kissinger well, he's still alive now. and for at least the next 30 years into his 89. he kept hoping that he'd be called back to some senior administrative point. but each republican president in turn looked at kissinger and thought it and then said, no no, no, i don't think we will. so he is he's written some great books since he's never been allowed back into the the centers power making that might also say something revealing advancing. anyway please welcome mr. david ferriero, archivist of the united states. mrs. lynda johnson robb, daughter of lyndon and lady bird johnson. the honorable hubert vole,

member of the texas house of representatives and vietnam immigrant. ms. luci baines johnson, daughter of lyndon and lady bird johnson and dr. bernard lefkow, retired major general of the united states army and a silver star. bronze star and purple heart recipient. the archive of this library contains thousands of letters to our 36th president. many of which concern the vietnam war. here are two letters from soldiers stationed in vietnam during the height of the president johnson's tenure in office, which reflect the dramatically contrasting views of the war held by americans, including our troops.

dear mr. president, here's a picture of a little vietnamese girl and myself. she has three older sisters, two older brothers and a younger brother. they live in a village about eight miles southeast of danang. their mother was killed by the v.c. because of us. she is able to smile. it is our duty to keep that smile which portrays so much on her face. but there are many more who do not have the freedom. smile, which she has. it is our duty as americans to bring happiness to those who may otherwise never be as free of care as she to be able to pose with her and have her still look so happy gives the idea of the good we are doing here. this is worth fighting for. this is worth dying for. i know the way you must carry on your shoulders, sir. and i pray that god will help you. i hope this letter and picture will bring you a blessing. she says the marines are number

one. sincerely yours. first corporal lever and. and bayonet. u.s. marine corps. dear sir. hope this letter finds the president in the best of health. before i begin, allow me to introduce myself. i am pfc nichols. united states marines in vietnam. and this is the topic of the letter. like most of the servicemen fighting here, i don't fully understand this war. we're given training, long talks and finally a weapon and told we have a war to fight. so if the people of vietnam can have a communist free government. in short, sir, we're fighting this war for the vietnamese people. and i'd like to know why. why should my buddies and other people's sons have to die fighting for what he doesn't understand or believe in? i've been here for seven months and probably will be here until my 13 is completed. if all goes well, but never will be able to understand. why are these americans and

maybe myself must die for people who really don't seem to give a --? most of us are hoping one day to see our loved ones, and to me this seems the most important to most of us. and if you were to ask the question, what are we fighting for? the honest men would tell you to get through these 13 months, to get back home. i hope you can understand our feelings and answer our questions in this letter. thank you, sir, for your time. the time you've taken to read this letter. yours truly, pfc charles nichols. united states marine corps. i'm going to read two letters from my husband, who also was a marine in vietnam. and we got married in december in washington, and he left in march. and he came home on our daughter's six month birthday. this is may 31st, 1968.

my darling linda, today i was a very lucky man. about 11:00 this morning, i was back at the bunker, the battalion, c.p., and walking toward the command bunker. when i heard the familiar sound, incoming mortars, even before the first round hit, i yelled incoming and dived for the nearest hole, just as the first round landed about 20 meters away. within 10 seconds, other marines had dived into the very same hole on top of me, which was only big enough for two people to begin with. rounds continued to land all around us for the next minute or so. then there was a pause of about 30 seconds and one last round landed right on the opposite edge of the foxhole. fortunately, all the shrapnel went forward in the same direction the round was headed, and none of it came back into the foxhole as it was that one round which completely destroyed the two company office structures.

next to my office and killed a small dog, which was not smart enough to get into a hole in the incoming started. my office structure was only slightly damaged and the only marine casualties from that last round were the two mile concussions suffered by two men who piled on top of me. had the round landed just six inches shorter. all of us would have been killed. needless to say, we all felt very lucky. even though there were a few others in the general area who did not fare so well. often chuck's company provided security for for the road sweeps and the convoys to the outpost near the cambodian border. and this is an august 5th, 1968, letter. i usually outpost the road all the way out and then pick up the troops on tanks. and amtrak's on the way back. otherwise, the round trip would take over a day each way.

