find about books on c-span now free mobile app or revenuest. >> housill be i >> c-span celebrates like no other. p for capitol hill providing balance are for the policies are debated and decided. c-span 45 years and counting verify cable. >> house intelligence committee chair mike turner talks about u.s. foreign policy and nuclear strategy in a emphasizes russia china o and adversaries discussion hosted for strategic international studies atlas about one hour.

[inaudible conversations] >> great, good morning. thank you for joining us. i'm the director of the project here we are excited to have you join us today for conversation with mike turner, chairmanf house committee on intelligence. arming turner for spending his time meeting with scholars today. and this is a group of next-generation nuclear experts. and chairman turne shared his views on a lot of -- a lot of the issues that we' going to hear more about, along with some professional advice. and so, just really grateful for all the time that you've given us today. 's event, i

do need to share with you our building safety precautions. overall, we feel secure in our building. as a convener, we have a duty to safety officer at this event and please follow my instructions if the need arises. and finally, please familiarize yourself with the emergency exit they're probably going to be behind you or at the sides so p.o.n.i. and the aerospace security project are really honored to he representative michael turner with us today to talk about a variety of strategic challenges, including the russian asat threat, along with the role of npolicy.in this room know, this conversation is coming at a really important moment for u.s. policymakers as they face crucial decisions about nuclear modernization and also about the future of arms control and the role of nuclear weapons in u.s. foreign policylic is reengaging with nuclear weapons in a way that we really haven't seen since the cold war. so, this is a very important the 2023 bipartisan strategic posture commission highlighted a, quote, "sense of urgency" -- a sense of urgency around

strategic issues. and just before we start the conversation, want to highlight three of those. first is the sense of urgency around the u.s. nuclear enterprise and modernization. the strategic posture commission t current modernization plans are, quote "necessary but not sufficient." modernization program should be clear strategy remains e more recently,ust a week or two ago, national security council senior director pranay vaddi stated that, absen change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming where an increase from the current deployed numbers is required. the report also called for theu.nc deterrence, where there's an ongoing debate among allied countries on their nuclear options and the credibility of u.s. deterrence. a second importam the strategic posture commission report is about the worsening security environment and adversaries' build-up of strategic systems. while america prioritized armsco our adversaries moved in the opposite direction and took advantage of that moment.

which the chairman was involvedwiwaasat threat, which the administration acknowledged could be a violation of the 1967 xpand its nuclear arsenal, including production of fissile material and the department of defense anchina's nuclear arsenal will reach 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030. a final topic requiring a sense of urgency is in the search for solutions, potentially to after a meeting in november of last year, china has declined for follow-on talks with theed states on this topic, and russia has backed out of several arms control commitments including suspension of the newf the inf treaty, and de-ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty. so overall, these raise really important questihe role of u.s. nuclear weapons in foreign policy and strategy. and that's why we are so thrilled to have chairman tuo offer his insights and thoughts, to include the potential role for the ic in addressing these new strategiclenges. to quickly go through chairman turner's biography, congressman michael turner was first elected

to congress in 2002. in congress, turner is a senior member of the house armed services committee and has previously served as the lead republican of the tactical air and land forces subcommittee, as well as the strategic forces subcommittee.ees oversee army and air force acquisition programs, all navy and marine weapons, missile defense, and space systems. after serving on the house permanent select committee on intelligence since 2015, congressman turner was elected as the chairman of the house permanent select com intelligence. the committee has oversight of the nation's 17 intelligence agencies. he was the president of the nato parliamentary assembly, and he now serves as the vice chairman of the defense and security parliamentary assembly. chairman turner is that he was mayor of dayton, ohio during the dayton peace accords. so, bringing a lot of expertise is an derstatement to today's session. but this will be moderated by ri bingen, who is director of the aerospace security project and senior fellow at the program here at csis. representative turner will provide his keynote address,

followed by a fireside chat withence. if you would like to submit a question, you should have a qr code either on your chair or there's a giant one right behind me. please just scan this on your phone and submit questions, and kari will field them as they come in. so, with that, chairman turner i'like to turn it over to you for your remarks. thank you. [applause] rep. turner: well, thank you and good morning. i want to thank bingen to be leading this, and for her leadership on the issue of nuclear weapons and the risks that our nation faces. the space age began when russia launched sputnik in 1957. the eyes of the world turned to the sky and wondered how space and techlogy w life on earth.nd when russia launches its nuclear anti-satellite weapon into general saltzman, chief of staff of the united states space force, has referred to the potential launch date of russia's nuclear anti-satellite

