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pressing issues. the house select intelligence committee hearing is the house select intelligence committee hearing is nearly three hours. [inaudible conversatns] >> the committee will come to order. without objection the chair mayk declare a recess at any time. today we come to discuss the intelligence communities 2024 annual threat assessment we begin with an open session has been broadcast live and streamed on the committee's and youtube channel. open session cth is entirely unclassified. allun, participants are remindeo refrain classified information or other informationub protected from public disclosure. on the conclusion of the open session we will recess and resume in a closed session and commit him group at two p.m. or immediately following the first

vote series scheduled from 130 time mac-2 ten. we will proceed wh without any disruptions. any disruption of the committeed will result in the united states capitol police restoring order and the protesters will be removed and arrested.re it is my pleasure to welcome our renowned group intelligence community leaders. during today's proceedings, wef will hear from the honorablers avril haines, director of national intelligence;ng the honorable wliam burns, director of the centralof intelligence agency; the honorable christopher wray, director of the federal bureau of investigation; general timothyaugh, director of the national security agency andd commander of the u.s. cyber command; and lieutenant general jeffrey kruse, director of theom defense intelligence agency. i want to pause for just a minute to give my personal thanks to director burns and to director haines. the manner in which you work with this committee over the past, over a year now and both a bipartisan way come working with jimes himes, myself and all members making sure we havinforg available for discussion on important issues i greatly

appreciate a your contributionso the success of this committee and i wanted c to recognize tha. the annual threat assessment hearing provides the intelligence community an opportunity to update congress and the american people on serious threats to our national security. the intelligence community exists to protect the american people by informing policy and decision-makers of the threats posed to national security, which includes critical security, cyber security, food security, and several other components of national security. each year the world evolves, growing more interdependent. our adversaries are aligning, and emerging technologies are changing the operational environment. we are in the midst of a shifting geopolitical landscape wi sompetition at the forefront. now, more than at any other time, at least since the cold war, nation-state threats are dominating the united states' national security concerns. beijing, moscow, and tehran are anti-american and working together domestically, regionally, and internationally. these common adversaries have overlapping interests and approaches..

examples include russia's invasion of ukraine, hamas' attack on israel and continuedpr iranian proxy assaults in the region, and the people's republic of china's regularue military show of force threatening taiwan. also concerning is pyongyang's recent tests of the north korean intercontinental ballistic missile hwasong-18, based on the missile's flight data, south korea and japan assess this north korean capability has the potential range to strike the united states. this is a flagrant violation of u.n. security council resolutions. over the last year, the committee has conducted numerous engagements both in and beyond the scif. one area that seems fragmented and vague is the foreign/domestic divide. there are heightened threats atc the border, and the homeland is under constant assault, whetherr it be from cyber-attacks, counterintelligence threats, or foreign malign influence. what is not clear is how the intelligence community communicates those threats to other federal, state, local, tribal, or private sector partners.

the lack of clarity on this issue raises the question of whether the federal government is organized appropriately and prepared to defend the united states against the kinds of threats the american people face from our foreign adversaries here. on more than one occasion, somef threats to homeland security from the people's republic of china. the prc is compromising and maintaining persistent access to u.s. critical infrastructure. as stated in an unclassified cybersecurity advisory published to the public last month, the prc is targeting and has already compromised telecommunications,, energy, transportio water sectors. to quote this advisory, in some cases, the cyber actors haveve been living inside information o pre-position for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the united states. remember, , these advisor state that this activity has been going on for years. that is i think the threat we need to rise to as an

understanding that this is not a new phenomenon of the prc targeting assets and infrastructure of the united states. in addition to pre-positioning in critical infrastructure, china seeks to be a world power in science and technology by any means possible.. this poses a significant counterintelligence threat to u.s. and allied partners. china is attempting to advance as a technology superpower by offering investment and acquiring or stealing intellectual property in fields like power and energy, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, agriculture, quantum computing, and russia continues an unjust war against ukraine's sovereignty, bolstering its defense production by leveraging relationships with china and iran. and we should not forget that i north korean munitions factories are supplying russia with weapons and artillery shells to use against ukraine. we look forward to further insights on russia's nuclear posture, directed energy weapons, anti-satellite capabilities in space, and ground-based anti-satellite missiles designed to target u.s. and allied satellites. iran, which is also benefitting

from closer ties with china and russia, has built and funded a iran's regional objectives. iran supported hamas' attack on israel and continues to back hamas. iran provides weapons and intelligence for terrorist attacks on u.s. personnel and installations in the region and terrorist attacks on the global supply chain transiting the red sea. last year, during the annual threat assessment hearing, i set forth the committee's plan for the reauthorization of fisa section 702. an immense amount of committee work has gone into our bill reforming fisa. we produced a strong bill that puts in place the appropriate compliance guardrails and provides the tools necessary to protect our country.mp we know the importance of this authority, and we know the danger to america and our allies if the intelligence community does not have the capability to produce intelligence from fisa 702 collection. there is a perceived lack of accountability that is the most troubling aspect for congress the intelligence community is doing the right thing, reporting

wrongdoing, taking responsibility, correcting actions, and monitoring. that is why our fisa bill aggressively reforms the fisa processes to address past abuses. in the face o a challenges, the intelligence community's core mission stands, which is to identify foreign threats and provide warning to protect americans. our committee oversight workib takes this very seriously as we continually examine areas for improvement and provide bipartisan legislative solutions where needed. today, you will hear questions from our members on various interest areas. to be respectful of everyone's time, i ask that you be direct and succinct in your responses. with that, i look forward to hearing your answer thorstein panel andst i recognize ranking member himes forceful remarks. >> welcome for 20 for the first time as the directors of nsa an) dia. this annular ring is a vital part of our oversight. it's a unique chance for the

public are directly from each of you about tessment of a range of threats and issues. the stuff that we every single day behind closed doors. the world can sometimes feel as though it's straining under the weight of conflict putin's ongoing assault in ukraine, the people's republic of china saber writing at a democratic taiwan come to during situation may could go on. my point is we need the public to see that we have dedicated and objective intelligence community that can soberly tepresent these complicated threats and challenges based on fact and rigorous analysis. we in hpsci to see the stand on a classified basis at the no your appearances today well help reinforce that. i will return to this during my question is what we are amidst another presidential election. in previous federal campaign cycles we know that foreign powers have attempted to interfere, and the latest the assessment by the ic says it's a possibility that they may do so

again. we need to ensure and in no way do i disagree with any of the catalogue of foreign threats that the chairman laid out i agree with them in their entirety but we need to ensure in particular that foreigners stay out of american elections, period. and we need the community to credibly collect against and warn the public when they determine such malign activities targeting our political process are occurring. i would be a focus on this threat in the months ahead and i'm pleased this committee will have the c opportunity to receie the classified update next week at the working level. we've seen past interference efforts by russia, chinaor and iran among others of different sorts and with every reason to believe some or all of them will try again. i'm particularly concerned that putin is exploring opportunities because he has already+l done so in part and because he has a lot to gain. i hope you will give us a sense of what the russian leaders

caicos may look like as well as that of other potential actors. i will alsols note this will be the first general election in the air of generative and i which can create realistic video photos, audio and text at a scale and sophistication that was unimaginable just agi year ago. we need to be ready. the ic's job is to focus its collective powers outward to protect our nation but i feel strongly some of the greatest threats to our security and the world security unfortunately or homegrown. i fear we are slouching towards an election in which decisions will be made based on what excites is, what enrages us, what in raptures as, that we will substitute for t ccal faculties that are essential for a citizen in in a democracy,a self-satisfied scratching of our prior beliefs and politicalr> opinions. i tell my constituent regularly that you will all work very hard, we will work hard to try

to take outke the temperature cd intelligence of our politics, but at the end of the day americans and their decisions about how they will act as citizens of a democracy would get the democracy that they deserve. we are faltering w toh support ukraine. the russian leader has been emboldened to believe that he can snatch victory from the jaws ofm defeat. our ukrainian partners have fought with incredible courage against the russian war machine and they have won victories that were beyond anyone's expectation. it appears, however, we lost our nerve at the critical juncture. burns, he recently returned from another visit to kyiv. i hope you will share some reflections on what's at stake and urgency with whicht we need and in the category of self-imposed crazies, i am deeply concerned section 702 a

fight expires in just over a month unless the congress acts. as the ice witnesses can attest 702 702 is our most important intelligence authority and we ed to reauthorize it right away. i appreciate all the work the witnesses at the table of the to help make that the case but we're not done yet. before turning back toe to touch briefly on technology adoption and innovation in the ic. i have longti championed it does work and authored a report on the topic several years ago. for all of china's strengths they cannot compete with the entrepreneurial culture and the innovation that would regulate the chief here in the united states. getting that innovation into the ic's mission and into the kyrgyz mission is going to define our success over the next decade. od displaced debating whether capital ship will come how ip should be protected, whether we should shut down a chinese owned social media platform. the merits of those efforts are open to debate, but if we continue to innovate the way we always have we will win.

so i thank you all for being here. i look forward to what will hopefully be a very valuable session for the american public, and i yield back. >> thank you mr. himes. i will now turn to avril haines director of national intelligence will be presented . >> thank you so much, chairman turner, ranking member himes, members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to alongside my wonderful colleagues to present the ic's annual threat assessment. before a start i want to publicly thank the people of the intelligence community, from the collector to the endless and everyone in between. we areg presenting the result of their labor at this hearing. they worked tirelessly everyday to keep our country safe and prosperous, and we're all very proud to represent them. and also want to take the opportunity to thank all of you for the extraordinary support that you've shown to the intelligence community. the ic's relationship with itsmu

oversight committees quite obviously is critically important, and you're all work with us on a bipartisan basis that is a special inspiring in todas environment, and we are grateful for your encouragement and for your wisdom. today the united states faces an increasingly complex and interconnecteded threat environmentt characterized by really threeng categories of challenges. the first is an accelerating strategic competition with major auoritarian powers that are actively workingar to undermine the rules-based rule open international system that the united stateste and our commerce, free flow of information and accountability to the truth. the second category is a set of more intense and unpredictable trsnational u challenges such as climateru change, corruption, narcotics trafficking, health security, terrorism cybercrime that often interact with traditional state-based political, economical and security challenges.

and the thirdrd category is reachable and localized conflicts that have far-reaching and at times cascading locations, download for neighboring countries but also for the world. and all three challenges are affected by trends in new and emerging technologies, environmental changes and economic strain that are stoking instability and making it that much more challenging for us to forecast the developments and their implications. and these dynamics are putting unprecedented burdens on the institutions and the relationships that the united states relies on to manage such a challenges, and perhaps more than ever highlight the need for sustained u.s. leadership to uphold the rules-based order. and i will just touch on these three categories of challs starting with strategic competition in china. an endeavor to provide some context and highlight some of the intersections. president xi continues■d to envision chinese as a leading power on the world stage, chinese leaders believe it is essential to project powerct

globally noted to be able to resist u.s. pressure so they're convinced the united states will not tolerate a powerful china. nevertheless, the prc seeks to ensurehian maintain positive ties to the united states and will likely continue to do so this year. as he seeks to build a relationship is important to the capacity to attract our direct investment. boosting the domestic economy is a fundamental priority for on a long-term growth strategy that will deepen public and investor pessimism over the nearr term. with youth unemployment around 14.9%, no major stimulus aimed at consumption forthcoming, massive local debt, and a property market contraction 2024 is likely to be another difficult year for4 china's economy. all against the backdrop of an aging and shrinking population and slowing economic growth. president xi is counting on china's investments in

technologies such as advanced manufacturing and robotics, artificial intelligence, high-performance computing to drive productivity gains and spur growth in the future. yet he's increasingly concerned about the united states ability to interfere with china's technological goals. consequently endeavor to protect and china's capacity to compete technologically which president xi views as fundamental to its long-term growth strategy,wt prc economic retaliation against the united states over the last year imposing some tangible cost on u.s. firms, even as they continue to moderate such actions to avoid domestic costse chinese leadership is furthermore pursuing a strategy to boost china's indigenous innovation and technological self-reliance, expand their efforts to acquire steel or compel the production of intellectual property and continue to engage in coercive behavior to control critical global supply chains of

relevance. in the meantime president xi is emphasis on control and central oversight is unlikely to solve the challenges posed by china's endemic corruption, demographic decline and structural economic constraint. over the coming year tension between these challenges and china's aspirations for greater joech political power will probably become all the more apparent. and given its ambitions beijing will continue to use its military forces to intids and te regions actions in accordance with the prc's priorities. we expect thes. pla will field more advancedeploy new technologies and grow more confident in joint operations with a particular focus on taiwan and the western pacific. the role intended for china's going nuclear forces and cyber capabilities in this effort and the ultimate intent he had unprecedented growthd in these areas remain priorits for us in the ic and you are not unrelated to the actions in russia. president putin's war

