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government is a cash flow budget. and the recapitalization of the

nuclear triade is a capital investment. we are talking 40 and 50-year assets. one of the problems we are facing in our budget is it all comes out, it looks like it's in the defense budget. i call it the pigon. there is this bulk of nuclear phodendization that should be considered capital investment. i think that's important for people to realize when you look at the defense budget there is a piece of it that is really something that probably should have been done over the past 30 years that we are trying to do in a hurry. is that your reading? general cotton: it is, sir. the way like to describe it is am responsible for maintaining and the components under me are responsible for maintainin on behalf of the president of the united states. senator king: general whiting you talked about -- we have the best space capabilities and have for many, many years. that's the good news. the bad news is, the dependency that we have on space, which

makes us vulnerable in terms of the relationship with these potential adversaries. what are we doing to think about alternatives to space? for example, i understand recently they are now teaching see lesstryial navigation at annapolis. we need to think how do we reduce our reliance on space assets given the development of capabilities of our adversaries. talk to me how we mitigate this risk. gone to space because of the advantage it brings us. it allow us to operate globally intetherred to -- senator king: w unopposed for years. general whiting: yes, sir. to your point, i know all the services are thinking about this what do we do when our pry -- primary capability may be not available. in space command it's to make sure it doesn't happen. the service vs. their secondary plans are and

all of them have those plans in place. and to your point are tra several of the services, such as the army, navy, and marines also have relatively small but dedicated cadres of space personnel to help their commanders understand the benefits and vulnerabilities of space so they can understand when those times might be they have to go to those secondary plans. senator king: i'm going to talk about those gaps i mentioned at the beginning that i don't want to overemphasize. you have partial responsibility for missile defense. it bothers me that we have been very slow on the issue of directed energy. we are using $2 million, or $5 million missiles to knock down 200,000 or $300,000 drones. this should be a task for directed energy. i hope that's part of missile defense, missile awareness and all branches not you necessarily, but all the branches should be working on

two things. missile defense and hyper sonic defense. those ar strategic game changers that i think we have been slow to develop. is directed energy going to be part of the future? general whiting: two weeks ago i was in huntsville meeting with the mi defense agency. we talked about directed energy. i know that is something they are looking a i agree with you. i think it needs to be part of the future. senator king: i want more than looking at. i want development and soon. i think we should be having a capability in the red sea right now. this is an opportunity to use that capacity. finally, i want to associate myself with my co-chair, senator fischer, on nc-3. that is part of the triade. i congratulate you on the work you are doing. but urge you to accelerate and continue. the whole idea -- the cornerstone of the defense of this country is deterrence.

the adversaries -- adversaries detect a weakness, we are vulnerable. i congratulate you, but want to prod you to keep going ernestly -- earnestly and accelerate the progress. chair reed: senator cotton. senator cotton: thank you for your testimony and thanks to alt men and women who serve under you. general cotton, since deping took power over a decade ago, china's nuclear paragraphsal more than 100%. by 2035 the department anticipates that china's nuclear arsenal will have increased by 500%. how would youthe threat posed to the united states by china's rapidly growing nuclear arsenal? general cotton: as my predecessor said i love this term tpho* tkpweu -- terminology, the breakout that

we saw and the advancements and how quickly the advancements that we are seeing on china to rapidly create a viable triade is breathtaking. senator cotton: unprecedented? the pace at which they are expanding? general is. senator cotton: your statement says they have a triade today. is that correct? general cotton: that is correct.senator cotton: may not be the most cutting edge. they are working on stealth bombers. general cotton: correct. senator cotton: do you think a nation that multiplies its nuclear arsenal as rapidly as china does, especially when governed by communists, is doing so with peaceful intent? general cotton: i think the minimum deterrent strategy that we used to hear that china unlinks themself with as far as their -- that their strategic policy i find hard to believe

that that can still be a policy with the way they are building out there. senator cotton: for years china deterrence, but they also are well-known for a policy called hide and bide, hide your strength and bide your time. do you think it's fair china is shedding that strategy? general cotton: senator, they are showing us their capability and how fast they can grow. senator cotton: they also have had a long declared, formal, policy no first use. does it make sense to expand your nuclear program by 500% and retain the no first use policy? general cotton: i go back to using that as the opening for a minimum deter strategy. that probably is in alignment. what we are seeing not so much. senator cotton: big investment of natural resources to expand

by nuclear weapons if you plan to keep a no first use policy. wouldn't you say? general cotton: even though we haven't heard them say that. you are correct. senator cotton: it will shock everyone to hear the chinese communists have a history of lying. not just aboutheir nuclear weapons. the tibetans would probably have something to say about that. let's look what we are doing to counteract this threat. first, let's stay on the threat. china's nuclear arsenal compare to ours today? general cotton: today we are still superior. but like i said, i think the reality is we are going to have to continue to modernize our current system. we are superior today. senator cotton: today. if china continues on the pace which the department projects by 2035, will they have parity with the united states? general cotton: in the realm of

their land basis thames yes. combined the total forces of china and russia by 2035, would those two countries combined have nuclear overmatch against the united states and the current pace? general cotton: weapons count would be larger than our weapons count. senator cotton: what we are tkoeg. is the b-21 moving quickly enough to meet your future deterrent requirements? general cotton: the limited production rate of the b-21 is the only thing i wish we could do quicker. the fact that that is an incredible sixth generation platform all indications are that that weapons system is moving along at a great pace as far as delivery. . the ability for production. as a war fighters i'd love to have it.

