all of these issues, what is on people's minds with your own service and there is a time in this world of everyone who is in the echo chamber so it is refreshing to get outside. when you step aside, they are the same or slightly variance in terms of interest so really grateful to be out here today. >> we have a short coffee break before our panel begins at 1230.

[inaudible conversations]l leae

join. >> thank you for. welcome back to the welcome center thank you to those who lingered and remained from the split of those of you join, thank you for joining this panel as those those streaming adult for the virtual audience. the bias of a a distinguished panelists are more fully available online fashion and as was said suzanne can't make it. we wish her well and a speedy recovery. otherwise i want to make three very quick plug from three very different organizations about iran and middle is related,

holly dagres to my left, don't take it politically, is editor and producer and creator of the field by substack-not mistaken. naysan rafati contributes to the monthly, monthly production at icj -- icg and has the overnight brief which is a daily kind of propensity things related. for those who are struggling to keep up with the delusion of regional and iran and other events, you can subscribe to all three of those. at that would set the scene a little bit with zooming in on one area of consensus, which is when we were prepping for the family said to parliamentary elections really matter? i want to turn over to naysan to begin, do elections even matter in the republic of iran? dcs at some version of this debate every time there's a presidential election, every time there's a protest triggered by an election, and vice versa.

so do these things matter? >> thank you. i give a classic d.c. editor classic d.c. question. yes and no. so for context iran on the first of march held do elections with the parliament and for the assembly of experts which is normally responsible selecting the next supreme leader. in terms of the results of election i can give you a six ax word summary, sweeping disqualifications, low turnout, conservative consolidation. we can all go home. that's not really the point. the point is, do elections matter, parliamentary election, present elections matter and iran? i would say that without getting into the details opposed military history let's just focus on the last decade where iran has had three presidential elections and three parliamentary elections.

you can look at this ten year period as a game of two halves. everything i will say is qualified within the parameters of what is acceptable under the islamic republic. when we refer to someone being a conservative or a reformist or pragmatist i think this i discussed my enough with that nomenclature to know that we're speaking within the confines of what the system allows as its own opposition for his loyal supporters. so if you go back to 2013th we have a pendulum swing within the narrow parameter the system allows from the two terms of the ahmadinejad administration. and again people will say that presidents don't matter,, parliament so meta. i think the transition there shows that again within that spectrum that is divergence on economic policies some degree social policy, certain foreign policy. and that presidential election

in 2013 was, ambassador wooster use the phrase not free and not fear. that is true. election dash iranian election jeffrey a not fair. that is not to say the not competitive or cable throwing out a curveball. so you had first in 2013 2a presidential election that brought in the elements in government that broadly referred to as pragmatist relatively centrist, not the reformist but also not hard-line ideologues of the ahmadinejad here. those forces consolidated again in 2016 with the elections with the parliament elections and again with president rouhani we election into a 17, again in all three of those elections reasonably robust turnout in the low '70s for the presidential election, and fairly convincing wins for that branch of the

iranian political spectrum. as i said it's been a game of two halves and this last election, parliamentary election, you can look at it with a six word summary i gave you, or you can look at as part of a trend line of the past couple of years where first you had a parliamentary election in 2020 that kind of set the stage for what we saw two weeks ago. again, with fairly sweeping disqualifications, fairly limited participation. in fact, 2020 set a record low for participation, which is only beaten two weeks ago with the 1% turnout. and what happened in between was the election of president raisi, again and another record low turnout. and people use the phrase something flattered to deceive. the numbers actually don't flatter and still deceived when

president raisi one office, the second-place vote-getter was like ballots. and again in this recent election, the 41% turnout -- blank -- has been announced by the government, even though you had high single-digit blank ballots. so what happened on the first of march i would situate within that swing of the pendulum of three successive national elections where the system even by its own standards, even within parameters of iranian national elections has essentially drawn up the drawbridge to kind of bring together a consolidation of not just non-reformists or non-pragmatists but a very, very conservative leaning towards hard-line base. and that i think is where i

