the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough, he wrote. americansience of human relationships the ability of all peoples, of all kinds to live together and work together in the same world at peace. to make our the world. find to be better than.

all right? welcome back, students. today we're going to be discussing the battle of at questions will be attempting to analyze. first was the battle of the atlantic as of your suggested the most important war. with that in mind, can we assess how much it reshaped the conflict on a global scale beyond just the atlantic? second what role did evolving technology have on this campaign? how did the cycle of technological innovation and

improvization affect its ultimate outcome? and third, why did the allies ultimately win the battle of the atlantic axis lose? what key decisions ended up resulting in thatutcome outcome? now, before we jump into the narrative, i want to just indicate for the stakes of the battle of. the atlantic, the first key reason the battle of the atlantic was so significant was. of course, military, operational mostld be determined by the amount of transportation available to, the allies at sea, and the ability of them to safely convey troops munitions and materiel to different battlefields across globe. transportation was the key bottleneck in facing the allied leaders? if weren't enough ships to safely bring men and their weapons to a given theater, the operation have to be canregardless. any other factor. and of coutrue as the united states and great britain were separated by

battlefields. they would be contesting ground. now, the most important of these plans that depended so heavily on transportation at sea was, invasion of france. the opening of the seco. this would require the buildup of enormous in great britain itself. in other words, if the could control th particularly atlantic, millions of american could and, prepare for the invasion of nd critical element a critical outcome upon battle of the atlantic which be determined by e battle of the atlantic, was the survival of great britain itself. the great german hopparticularly american entry into the war, had been that they could starve great into submission. after all, great britain was an island. it was not self-sufficient in food production. e cabinet calculated that great britain required roughly 26 year just to survive, just to feed its own people and

keep its factories running. now beginning in mar even before american entry into theparticularly critical part of those british. remember roosevelt had declared that the united states would be the arsenal of democracy, that it would the world from, its factories, from its economic surplus weapons, tanks planes ships, food would flow to all of the allied countries, and that this would be a key in the ion, the war. but american weapons systems and even soldiers could not the war unless they could actually get to the places they needed to go. and you get some sense from this map how global lend-lease would become. now, lend-lease always prioritized great britain from its end section in march of 1941, but also grew critical to the soviet union as well. by the end of the war, lend-lease would provide roughly a year's worth of food to the entire red army as well as

forces. over 400,000 tanks and cars that would allow the red army to go on the offensive. in the summer effects. we'll talk about in a fewby 1945, total american aid shipments overseas would amount. $700 billion in contemporary dollars. roughly 10% of the entire u.s. war effort was directed to sending supplies overseas. and again, without control of the seas, all of that american economic power could notrds final victory. the stakes are thus very high. le of the. we, strategy when the war began in europe? well, the german navy was largely unprepared for the conflict. admiral rader, who was commanding the german navy and had commanded the german navy since, 1928, was in many ways an man in his strategic, tactical views. believed in big ships, surface

cruisers and. he didn't necessarily look with gr fondness on airplanes or submarines things that would conflict. instead, he envisioned vast composed of fast cruisers and battleships. these would sneak into atlantic and blockade the u.k., all part of germany's ze plan. you can see all of the ships were were intended for that program, but few of these surface ships were actually builbeen told by hitler to bank on having until 1948 to build up german naval power something that obviously did not come to pass. in addition, hitler had not been sure, as we've already not great britain would declare war at all. and as a result priority his his navy he he hoped to avoid a naval a had guaranteed british entry into the first worldgerman would be by far the t of the three main branches of the german military. on the eve of. despite utility of the submarine in the first world war, where it had been used to such

devastating effect against allied shipping, the germans only 57 submarines in their entire navy at hitler and rader's decisions at the star war. roughly 30 or fewer of these submarin sea at any one time facing hundreds of merchant ships and dozens uponnses vessels in the expanse of the atlantic. now, karl dönitz was the commander of the german arm raider's subordinate. he was an ardent nazi. hitler had actually appointed him as his successor in 1945 upon his own suicide. dönitz was also a micromanager. he tried to control entire bases europe by radio. and we'll talk about that. both doenitz and rader prior ties discipline. they feared the naval mutinies had been so devastating in the in the final months of the first world war. neither during this nor rader would emphasize intelligence or logistics or really think that coherently in terms of strategy.