senator cotton: be nice to 100? general cotton: yes, sir. senator cotton: let's look at, i guess, a first generation aircraft, the b-52. i think it's 79 years old now? general cotton: 70. senator cotton: a as old as some senators. we often hear criticism like, well, we're flying aircraft that are older than general cotton. we are flying aircraft that these generals' grandparents for flying. i'm of the if it ain't broke don't fix it philosophy. it's highly effective. why is it critical that the air re-engine b-52 for your needs? general cotton: thank you for that question. it gets picked on quite a bit on

its age but as we look at what the capacity and what the capable is of that weapons system that platform it's amazing. and what that will be able to do for us, and i said earlier, we need to think about thible for it to carry lrso. this is the platform thawill carry lrso. it's the platform that has a lot of mass as far as capability. i want it to have a long-range strike standoff capability even greater than it has. senator accountton: if it's well-maintained, it seems like a big part of our weapons. >> senator warren? senator warren: strategic command is responsible for strategic deterrence including

nuclear weapons. we were already planning to spend $2 trillion to modernize and maintain those weapons over the next 30 years. now we are learning that the cost for those programs are going to be even higher than we anticipated. general cotton, i know you are not responsible for managing these programs, but we turn to your command for your best military advice on what these programs will mean for our national security. general cotton, do you a decisions about how to build our nuclear posture should be based on the most accurate information we have athe time? general cotton: senator, can you rephrase -- senator warren: should we base our decisions based on the most accurate information we've decisions? kip absolutely. senator warren: ok, good.

d.o.d. did motte do that for the sentinel program which will replace all land-based intercontinental ballistic sses. they havedy concluded that the base assumptions for the cost quote quote, weren't particularly valid. when i requested d.o.d. contract with a respected group of outside experts in 2021 to determine the technical feasible of extending the minuteman 3 missile program, instead of buying expensive new weapons, i was told they didn't have contract authoty to do so. that was not true. they just department want an honest assessment of the real risks of sentinel. and since then, the cost of the program has we initially thought the price for sentinel would be about $95 billion. now the air force reports that it will be $132 billion. nearly 40% more. by law, that kind of increase triggers a mandatory revie of

the program's viability. now i'm glad that this review is happening. but we need i experts people who will ask hard questions. we need to ask about the sentinel program, taking a look as well. yen cotton. would you oppose generalan cotton, would you oppose an outside review of the program if it advances our national security? >> senator warren, i agree with the previous assesth the last three administrations in regards to where we are in replacement of the minuteman program. as i said comments what i cannot endure as a combatant commander that has to provide cotas, i cannot endure having a gap or drop in

the reliability of the current platform that we currently have that's part of the triad. >> i appreciate that. what we are going to be replacing it with has been fully vetted and is the right direction for us to go. even before this latest cost breach there were bright ng warnings that this program was not on track. the air force's aggressive schedule meant they were relying on immature technology the time created additional risks of cost increases and schedule delays. best practices for budgeting these complex programs is to develop what is called integrated master schedule, and analysis to break down the project into steps, resources and budget needed to complete it, budgeting one hundred one. sentinel did not have that. general cotton, you warned of the complexity of the sentinel

program, i am quoting challenge air force and industry partners in ways not seen for a generation. let me ask. do you think it's important to have basic program management guard rails in place to help us prevent delays and cost overruns? >> the rest of that statement was you are absolutely right. i said it numerous times, that was going to be a megaproject we haven't seen since the onset of the minuteman real placement in the early 60s. ima taxpayer as well and i want to ensure that we, i have a weapon system that can deliver the capabilities i need to deliver. i also need to make sure that we don't create a larger gap in having assessments that would drive us to now question one leg of the triad in regards to how to produce or have forces

go to it. >> and i appreciate that, general, but we've got to have a plan that's going to work, we can't just keep burning money and say, at some point we hope we can deliver this thing. i am very concerned pentagon officials are already saying, already saying, quote, they will make the trades it takes to keep the sentinel program funded, analysis be damned. i will be watching closely to see if the dod takes this review that's required by law because of cost overruns, looking to see this review seriously or if it is just another paperwork exercise to justify throwing more money at more expensive nuclear programs. thank you, general. >> thank you, senator rounds please. >> thank you, mister chairman. first of all marchese to both

of you thank you for your service to our country and to your teams as well. today we are talking about the most strategic weapons systems our country has. our conventional forces are critical. our convtional forces are only effective because we have the nuclear deterrence and strategic weapons systems to support th general whiting, china and russia both understand how vital our space capably czar to the joint force and they have been developing capabilities to counter our space assets for years which are we currently postured to win a conflict that begins or extends into space? when we take a look at this right now, i really appreciated senator king's comments with regard to the fact that we are ready to f but can

we win that battle, what about 5 and 10 years from now on the current trajectories? >> thank you for the question. today, i am completely clear in saying we have the world's best military space capabilities, i will use the same or general cotton used when we look at what china and russia are doing with their counterspace weapons, they are moving breathtakingly fast and so we must ensure that the investments that have been made the we thanknts continue, those programs continue to execute and we continue to invest to make sure that we keep pace with that breathtaking pace. >> part of that i suspect you provided and you will provide on the priorities list that will likely be sent to congress over the next month or so. if we were to fully fund that unfunded priorities list, how would that impact your readiness in the near-term?