would situate the elections and why they matter. >> i'm glad you mentioned those trendlines in particular the three lower tiered historically lower tiered turnips, february 2020, spring spring 2021 and now again march 2024, for parliament as well as for president. but those trendlines tell a story of society as well not just of the elite contraction but social dispossession, social apathy and visually built off as you know a whole series of boom and bust protest and iran. enjoy 17-2020 at the contingent into 2021, twice in 2022 come once a make and once again begin in september a make and once again begin in september with a massive protest. holly, you into my track these protests online, social media intimately -- coming out of iran is not on a daily but hourly basis. what would you say is a popular attitude towards these elections general? the irony of ironies of new ways, and authoritarian government, a nationalist post

revolutionary society, sector society but until really that time that naysan was talk about, 2017 to president trump you had really high turnout by iranians, even parliamentary presidential elections within concurrent with foreign pressure, , concurrent with his domestic series of protests you a bad moving away from the ballot box. this one trendlines beget the other? is it because one thing there any population is moving away from the ballot box, the embrace the street as a better measure for change? what is it about what naysan was talk about the guardian council of qualifications, they can't get candidates want there? is that the logistic process or is it street power that is attractive in and move them away from the ballot box? >> i would argue it's a bit of both. it started i think, how many are the supreme leader of ivins the talk about the islamic revolution 2.0 basically his vision for an islamic republic

postmortem. he's been think about this for years now. in essence he wants to see a hard-line dominated relatively pious relatively young government in power. he seen and all three branches of government, the presidency, the legislative and the judiciary. so he's definitely made that a thing. that's why we're seeing all these disqualifications over the years. i think just to tie into the protest, the largest mass protests since 79 in terms of geography at the time was the december 2017 january 2018 protest. just a year later we saw that company two years later we saw that parliamentary election with a low turnout with hardliners in only about to run marlis in this election. at the time the authorities blame the coronavirus for the long trip because a qualifier sister to just become the thing

and eventually iran would have the largest number of deaths and cases in the region. but the trend continues with the present election. they gave president raisi the present of a silver platter and a lot of iranians did not vote. that just to talk about numbers for a second, even before these parliamentary elections happened on march 1, the iranian news agency it published pawling sylvia three percenter that. another institute said 77% of iranians inside the country would not vote. so what we saw on march 1 was the lowest turnout in the islamic republic 45 year history. so why is that? yes, it is a mix of hardliners leaving the scene but it's also that iranians are fed up with the status quo. mitchard those protest early that with the biggest since 79 at the time. one of the popular chance was reformist hardliners game is over. so really signaled iranians

didn't really care who is in office. they were set up with the status quo. i would achieve a lot of the low turnout to the disenchantment with the clerical establishment on several fronts. part because this systemic corruption, mismanagement and a rise in oppression. the outcome highlights illegitimate the clerical establishment has been in the eyes of the people. when you look at just some of the other things that were happening along the election there was a hashtag, and basically translates as no way i will vote. yes, there was some former members of the diaspora opposition coalition known as the georgetown ate that were leading some of this that we are also seeing folks like imprisoned nobel peace prize laureate call for for a boy. with us some of the other political, former political i i was a candidates in different

parts, reformist that were imprisoned and were also calling for this. and ironically, or not surprising, former reformist president did not vote in this election and that was actually a first and it surprised a lot of people but i think it shows how bankrupt this trend has been for the clerical establishment. >> if there's an image uncoated takes a moderate prominent because -- something that folks were looking at to see almost as bellwether. but if there's an image of this quote-unquote election or selection it is i believe the 96-year-old, 97, happy birthday, 97-year-old ayatollah who is now dual hatted i believe come ahead of the symbol of experts and head of the guardian council, him try to to put the paper slip into the quote-unquote ballot box and some of having to guide his hand-picked the image of a

guided process of an octogenarian if not even adequate establishment trying to maneuver their weight around the process that doesn't even suit them. the picture is i think a lot of iranian state media publish it online. if you can find go find it. it's a picture like that really is what 1000 a thousand woa thousand words. holly talked about the mood on the street, disconcerting pattern of protest. mass disenchantment. i stole a concurrent with that but i think there's something else at play at the level. folks i feel i can't stop doing the criminology of the islamic republic as the political elite contracted. we've seen, for example, people over the ultimate insiders, who is the definition of the self, if not the self. that polis continues the contract just as the boundaries of acceptable political space and iran has contracted.

