endeavor to capture in her novels.

i am robin rowland from the university of kansas and what a great place to assess and we have had such great reasons to that. i think reagan is routinely recognized as a class for eloquence in the same class as franklin delano roosevelt and slightly behind abrahamab linco. he used his words to when to

overwhelming presidential victories in his words helped shape what has been called by many authors the age of reagan. we have four panelists today and i'm going to introduce them now and then we are simply going to go in the order that's listed. we have agreed that we are going to take no more than 15 to 60 minutes each leaving time for discussion at the end. i know they are very distinguished scholars in the room and we all look forward to that. the first presenter is allison prasch from the university of wisconsin. reagan's foreign policies rider ken invocation of peace and she estalks about research done as part of her outstandingut new book. someone will talk about the great come and cater revisiting reagan's approach.

elizabeth spalding from a communism memorial foundation andfo pepperdine is going to tak about the evil empire in the fbi and thed moral rhetoric and wih some trepidation going to bat cleanup and talk about the arco reagan's soviet rhetoric a grand strategy. >> think you'll very much. i had a brief title change at the last minute. sorry i didn't quite know that but the world is a stage scenes from reagan's pretoria legacy but the cold war with the drama enacted in various places and moments on the world stage that ronald reagan played a starring role. his was the actor who appeared on this -- for many u.s.

americans the president spoke as he ultimate cold warrior and something he embodied and praise for the hallmark of reagan's a stargels or scale where lay in s ability to make complex proposals and ideas come quite literally to life byby using images bodies and places to bolster his argument. aristotle wants to find rhetoric is the ability to see into each particular case all the available means of persuasion. this description position frederick is aet radically at yr site is one that requires the order to identify and track the complexities of political and historical moment while also attending to the overlapping and often conflicting expectations of multiple audiences. no small task but as i detail my recent book and other published work some of the most important means of persuasion reagan deployed came not just for his

words but their images, stories and the people and the places rhetorically. so doing he invited his audience to see themselves as participants in the narrative. in fact i would argue that his invocation of images was what made him the greatommunicator had to be sure his language was eloquent and able to help members the u.s. public see themselves as part of the national narrative he describes. it was also physical tangible and material. laden with elements the vivid pictures he displayed the ordinary actors he featured in the symbolic places for rich he chose to seek this is what made the image of the nation come to life. in today's topic i look at tracing to which reagan brings people and places into the eyes of his audience about those the specific episodes are i would

imagine well-known to many in this room i draw on these examples not just to demonstrate how the centrality of images bodies and places created a lasting of all future presence but also to demonstrate that future presence after reagan utilize the strategies that shaped how we think about talk about in our expectations for presidential rhetoric. seen one visualizing the landscape. when reagan defeated jimmy carterer in 1985 in the election by more than 8 million votes many sour reagan's victory is a direct rejection of carter's policies at home and abroad. paul kessler notes when ronald reagan took office in the early 1981 kbytes data. to be in foreign affairs. the united states was still reeling from the defeat in vietnam faced not only the soviet union expanding but the major hostage crisis in iran.

it seemed as if america self-image as a strong competent international superpower was fading as a distant memory. reagan addressed this perception of the weekend america in his no-knock girl addressed pledging that the nationn to the steps to renew ourselves here in our own land we would be seen as having greater strength throughout the world and be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom. as they argued reagan's inaugural address offered a foundational statement of the governing philosophy by offering we the people as the antidote to government. the heroes of this moment were reagan argued ordinary americans who went about their lives and their livelihoods byve determination of sworn patriotism. reagan also used the location of his address tremendous audience of the shared historical

narrative, when he believed would inspire national identity. in so doing he also established a new norm for presidential inaugural addresses. forfo the first time the ceremoniesce were held on the wt lawn aligned the audience to overlook the national mall. photographers inza his annotatis captured and circulated images at the scene and those watching television coverage of home were transported to the site through vivid imagery and depiction in this clip was broadcast on c-span and idea of what viewers on c-span would have seen. toward the end of his speech reagan amplified the significance and he said standing here when faces a magnificent city's special beauty and history. the president went on to reference sites such as the washington monument the jefferson memorial and the

lincoln memorial and across the potomac arlington national cemetery.ag reagan said inspired by the giants unto shoulders we stand he asked the audience to see themselves as the living breathing link between past present future indignation of individual actors who could in their best effort and their willingness to believe in their capacity that they could confront the problems facing the nation.' reagan's depiction of these people places and moments that comprise the nation's history was made possible by as direct references to the markers before him. later u.s. president followed suit with exception of reagan's second inaugural all successive integrations have been held at the u.s. capital building. several presence including barack obama and joe biden have

gestured to the scenes evoke a shareded narrative. as recently in january of 2021 in the two weeks after the attack on the u.s. capital building bike repeatedly pointed his audience on the national mall to remind the audience of the sacred nature and in so doing he noted the resiliency of the american project tree like reagan biden reminded his audience of other moments in which the u.s. democracy have been tested and yet endured. this was a history that was uncertain and not guarantee that the democratic as permanent was one of the commitment to respect or end the confirmation of the nations most foundational ideals. the challenge now was whether the nation can meet this moment and ride the next great chapter in the history of united states and it's a challenge that remains. scene two elevating ordinary

american heroes. one year in six days after his first inaugural address on january 26, 1982 ronald reagan discovered his first state of the union address. inre his speech he showed a visn for american renewal and proposed deep cuts in the federal budget. what made reagan's 1982 state of the union union address notable and transformative even with the salute during the final moments of his speech. two weeks earlier sputnik dived into the frigid waters of the potomac river of an air florida ple that crashed into the 14 straight ridgeuring takeoff from what was known as washington nationa airport that becameme known as the ronald ag airport. he became a celebrity in the media -- the white house invited spniand his wife in the

house gallery during reagan's address of the president concluded his speech by identifying sputnik is an example of the experience of american heroism. even as he honored sputnik post publicly reagan used a government employee to represent what he called the quote countless every day heros and quote. he sacrificed their time and energy to idolize the american spirit. by pointing out sputnik to those assembled in the gallery millions of americans watching how reagan helped his audience visualize the ideals of the modern american hero reflected the lenny sputnik. this pursuit to sputnik or did they stay the union address. prior to that presence relied on language to deliver the congress. reagan featured a hero introducing a new strategy by