for instance, rader had urged the führer to declare war on the united states. so that his submarines could sink more he believed his forces were capable of defeating the united words, he had it backwards. so the germans were handicapped from the outset, at least, to a degree by its leadership on the british. the royal navy had three different admirals who would hold the key position of commander in chief of the western approaches responsible for overseeing much of the battle of the atlantic. e most significant was the one pictured here admiral max horton. he would serve in this role from 1942 to 1945. he a former submariner himself. he had extensive experience as a submarine captain in the baltic in the first world war, and in fact he would command the british submarine until 1942. he thus had a e of what rader and dennis were going to attempt to do with submines and proved quite astute in coming up with counstrategies.

for a variety of reasons. while the german air force and army had made huge technologic strides in the interwar period. we've talked about the development of radio, the improvement of aircraft and armor design. the german navy had somewhat less success. the main german submarine at the start, the second world war was thelw type submarine pictured here. cylinder, about 170 feet long and 30 feet across. it had large diesel engines, two propel it through the water. these engines also charged a battery that was used for movement while underwater. now by the way, you'll see a lot of mentions of knots in your readings. this is a nautical measurement 's derived from the old practice of tying knots in a rope and dragging it behind a calculate speed. i'm going to stick with miles perremarks today to keep things a little bit simpler for you, seven's would let it run around 20 miles per hour on the surface, and about half

of that underwater when relying on battery power.these diesel engines required oxygen. so when de run on battery power and it was quite limited in so. submerged for about 24 hours which technically made it a submersible instead of a true. but if it remained underwater for more than 24 hours the could run out of oxygen. the type seven could go down to about 700 feet in underwater. but any lower than that and it being crushed by deep, the type seven could nautical miles at reduced speeds. so for those who are have a sense of geography that's around to the of the united states eastern coast of the u.s. and back to germany because of limitati osize. these submarines could only carry about 14 torpedoes and on board at the best ofimes only five torpedo tubes from which to launch those 14 four were in and one in the rear. these torpedoes themselves had a

variety of technical issues which handicapped their reliability, by 42 they were generally quite good. and it should be noted that the germans better than the american navy, who had so many torpedo issues. that that the fleet at pearl harbor test a torpedo by dropping on concrete outside their hushed up, hoisted up on a winch and drop it down. it didn't detonate, giving a sign tha americans too had had real serious issues with torpedo desithat, but still constantly trying to innovat detonate when hitting a given target. in addition to theorpedoes most subs also had a gun mounted on their decks. you can can see it in the here. these were either to sink enemy ships or to that attempt to sink them from the skies. better range, more torpedoes and could go save cost and to speed up construction, the type seven had only a single hull. that is, it was. one long steel cylinder. this was actually difference than the first world war where german had been designed with two cylinders in order to

essent robust and make it more likely that if something went wrong with one hullsubmariners have a chance to escape or maneuver, do something. improved ensign steel design metallurgy, so the german navy thought this was not going to be a major source of concern. in fact, if we. german submarines in the second world war were more likely to there comparative ones in the first world war, in part because of this single hull construction approach, which again save time and money but at a cost. now you got some sense from there like on board these submarine types it was cramped. it was claustrophobic. as i recently learned from a essay, in fact michael jordan's private yacht is the same length and has three times the displacement as one of these yacht is supposed to accommodate only a family of accommodate 50 or more men on lengthy patrol. now you read an excerpt from captain vernon's memoirs of his

time sea, and it gives you some sense of what life boar cruises could last for months. men rotated bunks. know other very well sometimes too well. long periods boredom were punctuated by moments of absolute terror. you weren't likely to get wounded in the submarine yo likely to drown, be killed when your submarine was. sinking into the depths. you can't even when you successfully sunk an enemy. you'd hear it's perhaps in the distance. but as soon as you fired two torpedoes, usually you had a dive. flee the countermeasures that in variably brought on from allied forces inside the submarine was often bitterly cold. a wash was saltwater when the ship was running on the surface. sometimes it was extraordinary really hot because of engines. later, modifications improved. some of the combatnality of the submarines actually resulted in the submarines up with diesel fumes. water poured in with even even greater frequency. the snorkel was introduced number of these designs. everything could be and miserable on top of all the other stresses and. perhaps the most notable element

