companies and more. this is along with television providers. democracy. a front row seat >> recently, a pair of senate committees heard testimony on ways to improve government caregivers. they recommend giving credit ■z

>> welcome, everyone. if could you please find your if you could find your seats once again so we can get onto the next exciting p of today's control association annual meeting

ank you, everyone. >> hello and welcome back to the second half of the 2024 association annual meeting. to this pointou speakers and pannallist. we'll cover the threat posed by nuclearom weapon. we heard fromm the secretary general and his remarks the world is on a nice edge. we need to disarm it now. all countries need to step-up. they needd to lead the way. the arms control association we'd agree indeed they do. there are others that need to do

somethings too. they are based with members and friends across the world. along with our partners and friends herein cluing you have a special responsibility. moving back on the right path. our next speaker will talk about e the things we are thinking about. the board charity will offer h th members of what we need to do now nt moment. we can come up 2017 provided a jolt of energy and lifetime of

exberrance. there isf a diplomat or practitioner.. thank you, tom. of we look forward comments and the floor is yours. before i begin my comments this is the only moment we havef hundreds here and thousands more our appreciate and admiration. than you, darrell. [ applause ] for a number of reasons many of which have all ready been

discussed today. this is a dangerous pivotal moment in the long jury myself r weapons. what a way to centers that are not in church today. it's also not a cable news show pundents bemoan the world and want somebody to do think it's a bit to do more like a football coaches te.

fine tuning for the second half.er i offered thoughts. what we want from the possessors of nuclear weapons and what they must do. also what this community and others need to do to effect the change and direction. the. moment is dangerous world governments forgotten the risk of nuclear war. because too manys leaders no longer see it as the overriding strisk. ter the cuban crisis of 1962, two super recognized if it wasn't averted, no other national goal mattered. at least moscow views the risk o the risk of failing in it's goal

of territorial expansion. this drive reactive decision in other capitals they noted in his remarks the primary responsibility. couldn'ts toto lie with the owns of the two super sized arsenals the united states and refusal any kind of discussion is not just irresponsible. it's inconsistent with a history in which arms controlled dialog continued. at t times when one sides weapos were killing the other side in vietnam and26 afghanistan. just as unfortunately in response to moscows refusal some officials in the city instrumentingedd their shoulders

and say, we tried arms control, now lets rebuild our arsenal. ignoring a central lesson of the 350 years in which arms controlled negotiation improved the security. is the ingredient is american cree ativety and american persistence and american leadership. note leadersp doesn't mean american dominance or american control of a process. it simply means tireless determination. athi this moment refusing to tae no as the final answer. the conceptional basis for

washington and moscow to reach w start. the aggresses both states national security interest. he notes the political change make negotiationtical change possible. they might seem distant today but might be closer than it appears. their exists a place where russian ands american officials exist wh other for p5 process.■ the moment with bilateral dialog. the p5 dialog should assume greater importance. the private dialog new ideas any new steps. small or large can be explored without the posturing and points scoring that marks the public debate in geneva, new york, o■y

vienna. china will assume the chairmanship t of this process. president biden agreed that the concerns on one topic of which the two sides need to cooperate. it's my deep hope, china will show to the importance it will increase the frequency of p5 meetings and elevate their level and expand their agenda. they don't need to focus on reaching consensus among the five. this is on mu mute which will understanding as i noted, the riprimary responsibility lies wh washington in moscow. france and china and the united

kingdom are cook however. they do not have the option of sitting on the sideline waiting for the u.s.e and russia they must recognize and respond the overwhelming view of they ai failing to meet.■f ignoring ther obligations let me say a lit bit aboutxp what she should exspects i'm impressed by t nonenweapon state so urgently it shouldn't rest with t the p5.

one result with the treaty on nuclear wpons. perfect document. nonweapon state needs to step-up higher if we are to preserve the essential norms of glol security. these are thede norms against ue eaand threats of usage and nuclr testing there is no push back from the world only a deafening silence. sayings outloud are unacceptable

that's not taking sides over the war in ukraine. it's living up to the principals that nod nuclear states proclaim in the soundproof chambers in gentleman nev geneva and new york. he doesn't hear from anyone outside of nato criticizing his words he will continu speak them. let's be more specific. whentt i was an assistant secretary of state t my countero represent accurately the position of their government. presidents and prime ministers don't listen to their own assistant secretary and assistantt ministers as closely as they listen to other presidents and part-time

ministers. concerns are not conveyed at a■( higher level thy perhaps.at the issues are of lower importancehe to the start of the world. putin is not the only leader that needs to hear directly from other world leaders. his is the right address to begin. nonweapon states can preserve e the npt. several states speak openly about leaving the treaty of developing their own nuclear■x arsenal need to speak. they should declare jointly. any such move will make it

