so, you know, doing whatever she's.ave less than 50 seconds and yes, by any chance, do you know you're always working? i'm your schedule is so do you still play the violin? i do. and i picked up the cello during covid. yeah. yeah. thank you. they wanted to know if she was still playing the violin and. and, sheila, you heard her response. yes. once aga has earned the rare pomp award here. yeah. and again, the book is sheila johnson through fire. we didn't even get into the salamander, but this book is about love, loss and. of course, her amazing journey her triumphs and her sacrifices. so please, it's a greatin.

as i look out over the audience, i'm of something adlai stevenson said at the 1960 democratic convention because even though he whe wasn't announced candidate. so i walked onto theloor the convention and he got completely mobbed and as he left a television commentator there said to him, who do you think's going to win the last survivor huh? so i want to welcome you all as last survivorswith two of the most vital and insightfuls in america, whom i read all the time. anne applebaum is a pulitzer prize winning historian, writer for the atlantic, senior fellow at the johnskins of advanced international studies. her latest booht of democracy the seductive lure by the way.

when i recall a lot of the book titles that we've heard about during this festival, i'm tempted to think there's more than a little pessimism here about the future. ezra klein min is a columnist for the new york times, where he also hosts the ezra klein podcast at a young age. he has a storied career in journalism and as a is new york times best seller is entitled optimistic take on where we are in this and i guess i'll start with you, ezra. how polarized are we? how did we get here? and has the polarization ever been this serious and this dangerous in modern times? oh nice easy question for morning. well, thank you all for me. one of the tricky things about tion is you have to always ask polarized over what? it's a word we tend to use in the singular when it mean many

different things. so are polarized and ever more polarized over what compared to ten years ago, compared to 12? say we're less polarized economics. if you go back to the period where paul ryan and his budget are dominating the discussion and, you know, you have barack obama andse of bernie sanders economics is splitting the parties one party wanted to privatize medicare. the other party wanted to expand universal health insurance. that's eased a lot. we're less polarized on economics, on on a bunch of different things where the possibility of compromise, of unusual bipartisan coalitions has actually gone up. on the other hand, we have fallen down. what i like to think of as maslow's hierarchy political needs, we're much polarized over whether we should not rules of the american political system be followed. so we've become, i think polarized at the level of system more even than the level of policy we used to more or less system. but there were very deep divisions about the policy. now the system is what is under under attack.

republicans have become a much more antiracist party, not just the political system, but much an, they've always obviously been skeptical of what we get called the mainstream media. i mean, but they are much more intensely skeptical of that of universities. they've turned more on business. you can see ron desantis going going to war with disney. that's not the kind of thing you saw from the republican par the democratic party's become even more of a pro system party. hment orient did more frankly connected to so in a way, yes, i think we are much more polarized. we are more polarized fundamentally, but not more polarized in every respect. ome ways, it's a less policy oriented debate right now, moate over what kind of country and what kind of system we're going to be in. yeah, i would i wo say though, that the reason why kind of polarization feels more dangerous and also feels different to a lot of people probably this room is that something much more existw an argument over how high taxes

should be. i mean people feel ve s about it some people think it's know the most important issue in amerial to their businesses, but it's not about thei or the definition of who they is. whereas arguments over nature and you know who won the election 2020 and is you know, is there an elaborate conspiracy theory about it? these are real existent questions that reach to the the heart of what it means to be american. and that's why kinds ofer to solve. mean when you have a when you disagree about room and you can have an argument about taxes. maybe it's a won't each other at the end of it. if youisagree about what america is and you get everybody in a room and argue about that you could have people killing each other and that's actually that insight even comes from, you know, when you a of years ago i wrote something where i went and spoke to people had worked in post-conflict you know

after civil wars. and i also in'd worked in northern ireland, you know when they were when they process then there was an attempt toet communities to reconcile in northern ireland, where there had been a lot ofle literally lived different sides of walls. you e that together? and one of the things they tried to do is they tried to bring people togetr agaiabout should the road be and what kbuild and should we have a, you know, youth community center in, you know, on this street or on that street? and who should be in charge of building it? and again, those can be controversial things. you know, nobody wants the bridge going by their house or they want the road to be somewhere else and they can be angry at it. butely to murder each other. whereas if you have people know protestant or is the state catholic, you know irish people will kill each other. and so are polarization feel so bad now is that is that from policy differences, you know, differences about, you know, money and maybe money, maybe property

social issues. we've moved onto these existential differences. and that's much more bitter and angry. yeah, that's very interesting because if you think back to the obama administration and take disagreement about what to do and mitch mcconnell and obama, biden was negotiating the deal actually came to a place in the middle where for a certain group of people, the tax cuts were extended. for other groups of there was extra unemployment compensation for f wen't existential questions. they may be verys are not existential. i think the fact the what you're citing isa whole host of questions. i'm going to start with with extent does race and then the alienate asian of so many americans in face of vast cultural and demographic change and the loss of civic education drive this kind of systemic pol about.