which president displayed individuals as evidence of their argument. beginning with reagan this was expected invocation of the sputnik offered presents the opportunity to displayid rhetorically and physically pacific ideals they wished the national issues they deemed important in the policies they wished to advance. sputnik provided a physical representation a living breathing metaphor testifying that the state of the union is in fact strong. the presence of the sputnik provided a cautionary tale one that can be used to galvanize members of congress and by extension the u.s. public. such is the case in 22 when donald trump warned of the threat of north korea's nuclear arsenal posed to u.s. intelligence. the presentvi features several individuals had direct experience to the crave

behaviors and one included a north defector who escaped from south green 2006 you can see h image the crowd is applauding and is holding up his crutches because he hadmb lost two limbsn northorea. he heralded the bravery and sacrifice is a testament to the yearning of every human soul for freedom. this was he argued the same desire that inspired early americans to declare independence in the united states and like reagan had first done in 1982 trump called the u.s. public to recognize quote the heroesho who lived not onlyn the past. around us defending hope in the american way and the task for the audience quote was to respect them and to listen to them to serve them to protect them and into always be worthy of them end quote.

this is what remains. commemorating d-day. reagan's deployment of -- continued tears later with the 40th anniversary. in a speech reagan told the story of the air emissions at 5 u.s. army rangers undertook on the morning of the sixth of june, 1947. their mission he said was one of the most difficult and daring. r these u.s. army rangers the sheer and desolate place behind him and you can see those to take out the enemy guns that could decimate troops across the english channel. throughout his 30 minute speech reagan reference the 62 surviving u.s. army rangers who enacted the narrative he described and they were seated before many right it is obvious that they were here together in

every place where these events unfolded. the text of the speech is moving eloquently andie beautiful and it's a rhetorical masterpiece but what made it stand out as an exemplar of presidential -- which reagan pointed his audience to physical material evidence and the sheer and desolate t picture behind him to encapsulate his argument that the decision to feature these people and places was not a rhetorical flourish. instead it was the deliberate rhetorical strategies supported by reagan's speech team most specifically peggy noonan secretary of state george shultz and the number of white house staff. indeed as materials fromry the reagan library make plain officials sought the presence rhetoric in point as a central part of his overall preparation. numerous u.s. presence has followed his example but it's important to know how reagan's

commemorative action extended well beyond d-day and influenced his re-election campaign. in fact been normandy invasion became central park of the 1984 convention film for the producers of the convention documentary shot i in dallas tht paul explained in a memo to the campaign that their goal is to position reagan as the narrator of a shared history, they wrote that there would t be no barrier only the voice of the president. i quote in the memo he's our guy. is the president speaks we begin to see his elements of which he speaking for the verbal images become visual images and we see and hear what the president is talking about when we begin to relive those events and experience it oneself unquote for the final evening of 1984 republican national convention in dallas u.s. public encounter these striking images in an 18

minute campaign film and what is on the screen is a portion of the film that uses reagan's speech at the top. entitled the new beginnings the striking video montage featured snippets of reagan's speeches including speaking at the cliff and endless rows of crosses and stars of david in the normandy cemetery for the most poignant aspect of this section withoutut the campaign reagan speeches with actual footage of the men storming on june 6, the video featured close shots of the 62 draft and is audience listen to reagan's narrative that allies landing at normandy they watched black and white footage of soldiers coming to shore. when reagan recounted the courageous claim that the u.s. army major 40 years earlier the camera zoomed in on assessments.

.. eagan's image as a focused, patriotic head of state dedicated to protecting us democracy at home and around the world. conclusion reagan's rhetorical legacy as these scenes make plain reagan's skill was not due to alone. the president used his spoken oratory the president quick currently uses for this oratory to bring historical events literally for that as the audience. hoping to see or imagine the policies and events he sought to describe. throughout his presidency reagan right on the industry to make complex policy proposals tangible and relatable to the ordinary citizen. his vision for what the nation had been, what it was and what it could be came to life on the national mall. his hope for an active, engaged u.s. public with embodied in a person of. everyday american heroes.

his enduringen belief committedo democracy in europe was encapsulated by the presence of 62 u.s. army rangers 40 years after they scaled the cliffs. these examples also demonstrate words and actions shape the norms of presidential public address. not just in a particular context but also how their speech contributes to the nation's character, its overarching narrative and sense of self. when the president speaks people listen and they respond in kind. when the president said the choices of individual chief executives set a precedent where they expect to hear from their leader. the rhetoricsi of past presidens shapes the choices current and future chief executives make for good or for ill.

as president reagan understood the significance of these rhetorical norms on the u.s. presidency and the u.s. constitution. we reflect on legacy rhetorical and otherwise the vision of the nation's fundamental respect for the presidency as an institution. what it might require of us in the present and future? thank you very much. [applause]' >> well, let me say, slightly taller, it is an honor to have you all here. especially knowing taylor swift is performing down the road this evening. very glad you are all here. i learned that this morning at the hotel. i talk is over reagan and iran. typically more think about

reagan and the middle east often times we think of lebanon, perhaps the airstrikes in libya or the iran-contra scandal. i want to refocus us on a topic that is not often discussed and that's with the islamic republic. so to begin i will set the scene e for you. if i could get this to work. 1979 much planed in the middle east. i'm going to highlight threeen eventser in the invaded anistan getting their occupation of the country number two several islamis they held for two weeks until french special forces him to evacuate them. and third the revolution in the hostage crisis that it resulted in. during the 1980 campaign reagan did not necessarily raise the

issue it was of course a dominant and immediate narratives and on the evening news. in december 1977 jimmy carter regrettably said it was an island of stability one of the most troubled areas of the world as late as august 1970 he received a cia report that said iran it's not a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary state november of the next year u.s. ambassador and iran cabled back to washington the authority has been considerably shrunk his support among the general public has become almost invisible. we almost see you think the unthinkable at this time and of course in thinkable did occur ronald reagan during october 1980 made as one remark he said i just do not understand why the hostages are still there. of course this is been described as that media event with walter cronkite going on every single night saying it's been this manh days since the hostages have