impossible to continue for economic relatio w weapons possessed in the state. have to convey loudly.eas w since we are here in washington we need to start with the united states government. our public statement need to support the white house. it does the right. the best example one year ago. the nuclear arsenal for deterrence for the for seeable future. the u.s. wantedte bilateral diag without preconditions. sadly, att least a few peopl in u.s. government believe it's been overtaken by events and no

longer relevant. we have to be vocal about backwards steps convincing this government and others. they areiv alternatives to a nuclear arms work. oured work, to reduce and eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons must be informed by the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of war. the dialog with policymakers usmust recognize the validity of genuine national security concerns. made more obvious by threatening weapons. we can critique the flaws and deterrence and theories and posture. they dismissed deterrence. without offering realistic alternatives.

now, the arms control associationti it's a tiny but mighty team with great analytic contributions by so many of you in the room. worked to analyze and address the questions that should be discussed among governments. can the national security be better protected by consents of nsufficiency rather than symmetry. ratify treaties of the best form of agreements.e the bold forms and bilateral and multilateral agreements. focus on transparency as they do on numbers. nay agree to pursue and control

of n position. back against those that argue that arms control is dead or dying. we do one thing better than government spokeman or dip managements. we have to speak with an air of sa vilty. even when those that disagree with us. anyone in or out of government is trying to solve the same issues should be seen as a partner our target audience is broad. perhaps, possibly broad for the size of the community. in washington asn other countris comized of political leadership

and workers. thousands of debt cater specialist as well as congress. this is within any time in the last 40 or 60 years. we can't avoid the awareness that elections matter. every u.s. president, accept one, has acknowledged that arms corol is national security. it's win-win no is zero sum. it's a sign of confidence and not weakness. insistingth on absolute american

sovereignty or american dominance in arsenals is a recipe foror tragic conflicts. the results here on november 5th will effect the strategy of our f efforts but not their urgency. we have to look to younger people. the generation iy draw my daily dosage of optimism. are we doing enough to raise theirth consciousness to equip them withh the concepts and an lettic tools to address the da limb makes my generation is leaving to them. i was pulled kicking and screamingre into century. i sure don't know how to get d meaningful news and analysis from tiktok or other social

media. millions of youngng people do. we have to meet there they■z are. where they read, watch, and think. millions mobilized in support after saner nuclear policy to holt andth reverse the arms rac. their activism they pay political dividends. i contest also envious w wn i see millions of people, primary young people demandingg responsible action on

climate change. the other threat that we face.er i'd like to recommend an article in arms control today by ambassador ken knit. he notes there should be, there must bemu a common cause between demanding a secure and prosperous future and nuclear activistst that are simply demanding a future. a long list of tacts can be be discouraging. setbacks are frequent and only at the are many and our numbers are not. as they bray the sea is so wide and my boat is so small. the total budget for the

organizes w working in the field in the u.s. and elsewhere is less than governments spend on nuclear weapons in a half day. as john kennedy sad about going to then. we chose to do this not because it'sca easy b hard. the goal will organize and measure the best of our energies and skills because the challenge is one that we are unwilling to postpone. ili believe, humans are better than solving problems than creating problems. ■ of 1962 nobody would have a few months moscow and washington would initiate decades of world changing negotiatis.

making both nations safer. today wee both need to work to prevent the breakdown moment when the guardrails against nuck catastrophe. we can break again in the advance of the direction of a world free of nuclear weapons. your contributions, now, whether in time, money, or analysis or activism will be crucial as we head towards that moment. now, i realize this was more liketh a church s than a locker room pep talk. i can tell because there arele people dozing off. i'd like to simply thank you for your attention and above all,

commitment.tomorrow for your@3nd god bless. [ applause ] >> well, i'm ready to jump in the football field or soccer pitch. i will work even harder. okay, weave a few questions. i'm happy to takebo a few quick ones here. low do we successfully draw russia and china into the production dialog? whated helps? the microphone is here? >> it's not so easy. part of it is persistent.

it i was not impressed i am sad to say by the way the government. as if cause us backn usyou picked it up. i think it requires a number, you have to knock on the door more than once if you want the householder to answer. i don't think we have done enough with that as a governmen. i do think, aca organizes are pursuing with russia and china. we can demonstrate indirectly to those governments is a real agenda. it's not a trap. it's not an effort to undermind

your other goals. it's not an effort to subvert our cooperation or our competition in other areas. i think, they only hear that if we say it on a nearly daily basis. i do detect resistance within the government and certainly within congress to continue to try on that same point. dialog without precondition. that concerns me the degree doesn't match the explicit estatement mr. sullivan made. >> you called the approximate 5 statement . . . pa the eve of the russian invasion, reaffirming the reagan-gorbachev line.