so let me take this in a couple ces. i'm not a believer that the loss of civic education is a big player. i think thatme always want to hear, that if we just had better civic education classes, we coulpr happening. don't buy it. when i think of what i didn't talk about enough in why polarized which comes 2020 and which you should all buy and does in every other way. explain our current sales right now right. that book does talk a lot about racial polarization talked a lot about the polarization driven by high immigration numbers, talked a lot about the polarization driven by changing religion. and i think something that is crucial inextricably from the current moment is, i mean, each of these measures we've seen society right? we are on to become a majority minoritymeans. but the fact that we will not have theof sdemographic power sitting with white we have for the entirety of american history has destabilized right? i think it is for the better, but it is nevertheless destabilizing. i think people underestimate how big of a player religion is

here. there is no donald trump. no trump without his unbelievably intense support among evangelical christians. and the fact of the matter is that if look at the lines for when we're become going to become a majority minority country racially, which gets a lot on it's very similar for religion. when do protestants no longer have a protestant? christians no longer have a majority in this country? same chart, you know, it happens around 2040. the democratic party is itself now the most popular religious answer in it is nocratic party has become a i don't want to call it a secular le are spiritual but it is nevertheless a non-religious coalition way it used to be. but to the question were asking a second ago, one of the big surprises of the past four years has been slight, but nevertheless real would call racial polarization. the reason joe biden ws in 2020 is not that what donald trump does and 2020 alienates him. even more from black and hispanic voters. he wins more black and hispanic voters. what happened is he alienated itself from somewhat from some

number of voters. and they wen biden. so weirdly, the 2020 election sees a slight slide, but nevertheless meaningful drop in racial polarization. what changes is educational? and i don't i think educational polarization is tricky because it's not just education. it's tracking some referent of what we would call, in my opinion class, some referent of what means to be on the inside of american life and not life, some referent of what it means to bethf america and momentum on the inside of prbut trump begins winning. the republican party begins winning. larger numbers, non-college white people. that's been h driven by race or was for quite some time, but alsoans, also hispanic americans and the democratic party is winning college educated americans in numbers it has never seen before. the reason holds on the way it does in 2022 is it wins college ated americans. and so i do think one of the

pieces of polarization that often gets missed is thi kind of class polarization, not si polarization, not material. democrats win, voters making less than $100,000 even. but there is something whatever is getting education that has begun to flip that the democratic party that used to win was always called the party of the working class. right. that that won non-college voters. it doesn't win them anymore the republican party does and that explain in i think a lot of how our politicsemocratic party as a piece i published today in the times talks about i party where some factions of it want great stability, arguing that actually america's kind of already great. we don't want to change it too much. we don't want to burn too much down and. there are things that the republican party is doing. it has adopted the dynamic of donald trump, the kind of wwe dynamic donald trump that is sendingto the democratic party doesn't even understand how to send or even really how i think that this dimension of class city, this has become very, very, very important. and we've lost language for

talking about it. but it is a kind of polarization growing fastest in our elections is it's actually a question for you. i mean, is it also what we're seeingagainst meritocracy or the idea of know, you know, a lot of things in were decided not really by meritocracy but by inheritance. you know you you know, there was a kind of, you know protestant elite on the east coast and kids went to andover and yale you know, everybody kind of accepted that. and, you know, if you're from think about andover and yale and also you didn't really care about andover at yale. you know, you had your own university of michigan or you had your own, you know, farming community and was really i mean there's almost a way in which the expansion of an i'm just thinking out loud i'm not saying this is necessarily true. you know, the the the the university is opening up to more people, allowing people from over the country to apply, which iously a good thing. also created the feeling changed