of this experience was how important the captain was to life on. most merchant ships were sunk by just a handful of german captains. extremely captains. did the vast vast of the work for the germans the battle of the atthey tended to be short lived. however, passive captains tended live longer lives, but had relatively little impact on the course of events. your skipper played a big role in what your life would look like at sea, who were the men commanding submarines. well, this is silent. auto otto kretschmer, pictured here, probably the most famous of the german submarine. most of these men were very young. almost all of them under 30. very few u-boat captains were service from the first world war. many of them became like m stars, particularly in the early phases of the war particularly if they were successful widely in germany, appearing in newsreels getting all sorts of attention and rewards.

but the incredible stresses of command led to a cycle problems heavy drinking and a remarkably high suicide rate among those e not lost at sea. keep in mind, by the late stages of the war the on a given patrol, you only hadchance of coming back. imagine going to work and 5050 chance of coming back alive. that was what daily life was like for many sailors. was 28 years old when the began. in the first two years of the war before hisly 50 ships totaling 300,000 thousand tons of was known as silent otto for his tendency to run silent and to avoid radio contact. he was generally respected, they feared, by his royal navy adversary as he, unlike a number of other captains, he tended to follow the rules of war. in fact, some even called him gentlemen an auto as he had a reputation for pulling crews of ships. he'd sunk at least distance

towards safety and ices, dropping off blankets and even whiskey from his submarine to the unfortunate men of ships that he had sunk in early march 41, he attacked a convoy but was disabled by depth rapidly. the crew somehow managed to reestablish control after the submarine had passed crushed depth around 700 feet, just long enough to blow their ballast tanks and skyrocket up to the submarine disabled kretschmer scuttled his while ordering his crew t surrender. and he himself was actually for him and would spend the rest of the war in a paand. ad and one of the funny sort of ironies ofto h nato's naval forces against sovietmarine during the early cold war, the reverse of job he'd had in the second world war. it should be noted that there were other captains not as well versed in the laws of war and chivalry. kretschmer might have captains like heinz eck, who would surface after sinking ships in water. the biggest after the

war had begun, who in many instances were more radical and more willing to violate the rules of war. and i note we talked about total war there were elements of it that appear even in this battle of the atlantic as somewhat more decent, some way, shape or form. it wasn't just the axis that did of these these things i've described. so, for instance, two of the first german submarines sunk off the american after american entry, the war. the submarine surfaced. their crews tried to get off and they were machine gunned in the water by american sailors who were furious at the heavy loss of life that they had inflicted on american shipping. now turn to a sc of tactics. what does it look to fight? a battle in th middle. the atlantic. in 1917, when confronted by the u-boat menace, the had organized convoys. and the basic idea wase your you'dnc

merchant vessels with a ring of escorts that could protect them against submarines. convoys would set for their destination with these escort ships. well equipped and prepared for anti-submarine. the concentration of forces for a relatively few vessels to protect a large number of sily protecting that vast of goods and suppliacross atlantic. now, there were which is why the british empire had waited so long to use a convoy system in the first world war. ships had to wait in port sometimes for days upon, days for enough ships to assemble, that a convoy could then proceed. they also had to be dispersed when they reached their destination because usually a single harbor could not accommodate the vast tonnage of a single convoy. the survival rate, however, was much higher than in the case of so independence that just took off by themselves and tried to run the gamut of germans on their own. in part, this was of the difficulty of finding a convoy in the vast atlantic. this looks like an enormous number of ships.