continues unabated. ukraine's retreat from their struggle to stave off further territorial losses in the past 's military capabilities and the declining availability of external military aid. the assistant that is contemplated in the supplemental is absolutely critical to ukraine's defense right now, and without that assistance it is hard to imagine how ukraine will be able to maintain the extremely hard-fought advances it has made against the russians, especially given the■d mucin production and purchase from north korea and iran. urwh meanwhile, president putin is increasingly, increasing defense spending in russia, reversing his long-standing reluctance to devote a high percentage of gdp to the military as he looks to rebuild. the fact rush has paid an enormous price for the war in ukraine. not only has russia suffered more military losses than at any time since world war ii, casuald

thousands of tanks and armored combat vehicles setting them back yea, has also precipitated finland and sweden's membership in nato which putin believes requires an expansion of russia's ground forces. putin continues to judge that time is on his side in the most largerly assumes a better equipped military will also serve the purpose of driving that point home to western audiences. such messaging is important because putin's strategic goals remain unchanged. het of western support to ukraine as reinforcing his long-held belief that the united states and europe seek to restrict russian power and undermine him. and, of course, in the meantime russia continue to modernize and fortify its nuclear weapons capabilities even that e maintas the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile, and we remain concerned moscow will put at greater risk long-standing global norms against the use of

weapons, and includingea in spae and in the cyber domain. another critical intersection we are monitoring is the relationshipng the governments of russia, north korea, china and iran, which is evolving as these four count web of bilateral and in some cases bilateral arrangements. this growing cooperation and willingness to exchange aid and military cut economind intellige matters enhances the individual capacities, enables them to cooperate on competitive actions compasses into further undermines the rules-based order and gives up in each some insulation for external international pressure. nevertheless, we assess the relationships relationship will remain far short of formal alliances or a multilateral access. parochial interest come desire to avoid entanglements and willingness of■ from each others actions will likely limit their cooperation and ensure it advances incrementally, absent

directing conflict between what of these countries and the united states. nevertheless, the power dynamics are shiftinghe among them and ts is creating newges. in particular russia's need for support in the context of ukraine has forced it to grants of long-standing concessions to china and north korea and iran withth the potential to undermie among other thingsam long-held nonproliferation norms. and as i noted in beginning intensifying transnational challenges are interacting with his more traditional threats. for example, with the advent of degenerative eye, state and nonstate actors who are interested in conducting foreign allied interest operations to longer need to master a new language or create potentially come to create potentiallyhe ths exploiting these tools and technologies to undercut u.s. interest and democracy is particular potent as voters go to the polls in more than 60 elections around the globe this year. we've also seen a massive increase in the number of

ransomware attacks globally which went up roughly 74% in 23 from what it was in 2022. u.s. entities with the most these are conducted by nonstate actors with the russia-based cyber criminal group lock bed remains the most popular ransomware services of provider. so i can ransomware as a service provider. responsible for new record of all claims attacks leading to a joint effort by the 11 countries to cease its resources and take down its online domain. organizations and human smuggling operations increasingly exploit migrant through extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking and the particular the threat from illicit drugs remains at historic levels with mexican transnational criminal organizations supplying and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl into the united states. more than 100,000 americans have died from drug related overdoses during the past year,nd deaths n

attributed to elicit fentanyl. as such the threat from fentanyl and other syntheticen drugs to e health and welfare of everyday amerans remain a top■■ priority for the intelligence community. in the third category with multiple regional conflict with far-reaching implications perhaps nowhere more obviously than in the middle east. the crisis in gaza is a stark example of how regional developments have the potential for broader and even global now, having lasted for more than five months the gaza conflict as one of the middle of these with renewed instability presenting new security paradigms and humanitarian challenges while pulling in a range of actors. the conflict has prompted new dynamics even as it has entrenched old ones. we continue to assess that has bowl and a rented not cause an escalation of the conflict that polls as read and then into a full out war. yet the houthis and we willingan to do so withot iran acting first come become one of the most aggressive actors in the conflict. the iranian of on militia groups and iraq ingn syria that it been

attacking our forces have been more focused on the united states an issue using the concert as an opportunity to pursue their own agenda.f galvanized by the and range of factors run the world and while it is too early to tell it is likely the gaza crisis will have generational impact on terrorism. irboth al-qaeda and isis inspired by thomas have directed supporters to conduct attacks against israel and u.s. interests, ande how it is inspiring individuals to conduct acts of anti-semitism and islamophobic terror worldwide. and in this third category region with localized conflicts we have many more we might discuss including haiti, sudan, what is happening in the eastern democratic republic congo, and the list goes on. this brings me to section 702 of the foreign intelligence surveillance act as a smidgen which will expel onnc april 19 without congressional action. the intelligence gathered pursuant to section 702 was essentially preparing this annual assessment and is absolutely fundamental to every aspect of ouro work.

section 702 provides unique insights into foreign intelligence targets such as for episodes, terrorist organizations including hamas, weapons proliferators, spies, malicious cyber actors and fentanyl traffickers. it does so at a speed and reliil cannot replace any other authority. as congress pursues reauthorization we understand there wille reforms and we support those to bolster the complaint and oversight regimes in place today while preserving the operational agility that it's vital to keeping the nation safe and weuch of this committee has worked on that option. we thank you very much and look forward to your questions. >> thank you, director haines. i als want to thank director burns, director haines, director wray and, of course, a former director of nsa nakasone for your assistance and the process that this committee undertook in drafting our 702 bill

and reauthorization. the reforms that are in thatt bill, this committee worked very diligently responded to each of the areas where we found abuses, and this bill not only continues the ability for the intelligence community to collect intelligence on foreigners abroad, not american citizens can foreigners abroad, it also addresses the concerns that we had and the concerns that have been part of the public discussion in congress of abuses and i appreciate thedi fact that you have not only cooperated with us butth y the overall process of drafting that and in your advocacy for it. director wray, you have been republic over the past several months and including yesterday in the worldwide threats during in front of the senate. on the morning of the potential terrorist attack occurring in the united states, the intelligence that we see is clear and i appreciate that you publicly entered into the

discussion of a threat and concern we are currently facing. people who want to doountry illegally and are here. now, you have continued to cite that morni would like your comments on you believe that we are at significant risk right now here from the possibility of a terrorist attack? >> i believe that the terrorist threat level that we're contending with right now is at a whole nother level from an already heightened terrorist threat s level that we were seeg even before october 7. and i say that for a variety of reasons. first, you've seen a veritable rogues gallery of foreign terrorist organizations calling t we haven't seen ins against us a long, long time. and these are terrorist organizations, as this committee knows very well, which up until do i o m to eye on this. i would add to that, that we are

very concerned about the risk of inspired attacks, loan actors here, inspired by some of the same calls for violence from over in the middle east. so this is a time not for panic but for heightened vigilance given the risk. >> direct way i'm going to a couple question about the s fbi's role in designated individuals as known terrorists suspected terrorist and on the no-fly list. with a terrorist organization or have the intent to undertake a terrorist attack, there are designated categories, known terrorists, suspected terrorists, no-fly list and selectee. could you describe the fbi's role in those designations? >> so the fbi maintains the so-called terrorist watch list, the known or suspected terrorist list, based on information that comes from a variety of sources. that could come from fbi investigative work, but very

often a it comes from information from our, from our intelligence partners. or fm oth sources, other agencies. and so that's when the so-called drog, the derogatory information about the individl, puts them on the list. and then armed with that list, that's what allows us to engage with dhs as a running -- as they're in. >> who with designates someone on the no-fly list? >> well, the difference between no-fly list and the selectee list i guess i would say is they are both individuals who based on the list don't shouldn't fly, and then there are those who are identified for heightened screening. and it, interagency process determines who's in which category. >> what's the fbi's role in that? >> well, the fbi contributes its own threat intelligence, and obviously, maintains the watch

list itself. >> and the no-fly list is maintained by the fbi? ■, 81>> that's my understanding. >> have any individuals who are known terrorists, suspected terrorists or who are on the no-fly list presented themselves at the southern border or been apprehended crossing illegally into the united states? >> we have seen over the last, i think, five years an increase in the number of ksts or known or suspected terrorists attempting to cross the southern border. >> have i the knownist list, suspected terrorist list on no-fly if list presented themselves at a u.s. airports once entering the un to fly? >> i believe the answer to that is yes as well, although i don't have that right in front of kno? if. >> well, there may have been instances where as part of an investigation if in close coordination in order to be able

to potentially ap apprehend somebody, somebody's allowed to fly in order to see where they're going and then take action. but not intentionally. >> have individuals on the no-fly list been permitted to fly? >> i believe, again, depends on what time period you're talking about, but i believe there have been individuals where, in coordination with investigators and other agencies, an individual that we want to see where they're going is and be that there may have beenst situations where somebody's allowed to fly in that situation. >> does the fbi have a role if someone presents an, a u.s. airport with the intent to fly that is on the no-fly list, the fbi involved in permitting tm to fly or down graigd their status the for them to fly? >> not. no. well, we provide information toy that's involved at the airport

screening, but the decision to allow them to fly is not ours. >> are you no-fly list shows up and wants to fly? >> certainly most of the time, that's my understanding, yes. >> thank you. director burns, director haines, ukraine is a significant issue for the united states as we are, unfortunately, in a position where we are caught up in the legislative process that has not yet resolved the issue of continued u.s. support for ukraine as they struggle on the battlefield against russia and ukraine, russian aggression. director burns, there are stillk in that this war, this aggression by russia where they've invaded ukraine, is about russia wanting to prevent ukraine from being in

nato or perhaps if even that russia instigated this incursion by russia or that russia itself is trying to counter nato in ukraine. this conflict's much more than that, isn't it, director burns? if help us understand this conflict -- you've served as the u.s. ambassador to well. you've seen the intelligence. you have been active in working with ukraine and this administration on this issue. what is this conflict about, and what is putin seeking in ukraine? >> i think what vladimir putin seeks, what caused him to launch his brutal and unprovoked invasion about two years ago was his fixation on subjugating ukraine and controlling its choices, much broader than the issue of nato. i think putin, and i've heard him say this many times in the past, believes that ukraine isn't a real country, that it's weak and divided, and what

ukrainians have done is de countries fight back. and so i think there's a great deal at stake today in the supplemental assistance that the congress is considering. there's a great deal at stake not only for ukrainians and european security, for our long-term interests around the globe including in the indo-pacific. >> do ukrainians want to be part of russia? >> i'm sorry? >> do ukrainians want to be part of russia. vast majority of ukrainians especially reinforced by putin's brutal invasion want to be a part of a sovereign and independent ukraine. that's why they'h such bravery and valor with our support which has been incredibly important and remains incred write important to their success. >> in other words, if there was support in ukraine for russia, wouldn't we have during this conflict seen is an insurgency, some uprising of individuals who were cause of russia is? and we've not seen that in ukraine, have we? >> no.