that's an example of what the p5 can do. how could they given where things are built on that, espe later this year but chinese colleagues are. >> i already whispered it on another occasion. let's talk about that for a moment from january of 2022. we realize that genuine power saying that one sentence togethergo was above all, it was one sentence. when d5 sat down to negotiate worthwhile initiative repeated from five presidents and prime ministers, you know diplomats,

they could not keep it to one sentence. all five have suggestions how to explain what we meant by that one sentence and■r why it morphd into this. it should be repeated. i don't have expectations that the p5 can make a better statement than that before the review conference in 2026. but i do expect that they can do a couple of things. number one, other smaller areas where they have agreed to work together. very valuable, but only one of a very wide range of issues that

they could be discussing. secondly, a lot of the nonn■lear world takes some comfort in the fact that the p5 continue to talk to each other. not at the same high levelrs, ay intermittently and only on one topic, but it matters to the rest of the world. and if we are able not to open up what should closed dialogues but to at least say to the rest of the world, we are talking more frequently, we are talking at a more senior level and we are addressing more topics than before. that in itself creates a better atmosphere for the review conference in two years and a better opening for dialogue between nuclear and non-layer states. -- nonnuclear states.

>> thanks for the inspirational comments. it's a pleasure to work with yo. that's all the time i have for tom. we will take a two minute shift. don't go away. n thanking tom for his service s [applause] and if i could ask second panel to join us here on stage. just get them settled. the foreign affairs correspoent editor for reuters will moderate this■=■j a on preventing further proliferation in the middle east. -- this panel on preventing further proliferation in the middle east.

jd >> over to you. >> thank you. i'm arshad muhammad, a reporter with reuters. ■lpleased to moderate this discussion on further proliferation in the middle east. we have an excellent panel. to my left is kelsey davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the arms control association. next to her is professor of international affairs at george washington university's elliotts coil -- elliott school. next to her is a sen■ár fellow at the center for international policy and the host of the podcast. we will make some very brief introductory remarks and then we

will start in on the discussion among the four of us and wrap up with questions from all of you. to start, let meéh make four points that i fear are very well-known to the people in this room. first, nuclear proliferation has been an issue in the middle east for decades. with one presumed nuclear power, israel, iran currently at threshold status in the sense of having the capability to produce fissile material in very short order and saudi arabia clearly seeking to keep its nuclear weapons options open. since the trump administration pulled out of the iran nuclear aled u.s. sanctions, iran after waiting for about a year began

curtailing its compliance with that agreement, the joint comprehensive plan of action, and has steadily increased its capability to produce bomb grade nuclear material and although it has not actually done so, and it has steadily reduced to the international atomic energy agency's access to its facilities. third, regional tensions have increased thomas --s october 7 attack on israel and israel's subsequenoperation in . and it's worth noting that israel's april 1 unacknowledged but i think undisputed attack on the iranian embassy complex in damascus and iran's

unprecedented until then decision to attack israel from iranian soil. that was a first. and then finally asl are very wa are discussing what might be termed a megadeal, one in which there would be potentially a u.s.-saudi civil nuclear deal. there would be some form of u.s. security guarantee to the kithere would be some pathway to palestinian state. and there would be in theory normalization of relations between israel and saudi arabia. biden administration is exploring that civil nuclear agreement despite the fact that saudi arabia is of course a

massive oil producer and has obvious immediate need for new power. and despite the saudi crown prince's position that if iran developed a nuclear weapon, saudi arabia would have to, too. >> thank you also much for being here and thank you for agreeing to moderate. if you weren't moderating, i probably would be. i have the most -- much easier job of telling you what i think. i also want to thank -- for joining us on very short notice. >> my pleasure. >> those of you who know my work at the arms control association will not be surprised that i'm going to focus my remarks on iran's nuclear program.

look at iran's nuclear advances, we really need to recognize that iran's nuclear program is in a fundamentally different place than it was in the lead up to negotiations on the jcpoa. because the advances that iran has made since the deal was finalized to have really brought iran to the threshold of nuclear weapons and much of the work evf we are able to reengage iran reach an agreement that limits its nuclear program. in particular i would highlight has clearly invested a lot of time and energy in recent years. it has mastered enrichment up to 60% which is a level that technically can be used for nuclear weapons. it isn't considered weapons grade but it's pretty close. similarly iran has invested a lot of money in its advanced centrifuge capabilities. this allows iran to enrich