but in the grand scale of the atlantic ocean, it's much harder actually, this small grouping on the surface than say, ships dispersed over a wide now, as soon as the second world war began, the british began itute the system. now, karl doenitz, looking back, the first world war had come up with what he viewed as the antidote to this british tactic. this was the idea of the wolf pack. the idea was that thbmarines would be, well equipped with communications equipmentub find a convoy proceeding across thesafe and radio back to germany to its headquarters which was either in france or germany. and then he would begin alerting other u-boats to converge on convoy at an opportune point. but then other german u-boats could descend attack in mass disrupting the convoy, an overwhelmingescorts. and keep in mind at the

beginning of the war, the british had nowhere near vessels to protect these these convoys as we'll see in a moment. some would transit the atlantic with only one or two really capable ships. so a wolf pack of five or six submarines could absolutely overwhelm and and devastate a convoy very rapidly. now, this idea, this tactic of wolf pack require one fundamental vulnerability required long distance di meant that in theory messages could be intercepted or ies and thus allies could be alerted about the german at sea. the actual narrative ofrations. the naval campaign w schrader' the and caught by the british and ips ha contrast, their worth quitedly anets. the battle of the atlantic would thus proceed over the course of 1939 through 1943, across a vast geography, all way up from the arctic ocean down to the south

atlantic. the key section of the battle would take place in what was known as the mid-atlantic gap. you can see area highlighted in red in the middle. this was the area where at the start of the, based could not patrol where es could not be pursued, followed or identified from the air. it was here that they would have their greatest successes and concentrate their efforts in the early opening of the war. while the german submarine fleet would enjoy some advantages. as i noted, had so few operational ships that wolf packs would not really formed. but conquest of norway and france which added 20,000 miles of coa from which german raiders could foray made it po only launch large numbers of submarines at the time, but coordinate them relative proximity of the coast. thispacks possible for the first time, sailing from french ports. the germans would enjoy what they would call the first happy time.

eight. july 1940 2nd april 1941. in this period, for every submarine lost at sea the germans would sink roughly 23 allied ships in total during the first full year of the would sink more than 3.2 million tons of allied shipping, far more than the ld replace that juncture in the war. in fact, in churchill'he said this was the only moment where he was truly frightened, tr great britain might lose the war before american e submarine threatening to starve the british isles into submission. but because the the german navy the kriegsmarineps at the start of the war, they were unable to completely cut atlantic. the british wereork up adaptations and new defensive technologies to thec7 and in addition, british would partiallyhis period and kill or c best submarine commanders in rapidnow, the readings give you some sense of what life was lik convoy as well as the perspective of a submariner. but i wa to walk through the

experiences, one convoy, to give you a sense what this was actual like in. so otto kretschmer, then commanding you 99 would take part in one of the fiercest naval battles of 1940, when german wolfpack attacked ss in october of 1940, as he seven stood for slow convoy. it set out from canada from canada at four the united kingdom on october fifth. in in its convoy formation. they-h and grain, mostly from indiana ohio and minnesota. steel. iron and oil as well. were part of the. now several of the ships in this convoy were very slow. hence the designation slow convoy. and as you might imagine convoys had to travel aeed of the slower ship more or less. this meant that this c about seven or eight miles per hour. that was actually slowerthe top speed of a submarine which meant that these ships were in aere spotted by forces. this also meant it would take

three long weeks to transit the north atlantic until it reached the safety of british ports. and that was the weather accommodated which in the noatlantic in october and november was often not the case. the convoy was under the command. a retired former admiral, but he had only one dedicated escort ugh, to police and protect this convoy f about same size but slower than the to protect against. now the ship bunch. there were commanders from ay, captains from norway canada america, great britain, greece, others. they sometimes orders and sometimes not. they were an independent bunch. these are not military officers in vessels. and many of them, if you read some of memoirs, radio traffic from the war, you can see that they resented being babysat as they viewed it by the vy, especially at this early stage of the war. 8th, three days out of port, a fierce storm hit this, which slow them down even

further. the ships in the became dispersed. the s.s. travis began to lag n spotted by the u. u 124, it was sunk another straggler. the ss was picked off the and drawing from doenitz metaphor of the wolf the wolves essentially picking th stragglers, the back of the herd. on octoberport, the wolves began to circle smelling blood in the water. do you? 48 struck that evening, sinking two boats with torpedoes. the scarborough pursued and chased u 48 until it dived and disappear. but the attack drew off the making. entire rest of the convoy now 38 then surfaced fired a torpedo damaged and ow the following night, u-boats attacked in unison. they've been following news of the convoy from their fellow captains. the entire attack was coordinated all the way from by admiral doenitz, eager to micro-manage what he believed

