someone recently held shopping uc ulcers noncommercially and my friends who got mortgages in 2021, it's brutal. it's brutal in comparison. with that i would like you all to think the panelists. that's

>> hi, everyone, next panel will focus on demographic and socioeconomic ship with republican and democratic coalition having that shape economic policy in 2025 and beyond. i'm very pleased to be joined with two of the most insightful analysts of the american political scene. patrick rossini as founding partner of echelon insides one of the na'swell-regarded pollin about to celebrate its 10th anniversary and offer a party of the people inside the multiracial populace collision remaking the gop. a horrific and keen eye commentator with insights that he founded political, new york times washington post and the wide world of kibble beingincredibly

modernsavvypoliticalthinkk erstheyalsobothhaveterrif icstopstockswhichare,yous ubscribeto.sorrytosayourf riendhenryolsonhadtohandl eafamilymatteryouwillbejo iningusthisafternoon. patrick,anumberofinfluent ialcommentatorshavearguedthat thechangingrepublicanbase isdemandingexpandedwelfar estate. political new york times, washington post and the wide world of cable news. being incredibly modern savvy thinkers they have sub stocks which i recommend you subscribe to. olson had to handle a family matter so he will not be joining us this a. a number of commentates2ors have argued that as the republican party grows more working-class the changing republican base is demanding and expanding welfare state, higher taxes on the rich and more support for organized labor. you have argued that this is not quite right. the working-class shift is driven tough guy populism. tell us what you mean by that. >> everything about this realignment, it is not something that we have only seen in the y.

since donald trump has been on the scene. really going back to the 1960s driven over cultural issues. back from 1960s and it is really, you know voting has been much more aligned with social and cultural issues and there's been no change in the relationship of economic conservatism or progressivism and how people vote. it rlly is a cultural issue divide. but i think what we can say i tried to characterize this new electric, that both candidates are facing this year is either economically ripe or economically lost. i think we are apt to say that this is an electorate with no economic ideology they have a very definite social ideology left or right. the view of economic issues is

much more pragmatic. govern divide the view of specific economic economic debate is this election more so than an enter right or right left what we should do with the economy. >> if you're trying to argue a member of this popular coit grounds that wait a second, thesrich, that's not a persuasive argument because they don't think in any logical terms? >> i think it's really motivating. when you look within the republan coalition it's interesting we've done a lot of polling that shows the more you support donald trump, actually the more you icmarket, the more you voice antigovernment viewpoints, that goes come about diagram between

conservatidóves anthe electric and trump supporters and the electric is almost completely overlapping, the idea that there is any distance between the two is really an elite idea.it's commonly found inside the beltway. that when you actually look at the data on issue after issue after issue doesn't really have any basis in public opinion in the real world. >> david of the new york times made the case we are seeing a new form of market skeptical bipartisanship work transporters the ship, is neo-populism a real thing? how would you describe the ecological landscape among republicans in congress, do you see really well defined ideological cleavages or no? >> i think the emergence of populist■] ideas, the horseshoe you see emerging i think of the function of identity crisis happening within the elected

ranks. there is legislative entrepreneurship going on people trying to figure out what trump good works, what we been doing the voters didn't want. we had to figure out what the program looks like. you see diffent flavors. they are not all approaching at the same way. i tend to think it's interesting, it might there be ideas that come out of that that you could build around but right now it's still in the early stages where people are not trying to figure out what works. in terms of thinking about particularly in the republican conference i think ideology is probably the wrong lens at least a foot trying to understand it the last two years. it's much more about less about your policy positions more about your attitude toward

power, those the leadership structure and the other side in terms of do you believe your voters excite you to washington to make ãprogress to make things more conservative within the constraints of being in a town that's largely led by democrats or did they send you there to burn it out down? i think eabout what the turning points in the last two years was presented what we've seen over the last sense the 2022 election was the vote for following the vote for speaker within the conference when tmccarthy got the majority of his conference that's typically the end of the story. everyone else falls in line is an understanding that within the republican conference the only way to have a meaningful m

majority is respected once you go to a floor. what 20 to 25 members realize this is where it starts our ability to say no when i can vote for you, and unless you do everything we want that reoriented the power dynamics and on the one hand hamstrung with the was able to do all, and informed everything else that came after it. what the members of the conference believe as ideological matters a lot less than we believe we are there to come up with a strategy, go out and execute it and put points on the board or are we more interested in waging some more internally accruing power and i think it's all function of the incentive structures that's fundamentally changed over the last 10, 20 years because they