>> the priorities i expect will be on our unfunded priorities list are about improving our posture for the contested domain and to move ahead of the pace that russia and china are moving, that will give us the capacity and capabilities that we believe we need in 3, 5, and 10 years. >> i understand by law the department of these defense services cannot invest funds into a program that's going to be retired within 5 years. this is known as the sunset provision. you have concerns about your legacy systems being to vested too early, and the service secretaries can offer a waiver but are not required but replacement programs don't start to come online until the 2030s if they are on time. if this policy is not changed, how will that impact strategic deterrence? >> thank you for that question

you're referring to title 10, us code 224 alpha. >> imagine you were waiting for that. >> talk about you, and schedule for time and its dispersal. you're absolutely right. we've been talking about it all morning. you always have plans that show overlap between legacy systems and new modernized systems. as i stated earlier, when it comes to strategic deterrence, ional to that and credibility is insuring the transition from legacy system, that there's no gap between the transition between legacy system and modernized system. >> we are talking about modernizing specific parts of the triad right now there's going to be a time that we need to have both systems, the legacy system and the new system operating at it may be more than 5 years. >> that is correct. right now that law would stipulate that you wouldn't modernize components of the

legacy system if you are within 5 years of what you initially saw as a transition to the new system and that could be troublesome. >> the sentinel program is critical to our deterrent capability, correct? >> and modernized replacement of the minuteman system is foundational to the triad. >> can we afford to delay the implementation of the sentinel program? >> we need to be late to the triad. >> what do you mean by that? >> i would much rather and i think my colleagues would agree, i would write rather not have to have a transition of legacy system to modernized systems that are already past their service dates. >> i know my time is running out but i'm going to ask this. i don't think you necessarily had the opportunity to completely respond to the last comments with regard to the sentinel program and the reason why it nee even if the cost goes up and the review is completed, this

is not something we can simply sit back and take our time on. could you respond? will the chairman allow that? >> we cannot, senator rounds, the analysis the assessment that has been done, we need to make the decision in regards to what we need to do as far as modernization of a very important leg of the triad, the land leg of the system. >> senator hirono please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. this is for both of the witnesses. the 2,024 mba and direct the dod to develop a plan for the missile defense of hawaii, military construction project that will enable timely deployment of missile defense

capabilities across all of it. the president signed in december so you have 9days to complete and provide this plan. how is that plan coming along for either one of you? >> i will take that question, last year we took on the plan for trans regional missile defense, operational support and planning. i'm not familiar with where the plan is. if i could take that question for the record i could get back to you with specifics on where that is. >> i'm concerned over time about the missile defense of hawaii. i would like you to contemplate whether we need to mitigate any potential risks from our nuclear competitors as you both have discussed before we have a missile defense plan in place. as you know we had a major

mishap in hawaii which led to my ongoing concerns about missile defense. for general waiting -- general stephen whiting, the consolidation or transfer of the space functions of the national guard which must include cost-benefit analysis for each of the potential futures of these units. the options are the creation of a space national guard, keeping the status quo or transferring these space functions into the space force.xk what is the current role of the national guard in space and how would you transfer the space functions into the space force and what would you need if that's the finding of a study and the reason for the study was that there was some decision made as to what would happen to national guard space units, there was some decision

ka plan or study or cost-benefit analysis that would be to the three options that i mentioned, so what is being contemplated for the national guard space force? >> thank you for the question. from a space command perspective we appreciate the great support we get from a number of states that had their guard units have space missions and it's vital to us that however those options are resolved, we don't have an interruption to those missions i would have to defer to the united states space force for specifics of what options are being analyzed and where they are headed but vital to was that we don't have any interrup missions. >> we have a space function in the national guard in hawaii, these are skilled people. we need to make sure whatever decisions are made based on an

assessment that takes all of these issues into consideration. for stephen whiting, space was previously only used by the government but has become the domain for a new age of commercial satellites for broadband communications and remote sensing. are dod and space command specifically and appropriately leveraging commercial space capabilities? >> thank you for the question. us commercial space industry is one of our absolute national advantages and we' ve leveraged that in the past. i think we can find better and more innovative ways to leverage it going forward. us commercial space industry is moving incredibly fast, widening their lead in commercial space services over other countries and we want to make sure we are partnerewith them as tightly as possible. >> what protections exist for commercial satellites against cyber attack? >> as part of my unified command plan response abilities