been taken it dominates the airwaves and carter ease and even says one more helicopter would've won reelection this is an event that primed the public to view the islamic purpose republic in a very negative way americans have hostile attitudes as a result of this but it is not clear what meeting this will take within reagan's larger foreign-policy drama. we look at ronald reagan the constant cold where he cast aas vision of a two-sided conflict both globally and in the middle east the vehicle through which he articated that was strategic consensus. kristine just consensus was primarily of alexander haig is said were going to go to that region were going to unite all of our allies there and a recognition of a common threat of the soviet union in the region. and so deployment on the part of

the diplomatic trip he went to jordan, he went to cairo and he went and spoke with u.s. allies across the region and said why don't we set our differences aside i will recognize a soviet union is the greater threat. it did not go well. he did not find success. in fact a newspaper thought it was all a plot for him to lead marines and occupy. so you have a situation where the reagan's retreats from the consensus idea i think there are three elements of this basict premise. number one the middle east is a battlefield. th battlefield has two sides that are fighting it ou number three u. will lead this battle in some form or fashion. and so i think these three things continue on. i am going to pivot to my manuscript i want to set the scene for you discussed the

three acts of reagan and iran. so you might have noticed a been talking a lot about the soviet union and not as much about iran. and the reason for that is because iran did not fit well within this picture painted by the reagan administration. it sits awkwardly as a non-communist state for still hostile to the united states. my overarching claim is reagan's treatment of iran was a tale of two terms through the first four years of the reagan presidency and criminal language using metaphors and misconduct to depict the revolutionaryry regie as a violator of international law. the picture of iran fits well one-on-one and not as both in the overall strategic campaign. which treats the soviet union as all regional disorder by the second term has come to view iran is a major threat to u.s. gulf oil access shifted from the rhetoric of criminality to that

of enemy. over the equivalences posed by iran in the persian gulf regular borrowed language to describe comments to vilify thegi regimen tehran. the picture painted by rhetoric its tyrannical role as a would-be hegemon cutting off the neat oil supply to the united states and its allies. this picture found purchase and press coverage malign the islamic republic and in the process also circulated the equivalence between iran and the soviet union and persian gulf security in u.s. access to the oil in the region. act one neither a u.s. ally or communist states tehran did not onfeature prominently the administration early efforts to rally regional allies and consist of union. instead reagan described the country as a criminal. he said iran should have a government that would abide by international law which for

better relations with the united states. when asked if you permit u.s. oil companies ton return to operate there eventually, he questioned whether iran can enforce its own laws. heen highlighted delinquency agn when hostages return think it should quote be aware when the rules of international behavior are violated our policy will be one of swift ineffective retribution." in a statement honoring the free hostages contrast of their contr dignity, determination quiet courage with the abuse of their captors implying heroism was something the iranians did not understand. reagan commonly accused of commuting acts of terrorism he did that during the 1980 campaign. weeks into his presence he thanked margaret thatcher for efforts to bring the american prisoners on from iran and the next breath he said together it will work to confront the scourge of international terrorism. writing about the threat of international terrorismm oftenn relation to iran.

in 1982 address a call for political settlement and the conflicts and immediately continues the fight against international terrorism. other times reagan reference the threat which international terrorism for exemptions the three world in a dire peril that terrorism and intimidation in the gulf posed. this is why he continually characterized the persian gulf as a perilous region. the references were to isolate tehran. both in terms of coverage and treatment of the administration but on the world stage. criminality is not a static stated meeting the highly contingent radix of law and order inscribed markers of fear those in turn are to justify criminal surveillance and confinement. by invoking fears association with regime terrorism lawlessness andat the hostage crisis as utterances rationalize the policy of isolation, trending as a rogue felonious state policing was the logic of the rhetoric of criminality.

of course since was hardly a communist this offered a way out of the strategic framework. reagan did not need to say that rob was on the side of the soviet union relate there was an outlawea state and an early outworking of the rogue state idea. it was ruled by that was beyond the normal rule of the cold war. and so he continually summoned like being a sheriff, or a cop. united states should treat around like it's at all squalid criminals and lawbreakers. he said were going to bring the full weight of the law against them. ultimatelysu this works to subordinate iran to the soviet union as a primary threat that reagan identified in the persian gulf. i'll skip through all the examples i have of u.s. media coverage we do not have time for that. right back to enemy ships. this assessment of tehran is administration charge modify its internal i evaluation of the gu.

mate 1984 mc report shift in thinking through enhanced military cooperation with keithe gulf. the paper first reiterated the administration elusive goal of organizing a troop multilateral effort to defend western axis of the gulf. it enumerated the various threats to western axis to the gulf and said although the ill occupation of afghanistan is a constant reminder of the larger it said the stalemate and attrition warfare has made that less immediate lesson poignant's consequently a new danger had started to be on par with the soviet union. iran it's particular brand of fundamentalism has become the most immediate threat to the modern nsc reports but for my are going around represents a more direct security threat to the american allies mumble from the soviet union, this report captured a broader shift away

from a strict fixation on moscow. reagan called it a danger characterize it as eight lala's love and this actor on the world states he denounced the barbaric persecution of the height faithful in iran he readily said tehran was a place where iointernational law common decey were mocked. while it was common for him to use these in his public utterances, at no time prior tof this that i was able to find in the archives did the president or the nsc state tehran was of a dangerous as moscow is in the persian gulf. this change of the administration thinking shows most clearly in the june 19 eva's report on gulf security the 28 page document was intended to address legislative fears reagan had made unilateral american commitment to defend all non- belligerent shipping in the persian gulf during the rairan-iraq war started escortig gulfankers through the

clearing mines as a way to make sure axis continues was unhampered by the war. ultimately what the report said the free world was heavily dependent on oil which meant it was her title national interests i'm sorry our vital national interest is at stake in the gulf this cements the threat of iranian over the gulf presented an equal hazard to the soviet union when it came to the free flow of oil this report marked in evolution. like hague weinberger has an image of the persian gulf is under terrific threat from an imperialistic regionalna dominae unlike hague weinberger identified ironic not the soviet union as his dangerous foe this betrayal of iran is equal if not greater threat than the soviet union thus throughout the original image put forth by the reagan administration of a two-sided conflict with an imperialistic powder seeking to gain power of the region the body of the report went into more detail exit since a gulf is