weapon a from that day, no one can count on space the next day. from that day forward, the assumption on earth must b social, and military structures, right now, there isn't one. trillions and trillions ofme that we don't have will be required to build systems just to preserve what we have accompl age. for some things, no al exists. the united nations outer space treaty, entered into force in 1967, signed by the russian federation, the united states, and the united kingdom declared, "states shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner." the treaty was entered into

based upon the promise to mankind of advances on planetearth that might arise from the exploration and utilization of space. the signatories could not have imagined a world of today, where agriculture, medicine, commercial transactions, communications, maritime, international security, and even our ability similarly, we cannot imagine a world not space-dependent. on day zero, at the end of the we will have to. the biden administration, only after having been challenged by a group of bipartisan members of the house intelligence committee, reluc declassified that russia is developing a nuclear anti-satellite weapon intended space. no additional information has been released. news reports have speculated he weapon is past

development, exists, and is preparing to launch. additional news reports have speculated that russia already has a satellite in orbit as a test. first anti-satellite nuclear weapon system. without confirmi the accuracy of any of these reports, the questions they raise must be answered by the biden administration immediately, regardless of russia's timing or the possible immediate impact of this evolving threat. this crisis is the cuban missile crisis in space. and failing. the advances that mankha made during the space age are at risk, and the administration is sleepwalking into anible day zero. umb, former assistant secretary of defense for space policy, testified before the e ee that russia' satellite -- russia's nuclear anti-satellite weapon, low earth orbit would indiscriminately decimate all sate

orbit in space unusable for likely at least a year. mankind would be unable to repopulate low earth orbit during this period, and manned space exploration would be deadly. this threat would mean that our economic, international security, and social systems come to a grinding halt.strophic and devastating attack upon western vladimir putin knows this. checkmate. day zero can be avoided. imagine how different the world would have been if presidentkhrushchev to place nuclear weapons in cuba. the united states would haveearful to challenge russia and europe with nuclear weapons just off the coast of florida. just as khrushchev could have held the united states hostage with nuclear threats from cuba vladimir putin will hold the world's space assets hostage to counter attempts to stop him from reassembling the soviet union. there is precedent for russian-united states nuclear

weapons control treaties to include the dismantling of destabilizing weapons, inspection regimes, and prohibitions again through strength, something the biden administration seems incapable of showing.ñw in order to avoid day zero, the must immediately declassify all known information concerning the-satellite weapons program. vladimir putin thrives in secrecy. puisclosed by the administration and understood by the world. in addition, the united states and its nato allies must join together to declare the resolve to enforce the u.n. outer space tr./eaty. i call on the biden administration to do so. there are the biden administration is incredibly reluctant to take any action that would appear to be. however, russia is the escalatory aggressor. escalation has already occurred.h>íj

nd preserve space as the u.n. outer space treaty intended, for the betterment of all mankind. thank you. [applause] ms. bingen: chairman turner, those were incredibly soberingof us. i do want to start out by saying that i was fortunate to work with you for many years on theand when you were chairman of the strategic forces subcommittee. and what really struck me was right in the middle and leading on tackling ueissues -- missile defense, new start, nuclear modernization -- and i always appreciated your and the committee's bipartisan approach.s together, you took your trips together to get firsthand knowledge, and you were

information to make sure you really had all aspects of the issue understood. and i've seen you take that same approach with the houselligence committee, and we'll talk more about what the intelligence committee is doing.ia nuclear anti-sli'll also cover nuclear deterrence, other international security issues, a committee's priorities. i will remind everyone here in person, scan the qr code if you have questions. and for folks online, go to the event webpage, and you can also submit questions there. so, again, incredibly sobering remarks about day zero. you see all th all the threat assessments. russia has long had an ability space via their ballistic missiles. what makes this threat todayit so significant, and why did you take that unusual step, back in february, to raise this serious national security threat? you took flak from members in your own party, from the other side of the aisle. why did you do that? rep. turner: well, first off, i

want to begin by thanking kari because,ad expert on all of these issues, you have always been a mentor and an educator on it's great that you're here at csis, cause you're continuing that. thank you for including me and to be able to have a dialogue and a discussion about these issues. one of the aspects of your work is not just the policy that you've helped to effect, but the fact that you really want to educate others to ensure the dialogue on nuclear weapons and deterrence -- i mean, this is the greatest destructive force known to man and the fact that you advocate for, you know, knowledge understanding, and policy thank you for doing that. rs fi you know, overwhelming work of the house intelligence committee to call on the administration to make public that this threat was emerging. the fact that it took the house intelligence committee to do so i think shows you some of the, really, the waste of time that a response to this.