i have response ability to protect and defend commercial assets as directed so as we work with these commercial companies we already have information sharing agreements with the companies we are already contracted with for capability and they sit with us at one of our operation centers in california at the highest levels of intelligence to know what those threats are and we share that information and we went to work with them as well to help them harden their cyber infrastructure so that they are not denied due to cyber domain because that would impact our ability to leverage their services. >> under that aspect of protections and cyber domain, private entities need to be sure that they are up on what kind of protections they need to put in place as they work with you to make sure we are all on the same page in terms of cybersecurity issues. than >> thank you very much. >> thank you,

your service, thank you for being here and to all the troops under your command to. i want to get right to it. i need more context on a couple previous points. i start with you, general cotton which in response to a general question from senator fisher. you said something to the effect of adequate standoff capability, could you drill down on that a little bit? are we short in that capacity particularly in the conventional weapons and if so do you have a solution in mind? >> thank you for the question. so i can get more detail in what i meant by that i think as we look at who our adversaries are we would all agree having standoff fire and long-range strike capability will be beneficial for us against an adversary and what i mean by that more specifically,

this is not a parochial statement, just a matter of fact, i to have a bomber carry a long-range strike weapon because range is dependent on the size because it is fuel capacity of the weapon, would be very beneficial for us as a nation to be able to of capability for our bomber force. not just weapons that can be used for a myriad of weapons systems that could be specifically used in a conventional sense for the bomber that gives it incredible standoff, and incredible range and what that does for us, makes it so it doesn't have to hit a tanker as often as well. and actually keep the air and platform out of harm's away. >> well sa in response to something

senator king used in his usual great illustrations of a pig with a pipe on it, referencing a lack of capital budgeting in our system, transparency budgets always frustrated me honestly particularly as relates to the air force. you referenced the role of your command as a national role, understandably, united command. can you flesh that out for me? i have long been concerned that we are not adequately -- i don't want to see appropriating credit where credit is due and cost where cost is due. >> thank you. think, you there's a lot of times there can be a confusion even within a service component that they are advocating for a weapons system or a platform that is utilized

in their operational domain. ely is but when it comes to strategic deterrence weapons and strategic deterrence platforms, that those are national systems and what i mean by that is that we are doing the care and feeding on behalf of systems that ultimately belong, all weapons systems belong to the president of the united states but in particular when we talk terrent weapons, it's much more than the columbia being part of the united states navy or the bomber becoming a part of the united states air force and i think there's probably room for conversation on how do we make that so we don't have to have these conversations on funding >> that was therapeutic for me because silos within the same services are confused, i feel better about my confusion now. thank you for that clarification. i can't look at both of you without noticing that there is

a lack of space in your leadership. speak to that a little bit as i look at the two of you side-by-side and realize in the history of both commands. >> i will start off real quickly. space billets if you will, the majority of our airmen who are space specific. i will tell you that my colleague here, stephen whiting, has a joint force team that assists us. what i am missing is a space component officer, like a one star general, a component linkage to the space component. i have a direct linkage with the air component, air force global strike command and direct with the navy component, joint force maritime command. i don't have a direct linkage. in works with general salzman to fill that bill it because you are also part of the in c3 meetings

that we had here recently and what we really want to do, you saw a lot of that was the space layer and i want to be able to have experts, at a general officer level to articulate the requirement on the space layer. >> i talked about the vulnerability of satcom -- if you could elaborate a little bit to the point. if you would. >> important that we ensure that strategic command has all the insights they need as they rely on the space layer for early warning and protected communications and as general cotton noted, today us-based command provides joint integrated spacing in his headquarters, they sit in omaha to assist with that planning make sure that he has insight into what we are doing so we can best coordinate our plans

together. >> thank you. i want to recognize, and apologize, did not realize you were in the room. >> it's okay. i was ten feet away. i wasn't at my seat. >> i want to follow up on what senator cramer was asking about standoff capability, general cotton. two years since russia's invasion of ukraine, we'ven forced to rethink our nuclear posture and how our own deterrence works with growing nuclear capability of our adversaries. russia recently rejected a proposal to reopen bilateral nuclear arms control talks which their behavior their rhetoric along with chinese aggression north korea's regular testing of ballistic missiles

capabilities iran, increasing its supply of enriched uranium. this underscores the importance of having deterrence ourselves. the long-range standoff missile system developed in tucson critical feature of our future deterrence the ability to deploy dismissal and us bombers is a powerful message to our allies. beyond what senator cramer was asking about standoff more broadly, can you expand on the importance of the lrs so to our overall deterrence and give any updates you have on its fielding? >> thank you for the questio the air leg of the triad composes two mission essential tasks a bombers supposed to do with regard to what the mission set is. gravity bomb deployment and to have long-range standoff strike lrs so is absolutely critical for set

as a long-range standoff nuclear weapon. it will replace outcome that we currently carry. from reports that i'm receiving from the component, the breakdown is doing a great job manufacturing that weapon for us. like everything else, if i get it sooner than later that is good for us for maintaining. >> is the ioc of this weapon public or is it something we would have to talk about downstairs? >> i would rather have that conversation with you downstairs we could talk about that, if it is okay with you, sir. >> reporter: what else do you think we could be doing to deter our adversaries that we are currently not doing? >> i think the earlier