what you've seen is incredible bravery and valor, as i said before, on the part of ukrainians which have demonstrated their commitment to a sovereign, independent, democratic ukraine. >> in the areas whereusken ukras there been peace? are the people there safe? how is russia treating ukrainianse they incorporate a territory? >> they are treating them as second class citizens with a fair amount of are -- of repression as well. just like, would add, they treat many of their own citizens. >> director burns, tell us of some of the war crimes that have occurred against the ukrainian people. >> i think, you know, one of the most vicious of those crimes has been the illegal transportation and abduction n effect, of ukrainian children. i think that's the one that, you know, i think strikes at all of our hearts as well. >> if this is about nato, director burns, would putin be kidnapping children in ukraine? >> no. as i said, i don't think this is just about nato, it's about that

a wider fixation that putin as about subjugating ukraine. >> director haines, tell us what in your review of the intelligence, what is this conflict director burns stated it well. certainly about the subjugation of ukraine, but also, i mean, one of the things that's very consistent with in that putin believes the greatest tragedy of the 20th sent arely is the breakdown of the soviet yoon on. he perceives that theemendous at context and, i think, does not want to be the leader that loses even furthers that were a part f the soviet union and, in fact, wants to bring it back to its former glory. and i think the other of this that is behind, you know, the importance of our conning to support ukraine their extraordinarily courageous acts

in countering russia is china is also watching what's aping here. and i think's one of those scenarios where it's -- china sees that we're able and we already overexceeded, i think,ef coming together with europe and actually countering russia in this scenario. but they see that resolve weak within and and our inability the maintain assistance, that is going to be a lesson that they're going to learn for the future for their own assertive region. >> director haines, tomorrow if ukraine or nato or the united states said no nato for ukraine, would this be over? >> no. >> director burns, we have, unfortunately, taken a significant amount of time for■f congress to act for ukraine aid to be approved. we have stood by ukraine, we have provided the weapons that they have needed, that they have fought, we have not fought, they have fought to counter russian

aggression with great loss. what is our a delay costing now? if what is happening on the battlefield, and is ukrainet ade have not approved aid in. >> yes, is the short answer. you know, i came back a couple of weeks ago from if my tcame bs ago from my tenth visit to ukraine during the course of the war and in conversations just with president zelensky but with our intelligence counterparts and ukraine military officers, i'm struck by several things. first, ukraine is not running out of courage and tenacity. they're running out of ammunition, and we're running out of time to help them. i was briefed on a battle which caused a russian withdrawal of ukrainian forces about two days before i arrived in kyiv. and one of the senior ukrainian partners within the battle told me that our men fought as long as hard as he could, but

rebranded ammunition, and the russians just keptg. coming. and what i worry about in 20 forth without supplemental assistant is that you're going to see more of these. ukraine is going to lose more ground, notwithstanding the courage and tenacity, and may be significant ground over time. as director haines said, i think that has consequences for american interests that go well ukraine and europe security. they go directly to our interest in the indo-pacific. they're likely come back and outcome will stoke the ambitions of the chinese leadership, and they are going to undermine the faith that our partne and allies have in indo-pacific in our reliability as well. with supplemental assistance, however,■ç think it is possible to cnet a strategic success or ukraine, for the west and strategic loss for vladimir putin defeat him in his goal of subjugating ukraine and controlling its choices come to

put ukraine in a position wherebyf 2024 it can can regain the initiative on the ground, but even more importantly negotiate from a a position of relativeength.t with putin's russia. i don't think putin is serious debate about negotiating. he may be interested in the theateriations, but he's not interested in compromise. he's interested in negotiations where he can dictate the terms. without some assistance i think that's the future that ukrainians could face a year from now withh supplemental assistant, i think it's possible to puncture his arrogance, hisse side and put ukraine it into position with good negotiate and outcome from a position of i said putin's goal is defeated, ukraine remains a sovereign independent state anchored in western institutions and has the time and the security to recover while russia

has to live with the long-term consequences of putin's foolish and b brutish invasion of ukrai. >> last question, director burns. director haines their people and congress will work for aid for ukraine bubbly, believe mistakenly, that we have time. that this is not at a critical juncture, that we can take our time is an approving this paper director burns, director haines, are the mistaken? >> i think, as i said befornnin. i saw that in the description of what happened. they're running out of munitions one of the ukrainian brigades that thought, i was told in the two days before they were forced to withdraw had a grand total of 15, 155 artillery munitions per day for the entire brigade. that something like 2500 personnel. another brigade had a grand total of 42 42 mortar roundsr the entire brigade.

it's not that they didn't fight wi it's that they ran out of ammunition. you can already see ukrainian military rationing ammunition. you can already see them becoming more vulnerable to russian attacks from the air, from drones come from missiles, from aircraft. and that's the future we're going to see i think without providing them the munitions that they used so effectively in the past and which i believe are the key to a serious negotiation down the road. >> director haines? >> no, i have nothing more to add to that. i mean, i think it is urgent. >> thank you, mr.ou chairman. appreciate your highlighting the urgency of this house acting to support the ukrainians much is in the battle so thank youy for doing that. i do want to turn my attention to the topic i previewed election in fisma since the german product i want to spend a

minute or two on the southern border. let me state up front that every country needs a secure border, but i also it's important and put into context any hearing called worldwide threats what southern border relative to north korea, and demos from russia, china, attacks, you name it. so, director wray, i guess i'll start with you. give me a time period, choose a time. , five or ten years, what percentage of domestic terrorist attacks in this country were undertaken by an documented aliens or groups of undocumented? >> of domestic -- >> domestic terrorism. >> attacks are in the cunning? >> writes for i have r percenta. a large number of them have been conducted by what we call hves, homegrown violent extremists, inspired by spanish what'sr number one category oftr those who perpetrate domestic terrorist events, , number one category?

>> while again, ther one category of terrorist attacks here are known actors in small cells or sll accessible weapons. >> i'm asking, what i'm trying to get at here, loan actors, are the undocumented? whatte percentage of domestic terrorist attacks are undertaken by the undocumented? >> i don't have percentage. >> is it 50%? >> know. >> is a 25%? >> i would be surprised. >> you would be surprised, okay. l that enters this country comes on the back, if you will, of the undocumented relative to that percentage which comes in through legitimate ports of entry? >> again, i don't have the percentage but s majority? >> the vast majority of the fentanyl in this country obvious comes from mexico, r the other t

of the border. >> right but it is my the passenger vast majority comes to legal ports of entry. is that your understanding personal? >> i have been told that. >> okay. would it surprise you to know that encounters in the southern border in the third year of this presidents presidency, and third year of 23, were about 8050 know what the encounters with known or suspected terst the third year of the previous president, gina what the number is extensive cbp number. >> i don't have those numbers. i know that the numbers over the last five years is the information i have come over the last five years a number of -- >> by making a comparison and answer to the questn is in search of the biden presidency, encounters of the southern border with known or suspected terrorists is 80 pick in the third year of the previous administration the equivalent number is 280. i'm0. sure that we're to talk about this. this iss a serious issue. i which is put into the context of the many, many threats that

we hthis but the chairman and ie were with the president in the cabinet room when then leader mcconnell said to the speaker you will not get a better border deal if donald trump is president, if republicans controlled the senate and if they control the house. what a lost opportunity by repun friends make such hay over. with that it, want to turn to wt i really am concerned about, which is in particular foreign interference in our election. theef unclassified assessment divorced today is the latest in a string of ic analysis going back years, documenting foreign ambitions to influence our election. i please the communities assessment liens for to describe these threats in such plain terms because our best defense isis ensuring the americans acrs the political spectrum are the media. some want to use to remake of my time until the chairman gavels

be down around three questions. what does the threat look like? and by the way just to prompt that discussion, i have reproduced within your times reported on last week which was a little hazy about precisely, the tribute to the russian setting up four completely fake newspapers online, the d.c. weekly, interestingly named new york news daily, that's not the daily news, that's a new standard, the chicago chronicle, and the miami chronicle. the "new york times" reported rt these websites have since been taken down but they mixed local news with actual kremlin propaganda. i'm just putting that out there to prompt what i'm gting at here is what can, how can americans identified what foreign interference may look like, specifics? we've read that russians may seekk to start faux grassroots demonstrations. so again i have three categories of questions. important, what ag about it? and director wray i'm going to close with you because every american has a right

what you doing about this is also consistent with the protection of expression under the first amendment. let me devote some time what exactly shouldly americans expect to see if there are attempts to interfere with our elections, be on what i posted back here? >> thank you. i can start. so thanks for obviously raising this issue because it's of absolutely critical importance to us. as you noted we have our intelligence communityni n this that's been unclassified and released on a website on these issues. i think during, as a look back at the 2020 u.s. election cycle, russia engaged in a multi-pronged effort intended tr really heighten broad, existing geopolitical tensions and so

distressed and democratiprocess. russia's online s influence acts really sought to amplify mistrust in the electoralal process by denigrating mail in ballots, highlighting allege a rate of bitters t voter fraud. russia continued e its efforts during the 2022t election cycle probably with the intent to distract and wea the united states and produce u.s. support to ukraine. targeting specific demographics with tailored messaging intended to elicit responses about strongly held beliefs or moral issues. and what we do about it and obviously the point is that you may see things along the lines of what you described in the "new york times", ," but they also use, for example, commercial firms, others that are sort of go-betweens. they will hold a series of different ways of approaching effectively their information operations in the space. ank what we do in the intelligence community is worsted of an electione' securiy basically group. they have different leads from■d

participate, these elements are working collectively effectively to identify this type of information operations. and what we do is we provide it largely to the department of thr them to act and interact -- >> let me stop you there because i really want to focus on what it looks like. accusations that the system is corrupt, that elections are rigged, which are a hallmark obvious of the previous president speeches, and to be fair, most recently raised by a california senate candidate on the democratic side. so stick with the system are rigged may be designed to cost americans to lose confidence in their electoral system. is fair of me deemphasis pgh yes. they havee for years the russias have are used in the information operations been trying to

basically discredit the legitimacy of our processes and ultimately our democratic system. that is one of the main objectives.. >> are any of you aware, , let's get on the record, in the yearsl evidence that american elections are rigged? can iet >> no. >> thank you. no evidence in thehe last seven years in the american election have any material way been raped. thank you. director haines, before we move on i do want you to talk about what you're doing i about it, bt what else can we cut fake news sites, i hate to use the term will be cut accusations that system is rate, that the american government is being weaponized against americans. >> sure.e? there's also efforts to go after particular policy positions, to stoke divisions in effect and -- >> how do you stoke divisions amongst american? >> so you effectively take my there's real?, content, where ts

disputes within american society, social economic issues otherwise, and then you effectively lift and highlight those divisions up. it's one of the more challenging things for us to identify what the impact is because largely it's an exacerbation of an existing division in effect. so it's one ofone the areas whee they seek to focus. >> so let's spend a minute or so on what you're doing about it. you were starting to say that you talk to dhs come and director wray, we're going to close because i tt you make agat these attempts at misinformation and division are critical, but there is a very hazy line between identifying those efforts, going after those efforts and compromise constitutionally protected freedom of h expression and speech. director haines, give us a sense of what you were doing about it. >> sure. and i welcome to the extent that you time did to her from some my other colleagues, i mean, i

think all of us are involved in this in many respects in supporting ultimately dhs and fbi efforts on these questions. we stood up in odni electionio threat executive in 2019 which was incorporated into the foreign malign influencete centn foreign maligned influence or interference targeting u.s. elections. it also strategically manages ic collection in analytical resources on this issue and fosters partnership with other government, private and for entities pick in added the position of national intelligence officer for foreign maligned influence of national intelligence council for leading and analysis across the ic on foreign influence for u.s. elections. it's also like a as we work with different groups and as i mentioned dhs and fbi, obviously director wray can talk about fbi's fort influent task force and thehi work on this, but dhs has an office of■ i and providet

regarding threats to u.s.ur election infrastructure as well as u.s. organizations, campaigns, public officials and they were close with dhs cyber security and infrastructure agency, cisa is people not which is charged with assisting election officials in the private sector partners to mitigate risk and enhance the physical security and resilience of election facilities and equipment. tmay be just turned this into -- >> thank you. these efforts are critical. director wray, is essential and americans have confidence that t the fbi or anybody else stepping on the constitutional rights. give us 90 you can do that. >> so our focus is not on the content. our focus is on the actor come before and■fthat's the key dist. we are not the arbiter. we don't seek to be arbiter of what's truth or fake pic what we are doing is trying to identify

the hidden hand of foreign adversaries, foreign intelligence services, fake accounts that, in fact, belong to some foreign adversary and alerting the right people to that. that's the primary category of his foreign maligned influence space. there's a second category that is important in an election year which is lies about where and when tos vote, for example, is a form of voter suppression and there's a criminal investigation that would ensue there and we look the appropriate election officials so that they can make sure people know where they actually can vote and what the times the polls were open and i kind of thing but that's a separate category. >> thank you. well, i appreciated that. i would yield back, but i've been doing this now for almost a decade and a scene, like you, every manner of threat out there and though i seen every man■wned appreciate their severity, i still believe what lincoln second 1838 in a speech he gave lincoln said america will never

be destroyed from the outside. if we falter and lose our freedoms it will be because we destroyed ourselves. yield back. >> thank you. as for the privilege of the chairman i have my hands the u.s. customs and border protection encounter statistics for the years '24. my questions that were directed to director wray did not include a■x time. or criticism of any administration. since the comparison was made, my esteemed colleague used the numbers of individuals that were watch list in the third-year of the last of administration of the surge of this administration. those encounters for the field operations encountered at land borders are the numbers that i believe you were siding. this is the ones that really to the ones you use, which are 280 in fiscal year '19, 80 fiscal year 23 which would been a surge of theth biden administration. those are actual land ports was

as a field operation some presents themselves and there's actually boarded the people are seeking to cross. for those use of comparison, fy '19, fy '23, the actual aggregate which a been a surge of the top administration was 533 at those lan ports, and for the biden administration was 564 relatively consistent. over the category that is below that which is why i'm entering this into the record is encounters between ports of entry which is where it's not specific field operation but their crossing the border. for the third year of the top administration which was fy '19, this report indicates on the and for thehe number for the bin administration fiscal year '23 was 169. enter this into the record without objection. i call on dr. wenstrup. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. it's a pleasure to be with you today and havork with you now, r

the years. i greatly appreciate it. i want to go back t brought up a couple years ago in events of june 14, 2017, at the baseball field. i won't go into as much depth as a did c a couple years ago but there were 136 rounds fired that they upon republican members of congress baseball field. where if steve scalise wasn't there and capitol police were not there he could've easily killed 20-30 members of congress on the republican side, i might add, which would have led to a change in the balance of power in the house of representatives. i guess we didn't use the term that much back then, but i consn insurrection. this is someone who came to kill republicans. he had our names and descriptions in our pocket. odni i in dhs came and determine this was domestic violence and extremism, yet the fbi claimed that it was suicide