u've raised the issue of that, you know, russia could take an icbm and explode it to and, perhaps, destroy that the satellites that are there and, you know, why is t that they are undertaking to do this, right? the administration says that what i call on them is to tell the world what is the status of this, and development -- does that mean that this is a drawingis a research project in a lab? an that it's something in a manufacturing facility? does it mean that there's nuclear warheads that have been created? is there a satellite? is there a missile? all of these are the natural resulting questions from the administration, and they're because they're avoiding having to admit that they're not really the outcome that was different in the cuban missile crisis is that we had president kennedy. we need leadership by the administration, and we certainly need a dialogue worldwide to understand and call out, really, what are the russians doing and

aton: well, and that leads into my next question here. intelligence sources and methods involved in collecting this kind of information. so, you're calling for the declassification of intelligen what are -- and you just highlighted some, but what are some of the specifics that the american public, that policymakers, and others, need to understand? what are we missing? but then also, how do yoing those sensitive sources and methods? rep. turner: right. this should not be permitted to go into orbit, period, and theheir to-do list. part of informing what would be the to-do list is the issue of what is this? what do they mean by development, that russia is developing an anti-satellite nuclear weapon? now, obviously, you know they've been engaged with the intelligence committees and, certainly, we're awa this evolving threat looks like. the administration, though, i believe is reticent to have th want to admit that they're not doing anything, and we are sleepwalking into what will be an irreversible day zero effect. ng in

space is not just, "well, it's there in space, it's notctive unless they use it." no, it's destructive on day one.y zero, which is the next day, because suddenly we will not be and if we can't count on those systems, we're going to have to construct alternative systems, or, literally, it would be catastrophic economically, militarily, communication, to bithing you know, you think there are ways to convey more information about this program without reve methods? rep. turner: absolutely. ms. bingen: ok. and then all of this leads into the question of now what? to increase international pressure on russia with other international partners. a u.n. resolution in april sponsored by the u.s. and japan, r space treaty, which russia vetoed, and china abstained. so, you know, the question, i k, were hinting at this -- is, what actions do you think we are going to be treaty and prevent is from happening? rep. turner: right. so, i liken the administration

council on this issue as the principal of a school going to the student body to have a labor dispute with their teachers. the aspect here is that the administration needs to exert leadership. we have allies. we have -- i mean, the understandinon means and what its outcomes would result in needs to be diusseby the what would be worldwide support in opposition to russia placing a nuclear weapon in space in violation of the space weapons treaty.a now has a lot to lose in space. is t with china and perhaps others? rep. turner: absolutely. that the administration has done enough to inform, which is why i'm calling for the administration to inform, both our other adversaries and allies as to what this threat is. you can't garner support for something that you're not discussing, and i firmly believe that the administration is avoiding discussing this topic

, because they don't want the gap between what they should be doing and what they are doing to be publicly discussed. ms. bingen: well, if i think about the d.i.m.e. framework we're pursuing diplomatic and international pressure options table? should military options be on the table? you oversee intelligence capabilities. what should be on the tableurner: well, i think all of it. the biggest sign, i think, would be -- i mean, this is so catastrophic. secretary of defense austin took -- you know, in fronof this would be catastrophic. well, if this is catastrophic, there should be someone every y the administration that gets up to make certain that this isn't occurring. and there is no one who has that responsibility. and there's no one who'suting that to-do list. this is something they're aware of. this is something that they've informed us that russia is but this is not a priority of the administration. this needs to be a priority. intelligence community, i guess the intricacies of this threat? rep. turner: well, i think enough so that the administration was willing to come forward and say that russia is developing an anti-satellite nuclear weapon. i mean, the administration has

confirmed this. this is not speculative. this is not something that people are, at this point, having differing opinions. -- differing opinions. there probably are differing but that's the dialogue that we need to be having. what should be done? and the administration is not having that debate within itself, or with the american public, or worldwide with our allies. ms. bingen: well, and it's interesting. as chairman of the intelligence committee, i jt think you see -- you see everything. you have this global picture of the security environment. this is obviously one very sobering and consequentialat here. but there are a lot of other things happening in the world, i'm assuming, are consuming a lot of folks' bandwidth as well. so, you know, how do you -- if environment, what else are you but then also,o you see this threat in the context of everything else ppenin now, in the middle east, with china, technology advancemen etc.? rep. i think i'd start with, if