was going to be a victory. the u-boats struck singly and in pairs, picking off at the edge and in the some of these captains would sail into the midst of the convoyher directions and disappear. they mostly attacked at night, which added terror of course for the lives of therd. but it also aided the u-boats as they could rely on horizon, whether by moonlight or starlight. the submarines would quietly surface between ships moving quickly in and out of the convoy, preventing any warships from from coming to the aid of damaged vessels. on october, silent auto surfacedin middle the convoy and fired torpedoes in both rapidly sinking two ships, including the kri kirk which was later loaded with ste almost immediately drowning. all 36 of its crew. kretschmer, recorded in his naval log, quote, i fired three torpedoes spread ahe convoy, three sunk. i made off at full speed to the southwest and again made contact with the convoy. torpedoes from our other boa heard exploding. the british themselves by constantly

firing star shells, whichi now proceed to start my against the convoy from astern in just hours the wolfpack would sink 16 ships in stormy icy waters so cold that most of the crew who were submerged would drown. bues still not done. all five u-boats stuck to the fast it could. the fall behind and giving you a sense of the experience, even though they were not attackediately, they abandoned ship. certain that they would be sunk as they trailed behind the rest of the convoy on the night of october. enough shore to receive air support and assistance wereprotection from great britain. and at that point, the u-boats off their attacks on the eight ships would accompanied by the one warship. two others would later arrive in port heavily. in the casen just five days at the cost of no

casualties, the u-boats had sunk. 20 ships killed 140 sailors and destroyed 80,000 tons of critical war goods intended for great britain. 160 pounds million of eq raw materials. i'm going to show you very briefly here a clip that gives some sense of what these attacks looked like from the classic film dashboard. and found on the now detritus of. something different,it sealed off. give us. items including a vast item lines on. slight noise longer than iron. 60.hogan they they got winds smashed oil up this oh i'm so tired fromhis it oh i just.

one time. when up all died those. here nice. john this is. you. submarine immediately had a dive before seeing the results of iaction as a result of the destroyer attack. so how do you menace like this one that can surface without fire torpedoes in all directions, then disappear? the british began in particular to try to find a solution through new technologies. the british would begin, by modifying aircraft at installing radar to try to detect surface

of distance and perhaps at night as well. something that was obviously simply observing with your eyes. this led not just radar but sonar and all of the other technologies legal innovations that were introduced to try combat the u-boat arm to a technological arms race where each side attempted to develop new technologies that would give them the edge, either in terms of offensive or defensive introduction radar led the germans to respond a radar detector as well as sound proofing the holes of their ships. in 1940. in response, the british began the mass anti-submarine that would allow its dto shoot a great deal of distance, a depth charge, rather thande. this of course, made u-boats distance. in response, the germans began to introduce more reliable tic torpedoes one that could hone in on the sound of a ship's engine. this, in turn, led the british to introduce foxholes, which were essentially pipes that would bang against each other

the rear of a ship, but from some away extended out in order to confuse and cause these torpedoes to detonate prematurely. they alsontroduced anti-submarine airborne torpedoes. that aircraft could drop from a great distance and destroy a submarine effectively from the challenge in particular the growth and success of aerial innovations at submarines placed a great deal of strain on the german. the small type sevens were extremely vulnerable to attack. they had limited y range and were single hulled again, meaning that they could only survive limitedl gap over the north atlantic began to close the prospects of successful wolfpack hunting convoys began to in response. the germans began to pour resources into developing a submarine that was not actually a submersible type seven and other designs that were then in service that is in on surface at various times because of its engines. they began and t proper submarine that be able to

operate almost entirely underwater. the electoral votes these were produced in numbers, but only four would actually enter service. only two would be produced or actually deployed by the e ofe in other words, the germans had fallen behind in thisnse and by the end of the war had not found a soluo which were confronted. now, the other critical issue in the battle of the atlantic was intelligence how do you find a convoy in the vast expanse of the atlantic? or how do you track down a wolfpack that could be anywhere waiting on one of the major routes to ambassadorgermans had an edge the beginning of the war. their navalnce had in fact broken several of the major navy codes. in 1939. and from 1939 to 1942, the germans had a pretty good sense of where many were at any given time. american codes were also relatively rapidly after american entry into the war.