.. versation. they made this determination without talking to the witnesses or the victims, and two years ago after i spoke on this in this hearing you responded to and i appreciated that, and you changed that from suicide by cop to domestic violent extremism. but, you know, we have serious , and i think that we all work well >> t serious players on this committee today and we all want to work together and work with the intelligence committee with legislation. two years ago i said we need walls around us sometime and not walls between us. i'mfraid that's what we're finding. we have the responsibility of oversight. in fact, i'm the oversight chair for this committee and we fund your agency and so, that's an important thing to keep in mind and our efforts can only be productive if we can proceed with the speed of trust and that requires that we have a

process that is-- where there's accountability and you know, when you have the leading investigative body in the united states of america that conducts an investigation, they don't talk to the witnesses, they don't talk to the victims and they reach ausi else could reach, even you couldn't reach it and you changed their conclusion, we have to have accountability when the process is curiously insufficient here. you know, we want to make sure that there's integrity, professionalism, appropriate methodology that's taking place and seeking information as far as who made this decision to call it suicide by cop. and who went forward with the-- how do they conduct their investigations were being blocked. it's inappropriate. i don't think it's lawful. tho cite the lindhler memo out of the department of justice. that's a memo, that's not the o

we are a country of we the people and we're the representatives of the people and especially on this committee. when we inquire what's going on in the fbi and who is doing what and how is the process flawed, in an effort, webetter,t do it if you won't talk to us. if information we need and allow us to investigate. it comes across as very contemptuous against this body and the people and that's a problem and i want to continue to move forward so we can have a better process in place and make sure that our agencies are functioning at a high level of professionalism and competency, but you have to work with us. so i'm going to ask you and maybe in a classified setting that we do this and that's fine do you commit to providing this commte of the person who practices gross

negligence and perhaps a political decision, i don't know, until we investigate. and any punitive actions this person or persons may have further. and maybe create a better process. will you commit to me? >> congressman, let me just say first as we've discussed before, no conversation on this subject should proceed without me saying how much i respect your heroism on the day in question and in a variety of settings to you and your office, many of which would not be things that would normally share. >> let me-- ments so we will continue to try to work with you. i will doubledown on our efforts to see if there's more be more responsive. >> i don't want to have to take further action. i want it to be an acquiescence that we can work together. because, look, the law says the congressional--

this is under general congressional oversight, the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the united states, that's to be ensured, it says. so, the lindhler memo means nothing. it's not law. you can't write laws for yourself. congress writes the laws. i appreciate that, there are things i'll talk more in a classified setting and threats and biofentanyl, and how grateful in the arenas i've been in working with director hanes and director burns, and thank you very much. i think there's a lot more we can do sohat we can be better in the future, and see how well we've done on so many things already. and we'll do more than classified ll yield back. >> thank you, chairman.

>> director hanes, odni published the annual democratic 2022. i'm concerned, that despite progress the report once again highliongoing disparities for employees and women in the ic compared to the regular worse force. that includes decreases and a number of pay grade increases, representative of the highest pay grade and promoting these leadership ranks. i'd like your response, as well as the responses from the cia, dia and nsa and fbi on the following questions. ma'am, when will we see-- when will we finally see sustained documented progress on the key benchmarks, what's holding the ic back. where can the ic improve in its recruitment efforts specifically. do you feel comfortable with how the ic is engaging with

underrepresented communities an institutions of higher learning, such as through centers for academic excellence? also, what additional resources coul to effectively improve recruitment from all backgrounds and walks of li?>> so, this is an issue that i'm obviously quite passionality about, and we've had conversations on as well. i think there's no question that we are not where we want to be in terms of the representation that we see, minorities, and women, and persons of disabilities in the ic, in terms of it reflecting the broader country and as we note in the in the last report, we started to do some intersectionality to show some of the challenges that ext across these groups. we also see that the representation when you look at

the ic as a whole, is one thing. when you look at the upper ranks, you basically see that it is significantly lower in number of-- you know, specific minorities. and so here is a couple of things that we're doing. first of all, the recruitment piece is a piece, although that's a place where we've seen it get better in the sense that what you see in terms of applicants from the ic is a fairly robust demographic mix in a ic, that doesn't mean that we need-- that we don't need to continue to improve that and we've been trying to get out to different parts of the country and you mentioned the centers of academic excellency or keys to different universities, we basically work with those from sities to have programs those schools and from a coalition of schools that are attached to them and one of the things that, it was intended to do was to help us to get to more diverse populations across

the united states, and what we're doing right now is actually trying to apply metrics to it to demonstrate where it's working and where it may not be and see if we can, you know, sort of take advantage of best practices where we do see improvements. so that's one piece. another key element and you'll see this in the demographic report that just coming to congress will be here this month, that one of the key challenges we're finding is actually retention in that sort of first five-year period of diverse employees and that's an area that we're really trying to sort of dig into and this is where resources matter. so, let me explain what i mean by that. in order to understand why we're having challenges with retention, particularly of diversepopulation, we need to collect data. we need to do more essentially exit interviews, do a variety of barrier studies, other things that■h help us to understand what's happening across the ic and that's something that we've requested

money for in our deia budgets for the ic and that will help us then understand what's happening so that we can actually address the challenges that are being seen and see if we can actually promote programming that helps us. and we've seen some places where the sort of cycle that we're trying to create, which is data, understand what's happening, and then take action to try to fix it, and see whether or not that works. is actually having an impact and i think, for example, my director cruz may tell you a little what's happening in dia as an example of this. but it's a very long-term process. this is something that's going to take a while. to your question when are we going to see it. i in it's longer than whatfully -- what any of us want it to be and i'm reciate your advice and thoughts on things we can do

better in this area as well. let me let others talk as you like. >> sure, i'll be very believe, but i share and i've shared it with the three years i've been director at cia a high priority make it go a diverse institution, not just the right thing for us to do as americans, but and cia operates in diverse landscapes around the world and we are making progress. last year, one of the highest percentages in terms of new officers as women and minority and underrepresented community officers. 48% wom and 30% minority and equally important in terms of promotion and the senior intelligence service and the most senior jobs at cia and hit a historic high over quarter of a century, 47% women and 27% minority because the key to retention as i've learned the hard way over many years in public service, you've got to

show people that if their work merits it, whatever their background, they could be promoted to the senior agencies. it's not just a blip, a pattern, but that's what we're determined to try to do. >> mr. chairman, thank you for being here is is important that these conversations periodically out in the open because i think it's important for the american people to understand that we have the responsibility of overseeing your agencies and so, let me just get right into a couple of questions here. director wray, do youtihe bigget to the united states, national security, is domestic violence extremism? >> it significant terrorist threat to the united states is lone actors, acting with readily ft both domestic violent

extremists and what we call home grown violent extremists, jihadists typically inspired. and so, i have some concerns and i-- the potential for important industries to be attacked and national security industries, for example, agriculture andf+■ yu last ia, were able to get, basically usda into the ic through title 50 authorities so they become a member of the ic and with all the subject matter expertise that that implies and how safeguarding of our food supplies. i have some concerns about other industries, for example. i read an article earlier this week about chinese manufacturers of cranes in our ports. unfortunately, they're the only manufacturers of cranes. we don't build those types of things, unfortunately, in this country. but the chinese have sought to seed our supply chain with all

manner of surveillance devices andon. cranes were found to have been seeded with some devices and we've seen this with the and ot supply chain components that they've seeded into our supplies. do you have some c that? what are you doing to reach out to the industry to make sure we're safeguarding against those kinds of things from happening? >> thank you, you put your finger on a verypoint. something we referred to typically as the hybrid threat and otherwise legitimate incidences that can be leveraged by the china government pre-positioning for potentially disruptive action and so forth and something that we've talked about a lot and something that i've testified about in terms of cyber penetration, and there are other ways that you're putting your finger on one of them to

get control over critical through ordinary business transactions. >> we've put this authority, title 50 authority in usda, in some other agencies t might need to consider that same perspective? >> let me give some thought to that and love to circle back with you on this, because i think that this is one of the, maybe less talked about, but maybe most important dimensions of the chinese communist partyn require engagement because you're talking about activity that's itself for the most part lawful, but still presents vulnerabilities that the chinese government can exploit and that we need to figure out a better way to tighten that up and engage with you on it. >>hile i've got you director wray. that we've had difficulty the last few months trying to tap into the expertise that your agency brings. your organization continues to hold the role of lead for

counter intelligence in the ic. you have a lot in the work force even though this committee struggles to get access to the individuals. why is it with the talking points? >> i'm not aware of the restriction. >> that's the latest engagement with the fbi, why does the cia agents briefing this committee have to refer to headquarters and analysts to provide on the ci threat and an important issue and their expertise. >> our counter intelligence is the headquarters divion, are you talking in the field office. >> when we bring someone in the witness for questioning and

they say i have tog to headquarters. we ask them to come to the committee and yet we get stonewalled a back and forth, how they can't say this and ure setting, i might ad and suggested that you're not cleared for that. and i have to say, again, we are cleared for it, because when i hear from someone in your organization, we are not cleared to any other that you have purview. >> what you're saying concerns me greatly and let my staff follow up, and we have the specific examples and see what i can do to mitigate that. >> thank you, i appreciate expi. >> thank you, chairman for your testimony today. and director burns, thank you so much for your on achieving a piece agreement and thank you for the president for

calling for a cease-fire and the administration. and i want to ask you about part of your testimony today in the senate in regards to gaza and the situation there. yesterday the select committee you said regarding gaza, the reality that there are children who are starving and they're malnourished as a result of the fact that humanitarian assistance can't get to them. can you speak to what civilians getting this in gaza and who is responsible? >> i think the challenge is a real one and i think it's just a fact that you face incredible circumstances, in fact, desperate circumstances, especially in north gaza. partly of humanitarian assistance not getting there and it's partly a function of it not being distributed in conditions in which the conflict is still going on and that's why, as i tried to emphasize yesterday. i think it's so important to

work with our partners in israel, qatar and egypt to try to produce a deal and an agreement which would involve not only the release of a significant number of hostages and ultimately all of the hostages because they're in desperate circumstances and so are thees, but it would provide for an exchange of a defined number of palestinians held bysr six weeke and as a step toward more enduring arrangements and i think in terms of humanitarian assistance, allow practically not only for a surge of humanitarian assistance coming in, but under the conditions of a cease-fire, you could actually distribute it effectively. >> let me ask you, director, and i appreciate all of this work, and i think it's dire situation there. you're intimately familiar with what's going on on the ground.

and familiar with negotiations and long time diplomate and skilled negotiator, on top of this. and getting to the-- those working and i think that anybody who has had an interest and i think all of this feel this deeply to produce the kind of humanitarian assistance that so obviously is required has an interest in trying to get this deal done. i think as the president has made clear. israel has the right to again itself, especially after the brutish attack that hamas. >> sure, nobody disagrees with that. >> at the same time the president made clear israel has an obligation to try to protect civilians, particularly innocent women and children. >> i have to get to one more issue. can i just add one thing. >> of course. >> congressman, hamas also bears responsibility for this as well. >> sure. >> if hamas is interested in, you know, in the fate of women and children and innocent civilians in gaza, it will also work hard to try to produce this kind of an agreement.