uranium much more quickly than it could in the past 10 and it means that if iran ever needed to reconstitute its nuclear program, it could build its capacities up much more quickly by focusing on developing and operating just these more efficient centrifuge machines that were stringently limited under the jcpoa but now that iran is employing and operating en masse. ly changed the nature of iran's nuclear program. there significant applications these developments have on proliferation risk. first, iran is now much closer to weapons grade uranium than it ever has been in its history. this is a time that we frequently refer to as breakout. and that breakout timeframe for the first weapon is about one week. the breakout timeline for five or six nuclear weapons is about a month. that's really quite ucial

because we are getting into these time frames where there's a real risk that iran could try to produce weapons grade tween iaea inspections. or more quickly complete the process up to 90% in that parallel program. the other aspect of proliferation risk i would highlight is that because of these advances that iran has made, it can now reconstitute its nuclear program much more quickly. so while i■ not believe there is a viable military option to addressing the iranian nuclear risk, as we heard, force does remain on the table for the united states. but even if we did resort to force, iran could reconstitute its capabilities relying on these advanced machines.

it would not need to build up the same size of infrastructure to oppose again a risk from a proliferation perspective. it is another significant difference that changes proliferation risk. the third is iran's advances have opened up new pathways to nuclear weapons if the decision were ever made to do so. i would say the sneak out risk, trying to use undeclared facilities is more viable given the advancements and the shortened time frame. how iran would proceed in enriching to weapons grade levels, it has different options now. all of this changes our overarching understanding of iran's nuclear program and the risk it poses. ■■@unfortunately, these advances cannot be fully reversed. a deal that rolls back stockpiles or centrifuges could mitigate the risk posed by these developments we are looking

at a future where even if we have a nuclear agreement with , it is likely to be os perspective. unfortunately layered on top of this is the increased risk posed by the lack of monitoring and . which iran has limited over the last several years. currently around still is implementing its comprehensive safeguard agreement so inspectors are regularly in facilities where around is enriching uranium. as we know from past experiences, this comprehensive safeguard agreement is insufficient to defend against determined proliferators. right now the iaea does not have access to key facilities like the workshop iran is making centrifuges, concentrating and producing uraniuor concentrate.

the iaea does not have a good idea about what inventory in these areas looks like. th iaea cannot say where all of iran's centrifuges are. so this just increases the risk or the speculation of risk that iran may be diverting materials to some type of illicit program that it could use later as it makes the decision to pursue nuclear weapons or to retain that covert capacity. the other risk amplified by this lack of monitoring has that the longer these gaps persist, the more challenging it's going to be for thegency to try to reconstitute the history of iran's nuclear program which could be very beneficial and necessary if we do get to the point where we negotiate a new nuclear deal with iran. if the iaea cannot say with

reliability how many centrifuges iran hass very challenging to verify future limits that might be imposed in a future deal. that has implications for the sustainability of a deal, for effectively verifying limits and also the u.s. domestic context. the president has to certify that the iaea can verify any future agreement with iran. so these monitoring gaps pose a risk in the long-term and short-term when we talk about being able to ensure that we could quickly detect breakoutheo understand these gaps and reconstituted history of iran's nuclear program. that bring do about it. i am still an optimist that

there is time, space and interest in tehran. we need to acknowledge up front that the 2015 nuclear deal is dead. as a big supporter of the deal, it pains me to say that. iran's program technically has advanced to the point where the jcpoa would be less effective from a nonproliferation standpoint it politically the deal is very toxic in both and tehran. if we look forward, reconstituting it really i't an option given the political realities we face with the u.s. election but also some of the time frames and expiration dates. does that leave us with.a, at given the short timeframe between now and the u.s. election, i think strategy should be focused on reciprocal

actions that more immediately de-escalate risk. the u.s. should be looking at ways to incentivize iran to allow back into some centrifuge workshops where the uranium or concentrate is produced. and start to rebuild those gaps. this would be useful in deterring any diversion going forward preventing iran from trying to move to a covert program. monitoring should be the number one priority. in■s return, the u.s. should put something tangible on the table for a run in exchange for these options. that could be unfreezing more iranian assets and transferring them to qatar.

something that demonstrates to iran that there are still tangible realizable for engaging diplomatically with the united states. ideally this type of de-escalate or package could bide time and space for the comprehensive negotiation we are going toto be u.s. presidential election. m happy to talk more about this in the question and answer, but i think the u.s. is going to have to approach these negotiations with a newi think d that there are challenges to this transactional approach to nonproliferation. not only does the u.s. a credibility deficit, but we know better understand that there are significant challenges to actually realizing sanctions relief.

ensuring a country benefits once the sanctions are lifted is more difficult. maybe we shouldn't even just be looking at iran. maybe this is multiple agreements that includes countries in the region that try to capture some of thechallenged other spaces like saudi arabia. i will turn it over to the next speaker. >> actually i didn't prepare opening rerkh me. let's start with what we know, which is not a whole terrible amount. we have been negotiating with the kingdom of saudi arabia for 15 years on the nuclear cooperatiothis is kind of a lon.

