettily applied the same fundamental principles in the

best of circumstances he faced. and seeing that the subsequent actions of america and of the states winning to his assessment and that he was capable of looking at short, middle and long ranges. he was able to keep his end in mind. so the big question then, what was that end? in the peacemaker, wilson bowden analyzes reagan's pursuit of success in bringing the soviet union to a negotiated surrender. he responds to and builds on melvin questionwh about whether reagan aim to win or to end the cold war. although the two historians reached different answers. reagan was influenced by fdr's insistence on unconditional surrender in world war ii. but knew that a similar demand against the ussr would have been delusional and foolhardy in the case of the cold war. instead, reagan combined pressure with diplomacy working

against the soviet system while working with soviet leaders in seeking to bring the kremlin to negotiate surrender. this is very helpful in examining reagan's peace through strength strategy. by looking at what made reagan reagan, by following him on his intellectual, political, practical, exponential road to the white house it seems reagan always thought the cold war could be one. he committed to and brought this perspective with him to the white house. what did we when they lose me? admit the false and negative about the ussr, ideology, illegitimate regime, riding and corrupt states, and the true and positive about america and the west, as well as about those brave individuals and growing movements and communities wanting and struggling to be free behind and from the iron curtain. bringing all he had seen, learned, read andai written and said since a 1940 about

totalitarianism and communism into thehe 1980s, reagan identified the current factors undermining the ussr and helped to create the conditions for the soviet ideological surrender. and this is the context in which he placed surrender negotiated and strategic by the ussr. reagan wanted to free those held captive by ideological despotism. for reagan, if the truth prevailed then the like is to be kicked out from under the lies of the totalitarian ideology. as president reagan call for an pursuit the ideological surrender by then. soviet unionn his grand strategy of peace through strength. the evil empire and sdi speeches constitute a culmination of decades of thinking in which reagan aimed to change the terms of debate and break the status quo. he believed a victory at the level of ideology would morally disarm the enemy.

political rhetoric, economic recovery and prosperity, armed diplomacy, allied relationships and well conceived insistent pressure on the communist totalitarian core were all essential tools to have strategic end. and in the midst of securing ideological victory, , toward te end of his presidency reagan extended magnanimity in victory. thank you. [applause] >> in talking about the art of reagan's soviet rhetoric and policies, i'm bored and got a much larger project. i've written about all reagan's major soviet speeches that i also wrote a book about reagan's great speech at westminster. i have written with my friend, harvested and calling john jones in much of that work. students sometimes say to me

soviet policy that seems so dated. with putin's invasion of ukraine and chinese efforts to express power in east asia it doesn't seem very dated to me. there are three theories that are presented about the influence of reagan. in his cold war policies and rhetoric. there is a triumphalist theory that sibley says reagan won the cold war and force the soviet union to collapse. commentator charles krauthammer praise reagan's policies because it involved real army's supported by the united states that made them the soviets spend blood and treasure instance of this outpost and it to a radical reconsideration of moscow. i think this interpretation is quite simplistic. because it minimizes or ignores reagan's consistent advocacy for and regions, consistent commitment to nuclear

abolition. you also have to understand the reagan of course forced the soviets to do nothing. the soviets made decisions to do nothing in part based on policies that reagan implemented that impose costs on them. a second view which is been labeled the reagan reversal view very distinguished scholar has developed this view. and she argues, for example, the reagan administration pursued a hard-line policy only during its first three years in office. by january 1984 reagan was ardently pursuing rapprochement with moscow. his very sophisticate analysis of the gender 16, 1984, the great, great speech. there's a third view i develop in these essays and i'm hoping to develop any book that i sometimess have called reagan's rhetorical theory of the cold war.t and that view is i not so much a

reputation of the reagan reversal, as a reinterpretation of some the data. arguing that reagan relied consistently on four primary strategies, that these strategies evolved in part in response the rhetorical situation he faced. for example, the evil empire speech in part was aimed at undercutting the nuclear freeze by cementing support from evangelicals, that played a crucial tactical role. and these strategies also evolved creating new conditions, and that that allowed for the change in tone that is so in the january 16, 1984 speech. and it .2 just as a starting point that reagan continued on occasion very tough talk with the soviets. it's well known, for example, that he used humor in ways that infuriated gorbachev.

and, of course, the brandenburg gate speech in a way is the most dramatic moment when reagan challenges the soviets saying that they could prove that glass those and perestroika was real by opening this gate and tearing down this wall. and by the way, defense spending did not begin to decrease in 1984. it peaked in 1987. so i'm going to argue that there are four dimensions in what was fundamentally a rhetorical theory. now, why do i say it's fundamentally rhetorical? obviously reagan used major speeches and we know from any number of sources that reagan believed he could win the argument not only with the west but that he could actually convince theth soviet leaders of the superiority of democratic ideals. he was an idealist. john lewis gaddis have written

about that, the reagan sought to break the stalemate of the cold war with the potency of ideas. but there's another way that the strategy was fundamentally speeded we will eat its american history tv program now and take you live to u.s. senate for what is expected to be a brief session. live coverage of the senate here on c-span2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the parliamentarian will read a communication to the senate. the parliamentarian: washington, d.c., december 26, 2023. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable brian schatz, a senator from the state