>> but you agree'i war time, there are obligations by all sides that humanitarian assistance reaches rect. >> yes, i do. >> and u.s. law and the humanitarian aid corridor act assistance to countries, when it's made known to the president when it restricts directly or indirectly transport of the unid states humanitarian assistance. let me ask you a quick follow-up. a the president's principal advisors of intelligencings had a theeen made aware israel directly or indirectly to gaza. >> we provide that-- >> i have important question on declassification, has the president been aware of this? matt miller made a clear comment that israel did have

some role at least in blocking that assistance. does the president know that? >>. >> i mean, i think that the president made clear that israel should and,z can do more in terms of assuring that humanitarian assistance gets in. >> thank you all. >> directors wray and director burns, the practices, that led to the disruption of peaceful civil rights movements, i'm sure you're aware of the behavior, including the fbi operation against the reverend martin luther king, jr. and cia's operation chaos. yesterday, i sent a letter asking your agencies to declassify and release to the greatest extent possible, materials related to surveillance of latino civil rights movement if any exist in your holdings. and i want to you whether you'll commit to work with me to improve the historical record and assure that u.s. intelligence agencies can

correct the to surveillance of latino civil united states organizations? >> yes. >> we'll review your letter and see what we can provide. >> thank you. >> i appreciate it. >> ms. stefanik. >> director wray, have you heard special counsel hur's report? >> i have. >> do you believe that joe biden mishandled information. >> i'm not going to comment-- >> in your opinion as director of the fbi, do you believe he mishandled information? >> i'm going to-- >> are you aware there's a recording to joe biden saying to his ghost writer in 2016 i just saw all the classified downstairs-- >> i'm going to refer to-- >> are you aware as the director of the fbi, are you aware or not. >> am i aware.

>> joe bid just found all the classified stuff downstairs to his ghost writer. >> i'm going to refer to the specl counsel and hisñe testimony and his report. >> it sounds like you might be aware of it then. in front of this committee in open session, your predecessor jim comey said he didn't follow the proper protocol of the notification of the cross fire hurricane, investigation into trump in 2016 to address this illegal abuse of power by the fbi, this committee included direction to the fbi in the iaa requiring notification to congressional leadership of any counter intel investigation into a federal candidate for office. is there counter intelligence investigation into either joe biden or donald trump? >>ij■ i'll refer you to the special counsel-- >> it's not a question about the special counsel, it's requirement of the fiaa

phish. is there a counsel intelligence into joe biden or donald trump. >> there's no investigation that i can confirm, no. ere a counter intelligence investigation? >> again i'm n confirming any investigation into either candidate-- >> at this point we'll break away from this hearing on global threats to take you live to the u.s. senate holding what we believe will be a brief session this morning. no votes are expected. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the parliamentarian will read a communication to the senate. the parliamentarian: washington, d.c., march 15, 2024. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing

rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable brian schatz, a senator from the state of hawaii, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: patty murray, president pro tempore. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate stands adjourned until 3:00 p.m., on tuesday, march 19, 2024. >> wrapping up the senate pro forma session, the senators will be back march 14th at 3 p.m. eastern for the court of appeals. a confirmation vote is expected 5:30 eastern. and as always live coverage of the u.s. senate here on c-span2. we return to this week's house intelligence committee on global threats and we join it in progress. >> i can tell you we're going to comply with the law and my >> is your assessment that you're required to notify congress of any counter intel into any federal candidate? >> i'm going to defer to the

lawyers. >> you're the director they report to you. >> we're going to comply with the law including whatever is in the iaa. >> i want to turn to the search warrants and the search in one case of mar-a-lago, unprecedented raid and a search working with joe biden's legal team. were you or your did you have any communication about either of the execution of the search warrant on mar-a-lago or the search of documents working with joe biden's lawyer, commun joe biden? of you or your team? >> not to my knowledge. >> with any white house team? >> by you or any personnel at the fbi? >> again, i want to make sure i've got your question right. by me or my staff, would who about which? >> with the white house staff about the execution of a search warrant on mar-a-lago or the wos

lawyers of classified information. >> not to my knowledge. >> what about the attorney general? the attorney general? >> no, was there any communication with your staff with the attorney general or you regardingf the search warrant or the search of joe biden's classified documents? >> well, any search would be co department of justice. as to who may have communicateed with whom between the fbi. >> i'm asking >> i'm asking if you communicated. >> whether i communicated. >> with the attorney general prior or after the execution of the search warrant on mar-a-lago. >> no. >> do you think-- >> prior or after? >> prior or after. well, i would have had conversations with the attorney general about the appointment of at that time mr. loush.

>> and what were those conversations? >> just about the fact that he was going to be named so that's not really about the search itself. >> and my lastquestion, do you think it's a national security threat to have a federal campaign account on tik tok? >>■ well, i've been very clear about my views about tik tok and the national security concerns it tik tok on all fbi devices. as to what campaigns choose to do with their platforms, i'll ave that to them. >> so you don't think it's a national security threat. >> i'm not weighing in on that, no. >> as the director of the fbi. i agree that tik tok is a national security threat. i think that it's a national security campaign on tik tok. and you can't say here today that it's a national security threat? >> i think that tik tok represents all sorts of national security threat. as to whether specific account holders choose to exercise their right to the tik tok

account, it's up to them. we have a disagreement. i think it's a national threat to have a national campaign on tik tok. >> thank you, mr. chair. last week, mike gallagher and i spoke about tik tok, and you've spoken before. in the assessment hearing march of last year, you said tik tok is a tool that's ultimately within control of the chinese government and it to me, screams out with national security concerns, correct? >> correct. >> so, mike gallagher and ibill requires a divestment of tik tok from bytedance. bytedance as you know is the parent company of tik tok and is controlled ultimately by the chinese government. now, interestingly, after we introduced this bill, it got marked up in the house energy

and commerce committee and interestingly, on the morning of that markup, a certain pop-up message and push notification went out to thousands and thousands of users across the country. and it looked like this. essentially it said,quote, stop a tik tok shutdown. congress is planning a total ban of tik tok. of course, setting aside the misinformation of this message, we're not calling for a ban of tik tok, but a divestment. what was very interesting to us, the app used the geo location targeting data association with minor children to push this cause them to thenl many congressional offices with thousands and thousands of phone calls. now, whe■@n they call these offices they asked the question such as the following. what is congress? what is a congressman? let me have my tik tok back.

and on top of that, in one case, one member of the energy and commerce committee had someone call in impersonating his son asking to speak with his dad and ask him to allow so mr. wray, you've also talked about various threats associated with tik tok, including its ability to potentially mobilize public opinion. this particular push notification pop-up ended up convincing many members o day to change from being lean yeses to hard yeses, they felt this is exactly the nature legislatis being proposed to address. so, could you just talk about whether this is an example of the type off public opinion that tik tok under the control of the chinese communist party might conduct in the future? >> well, while i can't spean

tell you that the kind of thing you're describing illustrates why this is such a concern. i think americans need to understand that distinctions that we take for granted in our system between businesses and government, between the businesses and the government itself, don't exist for all practical purposes in china. so, americans need to ask themselves whether they want to give the chinese government the ability to control access to the data. whether they want to give the chinese government the ability to control the information they get through the recommendation of algorithm and whether they want the chinese government the ability to have the software on their devices and the chinese government-- >> just let the record reflect when you were talking about the type of algorithm or example of what could happen, you were pointing to this very poster with the pop-up menu. let me just make it clear, you cannot rule out that the

chinese communist party actually ordered this particular pop-up to appear on people's phones that day, right? >> that's right. and i think it illustrates why, when it comes to the algorithm and the recommendation algorithm, the ability to conduct influence operations, e difficult. >> you can't tell. >> to detect. >> you can't tell. >> and makes it a pernicious risk. >> and that's the problem because the ccp ultimately controls bytedance. bytedance can manipulate the algorithm and has access to all of this data. now, director hanes in this year's threat assessment on page 12, you said tik tok accounts run byprc propaganda arm reportedly targeted candidates from both political parties during the u.s. midterms in 20,■ right? >> can you just speak up? >> sorry, yes. i was just getting to the page. apologies. >> just to be clear. >> tik tok has already been

used to influence the elections in 2022. and then on that same page, it says, tik tok could, quote attempt to influence in 2024. so, director hanes, you cannot rule out that the ccp could again, just like they did here, use tik tok as a platform to influence 2024 election,s, right? >> we cannot rule out that the ccp could use it, correct. thank you, iback. >>. >> thank the witnesses for being here. director wray, i just want to kind of double tab what conduct the director talked about. i do not feel like we've been completely given the files from the 2017 baseball shootings and all relevant information. i feel like there's been a serious lack of transparency there. i appreciate what you've done, but we've not-- >> everything's been redacted

and in power point. being a lawyer and a former prosecutor, things i see and others don't see and advice versa. i ask that we hope this up and be transparent. it's not okay to keep that information, especially since the perpetrator, the terrorist who attacked us that day, has been over seven years and he was killed that day so there's no reason for any arguments or anything left there. we need to know who those people are who made those be accountability or at least see if there's been accountability. the second thing is i'm very concerned with people that we are catching and even more concerned by those that we are not catching that are crossing our southern bo■ianer i don't care which administration that are on the terror watch list, that are known or suspected terrorists. when we apprehend or touch bor what part does the fbi have in

either tracking, arresting, sending coordinating with homeland security director wray because these people are not? because i think they're here to do us harm. where and when we don't know. what is the fbi doing once we know there's a known or suspected terrorist on our watch list at the border? apprehended whether at the border or otherwise and their names are run against the terrorist maint watch list so we provide the hits, if you will, back to dhs so they know that this person is on the list. that's the short version and then, for instances where, for one reason or another, somebody guess gets into the the fbi through joint terrorism task force is working with state and local law enforcement and have the responsibility trying to find, apprehend and then getu3 back to dhs some of

the same individuals. >> and therefore, if a suspected or known terrorist, one that was on landed in dca today, would the fbi respond to that person who landed at dca, would you respond to that in conjunction with homeland? >> if we knew that someone who was on the wch list landing in a particular airport, let's say, there should be, there would be, most of the time in my experience, communication between dhs and fbi and depending on the circumstances, the fbi might deploy to that scene, for example, to interview, if cause to arrest, obviously, arrest. depends a little on the circumstances. >> are we confident with every interaction that we have with a known suspected terrorist or someone on the watch list at the southern border or any other border, that the fbi is responding and that we know where those people are within the united states that they're either arrested, deporteded or

tracked in the united states with any single encounter for someone on the watch list? >> let me answer this way. there are a few different categories of people we're concerned about. when a known or suspected terrorist, as in known that they are a known or suspected terrorist is apprehended at the border, i'm confident that in there's close by the fbi and dhs on it. the bigger concern, the bigger concern is the situation, for example, where somebody presents a fake identification documents at the border, and there's not biometrics to match up, there's no way to know they're not who they say they are, then they get into the country and then somehow wefact are somebody who is on the list at that point then we've got to go hunt down and try to find them. that's one category or there may be some other way in which somebody-- >> thank you, only 39 seconds.

director hanes, look forward to seeing you this month or next month in my district. secondly, the southern hemisphere, north africa, and we have a lhave a lot of great competition there. what assets or what things do the intelligence community need to make us safer in america, both in the southern hemisphere and in north africa? >> thank you so much, sir, and i am looking forward to my trip to mississippi. and i say in those areas i agree with you, we have tremendous challenges, we haven't spent as much time, ■p them. the things that we need, i think we are asking for in our budget in the context of our work there, is largely about just making sure that we have sufficient resources within the intelligence community to provide analysis collection, all of the things that we normally d i areas in order to help all of you what's

happening, and where there are sort of key events you m some o tensions and threats that exist and there are many. i recognize, given the time i probably can't start going through them, but if if there's anything in particular you want to us focus on, please let us know. >> thank you, i'll yield back. my time has expired. >> thank you. director hanes, you've looked at the a created in ukraine. and last year, the special coordinator in the ic and appointed this position and moved forward and are complying with it and that position, the coordinator or russian accountability, i understand, is working and can you share with us briefly, what you're learning and how this process is working and how it might be a model for other instances? >> yeah, absolutely,nd thank you very much for your support for this issue and your efforts

to help us essentially produce this. so, this is the person that we have as the coordinator is somebody who has long history and knowledge on working on accountability is in intelligence and it's a-- maybe a specialized field in the sense of what you're trying to do is best understand what kind of information is going to be useful for promoting accountability in these areas and that means understanding what the policy makers, what the-- you know, the department of state and the department of justice, typically the ones effectively making as evidence in order to actually produce accountability. and then, how it is that we draw that together and provide it to those institutions in ways that ultimately maybe releasable for various bodies and folks that are working on these issues and how we can about help to therefore promote greater awareness in our policy