there's something that's going toably something that should be at the top of the list. and i think that's one that i nderstand that there should not be tolera this be in orbit. i honestly think that there may be portions of the administration who believes that we can tolerate this in space. as general saltzman said, yo't tolerate this in space because the next day, day zero you have to assume that none of the space capabilities that we have are available the next day. and you're going to have to plan for alternative usesurces, which we don't have. which is what i mentioned in the speech, trillions and trillions of dollars and, certainly, time we don't have. but there are threats, obviously. you look at both on the nuclear side -- china increasing its nuclear weapons inventory, norg the same, russia both china and russia moving to hypersonics.e, you have the capabilities gaps between what the united states is currently doing and what our adversaries are certainly doing. and that creates a vulnerability. and then, the conflicts of russia's

aggression against really, iranian influence with hezbollah, hamas, and the addressed with respect to iranian aggression. ms. bingen: it's interesting, to your point here -- in some respects, it shouldn't surprise us that russia is doing this given all the other has underway in its nuclear forces whether ite missile, the undersea vehicle, the icbm's. you know, why not space?, it's at the extreme end of the space threat spectrum. if you take avangard, thei nuclear weapons cruise missile that orbits the earth, poseidon, the underwater, unmanned missile that can surface, with the intention of destruction of coastal cities -- all of those would have been not even imaginable 15 years ago. but it certacating, an intent on the part of russia to significantly invest in nuclear weapons capabilities. and we need to be able to respond. ms. bingen: and if i can pivot a bit here to talking specifically on nuclear modernization, you

know, i would observe there are few members of congress thatreally understand nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. how do you explain this to other those threats are, why do we need to modernize our nuclear weapons y is at stake? rep. turner: right. i think, you common analogy that people use is just your own personal vehicle. you know, i have a 1 i wouldn't use it to commute every day. you upgrade, you look to increase technology -- think of how many different iphones you've thrown away and replaced. but yet, we look at decades-old technology as our nuclear weapons deterrent and assume at nuclear weapon, we don't need to modernize. well, of course we do. they decay. their capabilities and their and our adversaries' capabilities increase, whichrelt vulnerabilities. it really should be a continuous process, not something we park in a garage and come back decades later and say, let's need if, you know, we have the resolve that nuclear weapons are necessary in order to deter our

adversaries and, certainly, our nuclear adversaries, then, in that commitment, it's going to require that we invest we modernize. ms. bingen: and when i think about it, that nuclear deterrence really is the foundation for our conventional forces and other decisions that we make in our security apparatus. so, on modernization, we're fortunate at csis to have a phenomenal group of junior scholars. so, i'm going to weave in a question here from joseph in its final report, the bipartisan strategic posture commission, established by congress, record -- which is the current modernization program that's being pursued -- is necessary but not sufficient. can you share some congressional "necessary but not sufficient" conclusion? what investments are needed? and what pace of activity is needed? rep. turner: right you know, when you get a new 'ality. you're not just getting one that works better or that is going to do the same things our modernization is really looking at our nuclear weapons the inventory, as doing the same

things and only, you know, modernizing it to make it do those things better but not looking at additional things that we need interesting about the nuclearsion is that they really also looked at our need to have an enhanced missile defense capability, because we have not availed ourselves of missile defense as a part t overall equation of deterrence and defense, both with modernization and with missile defense on a defensive capability, having our adversaries question whether or their target. ms. bingen: well, and you, in both your roles on the intelligence committee as well as armed services for a long time, you've been out to the nuclear weapons labs, production facilities, strategic command. what is your view of the state of the weapons complex and therial base where we're at right now to deliver? and you know, some of these modernization programs that are running behind schedule over cost. can our nation afford what's ahead of us here in modernization? rep. turner: w not to. ms. bingen: yeah. rep. turner: but you know, certainly, the systems that we ce.

we have nuclear weapons capabilities that are deterring our adversary, and that's -- adversaries -- and that's, of course, why. you know, we don't have people in -- looking to have conflicts with the united states. but, at the sa looking at the next 10, 15 years of how do they change thatwhere their capabilities increase stagnant. and that delta, that change of our adversaries' capabilits, have not lived in a world where russia and china had greater have had. that's a scary place to be. and that'c,why the nuclear posture commission called on that we needth we're doing. because if we're running in place and our adversaries are running a marathon, we're ms. bingen: well, what we didn seeing now is it's this two-peernuclear challenge is china, from a few hundred to, what, a thousand, 1,500 trajectory that they're on with their nuclear forces. how well postured is the intelligence community to collect and analyze on these threats -- t the risk of opportunism by one of the parties? how do you look at the ic's ability here?