used to be you came to town, if you're somebody that aspires to become you didn't come to be a t work your way up and do good things for your district or someday run statewide more and more you have people that have come with the understanding that it is once more satisfying in some ways you can raise your profile more by having podcast and having your twitter following. even if your antics get you kicked off the committees you didn't come to do committee work you can come here to be that matters has nothing to do with policy. >> kind of anti-institutionalist. i think the other piece is you have based ■bon if you think

about how the math gets redrawn every 10 years there was a scramble to redraw at this time in a way that reflected the changing coalition that patrick talked ■/about. but that means there are fewer and fewer of the sorts of seats that are visible oin a general election. there are a heck of a lot that can be lost if you're looking over your shoulder at your right. enprimaries tamp out to the general you might want to be with leadership you might want to be here to get things done but when the person in a similar district is out there doing stunts like you saw from the elements of the conferenceb you get ulin that direction. the other pieces those antics drive the people that want to be there to govern out so as an institutional grandfathers acts element you can end up with a

fundamentally different, we we fast-forward to next but if congss if every republican wins out you would have 85 members who were even around fo. >> which wasn't ancient history. patrick, you've done a number of cluster analyses, universal potential republican voters i wonder if you can talk to us about about the patterns you've observed. what are the different psychographic types of the could be a part of a trump coalition in 2024. there outset of the republican 2024. the largest is pretty maximalist. >> i think you call them he ultra-concerned. >> it was based upon because i

think public opinion on the right seems to be less and less defined by let's just say, where you stand on tissue x mo outreach comes up what is your level. >> what's your level of outrage. >> people 11 on every one of these questions. >> are they on the largest group and what we found was some degree this was right at the outset of the trump versus what we thought was going to be the great trump versus desantis battle in early 2023. the voters are going squarely head-on to really swipe what were donald trump's strongest supporters. it looked for a brief moment that this could be evenly

split. it could be persuaded and if you swipe the largest group it's over for trump very quickly and even before the bragg indictment, it turns out this group really rallies back behind trump. it was a quiere he appeared vul and turned out not to be. among the other, nothere are tw groups i would kind of highlight. you have a group of mostly younger people may be more cosmopolitan on old social issues.■f to actually do gravitate on this the very white votersion you ki. >> and it wasn't a tiny group it was like 13%.

>> right.and punched right above in a six way grouping. that was kind of think they were the 㦠>> they are not necessarily motivated kby gun rights and abortion. >> there is a 20% group i call mager moderate this idea of trump has this incredible strength among largest core of very conservative primary voters. this image of the moderate nikki haley broder is not ãã these are moderate voters who maybe weren't enamored of dona trump see any other alternatives voted d for him both times. they were really for trump in a lukewarm way but not really

considering anyone else. if you look at the voters who, ultimately decide republican primaries donald trump won the voters who broke late for mitt romney. the people not firmly committed and one lane of the party were not as ideologically committed. i ink it's not just the straight right left right kind of hing.

they believe this is really genuine and somewheres a more salient and pressing issue than classwork. this is a political formula that can unite blue-collar voters and upper middle-class voters who been bleeding away from the right-center coalition. >> not only can it be blended together it's s been in the pas terms of anti-walk it might be different but no different than the sorts of cultural war, knock knock them the sense of broad culture war issues. the archie bunker culture war issues. it's how the reagan coalition came i think the idea of these

things can't be brought together is false. and i think seeing it's a bad state then it's not my sense certainly but but the idea one should be taken seriously on the other dismissed at something you do it your own political peril. >> the biden campaign is running on essentially tax increases often weren't able to pass with the ff■ñdemocratic trifecta. how does democratic reliance on upscale voters impact the the t cuts and jobs act. i know you followed us very closely, curious to see where you see the divide. >> it's very interesting. for one thing if you think back part of what we are leaving in 2 to 2025 it's a reprise of what we saw in 2011 2012 2013

one was ultimately punted but every play reconciliation proce gave us the tax cuts set up a situation you're basically bearing the future congress to let it go. what happened there was you had an instance where first after a pretty good shellacking or whatever obama called it, he said okay i don't want any part of raising people's taxes we will do a two-year extension. the 2012 election obviously was quite good for obama he didn't feel compelled to do the same but even still despite such a bad night for republicans in 2000 1210 early 2013 they were actually able to get 98% of the bush tax cuts exteed. it wasn't full-fledged at that point but at that point you had