communities on these issues and one of the things you've done is working across the ic and also, with folks at the state department. at the department of justice who are consistently it■ing with him on what is needed to produce that kind of flow. so i think it's serving already as a model and we've appointed in accountability with respect to chinese and prc issues, according to the law that requested that we do so. and i think he's been helping development a kind of community of interest in the community with issues. >> i appreciate that. >> director wray, you said in the hearing there's a veritable gallery of terrorist organizations who have now arctic lated threats in the united states recently and a surge of threats including among groups who previously don't get along and kind of found common cause in the united states. what's causing that surge in

threats? >> so, these are all foreign anizations that have leveraged the conflict in the middle east as their excuse to serve as a rallying cry to their following. >> meaning the israel-hamas war in gaza? >> correct. >> so that war is causing the >> correct.reats in >> in what way? how are they leveraging it? can you provide more detail? >> well, it varies a little bit depending on the organization, for example, we've seen al-qaeda call for its most-- make its most specific call for attacks against the united states in i think the last five years. and so, they're invoking both hamas' success, brutal, horrifying, unacceptable success on october 7th and the conflict, of course, emerge as israel tries to defend itself. >> the number of casualties in

gaza, the articulation and the leveraging that you've seengrou? >> probably depends on the specific group, but some of them, sure. >> director burns, you've spent your career in national security in the decades helping us fight our war on terror. based on that experience, do you believe it's possible to destroy a terrorist ideology or an ideology that underpins a terrorist organization with military force alone? >> i mean, i think you can-- military forceqs can severely degrade, you know, the terrorist military capacities of any terrorist group and that's a fairly well-defined goal. you're talking about a movement, an idea or an ideology, the only way you kill that or destroy that is with a better idea. >> and what would those better ideas include in your professional opinion? >> well, i mean, i think i'm setting aside for a second, you know, the understandable goal of destroying the capacity of a

terrorist group. i think you have to padly and t of a function of policy and diplomacy, a sense of home and in this case for palestinians. there's a way of undermining the ideology of groups like hamas. i'll yield back. >> new for your service to the country and the men and women that serve under you that allows us to live in the greatest nation in the world. months, this committee under chairman turner how do we fix and ror 702, and 2008 when 702 was created. every five years we figure out and revise what we fix and702 b we did that in 2013, 2018 and now we have a responsibility to

do it this time. we've focused on three do we hold the fbi accountable in making sure the abuses that haven about articulated over the last five, six years■@ don't happen again. secondarily, how do we make sure what happened with cross fire hurricane and carter page never happens again and open the port to open up more. our bill that we put together does exactly that. we reduce by 90%■ tnts and anal can do in person query. and we look at evidence of a crime. we create specific criminal penalties and punitive measures for 702 leaks and make the fbi come contingent on all queries, and we prohibit queries to suppress america on making sure what happened in cross fire hurricane never happens again we create

enhanced criminal penalties for those that violate fisa or leak fisa or the court. we prohibit the usevu of political opposition research and press reports to get a fisa order. lastly on the fisa court we mandate transcripts for what goes on in the fisa court. we assign counsel to scrutinize u.s. person surveillance applications and we require the same fisa court judge to rule on extensions. those are the reforms and the feedback that we got from personnel how we fix this process and i would like to submit for the record, speaker johnson on december 7th, 2023, that supports our bill from mike pompeo, former dr of national intelligence. william bar, devin nunes, which

they say 702 must be reauthorized and they also go on to say that putting a warrant requirement in there is not what they recommend. if i could submit that for the record. >> without objection. >> there's no doubt that the value from a national security standpoint for what 702 has brought to this country is immense over the last 15, plus years. we have some that would want a warrant requirement as a part ofis. in my view that would be detrimental to 702 and the work that we've donement director wray, can you comment on what the warrant requirement would do to the work that you're engaged in? >> so, congressman, a warrant requirement would effectively gut the fbi's ability to use 702 to protect americans wherever it was applied. the reality is, that at the stage of an investigation we're running these queries, it is only after we review the

information that we query, again, this is informati lawful holdings that we're looking at when we do that. that's when we know that there may be probable cause as an agent of a foreignpower, so, the key is to put us in a position and make sure we continue to stay in a position where we have that upfront. there was an example just recently where we had information that a foreign terrorist was in contact, some nd contact with a person believed to be in the united states. we didn't know what the nature of the contact is. but we knew that that was something that caused us interest. we would not have had probable cause at that point to get a warrant to run the query. and we run that person identifying information through our holdings and that's what allowed us to look at the content which suddenly showed us, whoa, this is serious. this is urgent. and within a few■k weeks, i thik less than a month, we had disrupted and turned out the

individual had weapons, bomb making componentsnd other information in his home. that would never have happened without 702 and it would never have happened with a warrant requirement. >> i want to switch when we think about how essential and existential 702 has been, when i think over the last nine years and this will go to ■2 dire i think about instances like the taking out of al-zawahri, the al-qaeda leader in kabul. i think about taking out general solmeini. the leader of iraq, the leader isis, in the last five years. can you talk about how 70 was in general for those instances and other counterterrorism actions? >> it's crucial in each of the areas you mentioned and another 2022, when the united states took out both zawahiri in kabul, but also abdullah,

the then amir of isis as well and 702 was also crucial in an operation as well and as you know, congressman, well beyond ct, including in the fentanyl crisis, 702 has been absolutely crucial. last year, for example, 70% suc of illicit synthetic drug operations came fro there's an f concerns and threats crucial to the protection of americans that hinge on the succeful application of 702 with the reforms that i know that you're rightly working on. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> director burns you've already outlined the dire humanitarian situation in gaza right now, just the urgency oar save off massive starvation and

death my staff evaluation. i applaud the president looking at getting aid in through maritime passage as well. with within that urgency and the urgency of geing■[6 an extended cease-fire, four, five, six weeks. and in the instances we've h sam king abdullah that you're -- there is remains that possibility of finding a long-term peaceful solution in the middle east where the israeli people can live in security andlsecure, but it only comes with the ability of a palestinian solution where the palestinian people can also live with dignity and security. is that your assessment? >> it is. and the longer this conflict goes on you know, again in my conversations with seers, they have, you know, it becomes harder and harder because of what they're seeing in their

streets. there's some urgency to get that opening and then use those four, five, six weeks to negotiate a longer term solution, is that correct? >> i think you're exactly right. >> right. >> thank you. general cruz, you've sat here patiently. let me ask a a long time ago we would have passed the ukraine supplemental aid and i do firmly believe that the majority of my colleagues, democratic and republican firmly support the people of ukraine and want to get this done and we have to get it done urgently. for the american people, and the american taxpayers that may question the funding, is it h of the supplemental funding will actually go to u.s. companies, create u.s. jobs in theefense of peace and freedom in ukraine? >> congressman, thank you for the question and it's accurate to say that much of the

supplemental aid goes roughly to ukraine. much of it goes to the manufacturers after out all of that equipment among others and some of that comes to our agencies to allow us to do the things that we need to do to both advise you and to advise the ukrainians. >> and i do think that that's the important point to the american public, to the american taxpayers that while we're defending freedom, supporting the ukrainian people as they defend their own sovereignty, this is not a give away, this is supporting o that will also go to american jobs and americanves, and i think that that's very important. let me shift now. you spent a lot of time looking at the threats from russia and china, but you know, lot of my focus areas on the indo-pacific and we're seeing on the korean peninsula, kim

jong un, and what we're seeing is additional ballistic tests and obviously a relationship between putin and the northans . >> i'll start and please welcome, obviously, director burns and others weighing in on this. and given some respects given the crowded environment we're in for threats these days. the north korean piece is not getting as much attention as it normally would get. there are have been rhetorical actions taken by kim jong un

and indicating that the republic of korea is enemy number one. calling for an amendment to the constitution that makes clear that they are an enemy doing things like, now, blowing up effectively a liaison office and a whole series of things that are will lifting up the tensions and we believe that it's clear that he is increasingly provocative in a sense and theret the potential taking sort of military action, including on the northern line limit, which is basically the demarcation on the border between the maritime border between south korea and north korea in the space. i think our analysis right now is effectively that you will engage in increasingly provocative behavior, but is not interested in escalating this into a full-on war and that there's kind after limit on this. one of the challenges we see is

rt factor in this landscape is that he is potentially feeling increasingly emboldened by virtue of the relio russia, advancing as it has and the fact that putin needs the north now for the munitions, for weapons, for other things and as a likely to effectively stand up, for example, in the u.n. security council and other places to push back against north korea's actions when they're provocative and particularly in the nuclear space. so, i think that that's something that we're and i think it sort of does increase the risk of miscalculation and concern and we've been working very closely with the republic of korea and our counterparts there to try to manage that. >> mr. chairman, thank you all for being here and for our service to our nation. as we've seen time and time again, when america is strong

and projects that strength, the world is safer. when america is weak and divided and we project that weakness, america is less safe and the world is much less remd all of us of the heightened terrorism threat that should come as no surprise, given justr in the past several years a disastrous pullout of afghanistan, a green-- which projected weakness, a green lighting of nordstrom 2, another weakness and wide open southern border which projects weakness and now we have people in this chamber despite of those threats would like to strip us of our national security tool 702 of want you to address this myth that is being perpetuated with a so-called warrant requirement, which is not a warrant ruiret all, it's a secondary warrant requirement. a secondary

that's never existed in u.s. law. a warrant requirement is based on a collection of data on u.s. citizens with constitutional protections. it does not apply to foreign nationals with no constitutional protections and some of our colleagues are trying to do now, querying lawfully collected data inside a data base. taken to its logical extension that would impose a warrant polr running a license plate, impose a warrant requirement on a fugitive squad with the marshals querying the flight manifest for someone they're trying to safety arrest in an airport. it's a secondary warrant requirement. that's the policy flaw with it. now let's focus on the numbers. last year 371 warrants, if we now have a warrant requirement to query a data base based on the numbers last year, that would be 200,000-- 200,000 plus warrants. ... us warrants, there 750 judges

in the judiciary about nine to 11, we would have to expand the judiciary by five, if not more. it which shut down the system. maybe that is what some of our colleagues want to do but for the ones that think this political requirement will benefit america, director wray, if you couldou speak to this are what with thehe actual manifestation be upgrading our requirement brand-new that's ever existed in american law,ne not for collecting data but for querying databases of lawfully collected data. >> congressman, you rightly put your finger on the number of key points. the first is there is no constitutional underpinning our legal requirement for a warrant for us to query our own information.

this would be if congress were to impose one, a policy choice that congress would be making to blind the fbi to information already lawfully and our holdings. that's important because the stage of which we're looking at that information is at the front end when we're going to figure out what are we dealing with, is a something where to be concerned about, is this a threat? i started to give an example but i will unpack it more because it really tells the story. we had a situation where you had a foreign, known foreign terrorist individual overseas at some kind of contact. we did know what the nature of the contact was, with what appeared to be a u.s. person. so we did the thing that you do want us to do. we ran that u.s. person query, identify or associate with that use person through are already lawfully collected information to figure out what are we dealing with this. this is something to be concerned about or not? lo and behold when we saw the

content of the key mitigation, that's when we realized this is serious and that led to very quick investigative action, using other tools, and we disrupted a plot within i think less than a month. when i see disrupted a plot, the individual had weapo, bom compol infrastructure targets identified et cetera. no way we could have access tton when wee ran that initial query if we had without a warrantnt requirement. it would not have happened. so who knows what would've happened to that plot? >> with my remaining time, mr. chairman, i think it's a dissent and this is a challenging colleagues across a spectrum in this chamber, anybody advocating for function borders and others at the same time advocating for stripping our nation of our most critical national security tools at the time when her own director of the fbi suggests our terrorism risk is throughhr the roof,re he would be doing an incredible disservice to our

country and will be inviting another terror attack. i yield back. >> ms. plaskett. >> thank you, mr. chairman. appreciative of my colleagues last statements, his assessment i am wholeheartedly in agreement with him about that. i would suffice it to say as well that some of those of our colleagues who may want to■%n= increase these warrant requirements and, in fact, shut down the system are the same individualsiv who have called te january 6th victims and patriots. and we understand that they are not. and i alsoj understand that director wray and others that are here are doing everything that's possible to ensure that we have free and fair elections, and that foreign interference cannot be a part of that. we have to stop that. i'm grateful for your work■x

ensure that those enemies, foreign andor domestic, are deat with through the systems that we have in place. i had a question actually first for director burns and potentially director haines, if you may comment as well. as many of my colleagues on this committee know, i am veryynhe og instability in africa, particularly in the sahel. i'm interested in the cycle of clues, , the backsliding democracies that are taking place. we are in a global fight for dominance of our adversaries, both china, russia,■f particulay the weidner group, who are using africa to extract wealth -- wagner group -- to the detriment of the african people and the continent. wewe have seen in the last ten years the sudan three times,

molly twice, chad, niger, if americans do not think that this is going to affect them, it will. the minerals, the wealth as well as the fomenting of disease, instability, economic downfalls ofic these countries are very mh importance to the american people. in the end threat assessment flags sudan, ethiopia as well as additional countries that may fall. i wanted you in considering this power vacuum what can the united states do, how are reformulating and implementing ata comprehense strategy in the sahel to address the challenges and opportunity s that we have had on counterterrorism? which i believe needs to move away from and really focus on

instability, democracy, and our fight against our foreign adversaries. >> thank you very much. i think the first step for us as an intelligence service dissipateig tension and help highlight for policymakers exactly what you just described. that the future of africa is of enormous importance i think to the security of americans into the interest of our country. i was in africa last about six weeks ago in southern africa and i was reminded vividly of what's at stake for us and of the importance of the work that our officers do there to collect and analyze intelligence as well. i was a fir director actually in three of the several places that a visit, and think this is extremely important for us as an agency and us in the intelligence community. last year i was in the sahel and the challenges that you describe a very real in the grown since then.