but by may 1943, most of the allied code systems had changed an increasingly the germans were unable to read their traffic. now the germans themselves used a very complicated code making machine to transmit and decrypt the enigma machine here on the right. it used a very complex three rotor system which can encode letter in over 100,000 ways which they thought it unreadable uncrackable but the paul had captured equipment related to the enigma machine early in the which they brought following polish defeat to great britain and the british using this technology and other elligence began to crack german codes in summer of 1941, one way in which they able to read the codes was the fact that so many of them began with the two rd phrase heil hitler, which gave them a common reference point that would enable th decryption information from the increasingly complete ex-british code making system or code cracking system was codenamed and. it was one of the most closely guarded secrets in the united kingdom. h were extraordinarily

careful to conceal. they had cracked the codes in many information that might have saved in order to avoid the germans that in fact, their their codes had been cracked. the german donuts repeatedly ordered investigations to machine might have been compromised. a four rotor enigma machine was supposed to be even more complicated, was introduced february 1942, was so complex that many radio operators in the german rth rotor, which thankfully gave extra begin working on cracking it. only the invention of colossus an earlyuld in fact enable the huge number of calculations necessary to permanently crack the four rotor enigma result by, the time enigma was fully cracked. the whereabouts of every german submarine and in particular cows. these were submarines that would go out to sea fued food and supplies and refill german submarines at sea. th have to come all the way back to the coast. france sinking them essentially

ans to conduct a long war at sea, particularly against america's east coast ports. the attack at sea seven, as i noted, was part of the first ha german. this period would end in late 1940, then resume again in december 1941. why december 1941? well with the us entry into the war, germany suddenly had an almost unlimited number targets at sea, ships that technical been off limits beforehand, and the americans, for a variety of reasons, refused to adapt the convoy system at. first, they refused to blackout cities that would have prevented ships from being silhouetted against major ports. all of this meant that a huge number ships were sunk unnecessarily in the first 6 to 8 months of american entry. the war in 1942. to give you some sense of this the germans would nearly 7.5 million tons of shipping with losses peaking th fall, germany finally produced enough submarines to maintain large packs at sea for extended periods in november 1942, for

the first time in the war, germany sank enough that if it had continued that pace, britain would have in fact run out of food and suppliesd 1943. in total nearly 3000 allied ships would be sunk, with gross tonnage well over 12 million tons. er 3600 ships. merchant and military together wo battle. the atlantic in total, most of them in that critical period between 1940 and 1943, 72,000 sailors would be killed as result, there was a 17% death british merchant marine, the highest actually of but proportionately, u-boat losses would grow evenf the warf 1200 or so that the germans had manufactured had been lost, 7 rate. as 1943 dawned, the number of ships u-boats were sunk per convoy. and you get some sense of this from chart here. so the solid line are tons of shipping lost to u-boats. the dotted line new construction

added and the the indicates the number of u-boats at sea and you can see only for a period in 1941 did german the losses germany inflicted significantly or even consistently outnumber the amount of new construction with the entry of the united states. the enormous manufacturer capacity of american shipyards put to work for the allies andrapidly the germans began to lose a war of attrition. they would culminate in black. 1943 with new technical edges at their disposal, and in particular introduction of a lot of aircraft systems valves or a very long range bombers armed with new tordoes and radar. the air gap would be closed and german submarines devasta a single month that, single month of may, the germany would 43 u-boats and sink only 58 ships, one in four of all her u- sea would be damaged in this month. it became for the germans even to bases france without facing aerial attack doenitz essentially began to privately admit that his forces

had been defeated by this juncture. i want to turn to a few takeaways now in our final. first, a question we have to ask and one i'm not going to answer it. it'll for your discussions on is this key question of whether germany could ever won the battle of the atlantic. two star of great britain. germany neede sink 700,000 tons of shipping a month between 50 and 100 average sized convoy vessels. they only achieved that once. only one month of the entire war. november 1942. juncture, war was already going against the germans. almost seen now, i want to provide some arguments about why the allies won the axis lost here. one of the key factors was obviously strategy and leadership the germans lacked the number of they needed to overwhelm the british at the start of the war, in part because of ce by the german navy in the interwar period, particularly by admiral