in other cases perhaps with ea at various times, it has taken a few years but not 15 years. and why is that. first in the early years, udi arabia was very hesitant to do certain things that we wanted them to do in a nuclear cooperation agreement. the additional protocol. they had a small quantities protocol. sorry for getting into all the technical stuff. but this latest round of negotiations with saudi arabia s strategic deal. i see this as another chapter in some not very successful attempts by the u.çs. to dangle nuclear energy for strategic

purposes. i would call for a special ally. case of saudi arabia, what a special ally. we know that our special nuclear deal with india at least so far an's been at least 15 years, has perhaps not yielded what we wanted from that. we still don't have nuclear contracts with india, but maybe they are a little more amenable to pressure when it comes to china. but in the case of saudi arabia, there is an odd precedent and i wrote about this in the december 2023 edition of arms control today. i was surprised when i started researching it. the precedent was egypt and the camp david accords. i almost get the sense that the u.s. government sort of craft of

this policy with very little input from the nonproliferation community. the camp david accords paved the way for a peace treaty between egypt and israel which has been quite successful for the most part. and as a result of that, we signed what we call it a 123 agreement, section 123 of the atomic energy act, with egypt. egypt at the time did not any nuclear assets or very few. egyp reprocess spent fuel. we have had a long-standing, decades long-standing policy against the spread of both reprocessing technology and technology, two technologies that have dual uses, very sensitive. egypt was also interested in nuclear cooperation with russia

at the time. what we did in the nuclear cooperation agreement was to get tians to say no, we won't reprocess. on our soil. this is actually the origin of what has come to be known as the gold standard. ou don't often hear and see in the press is that the gold standard begin as a we didn't want in particular to spread enrichment and reprocessing technologies in the middle east. so our 2009 agreement was the , which has often held up as the gold standard, that wasn't the beginning. why is this important?

because those agreements -- now our agreement with egypt has lapsed. i wonder why. they are now in the arms of russia's nuclear technology. those agreements in the middle east all have a clause that is basically a no undercut clause. it says if another party in the region, if you conduct an agreement with another partyther capabilities, you kind the right to renegotiate. this is a problem. we don't have a lot of agreements with countries in the middle east. we have one with the uae and we have one with turkey. so if the press reports are correct that one of the benefits we are dangling in front of the saudi's is the uranium

enrichment capability and we don't know the contours of that. is it a u.s. built and operated facility, is there some kind of black box technology but keeps the saudi's from getting access to to sensitive information. -- tgooo sensitive information. critics we are ntes is -- theanium facility for saudi arabia. >> if that is the case, this will overturn not just one is 't enrichment■] technology to spred to additional countries. nand goodness knows we have spet a lot of effort and the policy

community over the years trying to enforce that the second one is this regional policy to maintain the equal terms and conditions for nuclear cooperation in the middle east. so that's the first problem with this approach. the second problem is that it raises risks from other countries. what would iran's reaction be? and i endorse your notion of perhaps coming up with a regional solution. what about south korea? we are almost in a double bind with south korea because of the august deal. and they have been pressuring us and so far we have would say staved off the request both in the nuclear cooperation agreements but also in other bilateral arrangements. but the pressure could certainly grow from south korea and that

get either a similar deal as saudi arabia, or maybe they decide to go it alone. are there constraints against this? yes. how good are those constraints? the nuclear suppliers group says if an agreement includes the country that the country has to have an additional protocol. south korea has an additional protocol. my guess is that saudi arabia will also have an additional protocol as part of this arrangement. is that good? absolutely. is that enough? no. i almost want to take a you in . did you feel better with the jcpoa in effect with iran's enrichment? >> let's do that actually. did you feel better when the

jcpoa was in effect? yes. and why is that? because the nonproliferation treaty does not■f prohibit enrichment or reprocessing. but it is enforced through a■kll of these bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements enforced through working with our allies in the nuclear's pliers group and we also try to get our allies, south korea is a good one because they have been very good on this in terms of putting such restrictions in their nuclear cooperation agreements. you could even get more creative and say what other countries might be interested? poland? australia? in any event, i think i will stop there. i have a host of things i would like to recommend both in the cooperationgri see a lot o.