was there a story of even exceptionally limited elite competition? i would fly for the audience that for the other electoral process, you symbol of experts, former president was disqualified as well as to make of his former ministers. what does that say? as well as of course the fact this dynasty that in many institutions even think so many distinguished wilson center events over the years a member sitting in the audience during folks like an -- an idea of the dynastic power they had. they are essentially all of this -- what is khamenei trying to engineer among the elite of what's left of the elite? is anything else at play? >> holly mitch in succession. i think holly also mentioned something else which is this notion that one can read about and then kind of wonder how much of this is real, how much of this is hype but this notion of purification, right, a purification of revolutionary

that the supreme leader has a letter to the last couple of years, other senior kind of irgc guys have mentioned. and you're about as well when many speak to people who are based in tehran where over the past few years we talk about parliament can we talk about the presidency, we talk but institution even in civil-service bureaucracy levels of bringing in people who in the past would a bit of a more technocratic mold now being kind of true believer, not appointed necessary based on qualifications but on beliefs and that sort of thing. you see that, the flipside of that with these berries corruption cases and mismanagement that you see come up from time to time. but i think the point about the assembly is well taken. rouhani who was not allowed to run for the assembly of experts which is the 88 person body, should say 88 men body that is

irresponsible -- >> clerical body. >> clerical body. i mean, we do need to narrow it any further but summerlike rouhani is not, could i really be considered anything but loyal opposition within the system. this is a man who is not even -- is a veteran of the nasa ns could establishment. he's a two-time president. he has been involved in all of the national decision-making circles over the past 30 odd years. and, but even that is perceived as too much of a wildcard at this stage. and you you know i think pat is that is where the system believes that it is, which is under siege from multiple vectors from below, from abroad. i mean, it sounds fantastical,

but there are people in the system who genuinely believe that 2022 protest were a foreign instigated plot. but they genuinely believe that. now again, it seems remarkable notion to think that the u.s., western allies, western media, a selection of human rights activists would all come together to concoct this grand plan. let it also, if you believe that, it also takes you to very risky conclusions, which is not actually what is driving the 2017 protests or economic grievances or the the 2018-9 protest sparked again by economic discontent but became very strong and they can become 2022 was not over social discontent but quickly manifested as at the system anger. but rather it's a foreign plot,

we subdued it, we're doing fine. right? and so this combination of paranoia and overconfidence that you have at the same time. and as part of that you have this shrinking of the circle to all but the most dogmatic and all but the most ideologically pure, all but the most conservative elements of the system that includes raisi ampulla been vetted and approved as experts, that includes embers of parliament. and succession obviously being part of that. >> that contraction and that preference for loyalty and zeal, is looking for phrase actually and someone from iran dismay with the university system there told me of this phrase that was used in the '80s during the cultural revolution when they were purging old professors and trend established a new generation of academic elites. i just with a stint at your

speaking, remind me of this line, the line was -- so it's your righteousness, not your competence that matters. nothing made better define how khamenei is moving his musical chairs then who is most righteous. it's not his most cover, not the managerial class, not the conservative pragmatists like the jcpoa, it is this righteousness. it is who is most loyal. what holley, does that mean that nixon islamic republic is almost certainly going to be faced with a crisis, domestic, foreign, regional, jealous people, righteous people not competent people will botch it? or is this odd cocktail of paranoia and hyperbolic or paranoia strength enough to kind of allow them to muddle along? >> well, i well, i mean, e been muddling along. they survived u.s. impose

sanctions under the top administration. they survived the coronavirus just by having the largest -- they survived the biggest threat to the regime 40 some year history which was the uprising. i like to say that still ongoing. so, i mean, so far there been winging it, but you highlighted a good point. this is probably the most incompetent administration the raisi government in its 45 year history but somehow they been able to amble along. i think part of it is a sense of arrogance. they have two u.n. security permanent members backing them, russia and china. they have managed to build ties with its arab neighbors in the persian gulf. they have managed to suppress these massive protests for the time being. and so when you look at -- i s him or less on the foreign policy front they are projecting strength but when you look