rader. in addition, the strategy at the of the war did not necessarily hat germany had to carry it out. and it took some time for adjust. this technological innovation that i presented is also a one a very important one that we see in explaining allied victory darwin in his origins of the species, has made an argument that it wasn't the strongest of the species that would survive nor the most intelligent, but instead the onesble to change. and some historians have drawn a paraller slower to adapt in part because they had fewer resources to do so, but system not encourage the innovation that might have letohe innovations that might have enabled them to win the battle of the atlantic. another key element was the fact of attrition. germans submariners went after defenseless or lightly armed merchant vessels, but they in turn were hunted by aircraft and by enemy warships. those warships were very rarely sunk. submarines, when they were cenk uygur their crews and their ex instances, those protecting the convoys, even if

their ships we sunk, would survive to fight again. as a result, the allies would accumulate experience and veteran sailors as the war in the atlantic went on. well, the germans wo their best, most capable commanders at the same time of the 40,000 germans who served the submarine arm, there ws at the war's end. 28,000 of them had beenlost. intelligence and, as i've noted here, the role of ultra played a huge role in the ultimate outcome, both sides were able to crack each other's codes, but it was only the british and the were able to consistently read their opponents traffic at critical moments in the battles certainly by the spring of 1943. and finally we have to acknowledge economic capacity it doesn't exevitself. all of these other factors were of course, too, but the united states and, great britain produced almost 40 million tons of shipping during the war, and the germans only sunk 20 million tons. in other words merof the allied powers were larger at the war's end than at the led some people to assume a sort of economic

determinist claim actually won against great britain alone. perhaps they might have the entry of the war into the united of entry into the war of the united states made german victory increasingly difficult particularly after the survival of the british empire over the course of 1942, in the face of the german. i conclude there we havene mobilizing for total war on monday monday. we have some microphones around. if anyone has any questions questions. so if the germans were able complete like a functional surface, how would that have changed the war but also like due to increasing aircraft carrier primacy. do you think i would been effective throughout the war. yes, you know, the z plan, incredibly ambitious. it would have required germany to subordinate construction of aircraft and tanks and everything else to the navy, whicnlikely have happened.

hitler just never prioritized the navy in the same way he did the air force or the army. if germany managed to finish the sea aircraft carriers as part of that program. but by 1948, i the had begun by that juncture or whatever the circumstances would be the states was capable of producing so many aircraft vessels you know, even if germany had a surface comparable to japan's it's difficult to see that leading to any sort of german victory. i think more likely like likelier path for german victory would be if they had concentrated on building submarines and it had enough at the start of the war to inflict grievous damage in those first six months or 12 months of the war. was there any any, ever, any attempt to stop or german shipping lines or the others to stop the german german from transiting? yes. so a of german ships were either captured or neutral port or an allied ports at, the start of the war.

and those were captured and interned to the allies. inwindfall of transport vessels thgreece and norway. all of those merchant marine vessels that were on the world's oceans became essentially allied property after after the fall of those countries. germans merchant marine is germany's merchant marines quite smal most of what was there was was the baltic trying rom swedish mines into, northern germany. there were som that trying to get to japan andls e in. did italian navy play any role significant role in the battle of the atlantic? yes. so the italians wanted to contribute in a serious way. they had a large submarine fleet of their own. this was actually much of it was transferredast of france alongside the germans. but mariners. he believed their ships were not seaworthy either. and they really were just using up resources. so the germans really try to limit their role to observation and reporting things.