we were a little past the half point that halfway point when one of the am trucks was blown up by what we later discovered was a command detonated 35 pounds box mine. command detonated means it was set off by a person hiding some distance away with a fuze box instead of a regular pressure or pressure relief mechanism. it was immediately engulfed in flames as the mine ignited at least six of the amtrak's 12 gas tanks. i had one entire platoon on the vehicle at the time. in addition to a three man forward air control team and a four man amtrak crew, the net result was 30 casualties, many from shrapnel, but all from burns. just yesterday, i had received a fairly large number of replacements and it assigned over half of them to this platoon to make up for previous losses. now they're back down to almost nothing again for tomorrow's convoy of already made

arrangements to borrow a platoon from another company. someone is watching over me personally because i was on the amtrak right behind the one the enemy decided to blow up and would have been just as good a target. fortunately, the enemy didn't launch a group attack, a ground attack to go with it. i was very proud of the company again. when the chips are down their tremendous. this is a letter written to president johnson by a captain of the republic of vietnam army reading from a us training base in alabama on america's 190th birthday, july 4th, 1966, 4th of july, 1966. the honorable lyndon baines

johnson, president of the united states. the white house. dear mr. president, i'm captain william cardon of vietnam. now on to training at the u.s. army chemical school and center at fort mcclellan, alabama. i am indebted and grateful to you for you. recently, thoughtfulness, speeches, which made me read over and over again u.s. history and declaration of independence. again, i found your speeches. the spirit of liberty, which made america strong and free. i am confident with a generous ease and encouragement of your heroic nation. we shall finally emerge victorious in the struggle for freedom and independence and close is a study i have tried to write in english for the first

time. i am taking the liberty to bring to your attention and as a token of my appreciation, i sincerely hope that it may express to you our burning desire to fight for freedom that almost it may serve itself. explanation of a humble but grateful people who truthfully show his weakness to a true friend in order to be help more effectively. with my very best wishes and respect to you, the leader of the free world, and to your honorable family, may i congratulate you, mr. president, on the occasion of your independence day? thank you. and i. when patrick nugent and i met the summer. of 1965, he was graduate from

college and already a member of the air national guard. we married a year later with a dream reception in the white house. our first child was nine months old in april of 1968, when patrick volunteered for vietnam. patrick did not have to go to war. he went because he wanted to serve his country. like many wives of a serviceman, i frequently went home to my parents. lying in my bed in the white house, i often heard the picketers say, hey, hey. lbj, how many boys did you kill today? i lived in the terror of knowing my husband and brothers in law, chuck robb and jerry nugent might be one of those boys for

my father. it was all so very personal. three of our troops in vietnam were family. all felt like it. it was daddy's constant struggle to bring them home safely and our country to the peace table. in january of 1969. patrick wrote his father in law and commander in chief a letter. my father shared with me because he was so proud of patrick and grateful to him. his children and i remain so forever. 12 january. my dear mr. president, chuck and i had a very peaceful and eventful christmas eve and christmas day and denying the highlight of our yuletide season

was a telephone call from you, mrs. johnson. lucy and linda lynn made a strong effort to converse with his daddy, but the conversation was one sided. all on his side. someday i look for him to be president of at&t. that is christmas day. chuck and i made three stops to distribute the articles he had gathered. our first up was a small village, some 30 miles south west of danang, where he passed out food and toys to the villagers. we then went to the catholic orphanage in danang and handed out all sorts of toys to the children. our final stop of the day was the naval hospital in danang, where we visited with the patients in the orthopedic ward.