little bit the nature of who is the elite or who are the leaders in feel like, you know, it wasn't ofand, you know, your family still matters, but there's also a sense that people have that we deserve to be here, you know not just because daddy owned bank, but because i worked hard and i did really well in my sats. and therefore, i deserve to be whatever it is that i am. and it meant that people who didn't get into that stream felt, they were, you know, lesser right. they couldn't compete or they didn'd they didn't get in. and i don't think this explains everything, but there is a there's a way in which the the nature the sort of so-called ruling class or what is perceived to be the ruling class chain edged, it became much more with and certain that it deserved the opposition to it, the resentment it grew, you know and it were people 100 years ago really resentful o don't i don't think so. i mean i you know, i don't i don't remember the the sort of hatred and dislike of them being so focused and being so much a part of the news every day.

and i went to one and i don't remember worrying about whether stuff i did. there e there were to show up the next day on the cover of newspapers, but now they do. child who also went to one. and he said, you know, the special thing about an ivynisomething there and you know the next day it's in the new york times and somehow that dynamic began to play inside american. and i wonder if that's not a close to what you're saying. it's it's an interesting question. i mean, the hard thing here and this really is what my book is about is that there is so many feedback loops happening simultaneously that unwinding them is difficult. so so here's and so here's like another cut it that i think the rule the what gets called the had a piece where and works and where my wife works there was like the ruling class is giving up on marriage. i'm like the atlantic is a ruling class but but whatever the more power it lost power i actually think in a lot of these things what happened is a stability of a power structure broke. and when that breaks, it's very

destabilizing. i'm not saying it's better when it did, but this of politics is you know, much better than i. the trumpist politics is populist, right? politics. it's very old. it is very old. it shows up again and again and again and again through history. it shows up erent countries, going to say it's international, it's not. it's international. the thing was that the structure in americans was capable of suppressing this dimension of so a political scientist sometimes you this chart and these are based on big surveys but it basicallyws that if you look at where voters are there are always this huge number of socially conservative, economically liberal, the economically liberal quadrant. right. not exactly liberal, but elfare state for them. right. government hands off my undesirables, but also does not want thingchanging in the culture too much. but that sort of politics was not.

well-represented and when it tried to emerge, it would be squashed down pat in the republican primaries. ross perot running as an independent. and this was a time when parties and bob would know this history much better than than i would. there was a time when parties i mean, they had a lot more power at their conventions parties, a loreprimary. they had a lot more power to structure. who came up. controlled of the information. and that power the ruling class somehow becomes most visible when it becomes weakest because when it becomes weakest, it can't actually stop challenges in the way it could before. that to me is one dimension of this. a lot of the cracks in the system become more legible. and then you begin talking a lot about the ruling class. but the political parties are not they were in 1990. they are much less powerful. they have much less of structuring anything. a more powerful republican party would have stopped dm(onald trump. he never would have got into where he got to. but he could only get to where he did becau power structure was breaking down. i'm not that it was becoming nc only thing i'll say quickly is that one dimension of the sort of analysis i try to build in that book is about media and culture. and as particularly the the digital age with cable going up

through the internet allowed for this incredible profusion of niche culture, thisf mass culture, and what that meant is that people got much tter at the cultures, more different from so one thing i do think we get that that began to happen in this period isth there opened up larger gaps between like the diffe america. and they began to notice that about each other. better because they were all on the internet. they were all on cable,began feel like they knew each other less. this is a periodyou will see like new york times maps about like this part of the country watches duck dynasty but this part watches the sopranos as a culture became the fact that we are more distant from each other, became more sa opportunity, a politician or a set of become hyper appealing to a pnd at all mixed with the of the party structures to stop them, i think created the sort we have here. you it's interesting because i think there's some consciousness here

that that marks people as people know herbert marcuse as people as people sort themselves out we've long said and i said this in another session we've lost daniel patrick moynihan that old adage thatdy's to their own opinions but not own facts. and one of the interesting things that's emerging in the the exit polls or entry polls in the case of iowa is, that the issue of immigration and illegal immigration seems be more powerful, as in states that are farthest borders. that all has to be fed by social media. i mean influx of migrants into new hampshire, but that's not that's not unique to the united states. the political leader in europe who made the who put immigration at the center of his campaign who ran on it, you know, time and again, who posters and advertising campaigns around his countryon was viktor orban, theinhungary has no