the threshold of whereby democrats were talking about the rich something like 200,000 might say the interesting thing there was a fear were to be in a similar position next year was if everybody remembers the idea of debaters plan b there was an opportunity for republicans to essentially pick the price point at which people became rich and therefore should be paying higher taxes and there was an attitude among republicans and i think the function of grover pledge discipline they said were not to vote for anything affirmatively that would raise taxes so instead find, democrats picked the number and that number ended up being tha where the 39% rate kicked in. ■and flashing forward biden is using that as the figure where anything below that is good that the middle class anything above it that's the rich people who are bad should pay more in taxes that shape up but to your

point as democrats are much more reliant on upper income high individuals that becomes much more salient for them. it looks like at worse it would be divide government so i think republicans will still be in a position where they need to pick some mean. of course if they get attract factor hithey would be able to what they could agree on which is not easy one thing i will shout out because patrick mentioned earlier a map where he used $1.5 million home values and what the partisan affiliation was. it was quite red, it was redder than discourse martellus i thought it was interesting. >> patrick, talk to us about where the upper-middle-class is politically, how it's shaping democratic and republican

parties. >> somebody made the comment before 2000 is the threshold for the couple new york times reporters conveniently designed at that level. i think at some level what's interesting, i'm surprised that the economic realignment hasn't reared in the same way that it really hasn't had very much transformative effect on republican economic policy. outside of trade. it's really trump foreground. we have the tax cuts and jobs act. that was donald trump getting behind a conventional republican economic policy. in the same way, i don't think democrats fully surrendered that on tax cuts to the wealthy.

>> and if you put public opinion, they seem quite supportive at progressive's zp■priorities at least in theor. >> they judge it to be advantageous for them politically. so popular, it's pretty popular. but in the same way as some of the republicans have been long the scene as long as you have the prospect of abortion ban. so long as you,x have this prospect of democracy is, and if trump wins. i think the tax policy is gonna fall pretty far down the priority list for a lot of these e voters. a lot of the upper-class voters who have cosmopolitan cultural values. so yes you have some

discontent, includes both democrats and republicans but a healthy share of democrats. at the end of the day this is still not a huge part of the democratic coalition.>> i think $4.6 trillion i think it's a great point, the salt issue in particular, the salt cap goes away. everything goes back to the way it was which amounts to $4.6 trillion but it does raise the question of, i think democrats would be happy to not have any of these fights not have to pick the threshold or somebody magically becomes rich. congress tends to kick the can whenever it can.

the never ending doom loop of debt ceiling practice, come back in the second quarter that's probably what forces the but it is one when it comes through word and i have to deal with some tough points in terms of remembering who their current coalition is. >> there's a slew of electrodes politics of abundance more market friendly approach in boosting housing supply renewable energy infrastructure investment there some elected officials that seem to be embracing the sensibility. it is it your sense that market friendly moderate democrats are poised for come back or is this another issue where it's ultimately culture that matters st and you can see a random focus on these issues?

>> what's interesting that issu has emerged sort of on the neoliberal left it's also interesting to see the catchphrase to call. what's interesting is that agenda is happening but happening in ããmaybe blue cities and red ates but if you look at what's happening in miami and throughout texas the and why is it happening because red state governors are more than happy to use their population growth figures we mentioned the 1.5 llion in housing after the houses are in california because they can't build housing, housing supply is already constrained.

>> elexactly. partly because the only place you can build things anymore is red states only place you have space to build. you have tax friendly policies a lot of open space lower cost of living. it's an interesting paradox i think you are seeing at drive maybe you have a community of folks of needing this and sort of the balance because if it works too well for the red states the red states might become blue. >> i'm curious about the relationship with business. when you think about the relationship of big business, the stereotype certainly stretching back to the 70s and as the conservative right, in the pocket it's a big business then there was this libertarian critique that we are against groaning

capitalism. but you see this social transformation. dynamics are playing out in corporate board rooms. now you have a lot of companies trying to attract young talented skilled employees in these high cost metros. it seems there's this change in partisan alignment of who's the corporate corporate c suite. i wonder what you see as the applications of that for political economy. do you believe democrats because of this are to be more business frfriendly but more business friendly and do you see alienation between republicans and the business-class that utcould pro problematic in the future. >> it's a tough position just because you cross lines with republicans doesn't mean democrats are coming to your aid. and some degree some of the fallout specifically with the chamber relates directly to support the foreign omdemocrats