conversation on posture, the current triad. what does that look like? in alignment with the study results of the posture commission and the work the pentagon is doing in response to the posture commission and work we are doing in strat,. i can elaborate in incredible detail in a secure session doing in that regard. >> thank you. different subject here, space priorities framework aims to secure our space industrial base including improving supply or crucial satellite components, like traveling wave tube and traveling wave tube amplifiers. in the united states we face some challenges with limited domestic capabilities and competition from china that is often heavily subsidized and the situation needs supply-chain risks for national security and commercial

satellites. i've got amendment to the defense bill to support developed of a competitive us source for these components and i'm going to keep working on that this year. do you believe it is important for the department of defense to have reliable us source for these subcrical satellionents to ensure timely delivery and fair pricing and what other risks do you see from having inadequate domestic supply-chain for key satellite components? >> i think it is important that we have robust supply chains we don't have that the risk is that this widening lead our commercial space industry has created for us might be stymied and that would give our competitors a chance to catch up so we want to ensure that doesn't happen. >> traveling wave tubes and wave tube amplifiers are kind of obscure components, most folks have not heard of them

but they are important to us maintaining our edge in space technology. so thank you. >> thank you, senator kelly, senator scott. >> thank you, chairman. first thing, thank you for being here. can you talk about how dependence our defense capabilities on our satellite systems? >> yes thank you for the question. the army/navy, air force marines charter, terrestrial forces are sized with the assumption they will have access to space capabilities and because of that, we've been able to reduce the number of forces we have and we can prosecute targets with fewer assets than we would have decades ago. if we don't have access to those space capabilities, if those happen, we don't have the force structure we would need to fight without them so that

is why we have to protect and defend these capabilities against the threats we now see a raid against us. >> how many satellite systems are we dependent on? >> i don't have a number but i can talk about the capabilities satellite communications global positioning system intelligence systems, longworth house office building systems, missile warning systems. there's a host of different capabilities we provide from space. >> so if our adversary was able to demolish, would create much debris? >> almost certainly, yes. >> how much of that doating out there, how much of our satellites would be at risk because of the debris hitting them? >> that is a concern and it is why we monitor the 45,000 trackable objects on orbit, watch for potential conjunctions but we don't want to proliferate debris on orbit

which would increase the risk to our system. >> if you are an adversary wouldn't that be the cheapest thing to do, if you wanted to cripple our ability, wouldn't the cheapest thing to do is go se large satellites that are out there? >> i don't know the cost of that but it would certainly be in credible reckless because it would pollute the very domain they are probably trying to operate in themselves because it isn't just a minute. it impacts our satellites, they are satellites, other countries satellites. it would be incredibly reckless behavior. >> let's take russian forces. if you look at our forces as compared to russia's forces how dependent are they on a satellite system as compared to us? >> they are less dependent for the reason they are a continental power and they run fiber and microwave shots and don't have the same global type

military we do >> how about chieplicated in many ways what we have done in space because if they tried to push us out from the first island chain in the second island chain of this pacific, they've gone to space for the advantage that brings so they are working to replicate the dependency we have. >> if they were able to hamper our abilities or satellite system, they were only focused on taiwan or japan or for sure korea, they need the satellite system to do anything with regard to korea, right? >> i think china are getting to the point forces are becoming space enabled so i think in any conflict they would be reliant on space capability. >> only the power they want to project was korea, taiwan, japan and that was all they

cared about, than they probably wouldn't need their space capabilities as much, would they? >> i think they would need those space capabilities because they are loo those countries and looking at the us and where the us would be flowing forces from and that has required them to go to space. >> how about iran, they don't need it, right? >> iran is not a space enabled military. >> do they have the ability to have any impact on us in space? >> they've not demonstrated that capability but we are watching their sce program and ballistic missile program carefully and can only think what they might be thinking about in the future. >> what about north korea? >> north korea has demonstrated electromagnetic warfare capabilities that could have impacts against our space systems and we are carefully watching their space systems, they should not be launching into space because of the un resolutions that say they can't usechnology for that and trying

to keep an eye on what they might be thinking of in the future. >> our troops in korea need access to space capabilities. in north korea they probably don't. >> north korea is not a space enabled military today. >> our troops in south korea would need it. >> absolutely, senator. >> thank you. >> thank you ranking member for holding this hearing and i would like to thank general cotton and stephen whiting for testifying today in your service to our country. i want to continue on the electromagnetic spectrum on the operations we have because you indicated electro magnetic spectrum operations are a top priority. so you're forces have done amazing work at the joint center for electromagnetic readiness at nellis air force base in my home state of nevada but even with efforts made so far i am sure there's probably more work to be done so what actions do you need to

take to ensure that the united states can deter threats across the electromagnetic spectrum and how can we help with that? >> thank you for the question and thanks for acknowledging the incredible work that team is doing and i would like to highlight some of that work the team is doing and that includes specifically the support to the yukon commander and what we are seeing in the ukrainian efforts as well as support to israel and the fight we are seeing there. that team coming out of the blocks, thank you for acknowledging that. on 26 july last year, we stood up, that's where i was given the responsibility, as you heard throughout the testimony today, electromagnetic spectrum is incredibly important for us.

it is a domain that was uncontested for us over the past 30 years. now that potential fight with adversaries that understand the domain we rely on and the capability to do something to counter have been dominant in that domain it is incredibly important and as the lead combatant command to ensure we have the proper training, the proper virtual and collaborative training techniques because as you know some of what we want to be able to test andin to can't be done in the live environment so we continue to work on -- how do we give them the reps and sets in a virtual environment that shows all ranges of how to contest that?