immigration. i mean, maybe a tiny bit maybe here and there actually in the nineties they had a few from bosnia because of the bosnian war, some of whom were muslims and they all integrate it in settled perfectly fine. like there's no historic history of know problems with immigration in hungary. you know nevertheless he was to make that to put it at the center of politics. bytually they do have a real immigration from libya and they land the boats on islands. and then someone has to do something with them. i mean, they have to be fedhoused. and a program has be set up for them and they have to be processed. and, you know, and it's, you know, even with the best of will, it's it costs money. it's a problem. you know, it's a it's something that, you know, locwith. and yet greece has not had a wave of massive, you know, so far massive, anti-immigration sentiment. i once worked on a project that tracked was to do with tracking of, immigration in

italy. i was working with another group and one of the things we found was that the the level of concern and anger immigration in the press had nothing to do with hointo the country. so, you know, so immigration is nt to say that it's not really about immigration, but it's clearly also about other things. you know, it's about you know, we were talking about this last night. i mean, it's about anxiety about growing diversity, about, you know, feelings of loss, of know, in a global economy, you don't the same control over your life that. you, you know, the image ofmasses over your border. anxiety. so so immigration is a is a profound and central issue not only because it's the one the right has chosen to run on in so many places, but also because clearly, you know, it's not necessarily related tove written this is a quote, the american political system, which includes

everyone from voters to journalifull of rational actors making rational decisions, given the incentives they face. we are a collection of, functional parts whose efforts combine into a dysfunction or whole. is there any way fix this? the set new one. see not just the problems but is there any way to fix this to incentives. the one the intentionf the book is to get people tosystem not the function of individuals and in particular to not believe the endless we tell that this or that president this or that senator will fix it. if you want things to be change rules. i think one of the analogies i ofr is it, you know, on one level, like the people who play other right. they know each other. they maybeth each other on the team before and then the whistle blows and they run at each other wearing armor as hardy can, a way that they know causes brain like raises his

hand is like i think we should not tackle anymore. they will just be replaced with somebody does tackle if you don't people to hit each other in the head and cause brain injury you have to change the lot we could do. i think we could literally just get rid of political primaries. you could certainly structure political primaries dramatically differently. and i think that you should. how well you c.you could, for one thing, open them up. right? political primaries could be open. sides. they could have ranked choice voting. right. but they strange because to in. right. the number of, the percentage of iowa republicans who voted in the iowa caucus not exactly a primary. if i'm not misremembering, this was 7%. yeah, 7%so 7% of republicans in iowa which is small. i'm from california. you're i7% of republicans in iowa dramatically shape the choice that everybody will end up havi in november. right. who wins in iowaand most important

question for who wins republican primary ad in new hampshire, you're talking about 47 people and three dogs. and like that ends up deciding who we vote for. so primaries have this quality putting this incredible leverage of the parties who then choose always. but oftentimes withdl the population. it's one reason i sort of miss one convention has had a real role because they had a much broader set of interests and dynamics comingon i often prefer parliamentary systems where partiession. so that's a space of leverage. the filibuster is a space of won't go into this. i will bore you guys forever with this.compromise less likely in the senate, not more likely. if you know, you can you know, if you can kill a bill that is often better for you than compromising on a bill. you can't kill bills compromising might be better for you than ineffectually voting. no, over and over and over again. there are a lot of things you could do to alter the structure of american politics that might

help. now, it wouldn't necessarily end these challenges all together, something that i think is a hing. you need to keep in mind that ads work is so important for is these dynamics international they recur across political systems with different internal rules and structures but how your political system works does matter and you could do more with that. so the issue is you can actually do a lot with structure. the problem is politics is very closely divided. structure. the way things usually work is you actually need much than a majority to change structural rules in american politics change the constition, change the rules of the etc. and that is very, very difficult to attain. so on the one hand, i can give you my laundry list of, things you could do, and on the other hand, in a world where you had the power to do them, they wouldn't be as necessary. do you know what i mean? yes. that if we had the functional political system, we could get together and be like, you know, the electoral college is word i'm stupid. college is stupid. and now tends to serve the precise opposite purpose. it was meant to serve of getting