to try to say let's embrace the folks who taken good votes. there's no real reward or market for that part of it goes back to the previous question. i don't know if there was a market on the left i don't want to overstate the parallels on the left there might be more of voting. to get somebody who can win the general. i think there are certainly, i think the ira is a good example of this where you've got this is democrats should thank and pitch and for the gold watch because he really saved them in many ways but his legacy is going to be his flaw it's best hope at this point is that it works and that businesses put in money and into projects and

shovels and steel into the ground, the faster that happens the better it's going take the economic activity and change the frame for republicans to think of this law not as a democratic thing not as an ideological thing as jobs and hardhats as economic activity. i think looking at the left there are similar dynamics it's just slightly more functional rí and there's a little bit more of strategic ability to cooperate in ways i thk, i will come back around to different version of the answer which is the best hope democrats can give business and corporate community as stability and ããin a way that the promise of the next trump administration there's lots of good in theo.as we

want to see who the personnel policy. and windsor to dictata lot ■4of worse things o. when i first started my career business comes to ashington.

it's because what they see from disney what they see coming out of these boardrooms the sense that these are not our people anymore. these are not. i thk populous positioning has been more successful you see it get much more purchase in terms of grassroots political in terms of public opinion on the right. is when people are defined as being completely on the long

side of our values. that has been the initial animating principle came from these fights he was able to pick in florida. with organizations people who thought were traditionally republican. but extremely popular at the more you attack disney the more he went up in the national polls. so i think much more so and i contrast this with saying republicans need to be friendly or the need to stand on the uaw picket line you see jd vance doing it easy republican start to do. that has habeen far less successful the things you can attach to the cultural agenda. >> wonder how you think about

the corporate course correction. there have been a number of prom■inent business leaders who have said we want to stay on electoral politics and understand and respect folks on the right side of the political aisle jamie diamond is one notable leader. he certainly is not alone in that regard and then of course you have consumer facing brand that has experienced not just custom to backgrounds of folks on the left but that question consumers on the right is your sense of this represents a real seachange in this course correction is gonna be stable when folks see suites nrecognizes not just the hr department pushing from one direction i also have folks pushing at me from tthe other direction i'm going to want to steer clear of political controversy. >> to the point you made earlier the fact you especially in the companies we are talking about in the public markets, to compete for talent

you have es within at your emplo■vyee base pressure come from without with investors in the esg you have the sensibilities of the c suite being fundamentally different. in terms of being wealthy college-educated people who don't share don't understand the new party exists so that's what they have to contend with. i think direct admission to your point and i can ever make anybody happy by anything you say the rest are gonna do is be as neutral as possible. it's not easy to navigate that. but the decision to play and recognition that more bad could happen then good and part of that is just general public affairs strategy. in terms of corporate identity i think yohave to be really careful

in between and there's going to be a mobilized group who is looking for the opportunity to use any misstep to their advantage. >> two interesting senate races where the right left contrast i think is potentially instructive.in pennsylvania you've got senator bob casey fairly straightforward prolabor democrat running successful entrepreneurial hedge fund manager now they more political landscape. this is a guy who has roots in the state but also associated with hedge funds, high finances, often demonized icularly but not exclusively. and in ohio we have senator sherrod brown firmly on the left of the democratic party somewhere in the bdmiddle.

facing off against bernie marino, highly successful car dealer kind of a paradigmatic republican donor way you make money. i wonder if you could talk to me a bit about what you're seeing from mccormick and marino, what you're seeing in the race is how do you think there's an affair. is indifferent to the wealthy self funder candidate. versus owning a chain of car dealerships. >> that something you have to navigate but i think the clearest retro positioning things that were common as recently as the 1990s was the 22 pennsylvania senate race john federman quite successfully branded dr. oz his opponent then who seated mccormick in the primary as the interloper carpetbagger.