you have a lot of predatory players, whether it's the russians or the wagner group whatever the wagner group will become in the future, as well as a terrorist groups who are taking advantage of insecurities , some of our closest partners like the french ar being pushed in some ways out of the role that traditionally played there. so there's a lot at stake for us in the united states. certainly for us as an intelligent service. all of us are determined to sustain that sharp focus on africa. >> thank i know general cruise you may have some on this as a. >> i certainly do want to save time for director haines itch is a think to add. i would certainly say from the intelligent side, instability that his heart rendering such as eloquently everybody come the contributions to that of actors that some of the best interest of the population in mind,

director burns mentioned a few,, russia. whether to even the enterprising and economic side o china where illusion dollars in chinese loans having it be inay the best interest of the populations within africa. it creates instability i think from a military perspective and it's a trickle-down effect military perspective, and you 40 the military coups. that's a topic we do need to address. would addhe thing i is one ofey the key points you make is this sort of overlap between terrorism and insurgencies and instability. that is absolutely right in one of the things we see in these places are insurgencies taking on the manner of terrorist organizations the sort of the challenges of disaggregating these issues in a way that helps us to address is just thehi

challenge we are seeing of various actors take advantage in the sense of competition between major powers in the fact to sort of the international pressures they would otherwise receive. they try to play us all off of each other in a way to get some more space to actions that are taken within their own governments that are not yet adding to the stability or the good governance of those countries, so thank >> think the judge luttig. i want to think of witnesses. chairman turner had to step out briefly, but after nearly two hours of testimony and 40 pages of written testimony under the annual threat assessment, i've heard very little about the open southern border policies. this is a man-made problem come out of the white house which poses one of the most if not the most significant threat to our nation security right now. i don't makee that statement

glibly. i don't make the following statement which is i feel a more volatile today than we were on september 10 of 2001 as a result of not just china, not just russia, not just the debacle in afghan■histan and iran and its proxies in the middle east and transnational criminal organizations, but because of our open borders. this is a continuation of a statement i made last year which as the primary advisors to the president and the white house and to the dod for all things intelligence, your failuresrv to convey and a part on this present the vulnerabilities of this open border policies is continuing to puto us at risk. just in the last year we saw 2.45 million crossings across our southern border. in december alone which was our last data set we saw 10,000 crossings illegal crossings across our bor

and we had laken riley killed by an illegal immigrant back on february 22nd a until page 35 of 40 after climate change that the border is even alluded to. i use the word alluded very loosely because it's the literature under the terms of migration and directoraines, you note the pressures of external political instability in countries in central and south america is a reason for this mass migration problem we are seeing. the reality is h we have open southern border as result of policies from the white house. this present when on these my opinion a greater threat than some of all the of the threats weus discussed her today to include russia, to include china, iran and its proxies and all terrorist organizations because they are aware of our open southern border, takings fans of our southern border. i want to talk about data. ranking member himes cited data from the third years of the last

administration and this administration but here is data from the actual numbers from customs and border protection figures, that in 2017 there were two the terrorist screening data center, the known terrorist watch list. in 2018 there were six in werterfeit in 201919 there three. in 2020, there were a mere six, and after that t parabolic. when not talking about hundreds, hundreds of people coming across the border in the last three years and each of the last three years that all the terror known watchlist picked this doesn't include the people that we have not caught. so this is the existential threat and this is the big0st threat. i'm disappointed yet again that in the searing daniel threat assessment that were not t talkg about the border, the open border policies m

mentioned earlier a lincoln quote which is evolved over the last couple of centuries but i'll summarize it as if we falter and lose our freedoms as a nation it is because we destroyed them ourselves from within. this is a policy that is the direct result of a president hu sits in the white house who is intentionally open our southern borders, has created a migration challenge -- a president hu -- building 75,000 american each year, dozens of people being murdered at the hands of illegals and now 7 million people who in our country are unaccounted for the court dates in some cases on the 2032 timeframe, no idea what living, their victims of human smuggling, victims of the affected was sleeping with on her own borders working off the debt to the cartels. so my question to you is why have you failed to import on this president levell of threat from a national security

perspective that his policies are creating and is is not being briefed, if it is being briefed what his reaction b you're gettg from either the secretary of defense austin, sector homeland defense mayorkas for the president ofsi the united state? i guess director haines we could start with you and if anyone else has any interest in addressing this. why has the president not recognize that the southern border policies that he has created very man-made problem are themselves the biggest threat to our nation security? >> thank you your i think the question as is understand ite is are we providing to the kennedy information abouthat's happening at the border? and i think as you indicate, we have our assessment in the annual threat assessment. the challenges and why it is

we're seeing so many folks at the border and we do provide that information on a regular basis. >> that actually wasn't my question. my question is why has the president in your opinion not taken this on board? the fact that in 2022 there were 98 encounters with known terrorists on the terror watch these numbers are parabolic, exponential inen nature. what is this administration not listening to you? do like the ability to commun■ñicate this is a chain of command with it or someone preventing you from clearly conveying this data set to the president. or is a frankly just a president @6and his cabinet who don't giva damn about the southern part of the policies and repercussions thereof? >> in my experience the policy -- they care what they are doing what is best not hesitate or i would hesitate to suggest that i can write an opinion about what

the president thinks on these issues are why he is come to the ons he has. >> i think the results speak for themselves and have no doubt the agents in the field and mortifications in the field too deeply about our n■/ation security. they're just as good as we are. that's what scares me franco when you have a commander-in-chief who doesn't change his behavior patterns or his policies as a result of this invasion on ours southern borde. puts out last of all things is very concerning as an american citizen. i thank you for your time and your testimony and look forward to talking to you on the classified site. i never get asked ms. houlihan for five minutes. the opportuniy to sit in public with you all, and i am grateful for the chance to talkonce on page 32, which is biology. biology, keeps me up at night,, giveaways and you probably would think. while security, bioterrorism, synthetic biology, biotech, you

name it, bioweapons whi■n is pa. it's a definitely on the u.s. list of critical technologies but i haven't heard enough conversation from ourselves as policymakers or from intel officers as well who talk about biology with the same sense o urgency as we do about ai are we do about quantumum as an exampl. biotech has enormous upsides, and some really downsides as well. our competitors see that as well. i was wondering indeed trying to catch up to us in this area if you all in this open setting of recognize a little bit more difficult to talk about two things. what is it that you see as the threat to the degree you are able to, and also what are we doing and d what can congress do to help you prepare in terms of

workforce, in terms of making sure we have the prope lineble o address the opportunities and the challenges and threats of biology has? i will start with director haines, please. >> thank you very much for raising this, and i share your concern about this issue. this is a fundamental question and it is one we spend a lot of time trying to invest more resources it, particularly because to your second point on awo workforce point is not an aa where we are likely to grow the greatest expertise within the ic. that's going to reside outside of the intelligence community and yet its■n fundamental we hae access to the expertise they were bringing it into the community as we do. in part what we've been trying to encourage is opportunities for exchanges where folks are able to work in bio and text areas and come back into the ic. we've also been working to try to expand our communication and/or access to expertise and

the private sector through advisor groups, fellowships, of of others will talk about it. i know director burns has some in these areas as well. to your first point the threat issue is in many respects one of the challenges here is biotech is almost byy its nature dual oe advances are ones that are often going to be providing great opportunities for society and at the same time can create some challenges that the least of which are in the so really being able to understand the dual use nature, then be able to find what is sort of the greatest priority from a national security perspective and let that up for policymakers and do that in a way that doe't hamper the science that is ultimately hopefully going to serve w to reduce opportunities but at the same t our national security. sigh me leave it that and leave it to others.

>> all i would add is just what director haines just mentioned, which is that as you described in biotechnology offers enormous promise and enormouslend lines . we see our adversaries looking for ways they can invest in those troubling trend lines, whether it's in terms of use of infectious diseases■ñ and pathogens or the wholele idea of building super soldiers in the future using biotechnology. all of those are deeply worrisome. what are we doing about it? we set up a new mission center which just celebrated its second anniversary which has as one of its highest priorities while technology. we've increased hiring so that we have a dedicated unit of officers who can help us and help policymakers better understand the nature of the threats and better anticipate, better■é disrupted them, to. >> general? >> very briefly on the military intelligence side, we do have a

small disruptive technology team, they are focus on ai and quantum but increasing over the last couple of years have had to focus on biotechnology. for us that means more recently biosecurity. as director haines laid out for us it's about a capacity at level of expertise that requires a partnering with industry and the medical communities and with our fellow ic members that we'ln resources for i would add from -- [inaudible] . [inaudible] [inaudible] >> thank you all for being here

director pains in september, yourself by the committee and these agencies to bring intelligence support and identify opportunities for the. steady and for this program? it brought and folks from the community and folks represented but also included not in their intelligence and folks and treasury and the idea was to see of they have the intelligence community and what treasure is doing the mark to have recommendation? >> they just finalized a report and we can get you a copy.

>> how are they to target this? focus on the fact that because it is not categorized within 702, it prevents us from targeting affiliates of the drug cartel, there subcontractors, can you speak to that? >> section 702 this bottle, and so many ways. it gives flexibility overseas in the area we have been successful is identifying precursor chemicals as a transit from china we hit limitations and use that authority. giving an opportunity to pursue

additional authorities related to section 702 humor option to further illuminate what that threat looks like. >> we have tried to make those changes have run into problems. we literally buying our hands behind our back in the effort to battle functional production and trucking and we are not even talking about american citizens, we are talking about foreigners and foreign land. >> what is your, benefit is a foreign terrorist organization? >> from a law enforcement perspective the principal benefit would be enhancement to go after the money, i don't want

to make a comic we don't have any but the principal effects would be more with other agencies they would have;] >> how they battle drug cartel? is us national security apparatus? if you could pick somebody, wod be office, the dod or eia?o >> it's beyond our scope but my senses it needs to be a whole of government strategy meeting

moving forward on prosecutions and they spend their time going after hotels in the■8 network. it is also an effort by treasury and others and dhs to interdict opportunity to support that to the intelligence we provide. >> i understand we caught you off guard there. i have more important questions to get to. adversaries have no problem no education for these needs. we do not have a policy or will.

ie problem and it is the same me as nuclear deterrence. view it the same and should review the records same as nuclear deterrence? these policies in placend ability to engage in the same defense?■j ... those costs that could be any

number of tools available to the executive branch for anyone that's willing to and we have to be able to perform that. >> i couldn't agree more but we need to be able to impose costs and our enemy needs to know we are willing to impose costs. in well over my time so thank you the chairman for indulging me and i yield back. >> thank you mr. chairman.p: i just want to follow-up on some of the recent questions from my colleagues related to the border related to the fentanyl crisis. we heard you loud and clear about the i winner billy -- ability to understand the sentinel related network but i appreciate it's a public version of the worldwide threat that talks explicitly about transnational criminal organizations their threat to ublic health system our financial system#% ad

my colleagues questioned saying that i would assert that we have a policy community and it's also up to us here in congress to legislate in put forth bills that will keep, as page 36, the more than 100,000 annual drug deaths in the united states literature beaded to elicit fentanyl mostly supplied by a-based ecs even as u.s. law enforcement sees record amounts of precursor chemicals and equipment. in china he remains a primary c. it's a global issue. this is an issue that gets at the heart of our national security overseas and abroad and i look forward to working with my colleagues on this because we are the policy community that should keep solving it. there was a bill in the senate

that was proposed moving forward and we can discuss that at a later date. i want to move to my actual question related to the terrorism issue. specifically recently my colleague congressman houlahan and i nairobi and somalia focused on the al-shabaab threat m as it continues in africa specifically with the larger impact with mass kidnapping of nearly 300 school-aged children and women in northern nigeria likely perpetrated by islamist extremists al-shabaab and smelling and capable al qaeda affiliates. these stages series of attacks including the murder ofle on thd africa continues to be the only continent where -- are growing.

my sincere gratitude to every person on the ground both the military personnel the intelligence community and personnel for working in this fight but you can give us your efforts to combat them contain threats emanating from africa and what threat africa extremist groups pose to the u.s. either indirect attacks or as was the topic!ó of conversation in east africa with money funneling out from al-shabaab to aid other affiliate organizations and any member who would like to take it. >> i will start. i'll be quick. i think your absolute right africa is growing place for terrorism and no isis and al qaeda which we a lot of time on there are more capable of striking u.s. interest in the

regions where they operate and that is true whether it's in africa where rather than the homelandoltained pressure that we have engaged in on those issues. but this is part of what is creating thenvironment you describe which is instability and exacerbating many of the challenges that africa already faces health region so we have done a lot to talk about some the things we are working on. >> i couldn't agree with you more not just in the sahel but in mogadishu a mogadishu and i was there not long after you were there and there's work with all sorts of u.s. officials right now. your reitinger stood -- underscoring the threat coming out of somali.

they are flush with money and some of that money has gone out and importance of our■s partnerships that have proven to be very effective partner in light of these issues and we can talk in closed session about some of the things that we are trying to just in a partnership but another once as well. i think in africa that sense of partnership is going to be incredibly important dealing with what is a growing threat. >> with that i yield back thank you. >> thank you mr. jared ms. spain special counsel hur is on the hill today and he is putting his report that president biden has top-secret compartments of documents knowingly in his basement. he knowingly provided■d■! those documents to his author. have you seen those documents?