golf isa region of vital economv importance of strategic interest in ensuring it does not come under the dominion or had jiminy of the power hostile to the united states. this is an echo of the carter doctrine it takes it a step by identifying a run up the soviet union as at. countryf threat. and so the magnitude of this development can be seen in how the report describes domination by moscow tehran. either quote the soviet or iranian hegemony in the gulf state it would represent a serious strategic setback to the thefirst time since the beginnig of the cold war since all the affected truman talked about her country other than the soviet union as a power that might be able to dominate the gulf and its oil is not a rhetorical level this shift to enemy ship under enemy ship framework rhetoricians make it active and ongoing construction of an enemy you must be vanquished as jeremy inglis observes in his book

enemy ship. little can bolster their authority manufactureid consento such a way to provide reportable cover for leaders to prosecute aggressive policies against those identified as enemies of the nation for that is certainly the case in this instance. once we get to intervention we have united states taking active steps to confront iran militarily and into as reagan said, let me find a quote here. reagan promised to find ways to end the scourge once and for all. i will skip to my other that reagan had to get to my intervention. by a show of hands as anyone heard of operation praying mantis? we have a couple of hands. this move to describe her and and reach a place of hostile engagement between the two countries both on earlier actions taken by the ministration of the iran-iraq war. after it had begun to share intelligence the administration

launched operation stops to halt will start ron. in 19844 u.s. ship started escorting oil tankers to the gulf from 84 -- 86 torpedoes and erminds damage 67 oil tankers which significantly increase global gas prices have maritime insurance rates. reagan reacted by ordering the u.s. navy to conduct more mind sleeping escort missions fighting operations retail three strikes was cold late april 18, 1988 u.s. warships sank over half of iran's navy operation praying mantis days later reagan followed up this action by committing the navy to use military force to defend neutral ships from iran. and that of course on july 3 the trigger-happy quote uss shut down iran there are 65 5a civilian plane carrying 300ge passengers. raggett attributed this tragic attempt to the ongoing war which he blamed iran for continuing.

and so operation praying mantis still ranks as the largest u.s. naval battle since world war ii. reagan's betrayal of iran as an animate was therefore not simply words to legitimate actual militaryy operations against the regime. in this regard reagan's characterization of iran as an enemy that demanded active intervention of gulf security and l is there prompted a pivotal step toward the united states and only articulating a response to protect the gulf but asserting books iran contra doesn't fit nicely in the story. and of course united states was caught selling weapons to iran. it's evidence for that iran underwent reagan's presidency.

what's up unclear what the relationship would be especially coming from a president focus si much on that rhetoric of cold war the soviet union for the overarching threat. by the end of his presidency, many applied they were aggressive imperialistic that they sought to dominate their neighbors have been transferred to iran. the fact the iran-contra scandal happened in generate such outrage is a testimony to how much this vision was accepted by the american people. so i think to conclude my talk i would say that observers who saw iran-contra at the time were left with one or two conclusions. either the reagan administration has lied about iran being an enemy or an adult weapons to a ilnation described as a threat o the flow of gulf oil by extension u.s. national security reagan chose to admit a lapse in judgment rather than argue iran is not quite so bad warehouse

sale off the image of a run as n american was in the eyes of the administration and perhaps the public. by the time the iran-iraq war shot noticeably air and of course include thousands and cld thousands of minds. these actions mark a stark contrast in the early days of proclaiming the soviet union lurked behind all of the middle east ills reagan has started out targeting the persian gulf was only part of the cold war. was effectively making the case conditions unique to the gulf all the threat ironic posted the free oil mandated military operations be undertaken for reasons disconnected and the larger cold war ironically reagan fulfilled the carter doctrine's pledge to the united states would prevent hostile power from seizing control of the gulf not by targeting the soviet union but by authorizing air and naval strikes. thank you.

[applause] asked thank you to the reagan library into the ronald reagan presidential foundation and institute. and all the other partners including one i am affiliated with, pepperdine university university. we meet to discuss and analyze all things reagan especially during the ongoing 40th anniversary of his presidency. i am one of the participants here focus on that meaning and significance of president ronald reagan key speeches and how they help us understand strategic and moral thinking. my question, how did reagan get to 1983? especially march 1983 what made reagan reagan and what did he bring to the white house with him?

what was the end of his cold war strategy of peace through strength expressed in pursuit as president especially into central speeches at a moment reagan saw and help make. did he stay the course so to speak? what if anything can we learn from the strategy for today some of these questions obviously will have be safer discussion here i hope throughout the conference. and here that was in retrospect a key inflection point march critical month for reagan the strategic defense initiative is often dismissed as technologically unfeasible or it is presented as an aspirational idiosyncratic element of reagan's defense buildup or as a bargaining chip that he stubbornly refused to use in later cold war symmetry. such interpretations devalue and ignore it reagan's own thinking that informs his visionary

project.to this thinking is best understood especially in the approximate setting by examining announcement of fdi it is march 23 remarks on defense and national security in combination with his more famous statement just over two weeks earlier. in a profound long-term context by examining how it reagan got to march 1983. the evil empire speech of march 8 distills a lifetime of reflection on human nature, theology, politics, freedom. should be seen as a practical manifestation of reagan's political, strategic, moral understanding of the cold war which he describes in the evil empire speech as part of thend struggle between right and wrong and good and evil. in the time here i like to briefly go to these four areas political strategic moral and religious to understand how reagan got too march 1983 and hw

he understood what he was saying and doing. political. reagan place the cold war and the necessities, requirements and contingencies imposed by the central conflict of his time in his framework for politics overall. justice was central as it was a freedom good in and of itself and the necessity of the exercise of justice. he wanted to be a man of peace notd war and said this privatey and publicly. i have w seen in my days of research here many examples of this. it is good to have something confirmed when you come too. for reagan piece followed from justice and freedom should be defined by those with a similar outlook. this is a key reason a recurring theme is the importance of and need for the unity of the west against soviet totalitarian

communism. the principles inspiring and government mattered to him as dead at structuring institutions and attitude toward the a individual, family and community. reagan viewed ideology a single fixed worldview that carried within it a revolutionary plan to transform man, state, society as a perversion of politics. ideology brought forth totalitarianism into species communism and nazism. from the 1940s on reagan spoke against totalitarianism often interchanged totalitarian and communist when referring to the soviet union. in general reagan viewed totalitarianism as a vehicle with its rotten core made of radical and illegitimate regime. for reagan as for other students the ideology based informs the