radio, though they would sink number of vessels in these the mediterranean or north atlantic. they played a very much an auxiliary germans, in part because germans confined them to that rol role. you mentioned that the british concealed tha cracked the german code. was there any significant consequences to that? yes. so there were a number of instances where key information essentially could not be acted upon for fear of of revealing that that the allies had cracked the. so give you one example. the british were so concerned that a lot of this key intelligence might be leaked that in one instance, an american very enthusiastic american captain, captured a german submarine in on the high seas, and he towed it in the harbor in in essentially g to the world, look what i did. you know, this is amazing. and the british were horrified

f course, if there was any german observer present, they would know that a submarine had been captured intact with its enigma machine and they might essentially change their their or change their entire communication systems. so they basically told the americans to, you know, get your guy under control of punish this poor captain who'd done such a brave, maybe without realizing that he was in danger of compromising part. the allied war effort. so i k atlantic did did germany ever work with japan in regards to like destroying shipping in like other areas like arounafrica, in asia, yes. so there are some german and japanese vessels operating in the indian ocean and there are there is a very limited exchange between german and japanese forces where german submarines or japanese submarines actually transmitting back and forth, carrying technology plans. or in some instances the germans were even loading up submarines with rubber when they got very short on rubber in japanese ports, sailing all the way back to germany. so there is some exchange but very little coordinated planning

between the two. really nooordinated operational planning though. again, technology skill exchanges and some some kindf r in the war at sea by exchanging information. erms of coordination. all r will you all on monday have a great weekend. madam president, 100 years ago this week a legend was born. 100 years ago champions of religious freedom refused to back down face of intolerance and 100 years ago today, madam president, the notre dame earned

the fighting irish. on may 17 1924 thousands of members of the indianapter of the ku klux klan gathered in south bendana, for a rally, a rally called by their infamous leader t.c. stevenson. the target tha despicable and misguided message of true americanism was the catholic institution of theiversity of notre dame. the young men who attended the university in the holyss taught at it: in the years that preceded that day the kkk watched with despair as rock ni barn stormed across the country winning praise for their fighting spirit in the university. madam president, we can't forget that at the time catholics were a major target for the kkkthe midwest.

and notre dame's success off field was an affront to the klan's false message of superiority. the kkk gathered outside the golden dome for a three-day rally complete with parades, speeches and dances and no small amount of overtly violent intimidation. you see, they weren't used to anyone standing up to them. they weren't expecting anyone to stand up to them. and little did they know mostly irish catholic student body across the street had no intention of being intimidated. little did they animated that the university president, father matthew walsh, a world war i veteran had been trying in vain to tell his students to stay safe and shelter in the school. little dhe that on that day the intended aspersion that the student body co-opted

as their preferred nickname the fighting irish, was about to reach a nationaldience. as the story goes no doubt colored with some apocryphal additions over the years the klan arriving in south bend and hundreds of studes to meet them. at first the students almost playfully offeredo assist the klansmen in finding lonling and food -- lodging and food sometimes leading them down alleys other times back out of town. when one kkk leader bec wise to the ruse and pointed a pistol at a student who had intended to pull down the unsacred cross of lights hung in a downtown third window well as they say, all hellloose. klansmen that chose to fight quickly scrambled out of town. students grabbed produce, yes, even potatoes from a local vegetable stand and hurled them at the cross, taking out all but

e uppermost bulb. at that very moment legendary four horseman quarterba a potato 40 feet in th at the bulb successfully darkening the last unholy light. p moments later the rest of the klansmen were run out of town tails between their legs. a subsequent exchang the next day led to another route by notre dame running the record to two and 0 against the klansmen that weekend. in describing the takedown of the kkk chapter in the country several newspapers seized on the fighting irish been applied to the football team. if you're interested in more details about that fateful weekend, notre dame alum to tucker wrote a book entitled

notrklan. events like the one that took place in south bend indiana, often prove to be historical inflection points.intolerance and hatred were on the rise in the country not just in indiana, but from coast to coast. many it was easier to give in to the fear of an uncertain future than to build a better community. but country were soon to turn a corner in the timing timing couldn't have been more poetic. rockney, stoldrey and the rest of the football team would pull off a perfect season in route to the 1924 national championship. and the indiana chapter, the kkk would quickly fizzle after the murder conviction of its leader d.c.stevenson, the next year. as for the university itself and brave and proud student body it would be three more years before father walsh would

reluctantly give in to the wave that started that may day in 1924 and officialize the nickname the fightinirish. but make no mistake, madam president, it was 100 years ago this week