and to some extent he kind of fell into he fell into the trap willingly as a inpolitical that always risky with the candidates who are really outside of the political process. the fact is, that remains a pretty decent winning the prima. being a political outsider is the attribute in this age of trump. that republican primary voters price pretty high. >> the idea of being someone self-made and business is a plus rather than a minus.>> but needle because it seemed like somebody who had more of a common well-known popular culture and the trump mold as opposed to mitt romney high finance type who famously they tried to get him to embrace

this sort of corporate reader to embrace the corporate raider narrative as somebody who could show that he meant business and he wouldn't do it because that's not who he was fundamentally the same way donald trump was able to tout his wealth bu certainly quite an interesting dynamic that candidates are gonna have to navigate. he>>. >> you've given a lot of thought to candidates positioning when you look at the two races are there any interesting aspects you want to call out for us in thinking about how economic policy debate unfolds. with casey and class including tester and mansion is the luckiest group of people you've ■overcorrected. 2006 the carter wave in the

first place. fast-forward 2012 which at the p time the republit cycle it turned out to be a pretty horrendous warm and as bad as people remember the romney experience the senate was worse. it was an array of on paper great candidates that flopped everywhere. this is the first time it sinks back up with the presidential. in ohio that means flashforward from 2012 the last time on the ballot with the presidential candidate housing a fundamentally different state because people that trumpet brings out where the people that either stay at home or still okay with obama back in

2012. the fundamentals of that state are such that trump should win by eight, 10, 12 points.in an environment where so much harder to maintain independent identity that's fundamentally share brown's trouble. the thing about sherrod brown he has this appearance of the rumpled guy he doesn't look politician. we think back to 2022 race which was ugly ended up being i think a bigger win than people remember but the democrat there actually had if you look back at tim's wardrobe in previous years immediately is rolling his sleeves up and wearing jeans i sthink his image despit the fact he's been an elective office and she was 26 years old or something crazy like that he

has the image of the guy that is so cool going down the local hiring hall. that's what marino needs to fight but he can come out and when this and i expect that's what will likely happen if you can avoid stepping in it. fundamentally different than pennsylvania pennsylvania is not the kind of place casey has a golden name in pennsylvania. i think is a neutral composition he fits what pennsylvania democrats are k with. it's much trickier. >> from a residual standpoint people remember his dad, he gets credit on both sides it's a weird dynamite. he hasn't evolved in his time in the senate but i think nobody holds it against him there's fewer single issue voters. but if you think about es mccormick, what we saw in 22

where is the playbook that's worked a number of other places. using the carpetbagger appealing to the sensibility. it's tricky but indeed i fought in the country i think the tricky part is both of the states the china issue is a big one on all sides or to see different people using it but i've seen them focus on what mccormick is trying to tie the hedge fund guy with investments in china is a tough one if they can make that steak it's really brutal. i think the fundamental problem for mccormick 㦠>> that's a throw back to 2012. >> it is.

even if trump wins in pennsylvania i don't think we expect him to have a crushing victory.so that ability of casey a little ahead of biden and chorale the third party voters. the reason the senate race looks different than the presidential race in part because thresholds where it matters for donald trump is probably 48 or 49. the there in the senate race those people are gonna choose between the right of the ■ left. >> patrick, you've written a great deal about the evolution of the hispanic electorate in particular, i wonder if you can talk to us a bit about what it is we can confidently say about the economic sensibilities of that group. one mental bamodel is that when you're looking at the cross

pressure swing voters basically largely blue-collar working class may be they fit the paradigm of really strongly opposing entitlement reform. another paradigm is that there are aspirational voters who embrace the idea of economic growth up by your bootstra mentality. strong guy populism resonates because they want to build wealth for themselves and get ahead where you see there? >> it's more of that and it's fundamentally ããmore of aspirational aspect.o] as a population that has come here with nothing. when you look at the safety nets that exist in most of these countries they are either nonexistent or the governments in these countries still from the population. there is no sense that the nce force. in hispanic culture.

it's not like you would have wisconsin and wisconsin rural wisconsin, there parts are pretty democratic and minnesota pretty democratic because you have a core of immigrants who believe in social democracy. you don't really have that with hispanics. what you had over several decades as some extent of working-class instability and outsider sensibility. a sense of group identity and people really gravitating and urban spolitical settings towar democratic party for reasons that are not ideological but i think what we are seeing across the electorate particularly among nonwhite voters and why we are seeing realignment over multiple cycles not just this cycle .... hispanics. what you have had over several decades is, you know, a working-class sensibility and