-ism strategic, it reagan typically operate at the level of principles looking at the cold war at its highest level it was not his goal to go to war but there is always the risk. reagan saw the cold war as a real conflict. he did not believe in mere stability or a long piece between what he viewed as two worlds at completee odds he thought was not only politically and morally mistaken but also strategically incorrect because it enabled repression and aggression and extended the cold dewar in this sense the u.s. defense buildup and the economic and technological strangulation work tools not ends. so or diplomacy and dialogue the correct circumstances reagan could and would use various tools strategy for freedom to

achieve peace through strength. to help limit the stakes of the cold war, reagan quoted lenin, an example it is inconceivable the soviet republics should continue to exist for a longer period side-by-side with imperialistic state ultimately one or the other must conquer. i found yesterday and files here at the library reagan knew a variation on this phrasing from lenin at least as early as 1962. reaganed cited about the correlation of forces being on communism side and he understood that lenin said the same and communist did not define coexistence as they taught dead. for reagan at the level of grand strategy the cold war could not be wished away, idealism are made into routine power politics, realism as early as 1961 reagan stated that can only

be one end to the war are in the. it will not go away if we simply try to out wait it. worse and victory or defeat. this is the strategic context in which you place reagan's famous we win, they lose through peace through strength. as he had taken a lenin seriously as a strategic thinker reagan took the american and soviet regime seriously. the united states form of government was built on natural and god-given rights. the consent of the governed, the rule of the law, and limited government, rights are secured not created by this republican form of government. reagan said all this for decades. opposition the soviet union's required abolition of individual rights the false promise and subsequent negation of collective rights. lack of consent the repression of distant tyranny in the unlimited state and party. went reagan referred in 1975 radio commentary to a disease

like communism he offered a regime judgment. and due to this understanding of the regime reagan distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate government. the soviet unionsu although a superpower and world affairs identified its military and natural resources was an reagan's view and illegitimate regime. if it could go, it should go. this is the moral context with which reagan we win, they lose through peace through strength. for reagan was not only illegitimate with respect to government and its treatment of the people that's legally recognized borders it was also illegitimate empire with respect to nations that threatened outside its legally recognized borders. for him no moral equivalent could or should be made between the opposing regime in the cold war. religious, reagan's deepest well

of inspiration, his religious ia intertwined with the political, strategic and immoral. how did he look at god and the human condition at grayson flaws as problems ultimately conquered by faith, hope, love. researching here this week i have asked archivists if there are more letters to be family the one discovered five or so years ago from reagan to his dying father-in-law. of the theological virtues reagan was a man of hope with faith and love. he believed in the triumph of good, not passively, not fatalistic leap. with man and in practice americans and others with goodwill doing their part in god's divine plan.nn part of the reason the cold war was a winnable for reagan was what the totalitarianism included at soviet communist species was evil. not ultimately could not stand forever. communism aimed to overturn what god had made all of creation

including the highest part of his creation beings. for reagan it mattered four reagan, it mattered that and was made in the image and likeness of god. as a result they would not be reduced. the power could be used for good purposes. reagan deeply agreed that absolute power was corrupt absolutely goodness propelling the exercise of power and through strength because he believed that freedom was morally right and communism was wrong. those who dismissed sdi as star wars did not think reagan of either possessing or expressing a spiritual anthropology. in reagan presidency, a strain runs of discovering the anti-nuclear. reagan, rather than seeing that reagan never liked war or nuclear destruction, he was a committed cold warrior so that there would be no world war

three or nuclear destruction. he held these points of principle similar heinously. yet critics regarded reagan as a warmonger. and i have been struck here at the library this week at how dominant this criticism of reagan was at the time it's all over the place in the files and sometimes these are the same commentators who see a reagan one and a reagan two rather than analyze reagan as a whole person who has prudently applied the same fundamental principles and the sets of circumstances he faced, and seeing that the subsequent actions of america and other states went into his assessment and that he was capable of looking at short, middle and, long ranges. he was able keep his end in mind. so the big question then, what was that end in the peacemaker? will inboden analyzes reagan's pursuit of and success in bringing the soviet union to a negotiated surrender. he responds and builds on melvin

lafleur's question about whether reagan aimed to win or to end the cold war. although the two historians reached different answers in both, inboden points out that reagan was by fdr. his insistence on unconditional surrender in world war two, but knew that similar demand against the ussr have been delusional and foolhardy. in the case of the cold war, instead, reagan combined pressure with diplomacy working against the soviet system while working soviet leaders in seeking to bring the kremlin to a negotiated surrender. this is very helpful in examining reagan's peace through strength strategy by looking at what made reagan reagan by following him on his intellectual political practical experi henschel road to the white house. it seems that reagan always thought the cold war be won. he committed to and brought this perspective him to the white house.

what we when they lose mean it meant the false and about the ussr ideology illegitimate regime rotting and corrupt state, and the true and positive about america and the west, as well as about those brave individuals and growing movements and communities wanting struggling to be free behind and from the iron curtain, bringing all he had seen learned, read and written and said since the 1940s about totality, arianism and communism into the 1980s. reagan identified the current factors undermining ussr and helped to the conditions for the soviets ideological surrender. and this is the context in which to place surrender, negotiate and strategic by the ussr. reagan wanted to free held captive by despotism for. if the truth prevailed, then the

legs could be kicked out from under the lies of the totalitarian. as president reagan called for and pursued the ideological surrender by the soviet union. in his grand strategy of peace through strength the evil empire and sdi speeches constitute a culmination of decades of thinking in reagan aimed to change the terms, debate and break the status quo. he believed that a victory, the level of ideology would morally disarm the enemy. political rhetoric, economic and prosperity. armed diplomacy, allied relationships and well conceived. consistent pressure on the communist totalitarian were all essential to that strategic end. and in the midst of securing ideology, victory toward the end of his presidency, reagan extended magnanimity in victory. thank you.