>> i have seen i think all of the documents that were part of the special counsel. there were special boxes have you seen all of them are part of them? i've seen all of them but i wouldn't say or breadth or all of them. i went through classificioview e community. it where you provide that review to this committee, this damage assessment, to this committee? wi that? >> we did an overall damage assessment with respect to all of the different documents etc. and that's been provided to the hill to i think a gang of eight and we'll see whether or not we can provide it. >> who has possession of those documents now? >> the department of justice. >> i would look forward to mr. chairman the broader committee seeing the extent of these documents so they could

have been fairly benign or they could have been incredibly serious so i would encourage the intelligence community to brieft the damage that those documents that apparently have been sitting for quite some time both in the university of this house time with the senate vice president and now as president. switching toan. the u.n. is reporting that al qaeda has established eight new training camps in afghanistan and list the specific provinces were all qaeda currently has training camps including a new base with stockpile weaponry in the panjshir. yet the threat assessment said al qaeda is not much of a threat. do you disagree with the u.n. security council's assessment?

>> can we approach this in closed session quick. >> i look forward to that. would you say at this pnt al qaeda's more less of a threat than in 2020? does al qaeda still intend to attack the homeland and the western interest if given the opportunity? >> they continue to have the intent but not the capacity. >> will they grow that capacity if given the opportunity? the mixture. spoon of the u.n. seems to think th capacity so i look forward to whether you agree or disagree with that's assessment and switching to russia. russia is selling an incount ofa through pro curs in china. i think it's safe to say russia benefits when the price of oil is high. does anyone disagree texas is how primarily russia is

elsewhere. so i think you'd also agree less oil and gas on the international market drives the price high and therefore both santay round for their work offers. is anyone disagree with that? so it's safe to say an lng ban on exporting american cleaner by the way more plentiful gas is indirectly fueling that? does anyone disagree with that? i will take that as an know and in fact i will share with witnesses i just sat down with the speaker of the parliament from lithuania on the front lines of fresh and aggressive and and she said we buy 8 o gasa and at some point they will have to go back to buying russian gas.

we are literally our domestic energy policy is creating an fueling russia's war machine and when we are being astopend again by also supporting continued to support ukraine and we should stop putin apps away n policies with both tehran and the assessment there's nothingo. in terms of gaza is hamas and honest after? did they tell the truth on a regular basis? >> no. >> okay. yet we have a casualtye coming from the hamas health ministry that is continually -- i don't think if putin was talking about a russian run health ministry and their that at

face value. do we take the intelligence community take it at face value or to have some independent verification there are? >> we don't take it on face all you. as was indicated it's not that far off. >> but it is not accurate on its face. you don't take that it face value quick. >> we don't take it on face value. >> thank you nation neither should the present and national television and finally mr. wray on domestic terrorism we have 16 universities teaching as part of their curriculum to book how to bomb oil pipelines, 16 universities. i would consider that facilitate and doquick. >> i don't know. >> i've liked ender into the record reporting how to come

universities are teaching students to blow up oil pipelines and in their curriculum how do bombing oil pipeline. i think you would agree that that's not acceptable. >> totally unacceptable. >> bicester wray can i get your consent to look into what i would call the left-wing domestic terrorism and not only theúx■ñ activities that. >> certainly i'll look into all of the comparisons including funding. >> thank you i'll look for that briefing. thank you mr. chairman. >> you've been waiting the entire hearing waiting to ask questions. >> director haines general burns general cruz i want to be clear i have called for a cease-fire in order to frame all the

hostages held by hamas allow more humanitarian aid to enter gaza to relieve suffering especially the children of hopefully begin to set the stage for a two-state solution for the establishment of an independent palestinian state living in peace next to a secure israel. additionally hamas must not have any future palestinian state especially after october 7 attack whereas they committed atrocities, killing, and kidnapping innocent civilians. i also recognize the hamas leader is not starving or suffering and is using hostages as a way to protect himself and biscuit and if he just turned himself so that won't happen.

director burns he recently returned from yet another visit to the middle east to assist in negotiating a cease-fire which will release additional hostages held byer increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into gaza. can you provide an update on how close we are to a deal? >> i think they are still a possibility of such a deal and it won't be for lack of trying on our part. we are workingyptian counterpart it's a very tough process and we can't guarantee success but thes the alternatives are worse. innocent civilians who are suffering in gaza and their hostages and their families. we will continue to work very this as i said and they are still a possibility as long as there's the smallest possibility

is essential for all of us to work together. >> what are the major obstacles to achieving a cease-fire? >> there are lot of very complicated to go in to all of them. we can do it in closed session as well. i think it's still possible to make progress. there are a number of very confiscated issues to sort through and i think it's absolutely urgent. >> i appreciate that that we don't take any numbers at face value. do they have a reliable assessment of the number of civilian casualties in gaza as well as e humanitarian toll? >> thank you. we really do not have our own co to tell

you what the numbers are. what we look to as indicated the gaza ministry and we talk to and largely rely on israeli counterparts and the numbers are not that different. i think the amount of time to roughly 31,000 the idf was actually supporting about 28. so it is in the challenge course is the health ministry is not differentiating civilian fighters in that context so we have a broad range and very challenging for us to independently corroborate effectively what the numbers are. >> additionally what are the issues i mentioned a few weeks ago that there was a concerned about escalating tensions in the absence of the cease-fire once

ramadan started particularly in the west bank. is that a significant concern tax. >> it is one i think the bank is a combustible place right now for a variety of reasons. there's a spillover of the violence in the west bank. it is in everybody's interest to try to get the cease-fire hostage deal because that is the best way in many respects to calm the situation and iranian proxies from at 11 to the houthiin yemen are feeding off of this crisis and t last cease-fire hostage release took part in the latter part of november and we all observed the

cease-fire that resulted. >> thank you and with that i yield back. >> thank you mr. chairman. it's such an important opportunity for the american people to get a view of the leadership of our intelligence community and to assess the worldwide threat had had views expressed from both republicans and democrats about those and when you think about worldwide threats, whether it's from space or from another country, from a terror group, of course they are the ones that are most important factor affecting american people and their daily lives, in their daily communities. you've heard a lot starting with chairman turner and mr. garcia, mr. kelly and others abo■s the threats being encountered along our border. those aree people on the terror watch list who have crossed the border and are in the united states, that we have encountered, therefore we know

there in the united states or we've asked him to leave the united states and so we don't have any idea, and people have crossed the border with this chaos with 7 million encounters that areh distracted our cbp uniformed people along that border. so want to start with following up on their thoughts. has reported a of al-shabaab who is on the terror watch list entered the united states and, quote, according to the director when heir testified in january, quote, roamed around the country forth a year, close quote, and apprehended or known about until he used his real identity documents to try to get a job. so director wray, to draw this main issue that we haven this t oversight point of view is, whether it's 169

people in this fiscal year or 300 in the last three fiscal years, where are the people that are on the terror watch list? you were asked have its own on a domestic flight. but is this a a priority for , domestic counterterrorism, counterintelligence operations that these people are targets that they been encountered at the border? >> so let me answer to this way. certainly all of our joint terrorism task force and all 56 field offices have as a significant part of their work focusing on terrorists■w subjec, subjects of investigations, many of whom may be people, in fact, all of whom if we have an open investigation -- >> let me stop you there. this triggering for that 56 field offices triggered by an open investigation,o here's my question. we had the counterintelligence fusion center testified before

us recently and i'm interested in the data integration that if they see, if tsa or cbp encounters these people and they go into our database is that automatically go to one of our saic that this personur a step n the united states? evenug open investigation. in other words, are refusing@p that information to our domestic counterterrorism counterintelligence? someone is on the no-fly list or the terror watch list, the been encountered, they now takee a southwest airlines flight from texas to boston. does the boston saic know that? are the notified of that? >> the way the system works they should be. i can tell you it's happened in every instanceork. the bigger concern frankly are

individuals who i will put them into two categories.■ one, someone who was on the list but present fake documents, and because of the basis for which a living on the lists are not biometrics fingerprint■n or otherwise to match them against the nobody catches them. or somebody who should have been on the list but intelligence wasn't developed to say they should be on the list until after they -- >> indicates of the al-shabaab rohmer in the domesc states come he present fake documents to get into country. but what concern does in december alone, cbp's estimate of three have 1000 encnt alone , to acknowledge eagle pass 60 members of codis with border one day n and there wereo documentation process, don't biometrics, no photo, noot interview come no run against the list, no checking of

documents. they just passed then threw into the u.s. that's a small sample out of 7.1 million but it think we are concerned on this committee that data is that been shared effectively and i i would ask a legitimate question for me and my oversight capacity to ask you as our director, tsa come cbp, fbi, fusion in, coordinating, integrate the data of the people who you've heard about all morning who have crossed the border withts are not been encountered on the terror watch list or were actually that are not such an open investigation, can i have your commitment that we can execute an answer to a question? we wrote you and asked what is, what's the status of the 106 and people that weren't counted? we've never gotten an answer. here's person one. he was deported. here's person to become present

fake documents, , we picked them up to boston. personable three, picked him up in chicago. we actually don't know the answer. the public what happens up public but the number one 1e the american people are saying where are they? common sense question, where are they? may i have your commitment? >> absolutel you can my commitment to cut it to whatever information you're looking for and i will talk about whatever the letter is you sit and see we can give you an answer. >> thank you very much. yield back, mr. chairman. >> we have no other members in the queue so before we close in what offer if there's anything you want to add any closing comments or clarification of a, they made earlier. seeing nine, will be adjourned until 2:15. thank you so much. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]!/

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>> celebrating the 20thf our anl studentcam documentary competition. this year c-span asks middle and high school students across the country to look forward while considering the past. ghlighting the milestone of the anniversary, each but says it was given the option to look 20 years into the future or 20 years into the past. in response we received inspiring and thought-provoking documentaries from more than 3200 students across 42tates, through conducting in-depth research and interviews with experts, students tackled critical topics such as technology and social media. >> from one that is our start replacing that a limiting entire fields of work. >> challenges and climate. >> no longer sustain. >> discussions about criminal justice. >> the american criminal justice system. >> we are excited to share the top winners of studentcam 2024

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tenth graders in connecticut. the compelling documentary innocence held hostage, navigating past and future conflicts withran, deals with the time and sensitive subject and features interviews with former iranian hostage. >> instead of saying so you're free to leave, i was blindfolded, handcuffed, thrown in the back of the car and taken straight to the prison. >> it makes me great joy out of 32 understood who participated in this competition this year you guys are the grand prize winners in studentcam 2024. >> thank you. >> thank you so much. >> this is a huge honor. we are so grateful for this opportunity, really thank you a lot. >> we extend our gratitude to the educators, parents and participants who supported each creative journey.lmmakers on the congratulations to all our winters. don't miss out, the top winning