many of you know i worked for the congressional research service for a while and analyzed this for a living. but there are definite aknesses in the atomic energy act that i think we could clog. the question is how urgent to members of congress or the administration see this. i willm-■' say one last thing. for 15 years we■k have been negotiating with the saudi's on this and for 11 years, they have insisted they would get the same capabilities that iran has. and so we really need to ask the question and this is why i feel like the nonproliferation community has not been really cold -- polled on all of this. should you be sharing enrichment technology in any shape or form with a country that has openly

said it would acquire nuclear weapons; capabilities in a specific scenario which doesn't look that far off actually in the middle east. >> thanks so much. let me also thank -- who stepped into the breach at the last moment because one of our panelists was ill. i would like to ask you two questions. why didn't israel's attack on the iranian embassy complex in damascus and then the subsequent direct iranian retaliation, why didn't that erect into a wider conflagration? question two, do you think that exchange has changed the balance of power or changed iranian strategic thinking and made it any more or less likely that they someday might

>> thank you, great to be here filling in for my colleagues. i think first talking about iran and israel and then we can come back to this discussion. i think that episode although it could be a dangerous escalation, is really attack on the consulate in damascus, a number of iranians killed. for the first time attacking israeli soil from its soil and then israel also retaliating in the same fashion. i think and i will try to explain the view from tehran more, the israeli attack came on the heels of years of a shadow war d was way before october 7 between iran and israel so they have been engaged

in this shadow war mainly in syria across the region and they have been back and forth but not to that level. i think what happened as far as that attack on the consulate from tehran's viewpoint was seen as an escalation a brazen attack on a diplomatic facility. gary publicly they saw that on a different level and something worth responding to. the way they reported as establishing deterrence, not necessarily escalating into something bigger. i thinkponse entailed from tehran's side was to show that they have the capacity to attack israeli soil and also the will. the assumption was that they wouldn't. maybe they can, but they wouldn't. that they are not interested in an open war with israel which i think is true. actually i would argue one of the sides are interested in

bringing that shadow war into the open direct confrontation. the third very important party here, the united states is not interested in with iran or iran and israel. so looking at that triangle, i think the iranians saw what escalation. they tried to respond but in a calculated way they had been telegraphing they were going to respond using back channels, letting the americans now. all of that aim to that minimizing the impact or the casualties. and then the israeli response on iranian soil i think was also measured and calculated, aimed at showing they are also willing to respond but not really taking this into the next level and the role of the u.s. with the biden administration making it clear

that they woulddefense so when e u.s. helped israel but they wouldn't engage in an offense, attacking iran, which is something that many analysts had been fearing. the netanyahu government pulling the united states into open war with iran. i think the biden administration drew that line very clear. and that triangle essentially turned into this not really escalating into next level both sides establishing deterrence and new redlines. the redlines have been moving in blurring since october 7 across the region with the dynamic shifting. this brought iran and israel kind of to a new lel but also back to where they saw they were as far as the shadow war.

to your next question on ■2weaponization, i don't think this episode has changed the thinking where the policy in tehran. we just saw that letter from the iranian mission in response to the e.u. letter yesterday emphasizing diplomacy, the facis i think tehran once enjoyed being in this threshold state that kelsey explained in much betterinto an actual weapons pr. ng the option, using that as leverage. but i don't think the calculation is to weaponize, the policy hasn't been that for about two decades.

so until he is alive, he is supreme leader and nothing really major has changed or shifted, even that episode with israel, some thought maybe that would be the final straw, but that didn't change. so unless something major happens like a u.s. attack on iran's nuclear program ironically may actually change that kind of decision-making. but i don't foresee anything major that would make them shift towards the weapons program but i think they enjoy pushing the line and going even further for leverage. >> i'm going to lob a couple of questions that you. i think it's important for the people in the room to understand the distinction between the ability to produce fissile material for nuclearweaponizati. that is to say the actual ability to build a nuclear

device that can explode when and where you want it to. iran is now a week from the ability to produce enough enriched uranium or for one bomb , what is publicly known about its weaponization efforts. to your knowledge is there anything to have changed the nie from 2006 which said the u.s. intelligen c believed iran had ceased weaponization efforts in 2003? where are we on weaponization and how long might it take for iran to actually build a weapon if they wish to? >> it's a faim not sure i have k answer unfortunately. the timeframe for produced fiscal material is relatively short. weaponization is much more difficult to gauge the time

frames. many experts and myself address that waste on the work iran had an organized program but if tehran really wanted to, they could probably build a nuclear weapon in as little as six months. the congressional research service has quoted a u.s. official as saying a year, others say one to two years. but to a certain extent, that timeframimportant when we are talking about risk because once iran has produced its fissile material, it is likely to divert that material to covert locations, possibly multiple. for the weaponization process. so if the united states or israel is looking to disrupt a bomb, the best chance that they have is in the fiscal material production phase because they know where it is and ideally because of the existing