we also handed out riding materials and fruit cake. christmas, 1968 will always be a memorable one for to reasons. number one, it was my first christmas away from my family and i hope the last. and two, i was able to help other people appreciate the meaning of christmas. the war activity has increased somewhat since the beginning of the new year. everyone is half expecting some sort of offensive around tet. the hot areas are still located northwest of saigon and along the cambodian border. ten days ago, my aircraft came under mortar fire at khartoum. as we were coming to a halt on the runway, as usual, i didn't

realize that we were being fired upon. my primary concern was to offload the 56 guys i had on board. thank god no one was hit and the aircraft have never received a scratch. the number of days i have remaining in vietnam is diminishing quite rapidly, or as the guys refer to it. i'm getting short. as of this writing, i have 88 days remaining. i received my orders last week, which in effect state i am to report to bergstrom air force base for separation from active duty upon return stateside. this letter will be my last address to you as my commander in chief. i consider it both an honor and

a privilege to have served under your command and direction. i didn't want to see you vacate the presidency, since you are the best we have. but at the same time i respect your decision and i am excited grimly proud of you. our men in vietnam. no, that you have done everything in your power to bring about a peaceful solution to the war. unfortunately, we cannot negotiate with ourselves, nor it is our desire to abandon the hope of a free and democratic south vietnam. you and mrs. johnson are in my prayers and thoughts today and every day.

love, pat. peace. i enjoyed talking to everyone last night. thank you. and tonight it is indeed a tremendous honor for me to speak to you as we come together to honor our vietnam veterans, and particularly those brave men and women who sacrificed their lives fighting, fighting for freedom and democracy in vietnam. the issue around this time on april 30th, vietnamese american communities commemorate and honor the fallen. the fallen soldiers. we also remember and mourn the loss of millions of lives in vietnam who died seeking freedom. today, on behalf of the vietnamese american community, i would like to express my deepest gratitude for the sacrifices made by america during the vietnam war, 58,000 brave

american soldiers and their families made the ultimate sacrifice. we should allow vietnamese american communities to survive and migrate to this great country. 50 years ago, south vietnam stood as a fortress of freedom and democracy, safeguarding against the expansion of communism in indochina. in making the stand against communism, 58,000 americans together. with 250,000 south vietnamese, lost their lives. north vietnam rising cause was to prevent foreign occupation, and i assure you, independent integrity. and over 450,000 north vietnamese soldiers died in the fight for that cause. today, what can we say with such these great losses? why do communist states around

the world have already fallen? vietnam still remained a communist state. north vietnam primary objective of preventing foreign occupation has now turned vietnam into a chinese vassal state. vietnam today still has neither freedom nor democracy. what has transpired in the 41 years since the war ended does not change. the gratitude we have for the brave men and women of the vietnam war as we honor them today. i mentioned these facts because properly honor those heroes. we must examine what their sacrifice means to us today and how much the costs of for which they die still remain to be achieve. one day when vietnam is no longer under the communist control and is once the land of freedom and democracy, the vietnam war will no longer be a

reminder of division. instead, it will be a reminder of a high price that freedom requires in all great countries. on that day, i believe that we will have finally truly honored these fallen soldiers and the souls of those brave men and women. we be proud that their sacrifice secure the most important blessing for mankind, freedom. why am i here today? i'm here today because a young man saved my life and changed my life in four years of combat. there were many soldiers who did this for many of us.

the name is larry morford. he was 24 when he was killed. 15 days before coming home. this man was intimately and i commanded in 69, 70 in that area. if you could remember, it was the height of the anti vietnam war. larry was a fervent christian, yet he was one of the very few who volunteered in a battalion. i had over 90% were draftees. he was one of the very few volunteers. one day i asked larry why, if you're such a christian, are you here? i know you don't believe in combat as the way to resolve conflict. and i know that you don't believe we should be in vietnam.