outside sensibility, you know, a sense of group identity and people really gravitating in urban political settings towards the democratic party for reasons that are not ideological. i think that what we are seeing across the electorate, i think that we are seeing a real alignment over multiple >> white voters who self-identify as conservatives vote repuican. among african-american voters it's among 45%. hispanic voters 65%. so the idea if you can get that conservative number up closer to 90%, those going to be some big shifts and that's going to fundamentally affect-- the popular vote could shift three or four points. as far as sensibility, when it comes to hasidic voters, you have so much as a result of the distrust of government and you know, corruption, you see not but in the united states, you just have families, rit,

stepping in with the 200 billion dollars iniduals to the united states to latin america. and that's reallyd i'm going to get ahead, i'm going to do it with my own hard work and then i'm going to be, once i make it, i'm going to pay it back to my family members. and that's just fundamentally, i think, different belief set, right, than that would-- than that which underpins kind of progressive ideology. >> i'm sure this is over simplification, i'm sure in a funny way, the constitution of a kissy, socially liberal, upscale for the democratic par more economically left, and the down-scale voters may get the republican party to reaffirm their policy to an economic pozy to you? >> i don't think so. i think one of the things you

hear along the rio grande valley, went down there and one of the things you hear is that people are really upset actually by this idea of -- and are really sensitive to this idea of peopl getting paid not to work, getting paid by the government not to work. i would say that social security, medicare, entitlement perhaps are not seen ase, they'i paid into and the only retirement savings that adb lot of people have. when it comes to food stamps and a lot of these programs, they see a lot of fraud in these programs, particular will in these poorer areasf south texas that really are a cash economy so it's easy to hide income. and so, it's easy to hide income, it's easy to claim benefits that you don't think. so, that's something that people down there are very sensitive to and polling, it's something that they associate, rig

wrongly, with the democratic party. >> liam, there's a pretty good chance that donald trump will be back in the white house in 2025 and there's great deal of reporting how he's seeking allies in silicon valley, wall street, and the corporate world, worlds that we're certy hostile to and skeptical to, you noted early on. assuming there's a second trump term, what's your gut with the economic policy. he seems to care about the health of equity markets. how do you see that playing out? >> andt's an interesting point, typically when things come out. who does he listen to on economic matters and it's a revolving door. one minute he could be listening to steve moore and larry kudlow, and the other listening to, you know, a donor that's next to him at mar-a-lago or the next, thinking about peter navarro and lighthizer.

he listens to them because they're successful and they're on tv and their policies aligned with trade in particular and it's that dissonance that makes it difficult. and what we saw in 2017 and whatnow, what trump understands is outsourcing hr functions to mike pence, to the heritage foundation and he didn't expect to win and once he did win, he didn't realize how important it was. he was surrounded with people he didn't trust, and for lawyers, telling him no not ways yes. what does the personnel look like and who is coming into the agencies? who is going to be leading the treasury department and whatnot? the cast of characters that we

saw in the first administration aren't necessarily the sorts of people i would expect to be in this one,uthe guessing game. to see who shows up over the trump transition trying to be on the ground floor and making a play for it. it's not always coherent or makes set, whatever he heard last and sticks in his head could become policy. >> patrick, a ball question for you. there's a very good chance that president biden will be reelected and i wonder what you think about what a second biden termout his approval rating is quite low, and it's quite possible that he could win reelection with a low approval rating, with a profound lack of enthusiasm about his management s that environment look like for economic consertihat a world where you cd see them running the table when it comes to midterms a gubernatorial elections around the country? is that a kind of periodheee so

building of this coalition you've described in your book t to be demoralization on the right in the event that biden is reelected. >> i think quick demoralization, to some extent, this is a mentally different psychology, i think, among people on the right and the left, in terms of how they apprch the prospect of losing, i mean, you know, democrats are deathly afraid of losing, you know, and republicans have no-- they absolutely don't believe they're going to lose and in some weird way, this is true in 2020 where you have that bed wetting phenomenon on the left and maybe overconfident they're going to win in some distances that manifest in post-2020 as a moment where we didn't actually lose among some people, right, that thought. so i wonder to what extent, right, you'll have -- will we see the return of this and we

saw that play out in ugly ways. >> fascinating, so could you imagine another scenario where biden wins reelection and there are a lot of folks who convince it was not on the up and up. >> rit, if history is any guide. but the question, i think, at that moment, the biggest question is is donald trump going to try to do it again? are we going to see a rerun. >> 2028. >> 2028, and so, you know, i think everything kind of fundamentally revolves around that. i think, you know, certainly midterms would be, you know, it's historical pattern prove correct, midterms could once again be seen as an opportunity for republicans and we thought that same thing about 2022. >> to patrick's point. i think it does take accepting the loss as the republicans did. 2009, on inauguration, that's the famous scene with mcconnell and assorted leadership figures