in talking about the arc of reagan's soviet rhetoric policies, i'm i'm boiling down a much larger project. i've written about all reagan's soviet speeches. i also wrote a book about reagan's great speech at westminster. i written with my friend, former and colleague john jones and much of that work, students sometimes say to a soviet policy that so dated with putin's invasion of ukraine and chinese efforts to express power in. east asia. it doesn't seem very dated to me. there are three theories that are presented about the influence of reagan on in the cold war his cold war policies and rhetoric. there is a triumphal theory that simply says reagan, the cold war and enforced the soviet union

into collapse. commentator charles krauthammer. reagan's policies because it involved real armies supported by the states but made them the soviets spend blood and pressure and defense of these outposts. and it led to a radical reconsideration of moscow about the costs of empire. i think this interpreted is quite simplistic because it minimizes or ignores reagan's consistent for arms control and reagan's consistent commitment to nuclear abolition. and you also have to understand, reagan, of course, forced the soviets to do nothing. the soviets made decisions to do nothing, in part based on policies that reagan implement that imposed costs on them. a second view, which has been the reagan reversal view, very distinguished scholar fisher has developed this view and she argues, for example, the reagan administration pursued a hard

policy only during its three years in office by of 1984. reagan was ardently pursuing rapprochement with moscow. he's a very sophisticated hearted analysis of the january 16th, 1984. the great, great speech. there is a third view that i have developed in these essays and i'm hoping to develop in a book that i sometimes have called reagan's rhetorical theory of the cold war and that view is not so much a refutation of the reagan reversal as a reenter her presentation of some of the data arguing that reagan consistently on four primary strategies that these strategies evolved out in part in response to the rhetorical situation he faced example the evil empire speech part was aimed at undercutting the nuclear freeze, cementing support from evangelical goals, and that it played a crucial tactical role,

and that these strategies also creating new conditions and that that allowed for the change tone that is so evident the january 16th, 1984 speech. and i point just as a starting point that reagan continued occasion very tough with the soviets. it's known, for example, that he used in ways that in fury aided gorbachev. and of course, the brandenburg gate speech. in a way, the most dramatic moment when reagan challenges the soviets saying that they could prove that glasnost and perestroika was real. my opening this gate and tearing down this wall and and by the way defense spending did not begin to decrease in 1984. it in 1987.

so i'm going to argue that there are four dimensions in was fundamentally a rhetorical. now why do i say it's fundamentally rhetorical abe reagan used major speeches. we know from any number of sources that reagan believed he could. the argument not only with the west, but that he could actually convince the soviet leaders of the superiority of the of democratic ideals. he was an idealist. john lewis gaddis has written about that, that reagan sought to break the to break the stale mate of the of the cold war with the potency of ideas. but there's another way that the strategy was fundamentally and that is all the steps that the administration took were designed to send a message in that. i argue that the buildup not not preparation for war but was

preparation for peace. that reagan did buildup to create the to have strong negotiating hand. and as soon as he thought had that hand, he immediately took steps to that led to the successful negotiations and that also explains i something that's been alluded to reagan's famous statement that that the only a appropriate strategy in the cold war is that we win and they lose because that strategy goal was based in ideas. one more thing about that, reagan more than more than any other major political figure of the time understood the weakness of soviet union. yes, there were experts who recognized the weakness of the soviet economy. but reagan saw that before else, and he was often ridic fueled

for those views and by policy commentary ideas of the time. so what are the four components in this strategy of the cold war that i see reflected across the arc of reagan's rhetoric throughout his presidency. the first one was to, in reagan's view, the truth about the soviet union and we know that reagan made any number of a harsh comments. and as i demonstrate later in the paper, these harsh comments on occasion continued after 1984. and even the great. january 16th speech included harsh. i wish i had time to make the argument in detail but the event and on and jim and sally passage of the most eloquent in all of reagan contained any implicit message that jim and sally could travel they want and ivan anana

could not. so this strategy jack matlock referred to it as telling the truth about soviet union. reagan said, when i came into the office, i believe there have been some mistakes in, our policy. i wanted to do things differently, like speaking the truth them for a change. peter robinson, the great speechwriter, argued that reagan's insistence on telling the truth produced a trump like quality to his speeches, and i think that's especially evident in the great, great soviet speeches and goal of this was to get the soviets attention. we know that he was successful in doing that after the speech, izvestia labeled reagan the new messiah. richard pipes said the london infuriated the russians more. anything else reagan had said. pipes added that reagan's response to him when he told that was so we touched a nerve.

reagan wanted to touch a nerve to get their attention. he combine that with an arms buildup that as i have argued previously was not designed to prepare for war, but was designed to create a strong negotiating position. so that he could get real arms reduction. his objection, the previous arms control agreements had been that they had been limitation and not arms reduction. reagan said in his autobiography, i wanted to go to the negotiating table, end the madness of the mad policy. but to do that, i knew america first had to upgrade its military capabilities so that we would able to negotiate with the soviets from a position of strength, not weakness. third, reagan's supported arms control and ultimately elimination of nuclear weapons. and he said this many, many times in public. but did. i remember at the time not that

he made it thinking. it was entirely tactical. but we now know it was. not tactical. it was a very firm belief, even in the evil empire speech. reagan said, this doesn't we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. i intend to do everything i can to persuade of our peaceful intent to our mind, that was the west that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties, something he said many times. and then he referenced his for a 50% cut in strategic ballistic missile weapons. even in the evil empire always labeled the most incendiary of reagan's speeches. although possibly the first press conference might be in that as well, that reagan made clear commitment to arms control. now the linchpin of of this approach this grand strategy was defense of democratic ideals.

i suggest to you that since the four freedoms speech, that the speech at west is the most important speech by president, talking about what western values, what what western liberalism means. there are wonderful pass and the speech where he makes clear commitment to democratic values. he echoed churchill when he said, from stettin on the baltic to varna on the black sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have more have had more than 30 years to establish violence. yet never say, but none. not one regime has. and i love this. regimes planted by barnett do not take root. george w bush should have read that line before. we decided to invade iraq. i especially like passage that reagan wrote himself when he pitched the for democracy and freedom in the in the history of the west, beginning with the exodus from egypt. and then in a long rhetorical

question and it's a long quotation, i'm going to read it to you because it is eloquent. the power of the democratic idea. and reagan wrote this himself who would voluntarily not to have the right to vote decide to purchase government propaganda handouts instead of independent newspaper prefer government to work out control unions, opt for land to be owned by the state instead of those who tell it want government repression of religious liberty, a single political party instead free choice, a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead a democratic tolerance and diversity. and again and again, the truth and those words has been demonstrated often have have stifled dissent. but it remains that is that desire. ideas utterly central to reagan's policy. now there is evolution over time. in the beginning of his first term, reagan on getting the attention of the soviet sphere, the tough talk and the arms