domestically, yes, they crushed the protest for the time being, but it think it's inevitable that these protests will continue in some shape or form. yes, there is like a sense of hopeless was on the ground. you are saying this like plight of iranians, like a flight of arenas and are trying to leave the country because they feel the situation has become so dire and hopeless that the literacy have is to leave. brain drain historic is been a problem in the country but it don't think the fight against the regime is over. i think like a talk a lot about gen z in my work, the '80s generation and the ranson cito have actually a word for -- i really put my faith in this generation of iranians, to move the needle in the country the way their parents and the grandparents happened. which is going back to the issue on the ground. domestically it's not just the people are just content with mismanagement and corruption and repression. the state of the economy is in

the fireplace. the environment, climate change is a big issue. i wouldn't be surprised if use u see mass movements of iranians from places like -- something that iranians analyst within the country are worried and predicting. and so until they deal with these big issues domestically, i think the regime is going to be more so paranoid and already is come just at what naysan saint and to do genuinely believe the west is keen on regime change. you talk about rouhani being discolored. and i are gse affiliated account at posted this like advertisement basically an ad the anti-rouhani and it was basically suggesting that all of iran's problems were rouhani, the economy, corruption, the failure of the jake g that the jcpoa. the protests. when this theater came out just

after he was disqualified, it usually showed they really want to cast blame on those people that are not the most loyal to the regime, and that these people cannot be trusted. and again in the context of the jcpoa a lot of these hard-line figures really thought the jcpoa was a threat to the islamic republic because if you had a nuclear deal and sanctions relief that myth western business were going to come through. that meant iranians would get to have a taste of what it's like to have these western opportunities to an extent, and that meant that that iranians would start asking for more. the situation in the country would be better arguably and so they would ask more from the government. that's why they celebrate when the jcpoa was still happen under the data withdrawn under the top administration. part of it had a paper version of the jcpoa and they set on fire and were chanting in

celebration. so to them these are threats to the clerical establishment. >> i mean, polite disagreements, cash and sanctions relief is a major threat to us enhance of the clerical establishment that we will agree to disagree there. but it do what you guys to make a slightly more conversation now, and correct me in a view i have of this movement a cycle of boom and bust cycle of elections and protester in particular there is an analogy khamenei is fond of saying. it's the train of the revolution. the train has minicars. and as the train is speeding or approaching toward its destination, these cars are cut. i can't help but think about is different movement over time. in the 1990s and the first front of the election for president, university students used to say -- clearly that

didn't happen. i believe the election was a shock. in the system begin to insulate itself against the shocks. the 2004 hard-line consolidation, the, the 2005 bring forth, albeit under second-round, the pressure getss even people who contested that, wasn't the first of people and event claimed there was a stolen election. all of these had an expiration date. rouhani seems have had an expiration date. the regime seems to be in my view contends with that limited number of trains on the car because it's allowing to approach its destination even further. khamenei is 84, 85, think about succession to you both hit that on your comics. comments. these things slow down history. if he's talking in the world of zeal of righteousness, not confidence, he doesn't anyone with an independent power base. he doesn't know anyone who will even seen some kind of flirtation with the west. so didn't we all just kind of

entertaining them in all these years by carrying a bit about too much these numbers and carry a bit too much of this faction, too much but everybody they could raise to entertain us, jcpoa and everything else? or was this not predestinate to move in this culture hard-line direction from the beginning? >> i should express a biased. i'm a historian so i'm trained not to see anything as predetermined by to see events and try to look at them in their own time and in the own context. >> a a structural agency is most important. >> exactly. so three kind of interlinked comment based on that and ejection. one is, and i mentioned ten year swing of the pendulum but it's actually much longer than that. you can look at the pendulum swing from ahmadinejad, to rouhani to racy.