monitoring, they would have some time to try to react if it was clear that iran was enriching to 90%. that's another reason why i think that the short time frames, the lack of monitoring is so concerning. i agree with the assessment that the supreme leader does feel bound by his fwa and there hasn't been a decision in iran to develop nuclear weapons. current u.s. intelligence community assessments support that. but the chance of miscalculating iran's intentions right now is i think higher than it ever has been in the history of the iranian nuclear issue. we now have senior officials in iran and former officials saying that iran's calculus might change. it might rethink the fatwa security change. combine that with a weak

breakout and a misperception, misinterpretation of an iranian development, and accidental spike in enrichment, all of these could put us on the path to conflict because we don't have the time to analyze the response because i do think the united states and israel are very serious when they say they will resort to force rather than allow iran to develop nuclear weapons. so even though the weaponization timeframe makes it sound like we have more time, my fear is that these windows have become so small, the risk of miscalculation and the ability to use meaningful diplomacy if we fear breakout is quite compressed and that's why we need this diplomacy now. >> i would like to ask you both a question about what the ie knows and doesn't know. there have been no snap

inspections for the years. that is to say those are the inspections where the iaea says we are going to an undeclared nuclear site and we wan's going. secondly, and i'm going to get a little won that i know those of you in the room will be pleased and not dismayed by this. if i understand it right code 3, iran is obliged under a safeguards agreement to tell the iaea if it is building a nuclear facility. and if i understand the iranians correctly, they said we are not doing that anymore and the iaea said you have to. given the absence of snap inspections and given this, does the iaea actually have the ability to figure out what it doesn't know or are we know and a world where iran is perfectly capable of building secret sites

and potentially diverting some indeterminate number of centrifuge parts which i don't think the iaea knows how many there are. >> do you want to go first or do you want me to? >> sure, i will take a stab at it. the biggest hurdle in the nuclear weapons enterprise is the fissile material production. so that should give you a sense. iran is enriching up to 60% and could go higher. so all this talk about how long does it take, the six month timeframe is used in the u.s. government or at least it was when i was there, that's kind of an assumption. you get the fissile material, anybody should pretty much be able to do it.

my guess is that it's much shorter for iran. i think you can rebar between the lines of -- read between the lines of iaea and understand that their challenge. and you have to ask the question, these snap inspections or the ability to go anywhere anytime, which is never really anywhere any time, and there is a host of ways in which agd country can delay the weather is bad today. the road is closed. different ways they can do that. i don't see the modified iran's statement that it would not adhere to the early declaration of new facilities. to me that's a red herring. if they're going to have a

secret facility, it's not like they are going to build it and then eventually tell the iaea. they are just going to do it. and the problem with uranium enrichment and specically with centrifuge facilities is that there are very few signatures. but you can detect remotely. so it is always a good thing to have people on the ground on-site inspections. it is always a good thing to be able to interview people. we found that out in iraq in the 1990's. walking around. of thingby and seeing how people react. so i agree. the less access, the restrictions on access, that degrades the iaea's capability but i think also in the popular press and popularly, people think of the international atomic energy agency as this

watchdog. it's going to go othe truth of h more that countries who are concerned help the iaea■ and a lot of that depends on levels of cooperation, levels of cooperation even within the secretariat of the iaea. and all of that cooperation has dropped down significantly. for a variety of reasons. i will leave it at that. >> kelce did so well on that, i'm going to pass over to you on you talked about your review

that the administration should seek a sort of de-escalate torres set of stats. you talked about some carrots like the unfreezing of assets. two questions. one, do you is a plausible diplomatic path to a meaningful agreement that would rollback iran's nuclear program? and second, why would iran ever trust the united states to adhere to a nuclear deal given the experience that they just had of negotiating one with the obama administration and seeing that tossed aside a couple of years later by the trump administration? >> i certainly think there's a plausible path to immediate discoloration in the short --

de-escalation in the short term. i think just last year iran was willing to engage in moderating some of its more proliferation sensitive activities in exchange for the unfreezing of u.s. assets. the u.s. re-froze those assets after october 7. iran no longer felt bound by the voluntary actions that agreed to think some of tehran's statements just around similar type of arrangement. in conversations between the atomic energy organization of iran and the iaea, those officials have said they are looking for sanctions really in exchange for additional transparency and monitoring. the iaea cannot put that on the table. united states can. i think it's critical the united states tries to follow up on this perhaps opening that iran might be signaling once the new

iranian president is elected. i don't think we're going to see anything until after that election in terms of diplomacy and space. would iran be interested in a broader deal that rolls back its program, i think that's a much more challenging question right now because iran is trying to leverage its threshold status for its security and national interests. will it be willing to give that up? i don't know, but i think we have to test that prospect because what the united states can put on the table in terms of economic benefits i still think would be attractive to iran, particularly if we can think about how to realize the sanctions lifting given some of iran's other stated goals. because of the advances i mentioned, i think rollback is challenging.ing to have to be a much more focused monitoring arrangemen, perhaps some unique

elements that provide greater visibility and perhaps monitoring on some of the weaponization aspects of the program, but certainly i think there are enough indications coming from tehran that they are interested in agreement and we have to pursue something in the short term but also think about that new framework for the long-term. because the idea of iran staying on the threshold is just not sustainable. there's too much risk, the security -- there's too much risk of miscalculation. so reall we need that longer-term framework than it's worth investing time now into thinking what it's look like. >> why would the iranians trust the united states given the memories of 1953 are also quite fresh in the iranian minds?