buildup, while also calling for eventual arms reduction and defending democratic values. after succeeded in getting the arms up and process there is a shift to greater focus on calls arms control. it's a shift. what i see as a shift in emphasis and when he proposes is the imf and that and the start and many of the beginning of cnf perceived it as an unfair but it became basis for the actual treaty that was finally negotiated. i argue the principle that holds together that strategy is the defense of democratic ideals. reagan really that he could win argument and a situation in which it was in the interests of

the soviets to change their policy. he was an ideal list and an old classical liberal. the consistency evolution present in reagan's cold war strategy and his rhetoric i think, reinforced judgment of gaddis that. reagan was a skillful politician as the nation has seen for many years and of its sharpest strategists think perhaps it also that american presidents should negotiate against the studio chiefs first. and if if they did that, they would learn a great deal. now, i want to make the argument that this what i've called an evolution in his strategy is reflected across the arc of his rhetoric. i do not have time develop this. it now in the paper which really a very rough draft of about the first third of a book.

i at the question of whether reagan consistently statements for arms control and statements affirming desire for peace between 1981 and 1983. and he did. and then i whether reagan continued to critique the soviet union and make other statements that were harsh in nature and defend an arms buildup after 1984. and i don't time to go through that today. i see that in all that the arc of all his major soviet speeches. what this suggests is, i think, is that having coherent policy based in ideas that should be at the core of responding to threats to world peace from totalitarian governments.

it seems to me that it has great relevance for how the united states and the west deal not only with putin and russia and but also in the future potentially with china. and so i the i see the evolution reagan's soviet rhetoric as demonstrating one final thing and you see this in the files and the speechwriting files that reagan the primary author of this strategy often over the pragmatists in his but also tony dolan and the others who were let us say less pragmatic that reagan was the author this in the westminster speech. this is only one anecdote. but reagan either edited or wrote about 60% of the final speech. you cannot spend more than 5

minutes with speeches that edited. i remember. clearly when i first discovered that the realization that -- reagan was really because that skill editing reveals a very sufficient excited mind. thank you very much. well, we mostly kept to our time limits. and so we have time for some discussion. questions, comments comments. go ahead, roger that. great to have all of you here. and thanks for that excellent set of presentations. i am curious, particularly for the last presentations, but welcome the entire panel to address this. what you see reagan doing prior to his election today as it relates to peace, strength, about his commitment to arms control reductions.

your in the last presentation that really advance your theory and seems there's a lot out there on the record in terms of reagan working particularly in 1976 his election in 1981 that might events your work and your arguments. thank you. sure i'll start. you can tell from my presentation that i went earlier and earlier when i submitted my topic. i was going to be focusing on the two speeches, but then i just kept going backwards. so. so for me, when i said back to the 1940s, i mean, going back to the 1940s, but the period you're talking about lines up a lot in terms of content and rhetoric with, the radio addresses and we know that reagan all of those. and so again know looking at his handwriting robin talking about is is both illuminating and fun and you just see over and over and over all these different themes are there that he's going to develop in terms of strategy and policy and expression.

and there are i mean, there are many examples, but it's it's in area to it's in the military part. it's in the arms reductions argument. it's in his dislike and hatred of war, the real meaning of peace he has multiple addresses on the real meaning of he does two addresses on the declassification of nsc 68 a classic truman administration the classic truman and human rights throughout get a lot on that, too. all the different people with reagan are there. it is as i see us thinking it through fighting about it, thinking about it. i forget where nancy reagan, in her own book, she says her husband was always a writer and people notice that. getting to spend time in

archives shows that. the anderson book and the addition. it still makes a different when you immerse yourself in the handwritingt . >> i have an analysis. i think that they are consistent with the archives. the famous debate with robert kennedy cleared the prior say. they always started with my name because they agreed that reagan was not a bad speech writer. >> reagan assumed office and d,became governor of california and became president. then he did at a private citizen

.to some extent, that change happened when he was running for president. >> thank you. very quickly. various places, interviews and elsewhere, when people asked him how did you write so well for reagan, it is because i went and read reagan. >> you should look at the westminster address. and then look at what reagan does to it. there are places where reagan will mark out for paragraphs. a partial sentence nt will link it to another sentence eight or nine paragraphs later. you cut out things that would have unnecessarily offended people for no reason. look at some of the things he wrote. it is just magic. so much of what you said.

>> your argument and your book about reagan. okay. >> you say he was committed. i love the session about leverage. a little bit with the defective spirit arms control and abolition. >> right. the fact that he was totally still concerned spirit he was still realistic enough to understand getting rid of weapons. we will still face the world. you have to respond. what would you use to deter. is there a picture that comes. the concept. ndit seems to me that he was in abolition as well. you got rid of weapons to get

rid of the war. >> i am not saying that. it is a rhetorical purpose. you build up so you don't have to find. think how many nuclear weapons between the u.s. and the soviet union existed and how incredibly dangerous it has become as the chinese are dramatically increasing the number of their nuclear weapons with who knows what kind of command and decision-making processes. i think reagan recognizes those risks and consistently use an arms buildup. yes, he has four arms control but maintaining deterrent. how reagan thought that you could have conventional forces that have adequate deterrence once you got to an fbi regime

and, of course, reagan beyond the advice of virtually everyone wanted to share the technology. even internationalize the technology which i think demonstrates what an ideal it was. in classical liberal. >> thank you all. a panel on reassessing. it really makes sense that you focused on this. tto what extent of your work do you grapple with the actual effects of the implementation of the reagan era policies and to what extent does the development and implementation policies have left of t what reagan taught. .... t a more specific question for randall, ....

it's posed by the iranian revolution and the soviet union. >> sanctions between groups with the communist party or talk tugt to debt party. then it goes back all the way. and so, intelligence community i've not come across a document that's what was found within the larger frame of a wrong reagan tended not to talk because he was --'s main commitment wasan

israel. and so in so far it was brought up he was not trying to talk about iran and the soviet partner he did say over and over and overso again what you do fid in all kinds of campaign documents is the illusion soviets are behind everything they are behind terrorism. they are behind hostagetaking. they are behind lebanon, they are behind everything. if you're reading between the lines you can see an assessment of our own as a partner with the soviet union without wanting to declare that outright. in terms of policy what i would say is the main effect of the tilt of her reagan's demonization of iran and seen a run as an enemy i would say resulted in the tilt towards heiraq appeared obviously they e not sharing geo spatial intelligence. it's more involved in helping the iraqi side.