like the electoral college ismeant be the thing where a bunch of elites would get and say, are you kidding me? donald trump as president? absolutely not. instead, it's the reason he wins. but you can't get that because the electoral college benefits have this sort of recursive problem like you solve, you have a pre. and because you have a problem of structure, you can't a structural problem. things you just said, then an if you talked about regret in the declining power conventions, political conventions, and it occurs me that that happened nother period of polarization in recentwar. and you had a demra american. yeah. and i was a yog person hoping to do a two young man hoping to destroy american politics. well no. hoping to destroy a convention system that could clearly frustrate the will of a majority of democrats. and the result of that was that u harepublican party ultimately followed this. you had a commission that said

the voters are going to pick the candidates the party bosses are not going to pick the. and i agree with you without that, you wouldn't have had donald trump. but i also think that without that change you wouldn't have had barack obama. are two sides of the coin. the other thing you said that's very int just a problem in are these are bigger problems. so what i want to she she's written so persistently and so elegantly about this, senate democrats and republicans, along with president biden, have negotiated a deal. it's a rather odd deal. the ties aid to ukr secure. they're about to announce says. this is a nonstarter for republican ends in that body. why can't they take yes for an answer on border security? and what does it say about the ress on hot button issues?

and does it other america in this polarized era is bee're going back to the thirties, you know so one of the one of the, i think, problems the democrat party has, not just the democratic party, actually because it's a broader coalition, but people who believe democracy is under threat. america, which includes republicans and independents as well. one of the problems that they have is it's very hard for them express to people what it is they're afraid of. i mean, if you tell americans, oh you know, it's going to be nazi germany, really i mean, nobody believes you. you it's clearly not going to be nazi germany. you know, but but there are in public life beginning be manifestations of what a, you know, what what real political dysfunctionality in the united states would look like. and actually, this bill is one of them. so you know what? if we get to a point where the united states is unable to take important decisions you know, where in emergency, in a

militarytical emergency, we aren't able to come together as a nation, you know, and and make a decision. you know what if the the interests of us of a minority, actually of people who don't care about democracy, who prefer dictators, who have a different vision of the united states, are able to block the majority and that's the of that or what you're seeing in this process. so for those of you who don't know last summer there was meant to be a spending bill that would have aid to ukraine and that passed, which there was a majority in both houses of congressof passing it, we wouldn't even be talking about this and and actually up until that moment, i didn't think there was going to be any troubleith spending for ukraine. i mean, why should there be? it was supported by the white house, by congress by the public, everybody. and it's overwhelming only in the public ies and then the what happened was is kevin mccarthy under pressure caucus his party dropped it off the bill and did a sort of private deal with the white where they agreed they would pass it later.

is it separately what happened? we we know or of y follow the saga of washington know is that kevin mccarthy immediately lost his job he was replaced by mike johnson. clearly comes from this minority faction the party and th decided play politics with this money. so they said you know we don't want to just give the president this you know, this money and solve the we want to bring these issues of the border. and so they had this idea that we can't pass ukraine aid unless we solve the border by which th mean giving funding for know border guards and processors. and so on, but also changing the rules for asylum and parole anly difficult set of issues to solve, you know, it's very hard to know if you change the rules of asylum, how you're going to affect people and how that's going to change, you know. and anyway, they spent months arguing about it and what's happened now is that the senate is finally having been given this impossible task of creating a bill that these two radically different things

you know aid uai a changes to the border law with additional some money for israel, too, they've they've now created this thing and now suddenly because trump is appears to be the candidate because he influences johnson and calls him on the phone. now suddenly johnson doesn't doesn't want to pass it because that might solve the border problem or appear to solve it and that would then give biden a victory and that might be bad for the trump campaign. and so what you have now is a minority of republicans who don't really want to govern anymore. so their interest is all this propaganda and and discussion and conversation about border so based on real stuff and some of it not turns out to be you a kind of fiction. i mean they don' want to solve it they want to they want to talk about it they want to have as an issue. they want it to be thing they're going to run on, you know, next autumn, you know, and the opportunity to solveif

it's just to partially solve it, they're about to give away. and the coue this for the us and for it's the of us in the world are going to be extraordinary if will mean the us has abandoned an ally focreated this massive international coalition. you know, biden was, the leader of a 50 country coalition that was giving aid to ukraine, you know, he he pulled it together almost miraculously, you know, after the invasion began, he personally went to kiev. he's given two major speeches in warsaw about the significance of and suddenly it will appear the autocrats of theussia who've been describing united states as degenerate and divided, unable to you will be right in. and so we will we will fail. you knowe conquest of ukraine. it could mean then government. and there are all kinds of consequences could follow if the ukrainians run out of ammunition know, the europeans will help and actually they've given don't have the