it's almost like every time center of the pendulum keeps moving further to the right, right? like rouhani is not -- and even raisi is not that it is a pendulum, you used the word cycle. we don't know at this point if this is now the consolidated meeting term vision or if there is 2025, 2027 come if we can look at and predict another cycle back. at this point looks like this is more of a default setting than a swing of the pendulum but at some point looks like they just want to hold the pendulum of fall and is and what it is. again partially perhaps for succession, but two further asterisks to that. one is that even under the circumstances that were all discussing and think we are all in broad agreement that this current government is well

consolidated from the most dogmatic and most conservative element of the iranian political staffs to come up is the judiciary, the executive of the supreme leader's office, you can look at and say even under rouhani it was shades of gray, now it is more shades of black. that being said, that isn't to take away that they all agree with each other or indeed that they like each other on a personal level. we've already seen khamenei himself doing his impersonation of the character and kiki blinder said no fighting, no fighting. even now before we've even gotten to the things like the chairmanship of the elections, you've already seen knives out between what are now the traditional conservatives and the ultraconservatives that have done well. that's one asterisk. the other asterisk is we sit here, i think we rightly put

emphasis on what's missing from this picture, which is any of it of combativeness, any element of political variation even within the spectrum. what the system is looking at is yes, they would love to 60%. >> translator: yesterday like that 70% turnout. but it seems like the way that, they knew this going in, like holly mentioned one, they knew the elections were going to be low. for system that puts on so much emphasis over this turnout number, the obvious answer is well, increasing competitiveness, results in greater interest, great interest leads to greater participation. that's a fairly straightforward formula. they chose not to do that. they didn't do that under raisi election and they didn't do that now. that tells you that the emphasis right now is on holding that 40% who did turn out. again like i said, that figure fails to flatter and still deceives, if you take away --

first it's an official figure, second it not inclusive of the ballots that were discontinued, but thirdly, we've always seen turnout in rural areas and provinces fare much better than the political centers like the main cities. ..

ideations next-generation in the hope that they can expand. the focus seems to be it doesn't matter how much representative or client, it is to scrape the court across. >> ironically the defense staff, the ministry of defense, high turnout by deterrence and shield against foreign pressure so it's what's left is just the function or impression or holding the

hardline case and dragging the system. >> i will start with talking about a social media clip 2002. he said 40% voter participation they do not care and back trust and hope in here we have this eternal. they don't care what the international community and for them because back to securing that stability and there is a divide and talking about this

engineered election and the frustration that yes, people are voting but there is a problem with the system here and it's an issue across the board and those not supporting the hardline dominated three branches of government being out again says and saying we continue this trend, use more than we already have. i remember years ago months after that i keep going back to that because you look at the protest we have been in protest december 2017 and they take off their job in september of 2022

so going back to then president saying on the ground there going to be closed so there is this sense experts putting them on a path of the islamic republic when and how it will happen, the million dollar question people arguably push for but you're getting more and that direction and crisis. >> with that, he said animal get their questions coming in that may be conducive here. on the way to one more question,

there is protest devolved over many years in the turnout is one trendline among many. the future trump administration and i think it's a more forceful approach from my perspective would be elective and useful. the timeline that it might be more appealing to a different audience so what you think is the pathway here there is a chasm between states and society that they are more performative books is this opportunity for the rest that exist between the u.s. government or is it

counterproductive? given all the trendlines, where is the appropriate role? >> it's funny listening to the last panel become a way and impression that is confident and doing quite well and threatening key west interest in developing relations u.s. adversary and then you listen to us. i don't think these things are contradictory and i reference this at the same time so it is possible to look at something

and post opportunity in this. during the previous panel the speaker has said we tried a little bit of everything on this program. we also tried many things but a case study will have to look at november, imagine a scenario we have protest tomorrow or the next week and it's possible because the major rounds five or six years and in both cases the response has been consistent in the human rights position.