why are you here? his answer was simple, sir. i could not stay at home when others were fighting this war, sir. also, the job that you and i are doing is the job of the beast. and the least beastly of us should be doing it. that was sergeant morford message. he lived his sermon. he's the man that has inspired me to create an award every year at west point. sergeant morford award. that sense west point cadets to china. also to teach preventive medicine and chinese high school. he, along with a corporal by the name of lei fung, who was killed at age 24, are two soldiers that are remembered in china. we're trying to make soldiers be

role models of what a good citizen should be. as cardinal spellman mentioned, a religious leader in the united states. he said it this way. if i had not been a priest, i most certainly would have been a soldier, because they're both called to do the same thing, protect the innocents and right the injustice. i listened to mark, our host, and he has given me a very strict rule. and i must tell you that i left the army and went to medical school and became a missionary in africa and in africa. the rule is very simple. you can only speak as long as you have one leg up. when you can no longer keep that leg up. you must give up the podium or the audience can spare you.

so let me ended by saying that it's only fitting that my remember friends of sergeant larry morford should be followed by sergeant henry kissinger, because many of you probably don't know that before dr. kissinger became famous, he was a sergeant in the us army. may your parachutes open.

ladies and gentlemen, please welcome mr. larry temple, chairman of the lyndon baines johnson foundation, the navy. as chairman of the lbj foundation. it is my privilege to welcome you to this keynote presentation

of the vietnam war summit. lyndon johnson would have been very proud of this summit and would have wanted it to take place. he would particularly have been proud that the valor and commitment of the men and women who serve this country in vietnam is being recognized and honored. here. while few people see disagreement and dispute, lyndon johnson never shied away from controversy. when this library was dedicated, lbj famously proclaimed, it's all here. the story of our time with the bark off. there is no record of a mistake or of an unpleasantness or a criticism that is not included in the files here. the exhibits and papers in this library certainly testify to the remarkable accomplishments of lbj legacy, his monumental successes in civil rights work,

chronicle, and the summit programs held in this library just two years ago. but this library does not ignore lbj's anguish. the tragedy of the vietnam war. his greatest disappointment was the failure to achieve peace in the war in vietnam that he inherited and pursued. president johnson always wanted this stage to be the forum for the great issues of the day. that includes reflections and revisiting of events of an earlier period to learn lessons to apply to the current time. so that is why i can say with certainty that president johnson would welcome the discussions of this summit, including criticisms of decisions and actions that were taken 50 years ago. to borrow president johnson's own words, the aspiration actions of this summit is to revisit the entire story of vietnam with the bark off.

there should be no record of a mistake or an unpleasantness or a criticism that is not included in this forum. now it is my pleasure to introduce lbj foundation chairman emeritus tom johnson, who will present the program tonight. thank you, larry. it is my honor and my privilege now to introduce my friend dr. henry kissinger. dr. kissinger and i have known each other since 1967, when he was a relatively young professor at harvard university. and i was a very low ranking member of president johnson's white house staff in. july 1967. dr. kissinger was a top secret

channel for president johnson through french and a materials with north vietnamese prime minister pham van dong and the aging ho chi minh. through dr. kissinger, president johnson offered a bombing halt if a cessation of bombing would lead to product of discussions between the united states and hanoi president johnson. he would proposed a direct meeting between dr. kissinger and hanoi, his representatives, and as a good faith measure. president johnson unilaterally halted bombing in the vicinity of hanoi. the north vietnamese response was entirely negative, and i quote, we can neither receive mr. kissinger nor comment on the american views as transmitted through this channel in a very

highly classified meeting in the cabinet room on october 18, 1967. president johnson and secretary of state dean rush. secretary of defense robert mcnamara and nsc advisor walter rostow asked dr. kissinger to make one more attempt. the north vietnamese response, and i quote, there is no reason for us to talk again. what we soon learned was that hanoi was planning a massive, all out assault throughout vietnam. a sledge hammer blow designed to shatter the north vietnamese army. and for them hopefully to drive the united states out. on january 30, 1968, hanoi launched its tet offensive. it was much more massive than the cia or our military leadership had anticipated. president johnson and virtually