>> my team is going to follow up on that as we work on next year's in daa thinking about what we need to incredibly important. i'm going to move on to modeling and simulation. we have that forpace too. so i'm going to keep on nellis here, space delta one trains weapons officers at nellis air force base in nevada, they graduate from the pinnacle of training offered by the space force to prepare guardians for what they may feed and more so building on what you may need or you have now the ability to model and simulate, how does this prepare your forces and what can we continue to do to give you that simulation you need because you may not be able to go up there. >> thank you for the question. i know the gre i was stationed there a decade ago as vice president of they are for center model capability, modeling and simulation is foundational for us in the space because as you

allude to it is expensive for us to get there so we can't just launch all sorts of things just to do training although there is an aspect of that we need to do but modeling and simulation allow us to do multiple iterations of various activities and simulate the threats we now see a raid against us so these weapons officers have the skills so they go back to their operational squadrons they can share that among the crew force. the modeling and simulation is absolutely critical to us and we want to continue to grow that capability for all space forces because that will support space command as we move forward. >> we will work with you on that moving forward but speaking of space i will continue with you. considering the reported collaboration between iran and russia and space activity that could challenge our interests and security. can you elaborate a little bit what is happening in iran given iran's progress on their

ballistic missiles and space programs. how might additional sharing we know there is increasing challenges going on there the emerging threats and particularly the uranian threat, can you speak to >> our relationships across the globe with allies and partners is one of our asymmetric advantages. we've signed a number of situational awareness sharing agreements as you allude to with over 30 countries, 3 of those in the middle east and we have ongoing discussions to expand tha as we partner more closely with countries in the middle east it helps us to have a better understanding of what is going on in space so when we see potential bad actors acting we can call out that behavior and it also builds a set of partnerships to deny those partnerships countries like russia and iran so those are important for us to grow them. >> thank you. senator schmidt please. >> thank you. i think i believe this is if

not, one of the mostortant committees in the senate for a variety of reasons. our role in advocating is important but i also think going back home and talking to constituents and having those conversations, what are the threats, hearing get from the man ex things we learn up here. my two questions are related to that conversational about a question i would give somebody at home.er as far as nuclear modernization the price tag of $2 trillion or 30 years. the number is something like that. could both of you sort of address the perception is that the united states has right now all the nuclear weapons we need to blow up the world into oblivion a thousand times over so if you were trying to

explain the importance of this modernization effort, how would each one of you describe that to folks back home, why it is important? >> i will start off. i want to say thank you because the men and women of pinker air force base and the work they are doing in regards to a bomber camp that is being built out there for one leg of the triad is incredibly important. ou way we should be able to frame it is it's not a one for one. it is not one of these conversations where we are talking about how you have to have a 1-for-1 or overmatched of those type of things. as we already know, the russians have more weapons than we have today but we absolutely hold them at risk. the way i would describe it to people is you need to

understand, it is a proposition in regards to cost analysis which i want to be able to deter because my adversary understands that the risk of them taking an action would fail upon arrival to meet their ultimate needs. it is a cost benefit analysis model if you will and that is what strategic deterrence truly is a way we use the cost benefit analysis tool is three legs of the triad. >> as far as the modernization itself how would you describe why that is important. of the perception is we have everything we need to deter we can wipe a country off of the face of the earth. >> we must have the ability to have weapons systems and platforms, training environment etc. the adversary for deterrence, the adversary always gets a

vote, the adversary to understand the cost/benefit of them taking action won't outweigh and the modernized systems can hold them at risk. >> thank you for the question. for space the challenge is the american people can't look up and see the space sys they don't even realize the weight is enabling the modern way of life. i think it's important we remind the american people of all th great advantages space gives us the we can synchronize global stock markets and point of sale and precision farming and if we lost all of that, our modern way of life would be at risk and that is why we have to protect and defend those capabilities and bankers investments. it is incumbent on all of us to make people understand how space is truly a part of their life even if they can't see it. >> for each of you and your domains here, if you could identify one thing a non-unclassified setting, one thing that keeps you up at

night about china's capabilities, explain that threat to folks back home who don't understand the specifics what would that be? >> for me, it is their capacity, capability to build out their weapons systems in their arsenal. it is that simple. the pace at which they can, the vers thathey drive or do not drive, idle or accelerate, lar. what's most concerning is the way china has clinically studied to us and our dependency on space and figure out what they think our architecture looks like and rapidly building systems to hold the architecture. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> i suggest the simplest answer is we want our adversaries to be scared so they don't try anything. >> i agree with that.