why would they engage in such an agreement? >> even the jcpoa, the trump administration withdrawal surprised maf u.s. and around, sidelined that idea of that camp in iran, the more moderate pro-diplo camp that there is a way that we can deliver, negotiate and get a deal. i don't think anything like that would be possible but i still diplomacy.e i it wouldn't look like something like jcpoa, something that encompassing and future looking. the jcpoa had a lot of promises in terms of investment into the future. i think what iranians are more interested in or looking for is step by step, unfreezi o assets. something tangible that you can

ve to rely on for administrations after. i think the biden administration missed opportunity at the beginning of the about six months when they overlap with the previous iranian administration in tehran. that was really the time for the u.s., before ukraine, before october 7. before the world got so crazy to either return to the jcpoa or reach out with serious meaningful diplomacy and unfortunately that didn't happen until about april and it hit the presidential election in iran. with the death of the iranian president, be a new opening. we still have to wait and see. iranian elections are coming up there are indications that there may be■l a slight shift to the center. not towards moderate or

reformist by any means but a less hard-line president and a less hard-line minister could indicate -- whoever becomes u.s. president. we have these important elections coming up in iran and also in the u.s. that can show us a path forward. going back to what kelsey was saying, even in the jcpoa they say. in more different and creative format. >> thank. if president trump is reelected. do you expect him to pursue a so-called maximum pressure policy toward iran? and is maximum pressure in an

economic even conceivable in the world in which china seems quite happy to buy iranian oil, albeit not with its official state refineries. one of the unusual things about jcpoa was you had this consensus among the p5 plus one and the chinese did significantly reduce the purchases. do you see maximum pressure and is that even possible today? >> i think i learned my lesson during the first trump administration of the challenges of trying to predict what might happen. you can takewith a grain of salt. i we would see a second trump administration lean very hard into the maximum pressure focus with an attempt to get iran back to the negotiating table to get a deal

better than the jcpoa. but as you said, maximum pressure today cannot what maximum pressure was during the first trump administration and it cannot be what the pressure campaign was in the lead up to the jcpoa in large part because of the geopolitical situation that we are in. one thing that is striking is that we have lost some of the core unity between the p5 on certain nonproliferation norms. it was not that long ago that we ha cooperation at the security council on north korea. it was not that long ago that russia and china implemented sanctions on and engaged veryithin the jcpoa context. so without that basis, i think it's going to be much more challenging to sustain pressure on iran.

i could be disrupted even further if the european union or e3, france and the united kingdom go ahead with trying to impose u.n. that were lifted under the jcpoa. there is a measure that would allow them to do that in a way that cannot be vetoed by russia and china. enacting this measure before it expires october 2025 is likely to deepen the rift between the left -- the west and russia and more importantly at the westin china because china has more influence on iran and china does not want to see iran develop nuclear weapons, but they will not want toisk the snapback of u.n. measures, so i think the international disunity makes

addressing the iran crisis more challenging, and i think we have to look for more novel ways to try to reinforce nonproliferation norms at least between the u.s., europe, and china in a way that can help support addressing the iranian crisis even if we do not directly reference iran. i think we are much more likely to garner beijing's support if we talk about nonproliferation norms were broadly, and if it is the ubeing applicable in the irn case. will be on the table but i am not sure how maximum it will be. >> how do you think iran may respond to a trump maximum pressure campaign such as it would be? do you think one would see additional -- you know, attacks by our iranian proxies like the

attacks on the oil facilities in saudi arabia? do you think you will see our iranian nuclear acceleration or regional escalation? how do you think they would respond to it? >> i think more of what we saw under the trump administration forget, donald trump is the person who pulled the united states out of the jcpoa and assassinated general stella many -- general sole■yimani. iran and the larger allygotiate. very difficult defense on who

they bring for themselves and will be the mike comparesr will be new?■? all that matters but assuming ther w more, i agree what it wil potentially request of secretary ontario so more of the same. dynamic in court gaza and the top immediate issue that will show. it will escalate with other

members and it slows down. somer like johnny and he's allowed to run and when. all of these not it is a lot of that ...