by the time bush came into office had established a very close relationship with the regime it. there's a sense in which reagan's rhetoric gets covered with thesemaom transformations. have been able to tell it was minutely involved in the policy decisions. or the persian gulf. >> allison, do you want to add anything on the relationship? quickset is a great question. i'm think about what is the relationship what is that doing a practical level? i would say very much agree with what you are saying. i also think to four individual citizens, not everyone was considered with the minute details. in particular regions of the

world. that legacy more broadly one of things he did accomplish is develop a vision for the nation that individuals could see themselves. students in classes i show them in 1984 convention film that starts out with individuals being interviewed and saying i see myself in this vision he is. that vision and that narrative encapsulate these policy proposals. and even if you have that doesn't care about on a technical level they do is see themselves as a part of this anti-communist narrative. that elizabeth was talking about. that is where the nexus of rhetoric and policy come in. rhetoric can be both a producer

of history and it also provides individuals a narrative they could see themselves part of the t policy. >> let me add one other thing. in a way rhetoric can become the ideology appeared the most famous line in the first inaugural address this present crisis government is not the solution comic government is a problem. the problem. that became orthodox cconservative policy in an essy i've written a major figure in conservatism conferred as a doctrine. the introductory phrase in the present crisis was largely lost in that. it became an antigovernment philosophy. think about how different that is from the environmentalism of richard nixon for example or the montréal accords that were

negotiated during the reagan administration the tilt the ozone crisis. that was a pragmatic conservatism those words help transform into it antigovernment. >> richard marsh. go back to fbi the question for anybody wants to answer, should reagan truly believe in the technology and the ideasid behi? how much was it a matter of a rhetoric are getting the bargaining position establishing a position of strength and negotiation? is there a way to know that does anyone have an answer? >> again from 1970s at norad when he realized this was a thing he became very interested in it technologically.

what you see including was in his handwriting and he wrote before the fbi speech shows he believes an america to create, to develop. for him it was a real thing. i thought it was a real thing that could bring about. >> if he had thought about as a strategy because he was very, very close even bigger arms reduction. good withn was very larger ideological questions. minute technical question you are exactly right.

he had faith in the scientists. did not need a lot of other details. go ahead. >> university of connecticut. this is a question for anyone who wants to take it. and a rhetoric there's always an audience. i was wondering how each of you it seems implicitly for many of you assuming the attic is domestic. but who for each of you to the audience of this reddick you're talking about. >> for my project right presented as part of a larger project that analyzes core images and metaphors.e for iran specifically i think the metaphoric heat used gains a picture of this one that big battle everyone is on one side or the other side.

part of that audience question has to do with how to set core image get picked up by press outlets or other politicians or by the political opposition as well as reagan and his team. there is a question of not just audience but who is the audience? how are they recirculated the ideas? in my project, that is what i am tracking. how these core images getet reproduced. in terms of audience though there's obviously dozens of figures that we could name. but clearly for my case study the primary audience would be the american people as well as international scene. esreagan is sending messages to iran like he would consider a redlined process of sending messages to american allies reassuring them we will protect thems . there's also the larger question looming in the background of what is the relationship of this

conflict to wider american policy? >> an american audience needs to maintain support for the arms buildup. at the end of his presidency maintain support for the arms control agreement against conservative opposition at the time many conservatives are vero skeptical. some of that is tactical. there is a european audience because there's a major and tight nuclear movement he is especially concerned with thet, west german's he's got to maintain support for supporting the pershing's and to europe is the linchpin of the strategy. creating negotiating strength to get rid of the nuclear weapons which are incredibly dangerous he's obviously speaking to the soviets. he is saying things that were true that president has never said because he wants to get their attention but is also

speaking to the people of the warsawth pact. we know from their reaction which was about a half a second after the end of the soviet union they asked to join nato. how effective that was in combination with their own experience.he those are the four crucial audiences. there is a statement about reagan he did not need a pollster he had an intuitive understanding of the american people i think he had a very sophisticated understanding ofe audience. >> i completelyal agree. one example echoing what robert was talking about there is a story about how behind the iron curtain in prison found out about it because he finds out about it by reading soviet sources and taps out from

isolation on present walls in the way that they did oh my gosh the president of the united states called an evil empire keep fighting. we note many where it mattered and it helped to create these conditions like i said where people are fighting from within behind the curtain along with the pressure they're leading the west in from theut outside. it is really, really important and reagan did. >> i would add very briefly several people have noted the importance of looking at the archives. there's always multiple audiences at play but also looking at particular moments very particular audience and the desire to reach specific ones. one of the best descriptions is

in but i thought of the revolution. she talks about how she wanted the american public watching atd home because that speech was timed precisely to coincide with the 8:00 a.m. a new cycle on the east coast.of they went through a lot of discussions with french officials fighting about the time of the white house was adamant that had to be at like to 12:00 p.m. 12:00 a.m. has an incredible passage she says my goal was to write so that the president would describe with the u.s. army rangers and did so that the teenagers there were eating their rice crispies with pause and stop and say that really happened. because at this moment in u.s. foreign policy is post- vietnam and talking about how we see it in this particular moments. i was a very specific audience that they were trying to reach and yet at the same time and

edit multiple ripple effects that it moved out in the campaign film it is still replayed. thinking about the multiple audiences is a very specific rhetorical purpose and an individual speech. >> we are at the very end. i want to say one more thing. use my role as a moderator here. i think reagan was in a way speaking from the past to future americans. i want to pointed to passages one in the first inaugural and one in the great westminsterwh speech where he spoke to us about the importance of our democracy. the first inaugural he talked about the transition of power as a miracle that almost no other country in the world.sh i think of reagan were here today he would say we should remember that miracle and protect it. and at the end of the westminster speak about the very

end of the second world war churchill lost an election and he praised him for recognizing the importance of democratic norms and noting that he came back again later on. it seems to me the greatest importance of reagan ultimately in his rhetoric is for that defense of democratic values is central to the american story and it's believed that ideas could move mountains and they did in the cold war and perhaps they can again so thank you very much. [applause] [applause] newsletter the presidency and more. sign up for the american history

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