rep. turner: wel you and i have discussed, is the issue that the capabilities that russia and call first-strike capabilities capabilities where it would cause them to change their not they could undertake an attack on the united states, which would prevent us to have an ability to respond and that diminish our ability to be able to deter them by having those first-strike capabilities.i think, on the intelligence side, what's really important is that there's a lot of things that, publicly, we know. right now, anyone can pull out ese icbm missile silo expansion," and you will get a space picture of the silos that china is building to put in new nuclear weapons. then, if you google "u.s. response to china's expansion of nuclear we going to find anything that's going to be helpful. that's where our dialogue and discussion need to be. that's why it's so important what you're doing here at csis is taking actually what is occurring, saying it needs to be placed in the dialogue, so that we can have a policy response,

and then, in that, you know, real action on the part of the united states to respond to es ms. bingen: yeah. i want to shift to the topic of extended deterrence. and you do a lot of engagement with our allies and partners. you were the president of the nato parliamentary assembly and still heavily involved in a leadership role there. i don't think, you know, if you look at the broad american public, that we fully appreciate the concept of extended deterrence. and the premise is that our allies do't develoear weapons, you know, we don't proliferate nuclear capability in exchange for us extending a nuclear umbrella to them. we've discussed -- with chin's doing; -- you know, it has even been striking to see south korea and japan start having a bit of a nuclear dialogue here.@a in all your discussions, how confident are our allies and partners in our nuclear umbrella? how is their thinkinshaping our nuclear policy, shaping what -- how congress is viewing these issues? rep. turner: so, we had this discussion with your nuclear

scholars here at cs, and what's interesting is, you know on what extended deterrence policy was. so extended deterrence was where the united states, through its nuclear umbrella, said, "we will cover other allies who don'tapons and provide them our umbrella. if they're attacked, we will pledge both in defense and our nuclear umbrella as a response if the d weapons themselves." the intention was not just that our allies not developuclear for nonproliferation. that certainly was a win, at but it was also intended to be a disincentive for our adversaries to expand their nuclear weapons. because if our allies -- those who are nuclear weapons, the thought was that our adversaries would have to build up their nuclear weapons. and so, you would have this proliferation not just with our allies, but our adversaries because they'd have to counter-deter both us and our now-nuclear allies. the problem is that that didn't happen. china is expanding. russia is expanding. north korea is expanding. iran is continuing to march toward the ability to make a nuclear weapon.

so the extended deterrent umbrella has failed to cause the failed allies the enormity of the expansion as you described. with the united protect them and it's a valid question as they now as wha increasing >> that leads into arms-control production. in 2026 china declined withu.s. so what is the and do you see a path forward not just on but perhaps greater compromise between we

willmi undertake it at the same time we have a need to modernize. nuclear deterrent. do you see something like that playing out here, going forward? rep. turner: i mean, ronald 'ne of "peace through strength" is not just a political slogan. the reality is that you're never going to get anyone to the in a business transaction or nuclear weapons negotiations where they don't believe -- if they don't believe that they have anything to gain from you. you don' someone to negotiate where you believe that voluntarily unilaterally, th already giving up what you mightm them. and that's the situation we've placed ourselves in. we have russia and china are expanding their nuclear weapons. weapons capabilities. we have something we want from them. but they don't believe that we have either the will or the interest or the means, currently, to undeake going in any direction, even expansion, that would be a benefit to them to restrain us.

and so, we're stalled in any opportunities for nuclear weapons reduction negotiations. i am for arms contk. it has concluded many times. you know, as i said in my speech, the dismantling of a destabilizing weapons inspection regime, so that, you know, we had numerous individuals, both on the russian and the american side, who knew each other well and knheews well. all of that has gone by the wayside, and, certainly, we're less safe because of it. ms. bingen: and to your point onpresident reagan also believed that we could pursue a nonproliferation agenda, control agenda, but do it through, as you said, a position of strength while also making sure that we had a strong nuclear deterrent. here's an interesting question from another one of our junior scholars, lachlan mackenzie. nu misperception about nuclear weapons or nuclear risks that you wish you could clarify for e rep. turner: i truly believen public think that we have a missile defense system in place that is operational and would defend us against china and russia. and, unfortunately, as we've gone through the obama