i want to make sure we talk about the modernization, how does that fit into the discussion? >> the space scare. >> senator shaheen please. >> thank you, stephen whiting, antohy cotton, for beice. senator kelly asked what we could be doing to deter our adversaries, what else we could be doing to deter our adversaries and i appreciated the time we spend yesterday and one of the things we talked about was just how critical passing the supplemental bill and getting a budget process that is regular, that can be depended upon, insuring that you can accomplish your mission. is that correct? >> yes, it was great speaking with you yesterday. i would even capture continuing

resolutions for us. especially in my platform where everything that i own is being modernized. folks are quick to not realize there's new start proams that are embedded in these large programs folks will think are already underway and i had just mentioned to senator schmidt, for example, they are building a new bomber campus for sustainment not only of the b-52 but the be 21 moving forward. continuing resolution could preserve that. if you preserve anything in a larger program it subsequently can affect the program overall and we have conversations of a program slipping so yes,e budget, on-time budgets are incredibly critical for us as we are making this modernization not only across my portfolio but across the entire department. >> can you speak to what is in the national security

supplement will bill we passed out of the senate that is critical to our defense industrial base and why that matters as you are looking at rebuilding, insuring the nuclear triad remains credible? >> the majority is not necessarily a part of my portfolio but it does touch on the industrial base, which touches all of our portfolios if you will in regards of how do we strengthen that because that's foundational for our nation, more than a department of defense issue. >> one of the things that i think you alluded to was the end game we are at with russia in terms of bilateral

negotiations, any sort of new start treaty or effort to reduce nuclear weapons but can you talk about vladimir putin's recent rhetoric around using nuclear weapons and how concerned you are about that? the conversation is i'm absolutely a proponent of treaties but everyone has to play and follow the rules so yes. what i would love to see china stepped up, and want to have a negotiation with us, to see russia come back, absolutely but i'm a realist and understand that may or may not happen so my job is to understand how do i build a force i can present to the president if that doesn't happen, but to your point on what we think what we are

seeing is the president of the russian federation sees that hee that as a coercion tool to threaten in regards to what he has as far as a nuclear force. >> darling and other commercial satellite ventures have been a complement to our operations in space but of course there have been some issues around how they are being used and we have to ensure that we have the appropriate mechanisms in place to guarantee access. how should we be thinking about that and what are you doing to mitigate the risk that we might half by relying on a commercial source for some of those services? >> i would point to two aspects which help mitigate that risk, number one in all of my experience, i have only known that every company we contracted with for satellite communications always fulfilled their contractual obligations

to us and i would expect that going forward and want to make sure we are writing those contracts smartly to ensure we are getting that and secondly i would point to the fact in satellite communications we want a hybrid architecture where there are some constellations we need purpose built for the government, exclusive use of the government. our work in support of general cotton as we provide nuclear command and control, protected communications to ensure the president, secretary of defense geheir forces, we want that to be a government-owned constellation but other communication requirements we for so it is understanding what those highest priority requirements are and satisfying those through our own systems and using commercial to the maximum extent we can, that is how we mitigate risk. >> thank you. i have other questions but i will save those for the closed session. >> thank you very much. >> thank you both for being here today.

general stephen whiting, your predecessor told this committee space, is creating concepts for space, generate advantages around the globe. press release from your recent visit to u.s. army space and missile defense command mentions army space professionals operating across multiple domains including cyber and space to support war fighters especially for deploying special operations forces. can you briefly talk about the nexus between space, cyber and soft? >> thank you forst we see it as a unique opportunity to bring together these three capabilities to help us achieve our mission. there's times using space, we can create access for cyberforces who can support special operations forces or special operation forces gain access to certain geographic locations can help us in our space mission executing functions that support us so i have spoken to

the commander special operations command, spoken to our army comso leveraged the fact that our navy and marine corps components are also cybercomponents so that gives us a unique pairing there as >> thank you for that. sounds sound like a 2-way street. just as much as space enables the joint force, physical access soft provides enables could go space operations. correct? >> absolutely correct. >> given proposed cuts to army soft there will be reduced capacity to fill combatant commander requirements which i know the demand is up. geographical combatant commands. do you anticipate any impacts on your command operations should those cuts to soft move forward over the next few years? >> no, i don't. >> it's a 2 way street but you don't see that it will you with soft cuts? >> i've not been briefed on any of the work we've been doing

with special operations command that will specifically impact us. >> switching gears a bit, last year i asked your predecessor how he would help our satellite constellations given they are often deployed with minimum number of satellites necessary. how would you answer the same question about advanced threats? >> thank you for the question. today our constellations are optimized for a benign environment, we have to protect and defend those constellations until we develop the next generation of resilience constellations. that is ongoing, deploy those next generation on capabilities but we have to protect and defend our current ones for years to come. we have to focus on those capabilities.