all of us around him were shocked. the north vietnamese and the viet cong attacked 36 of vietnam's 42 provincial capitals and five of its six largest cities. thousands were killed. but united states forces prevailed and won in every single battle, including a messy battle at way. despite his best efforts and the efforts of the french millimeter, harry, the kissinger, paris channel, which was codenamed philadelphia, was killed as well. in my opinion, no. two man show wanted an honorable peace in vietnam, as did dr. kissinger and president johnson. lbj died before a peace treaty was negotiated. however, dr. kissinger and president nixon did advise the

president. president johnson at the ranch just a few days before his death, that what they thought would be an honorable peace agreement was about to be signed. unfortunate the peace agreement dr. kissinger negotiated was violated by hanoi and completely disregarded within much of it, citing what the american people, especially the anti-war activists. and we know that there are many in this room tonight of that era. antiwar activists everywhere, especially on american campuses and the american congress and the american press had had all of the war that it could take. the united states troops did not lose the war. they literally won every engagement. however, after eight long years, most americans had lost the will to fight.

the price had become unacceptably high in hanoi, ho chi minh and geraci up never seemed to lose their will to continue the war until they had reunited north and south. i know there are men and women in this auditorium tonight who have disagreed and continue to disagree with henry kissinger. yet, i will assure you that he and lbj also wanted peace as much as they did an honorable peace that would stop the war and permit the people of south vietnam to remain free from communism, from repression, and from totalitarian rule. how do i know? i know because i was there. i know because i took the notes of their conversations. i read the transcripts of their telephone calls and their

meetings, sometimes without dr. kissinger knowing that i was on the lot. i served as a confidant, a link between dr. kissinger and former president johnson until president johnson died. they both wanted an honorable peace for his efforts. dr. kissinger won the nobel prize, and after you see a brief presentation, a video of dr. kissinger after he negotiated that peace treaty, we will bring him forward to introduce him to you. thank you. the united states is seeking a peace that heals. we have had many armistice in indochina. we want a peace that will last.

and therefore, it is our firm intention in our relationship to the democratic republic of vietnam to move from hostility to normalization and from normalization to conciliation and cooperation. and we believe that under conditions of peace. we can contribute throughout indochina to the realization of the human aspiration and of all the people of indochina. and we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in, peace.

ladies and gentlemen, please welcome the former secretary of state, dr. henry kissinger. dr. kissinger, welcome. it is a privilege to have you on this stage. one of the things i think most people don't realize is that you are not only the national security adviser to and secretary of state to president nixon and secretary of state to president ford, but also a part time consultant to president kennedy and president johnson is as tom johnson just, just

alluded to. so more than any living person, i think you saw all the principal commanders in chief around vietnam up close. can you talk about each of those men and what characterize position on the war? but first of all, let me say good and unrelated for me to be here and to participate in a conference which is needed to heal wounds of the debates above vietnam and to i want to congratulate the library for organizing this and to providing the opportunity that i'd like to tell, too, that it's sort of symbol like that. secretary kerry is coming here tomorrow night. he was walking around with black hands outside the white house

when i served there. and at that point, i want to make is we've become friends in the interview and he came to my 90th birthday party and made a toast in which he said he pointed out what he what his actions had been then and that it was a pity that we didn't have an opportunity to to talk rather than confront each other. and that period in that period, he and i have worked together when he was chairman of the foreign relations committee. and i greatly respect his efforts. now and it's very meaningful to that this conference would end with a speech by the

distinguished leader of america now. now to answer your question. in the kennedy administration. the vietnam was at first a relatively peripheral issue. the dominant concern about indochina in the kennedy had ministration was the future of those and we could they in turn had received the advice from president eisenhower in the translation that the future of love might determine the future of vietnam. then, as the administration went on, there was, a document that