administration and then the short term of the trump administration to the biden administration, you have policies that have been anti-missile defense. remember, missile defense, when it was first proposed by ronald escalatory, that it was destabilizing, and that your adversary would think we need more nuclear weapons, becauseat it wouldn't work, and that it was too costly. well, what we've seen is it's actually de-escalatory, not escalatory. we saw that in iran shooting 300 missiles at israel that we worked collectively with them using missile defense technology to take those down. imagine if israel had been at the receiving end of 300 missiles, the response that would have had to have gone to iran.de-escalatory. it works. you can see, in every aspect of what, we have proven in technology -- you and i worked on that on capitol hill,cluding with the deal with israel for shared technology for the iron dome. and then, of course, the cost is proven in that you don't have fo you're able to eliminate through missile defense technology. ms. bingen: and that was a great point, that the strategic

posture commission, in a bipartisan manner, emphasized as well, was to recommend wexpand our missile defenses, not just against the strategic missile threats, but also these more coercive cruise missiles and other threats that can now target the homeland. rep. turner: we can protect the homeland, and we should.. so, you're a senior leader in the nato parliamentary assembly.to's summit will be in d.c. in a few weeks, marking the 75th anniversary. can you share your thoughts on where nato is at today, where it needs to go in the future? and i'm going to weave in a question from the audience, from natalie grishin, the ukrainian culture association of ohio. got to get the ohio piece in here. thank you, chairman turner, for a clear and to-the-point presentation. house administration position on the ukraine path to nato should so maybe just also hit on your assessnt in ukraine, and where that goes from here. rep. turner: this is an exciting nato summit, because the success of the summit has already

occurred before everybody convenes. and that success is the nato to include finland and sweden, and the fact that they will be at the table full members, which shows the failure of putin's policies of he's actually pushed people into nato. both sweden an levef of all of the nato countries. so they're increasing the capabilities of nato. their joining and sitting at that table i think is a reflection of, really, the success of nato as an alliance and the failure of putin's aggression, and the real calculus that there is a riskeden and finland didn't join nato because of ukraine. they joined -- finland and sweden joined nato because they knew that other countries were next. and that's why we're supporting ukraine. that's why we need to continue to support ukraine. i think, at this summit, there should be just a, you know recommitment to the bucharest statement.

in bucharest, nato stated ukraine will be a member of est statement -- both georgia and ukraine t -- strongest statement that nato has made in aspiring nations that want to join nato. and that, i think, is a standing commitment by nato.ing it in the billions of dollars of weapons and capabilities that are being provided to ukraine to defend itself against russia. ms. bingen: and you were one of the leading voices on the hill articulating the need to pass that legislation to ensure that ukraine does receive the security assistance and munitions from the united states and others. so, thank you for that. te technology. several areas are emerging. we've talked space., ai biotech, all with warfighting and intelligence community benefit, but also with security risk, when you look at what, perhaps, china is doing in these areas. so how do you think about these technologies and what the intelligence community needs to do to main and i'm also going to weave in

that -- a question from alexander givin on nuclear --apons have shaped how conflict is perceived and conducted since their conception. so how do you see artificial intelligence and cyber interacting with nuclear weapons?ader emerging technology question as well as nuclear with ai and cyber. so, ai is one of the most important developments because of what it is able to provide as an analytical capabi assistance. i had an opportunity to sit with henry kissinger just shortly before he passed. and he was -- he had just written a book the year before on ai.ontinuing to publish on artificial intelligence. and he was talking about the of ai in strategic planning. but he went the next step to say, as policy, we should never implement ai, where there's not a requirement that ai inform us of how it's coming to that it's offering to us, or the advancement of human knowledge will stop, and computers and maectivity. and i think the human element in utilizing ai is going to be

incredibly important. and i don't think ai should ever be used with respect to any decision making with respect to nuclear apons, or look to the prosecution of conflicts. obviously, strategy, the assessment, discernment, it's) going to be incredibly important.ctor. our biggest threat in ai is that our adversaries get there first. china,ith its surveillance society, where it has implemented this surveillance culture to be able to further su attempted to export that. they've also couple cyber efforts to access and countries' populations and their activities. the utilization of ai, for an authoritarian regime, is probably the biggest threat that we have seen in the longest time to mankind and to the issue of freedom and liberty.