>> reporter: >> this ensures minuteman's continued operational ways. as such, how important is it to conduct regular test launches to demonstrate the nuclear deterrent, reliable and effective? >> we want to have an ability to survey all all three legs to include those forces as well.v9 >> you've spoken about the need to maximize partnerships with interagency commercial industry and academia so why is this in the space capabilities. >> department service, command and it's an asymmetrical

advantage, to achieve our goals so that is why we want to partner as widely as we can because it maximizes our ability to execute our mission. >> thank you very much. thank you very much. >> thank you, mister chairman. in your written testimony, you acknowledged the import of the refueling tanker, with installations, highlighting the air force's upcoming refueling are tanker l, for operations including those involving multiple combatant commands. my quest robust refueling tanker fleet sustain these missions if you can elaborate that and also elaborate on how the acquisition of the new kc 46 tankers, to expand current capabilities. >> thank you for the question.

something that makes us unique as a fighting force is we have a ability to fly the entire globe. even at its onset the tanker and the bomber were both complementary acquisitions. it gives us incredible reach. that being said, that is why it is such a unique relationship between the tanker force and our bomber force. insuring we have sustainable and enough tankers to make them a requirement. pay attention to the availability of the tanker -- jackie is a dear friend -- to ensure there is no

disconnect in requirements. that can be stretched with the requirements the tanker force has on non-weapons system movement, the don't include bombers, providing forces forward etc. etc. so we have to make sure we pay attention and see those acquisitions not only nuclear triad, but those acquisition programs are on time and healthy as well. >> i suspect the new kc 46 will be around a long time. that mission won't go anywhere soon and it could be a 50 year mission and b-52s are likely to be in excess of 50 years. is that an accurate statement in regards to the kc 46? >> don't know how long the

tanker community plans on having a kc 46 use legacy as a measure, the kc one 45 has been around a long time as well. >> absolutely. as you know northern strike in michigan is the dod's largest annual joint reserve component readiness exercise that takes place in the country, over 7000 service members from 25 states and several international partners converge at the national war fighting center which is known as nedwick for training on multi-domain conflicts. it's one of my top priorities to ensure northern strike continues to funding to support realistic joint force training with our global allies and partners and part preparation for future conflict requires training for our armed forces to fight and win in the electromagnetic spectrum.

what role do you see state-of-the-art training centers like nedwith in preparing for this electro magnetic challenge that will likely get more significant? >> thank you for the question. what is key is ensuring participants of those exercises are given the true challenges they could face and drive the techniques, tactics, and procedures because some of it is as simple as that. having live opportunities training venues are important as well, understanding having good live training venue may not be feasible but having a virtual one is. continued support in having push for that type of training venue would be important.

>> for recognizing, we will convene immediately after this open session in alosed 217, let me pass it to senator shaheen. >> thank you both for being here today. thank you for emphasizing the importance and modernization of the b-52 fleet and keeping them in the air especially all that work being done in oklahoma, tinker will be the maintenance center for the new be 2 take on the new mission, general cotton, question for you. oklahoma is proud to invest the investments to support the

bomber modernization. can you speak of the benefit this brings to the leg of the triad. >> absolutely. it is absolutely foundational. tinker and the teammates that are there to support that mission leg on behalf of men and women of air force global strike command, is absolutely critical. the fact that we are expanding and building a bomber campus in preparation of be 20 one. it is going to be extremely important. .. the production of the b-52-j as we go through the commercial engine replacement program for that jet senator mullen: in addition t what is the next technological frontier for protecting our electronic communications and weapons systems?

>> obviously its protection systems and my colleague to the left also plays an important role in that. but more so one of the things we are finding and that was noted through both northern edge 21 and northern edge 23 exercises he men and women that are put in those situations understand there are techniques, tactics and procedures that can avoid having, being a susceptible to the interference that you might see in the spectrum domain. i mentioned earlier the realities of us recognizing that domain is going to be contest it appears we have a new. adversary that we have now and being able to identify and find waysys to ensure that we can fight in that domain at our choosing is going to be incredibly important. >> general whiting doing to speak about that? >> yes. electromagnetic spectrum is

vital to us, the way to get information back from space. that's her satellite g communications, our missile warning, our position navigation and timing and so we absolutely have to ensure we can operate there free of any inference that we see. we definitely want to look to technology that can help us reduce that susceptibility to jimmy, for example. i think things like laser t communications can help with that and i like to see this investment continue moving forward. >> currently with a company that her station is working on a quantum physics-based communication techniques. is that a help, a big role for you guys? >> senator i think it could be. that's one ofat those new technologies that would give us away perhaps to defeat traditional jamming techniques. and so i certainly would encourage the researchh lab and the science and technology community to continue work on that. and for companies to bring

mature capabilities forward in that area. >> is our defense industry capable to make changes when working on a system that they say is three years four years out some cases most of in the seventh? are theybl able to pivot when new technology comes on? because obviously this is a growing concern and a growing space. so there's new finds new technology that's coming on constantly. are we able to pivot? i hold out for both of you all and defense to say yes we want to start moving this direction. >> n.for us as a lookn programs across a portfolio, what we're seeing that stupid in the way we want to do business, senator is through modularity. so having the opportunity for modularity is going to be critical for us and crucial for us because and we can outpace an stay ahead of that adversary. >> senator i would add we want to work with the companies that have existed for a long time and

help them to see the requirements to make the pivot what also we want to make sure we have relationship with new start up companies that may not be burdened by the way things have happened in the past and can now move right to the future. we want to make sure with them an opportunity to compete for our requirements and we can help move them to that valley of death they call successful programs forward. >> thank you guys. see you inn just minutes in the skiff. yield back. >> thank you. senator king, did you have a second that you wanted to do? we're going to turn for 15 minutes so senators can vote and go into closed session in the sec, so at this point we will close the open session.udible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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