capacity to produce weapons and we and so that, you know, are at a point where a small of people whose aims are you know political you know, who are really in their own interests rather thainterest of all americans, are blocking a bill and that's that's pret far down the line in the direction towards i don't the end of democracy because that's the wrong word but certainly towards, youction that i don't think we've ever had before. well so we can't solve systemic problems. we're polarized over those. we can't deal with policy problems. how much and democracy is in trouble? how much trouble is it in how much peril does democracy today? and where would you now. i it's bad. we are in this election cycle dealing with a level of

fundamental threat about what at what level the system can be atta unlike anying i mean certainly in my lifetime think frankly i mean you could make some arguments about don't actually think they're the same anymore. i would ht this a couple of years ago. i would have thought the nixon trump analogy of worked. but think and think ab what happened to nixon. i mean, barry goldwater, john rhodes, all the republican go down from the congress andot to, you know, this isn't going to work. you got to resign. and nixon says, well if pu trial, will you? how will you vote? and goldwater said, i' v thing i was going to say that like in 2016 donald trump governed in a coalition government with the republparty. in 2020, that republican has gone right. no paul ryan speakership. there's a mike johnson speakership.and so the the very we've a very term question. right. what happens if the bridge builds overhe trump waters? right. what happens if joe biden.

wins 5347 and that's end of that? i don', look, i was wrong about trump coming back in 2020, but coming back24 seems i'm sorry, 2024. i was wrong about him coming 2024, but him coming back in 2028 aftern a row feels even less likely to be at some point. the again and you could see things reverting. i do think party, a clear kind of threat trump poses. even if you look at the other people who are running this. on't know because the thing that does worry me is infected republican party behind him and the young one thing i'm a lii'm attentive to these days is what it person up in republican party politics. what kinds of things are you readthe fact that you had all of these young campaign d you get fired this year? because they're turned out to be nazi imagery in. the meme videos they were making ron desantis and people like that, that was worrying because iat that imagery was, but it was in the world they wereonline the kinds

of thinkers who havee republican people like this online writer, b real thing. you can look it up the atlanticne a great profile of bronze age pervert because we are all demeaned now having to describe reality that the what is the. i am not sure for a long time i thought trump was an isolated and as a politician in a way i think he is. spread more broadly. and so i don't is a kind of temporary threat that america navigates its way past or not i don't know what jones's politics end up lo i mean, there is just a dimension. look, donald trump of the republicans cannot win without much older voters, that changes over. but i'reason to think you're going to have a more reactionary backlash voters. right. the popularity of people like tate and to some dpeterson like that should make you wonder a little bit. and you're seeing some that in polling. so i don't know i find the both near-term and the slightly longer term very hard to rate in american politics right now. i don't think should be

sanguine. i think that you should expect that democracy and a reasonable political system is something is going to have to be fought for and won again by election after election after. election. and sometimes you and you might have the last election.it's i think it's also going to require a lot public participation than it has up until now. and one of the features of american democracy over the last 20 or 30 years was along with the the the par as real things. you know it wasn't just that they're you know, they were weren't, you know, once upon a time, you know, your local politirganized, you know, dances for teenagers know, picnics and so on. i mean so but they've also declined as forms of socializing, real life political engagement. i mean, as a friend of mine has this thing about european parties, you know, the european left, social democrats emerged t of the trade union movement, which were that was a real thing. it was a placed they met each other and they saw each other. and the european center right emerged out of church

organizations and church groups. the christian democrats. and that's gone. and so now you have these kind of shells parties. and one of the effects of that is that politics become r and it's a kind a thing you think about every four years. 's something that professionals do. and ordinary people don't and we may be coming to a moment when that's nowill mean alongside your structural changes. i think having the democratic party sink about what hav people involved means, how to how to create mass participation and energy. we just had an election campaign insful. and one of the reasons it was was because the party ran a big, you know kind of big. were of jolly, you know, people had to physically to warsaw and, you know,ple came and it was fun and, you know, and that was part of what gave what created this energy around the the campaign and it and they organized, you know, chants and they participated. and the democratic party may

also not again, i keep saying the democratic poe mean i mean the democracy coalition might also have to thinkget people engaged again. and how dois

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