say we're going to make obama and-- >> in a big loss for modern standards. >> a huge loss and the tea party wave 2009 and the brown election in 2010. and came back quickly. there was no time to worry about whether you lost, you had villain. demoralizing loss in 2012. and 2014, crushing, huge midterm probably one of the biggest. and the catch here is two-fold. number one, as i mentioned before, you know, having the map that was drawn in 2011, redirecting was not built for the trump coalition, it was built for a romney theoretical coalition that started together and that started being that wild swing from 2016, 2018, a reflection of that. so what you saw in the most recent redistricting, redrawing lines protecting incumbents on

both sides and wild swings. you have a sturdy house map and that senate map, this is the class where republicans have to win or the alignments have happened. the other classes, the only other membe out of step with the presidential lean of the state and susan collins manages to defy gravity, up in 2026. but that's defense not offense. the opportunities are here and now, and so the idea that we're going to bounce back and have a really good midterm, i think they would in terms of the environment, but-- . and there's only so much they'd win the house popular vote and the senate popular vote, but only so much you can get. what we saw and why people were so shocked coming out of 2022, number one as patrick said, republicans time and when they don't they have an existential crisis. and democrats think they are the-- you know, had a incredible

night, had an incredible nigh s en or 10 seat margin. >> new york. >> and this new map is durable relative to recent years. >> fairly durable in the sense that? seems to match up pretty well with the coalitions such as they are in th so, while you could have a backlash against the six-year itch of joe biden who is very unpopular at that point, republicans, a, have to get their act together and b, the seats have to be there. it's coming-- maybe in new york, but that means they would have to lose to have the seats to gain back. part of the reasons that republicans stand to have a good night and the house despite everybody counting them out, they shouldn't. the same place, and the reason it's priced in based on every

day is the fact that, well, you know, they-- biden will win and therefore there will be a bunch of seats to go. the republicans did so poorly they're not overexposed the way the democrats were in 2020. the reason they had the big swings it was that counter cyclical going against trump and republicans got some of it usually reflected by people in seats that they can't. >> and we have time for two quick questions. i wonder if anyone has a i really appreciate your k. insight today in the panel. and kind of picky bagging on the same question, how do you see that would have them move with a biden victory, versus a m

with the republican loss? >> i just, i don't know if it's a satisfying answer to your question. what it raises is the fact that we have for the first t years, m limited. lame ducks as soon as they're elected. the question is what's next for both sides to figure out and why they lose large here because you look at the short st that would immediately set off speculation and this is going to be the guy and the question, will be reflective clubhouse vice-presidents, whoever that person might be and i don't know if they'll get it lying down, but i think that's going to be the question, because that decision has a huge bearing on where the republican coalition goes2028. >> fascinating. so if you have someone who is in that kind of hawley, vance, rubio camp. >> two of those three are apparently on. >> where someone as a ber

burgum. >> or a tim scott. >> and an ideological ak accolyte of this new right. and someone he per sfs, quote, casting. he seems to prize highly or someone who won't get in the way, won't necessarily have their own distinctive political identity like a doug burgum who may be well-positioned to run, but-- >> a center of gravity for the party. >> i think he wants-- he will want that. >> wplus? any other questions? on the side. >> does regional identity have any relevancen today's

politics? >> surprisingly, yes. surprisingly, i think, as somebody who analyzes voting patterns in states. pretty stubborn in some respects. it's definitely gone away. it's gone down and i think, but you why you still have significant parts of rural wisconsin, right, that are closed. it should be a red state. and you look at straight demographics, wisconsin should be a pretty solidly red state, but because of patterns of settlement going back 100 years, it's not solidly a red state. obviously more of a red state now than it was. and, but i do think that it's something to watch for, right? i mean, particularly, like you have arizona, nevada, right? which are two of the-- i don't think either of those are by any means locked in for

donald trump. what's interesting, you have very similar demographics in those states. very similarly concentrated populations in one major metro and one state trending right while the other trends left. and so, i do think that that is a factor that gets underplayed a lot. >> there's so much more to talk about, but please join me in thanking patrick and liam for joining us. [applause] ♪♪ [inaudible conversations] # [inaudible conversations]

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