ms. bingen: really appreciate that. in other technology areas, hypersonics. and i don't want to steal your thunder, but you and i have talked about this. but as it relates to title 10, defense authority, and title 50, which is an intelligence community few members that see that total picture. so, when we're looking at these different technology areas, what concerns you about red? what is blue doing about it? talk to us about, i guess, some of the tension that you see there, but also how do you bring greater integration across title 10, d.o.d., and title 50, the intelligence community? rep. turner: right. so, further on your description, you know, on the intelligence adversaries. what are our adversaries doing? on the national security and defense side, we plan what we're sometimes, those don't match, from one side to the other. and there was a period obviously, where we were much more advanced than our adversaries. so, the -- an understanding of what adversaries were doing was important, but, at the same

time, it didn't bilities and theirs. and that evolution of that gap that identification of it, is, i embodied most in the -- in the issue of hypersonics, whth vastly ahead, technology was stolen, china and russia now have hypersonics programs fielded. hypersonic weapons are in the hands of our adversaries. we do not have, currently, a hypersonics weapon that has been even capable of being deployed. if you look at what you know that our adversaries are doing in hypersonics, and then what you know the united states is doing, even if we accomplish everything that we have on the drawing board tomorrow in hypersonics programs, we still fall short of where they're currently performing. ed as to never, you know, allowing ourselves again to be setting -- first off, abandoning a program, than what we know our adversaries are already capable of. and this iccurred in the last several years of china, russia, north korea, iran that's probably the most haunting that people should focus on is -- and

we all got to see it. president xi is standing next to vladimir putin. he went to moscow to show his support of this, you know, unlimited friendship, of no. and what we would call a hot-mic moment, where they're not doingentation, but the mic is open, president xi is caught. and he says to vladimir putin, what we are brin a -- "we" meaning them together -- is a change that hasn't happened in 100 years. pause on that for a second. we know what happened 100 years ago. that's world war i and world war ii. that is the fight between authoritarianism and democracy. and that's what they're saying. they're saying, we, together --ey want to re-prosecute the conflict between authoritarianism and democracy. and ey believe that they will win. they certainly can win if we don't rise to the occasion making certain that they do not have capabilities for which we cannot respond. ms. bingen: and you just had that happen again this week, with vladimir putin visiting north korea with kim jong-un.

rachel oswald at cq roll call. how worried should the u.s. be that russia may now provide north korea with technological korea's long-range ballistic missiles and directly target the united states? rep. turner: well, that they have that ability now. certainly, the cooperation between russia and north korea y to do so. i think we've all sort of felt north korea, iran are workingn both their development of capabilities and in their thrbeeats tthe united states. these symbolic meetings, i think, are -- should allow us to focus on this is a threat that ms. bingen: and i'm going to just jump around here with some additional questions from thedi aerospace interns here at csis annalise johnson, who happens to s u student. how do you foresee continued sanctions against russia affecting their space and nucl

and then, what levelgagement with russia should the u.s. strive to have? rep. turner: this is a great question, because the question is would sanctions significantly by ais developing a nuclear anti-satellite weapon? well, i think we should certainly try. i think we need to try every -- you do not hear the administration saying this is such a red line, this is such aophic dynamic that places at risk all of the accomplishments that we have in integrating space in the defense, our communications, that that red line is so great that we are going to implement an additional regime of financial restrictions, of sanctions, and even look to what are we going to do with our allies in nato to make such a strong statement as to have russia understand that this isis going to be accepted. ms. bingen: ok.

and you briefly mentioned iran at the outset here, but i want to comback to this. paul tervo from the institute for science and international security. iran's recent iaea-confirmed expansion of enrichment plants, the instiational security estimates that the time it would take for iran to now produce a nuclear weapon has been reduced dramatically, under a third of a month. so how do you think iran'scity and capability here will influence middle east poli? rep. turner: well, really, all roads lead to iran when you look at the instability in the middle east. their franchises -- hamas, hezbollah, and the houthis -- areas in which they have challenged, you know, saudi what we've seen, of course, in the conflict that has unfolded with israel.k to the destabilizing effect of iran and it needs to be countered by the administration. ms. bingen: this is a question from polly keim from t national nuclear security

administration, nnsa.teresting. what do you think we should conceal versus reveal to assure and i reca discussions in the space domain as well as others is, you know under what circumstances would you reveal a capability versus obviously, protecting the exquisite nature or the performance of that system. so how do you conceal versus reveal? rep. turner: well, intelligence is gathered so you can impact casual observers. if you're not using intelligence to impact the outcome, the intelligence has no value. merely to inform ourselves.and in this instance, you know as i've called for the adclsify the status of this program, there's no risk to means, methods, and te russia's program as to what is its stage in development. and then from that we can inform: what is our to-do list? what do our allies need to do? as the world, western economic

community, to address this? ms. bingen: well, and then a question from ajay gokul, who's a mchenry fellow pursuing a maste'' university. what role does india play here? so how can the u.s. leverage india to play a constructive role, particularly on the nuclear proliferation or nuclearration front? you know, they have an interesting historical relationship with russia, but so increasingly adversarial relationships with china and with pakistan. these are all nuclear states. so, what role do you see india playing going forward? rep. turner: well,portant, because if you look at india and if you look at africa, their development has occurred not because they that we had in the 1970's and 1980's. it's because they jumped forward in infrastructure and gy. their ability to establish communications systems, economic infrastructure, energy, all of it is dependent upon space. africa and india today a what they are today because of space.