naming and shaming to sanctions ability and finding mission. one place to start is not to think of it in terms of this approach and the engagement and whatever mode that means. and we figure out from the start what would or would not have been. i think a lot of people would be on this. the strategic interest in the region would not be that much

different, this speech in may of 2018 and in that sense, the interest is roughly the same, we do not want to see it and fundamentally we want iranians to have the right perspective voices heard and economy function to a reasonable degree. we have responses we've tried at various points and in terms of support we seen in the course of this process interesting ideas trying to come out. the iranian government them out

saying how dare you do this? is a u.s. sanction the general elections was trying to encourage in order to set up in advance medication. and in terms of accelerating court defenders and things like that. there other concerns we see if you have family you want to get money to them, how do you do that without the sanctions? is a person-to-person kind of thing talk about in terms of mechanism is the same thing and

that right now is very difficult. those are one, two and three straightforward practical things that would be a practical issue because they tried to fix a problem on the ground. >> those of us who do prefer a more pressure -based approach on the something wrong the concern is this an on-ramp and encouraging more books it doesn't happen i rgc has pathways based on not one but

many strands. even on the fundamentals they are greedy mentation, a risk tolerance and time horizons success, how come sanction court the sanctions were successful if you look at it 2013. in different little capital. >> i want to unpack that. the administration is continuing maximum pressure policy and everything but name.

and it is 2.0 because they hope they will put pressure and it is impossible and whether the trump administration they are so i don't think they care about the iranian people. in the iranian people want. and they would be more on that front.

two unpack a bit what we saw during this protest the wants and needs of the people before the iranians were into camps, the status quo can't or the regime change. the regime change was smaller than it is today but for the first time you saw a lot of the diaspora in mass numbers in d.c. and l.a. berlin about 80 to 100,000 october 2022 mobilized the people of iran so they were pushing for a lot of those talking points they wanted the regime gone and saudis iranians and europe called for the

resignation of the i rgc in the uk and european union. he really saw the gap that divides between inside and outside and it gets very small so that was something very noteworthy. if the protest was to pop up now, i would say that would be the one calling congress learning past lessons to put more pressure on talking about members of congress, a lot of them participate in elections but they didn't realize the power they could push their members of congress in so they are learning a lot and you will see a lot more pressure regardless of foods especially

not coming off again which is what i would argue. >> thank you for your insights and comments and wisdom. i think we have a little bit of time broke of the questions. i have one or two and we will not. over here and then over there. >> you mentioned the regime space of 20, 25% or whatever it is, what would be their view of this program? they support of promoter they want weaponization, one of the views on that? >> i'm here at the wilson center. my question, it's clear the way

they want, why did they allow burnout we know allowing this figure, why did they allow this? they could have said 55%. >> you may take it as you which, with the nuclear desires are and about the numbers. >> in terms of the nuclear programs the cylinder in 2006

and it was their inherent right and now it's about 20 years of sanctions of iran's nuclear program. a hold generation impacted by iran's nuclear program. you talk to a lot of iranians, they are not chancing it out there. so you see more of that sense in

the west on its commitment for the trump administration withdrew despite iran violating and getting a sense going in that direction. just so they wouldn't have to deal with the sanctions and it doesn't go and ride with what i said earlier. in the frustrations of the clerical establishment i'm sure

we will recall, the first year after the iranian parameters they began to breach restrictions in 2019 and i was part of a two-pronged under pressure. the 26th seven% of this limitation and stockpile. there was the administration

being too modest but those incremental. if you go back to 2013 the deal was signed in the parliament raised deal which was 60%. in december of 2020, that dominated parliament and god's wish at the end of november and it was percolating for several months over the objections of his team quickly approved by parliament and guardian council. and it was%.

and the agents of iraq and a few days prior so whether or not they believed i read should take it and go for a nuclear weapon, it was never their intention against nuclear weapon but certainly a matter of minimum leverage, they are far more assertive and you debate whether that is useful because the bill they passed, clearly the sanctions have not been lifted. the turnout rate, momentarily

true and as mentioned, there's a lot of push from activist from actors in the diaspora so the system has taken that and turnout is only one and a half 2% than what was 2020 so within the cone of failure and if you listen the official, it's a great outcome. 21%. for a system that puts emphasis on the republic major is no definition a strong turnout and there is a mixed record getting

turnout figures that are not seen including in 2009. >> a focus on diplomatic engagement. >> i won't keep you here any longer. thank you for your time and attention. thank you for your time. >> thank you and i also want to thank you for moderating this discussion and i particularly think all the support on the work we do here and talking about the publication and the cosponsors with u.s. it, thank you for your engagement and we will continue at future events.

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