if space -- if the space-age advancement ceases to exist, africa and india will become isolated. ms. bingen: i want to come back to your role as chairman of the intelligence committee. a great credit to you and to ranking member himes for your ere, rather than do everything in classified form, you've both about things that the committee is concerned about. related t, trust in the intelligence you know, in recent years there's been this drumbeat of media reports and commentaries that suggest that trust in the intelligence community has eroded, and, frankly, trust in u.s. national security institutions writ large. got the military intelligence community is doing. i know you've seen ur so how do you think about how can we build trust in our intelligence institutions, given the vital security role that they play? rep. turner: right. well, we give our intelligence

community exquisite tools that have great risks if they are used against the american public and can be destabilizing to a democracy. of the things that we have seen, and certainly of the discourse that we've had in the public of the most egregious violations, they'he fbi, which are not an intelligence community generator but intelligence user. and i do think we need significant focus on reformingch the department of justice and the fbi marry intelligence. when we did the renewal of theforeign surveillance act section 702, we put in targeting largely doj and fbi and their utilizat intelligence, and making certain that the court system is cted. that is going to be a continuing issue. and i think the american public see it, as they look at the news stories that clip by them, that both in inequality in the manner

in which justice is pursued, but also in th and that is a real issue. ms. bingen: and you just passed your intelligence community your intelligence authorization act, your iaa, out of committee. so, congratulations on that. you mind just spending a minute here talking about the committee's priorities? but also, you've hinted at there are some broader intelligence community reforms that your commitp. turner: right. i now is the administration' ukraine has been forced to fight russian aggression on thith one arm tied behind their back. the administration has been slow to give them the type of lethal weapons that can make a difference on the battlefield. very slow to give them authority to actually use those within russ are actively sending missiles the weapons infrastructure where they're quadrupling their output of missiles to attack ukraine. and they're hesitant to provide intelligence as to what russia

is doing within russia for ukraine. in the beginning, the administration refused to give ukraine any intelligence as to where the the house and our intelligence committee had to push. the administration ultimately position. and the effect was so dramatic that they ran to the microphone to claim credit for changing their own policy. so instead of acknowledging that the policy was wrong, they wanted credit for the change on the battlefield as a result of them lifting their own restrictions. ms. bingen: so, i know we're running out of time here. a pretty sobering conversation across a whole range of issues. i want to end on a bit of a note of optimism here. earlier this morning, you talked to our next-generation nuclear scholars here at csis.so, i'm curious what you told them, what do you want these young scholars thinking about as they embark on their careers? and, you know, nuclear weapo nuclear anti-satellite abilities, these are pretty dark akes you then optimistic about our future going forward? rep. turner: right. most nations,

about a vulnerability, or they talk about an adversary, talk about actually actions against an adversary. for us, it really is a to-do as we look to what our risks are, we have to inform our to-do russia's economy is the size of italy, and, yet, it dominates as to whether or not our huge economy and ingenuity and capaill even be applied to respond to some of the things that they're accomplishing. we have great capability, and, as long as we do the to-do list, there's nothing we're going to be able -- not be able to accomplish. there are many nations who have wish lists. we have to-do lists. we just have to fill out the to-do list and get to work. ms. bingen: and you have a phenomenal group of young nuclear scholars that want to engage in these issues and work on them for the betterment of security, going forward. rep. turner: they're incredibly bright. zing to see not just what they're currently doing but what they want to do in the future, and their questions were so incredibly informed. the

especially since they've seen what has been occurring, are absolutely dedicating -- dedicated to a strong united translates into freedom and liberty. and without it, we're all at risk. ms. bingen: well, chairman turner, thank you so much. i willor us to get the chairman of a full committee to csis, not just to do t discussion on a whole range of topics, but also for you to spend time with our young scholars. so, thank you for that. thank you for bringing greater awareness and urgency to the russian nuclear anti-satellite threat. it is absolutely a day zero -- ianweto the 1950's go forward, and the threat that it poses is just incredibly grave. leadership and all that you are doing onting the american public. for folks here in the audienceeception out in the foyer here, so it's an opportunity to network and to continue the convers again, mr. chairman, thank you. rep. turner: thank you. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2024] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which f caption content and accuracy.

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