the chinese produced by lin biao, who would send a successor to mao, who had said that the whole world was going to be corrected, ized by a struggle of the countryside against the cities and the administration tended to interpret what was going on in indochina as part of that process. but in those days we had only a few thousand advisors there, but that number would increase to about 50,000. in the kennedy administration. but it was not yet a send to a obsession of american policy. then lyndon johnson inherited it situation in which the government of vietnam had been overthrown. the north vietnamese had

infiltrated irregular divisions and that just carried live footage. and so it's it's i could to. lyndon johnson saw that he was carrying out the spirit of the policy that had been studied by. president kennedy, when he ordered the increase of forces. and then gradually, as the administration went on, a president who all his life had been known as concerned primarily with domestic policy, was engulfed in a division of the country that in a way, it left it to stay in the perception of foreign policy. and i might say he was an

anguished person because he wanted peace and but his notion of peace were that you made a compromise. and that is the one thing that the north vietnamese were never prepared to do. and indeed. i became involved because it because the norm, the attempt to achieve negotiations had all been blocked. and i became involved the following way. i was at that time a of it was no standing in the hierarchy in washington. and i went i tended to say defeat confronted europe and that country.

they were two individuals who talk to me because they knew i had been in vietnam for a few weeks earlier that year. at the invitation of ambassador large. well, one of these two people had been the host of ho chi minh when ogi men lived in paris for a year to negotiate peace with the french. and he offered to go to vietnam and call on his acquaintance and on behalf of peace for the united states, i called them secretary mcnamara to tell him about this. as secretary mcnamara to discuss the matter with president johnson and the amazingly

president johnson entrusted a professor at harvard, which was not the constituency that most favored him. with being an intermediary to two frenchmen that no one had ever heard of before. and so, david set off with a message from president johnson to hold chairman that outlined to stated that under which he was prepared to to make peace. and they would receive by ho in and they came back with a reply, which after six years of negotiations in various administrations, we learned was

it typical north vietnamese? they reply that basically rejected the proposal but made it sound as if maybe there would something. so they brought back that reply and i would go through all the details. but i would sit back with it as it measured and it not in none of this effort did i ever see a vietnamese negotiator. i dealt with the two frenchmen. they did with the vietnamese, right between don for about three months. and then after. but we realized that they were that they were stalling. but i this only to show the dedication of president johnson to achieve a honorable

negotiated peace from the very beginning. president nixon had problem of how he inherited the war. they were at 8500 plots of troops. vietnam, and they quit. he had the same issue as president johnson. how do you and the war. and the how do you withdraw these troops without leaving it to a collapse of the whole structure in indochina and some of our allies in the rest of south asia were telling of the collapse of the whole structure. you can ask me questions about individual decisions. sure. that were taking and president

ford was president in the very last phase of the war. but i want to say at the very end, when the war when it was obvious and we were talking only about the evacuation of the led that shoot civilians that were stuck at the airport in saigon. and i called him and said that we now have we have to permit the evacuation of saigon. and if you read that phone conversation between him and me, he realized that we had to leave, but he wanted to squeeze out the 12 hours to see whether we could rescue a few more people.

so the president haunted in a heat of them, but dedicated to coming with it to finding a peaceful solution. each of them had the dilemma how you relate american honor to the ending of the war and that that was the dilemma. there was nobody who wanted war. there was nobody who wanted to escalate the war. they all wanted peace. but the question was, under what conditions can you do that without turning over the millions who wouldn't rely? and they would of previous presidents had committed themselves. dr. kissinger, let me go back to john f kennedy. there is widespread speculation that had he not been assassinated, president kennedy would have reversed course and

withdrawn troops from vietnam. despite any evidence to that end. is there anything you saw from president kennedy that would suggest that over he would have withdrawn our support for the war in vietnam. i, i have never seen the slightest evidence of this. it is possible to say that he would have done this, that all the moves of the kennedy administration while kennedy was alive were in the direction of increasing our commitment and not diminishing it all based on the belief that it was a simpler problem than it turned out to be. but i have never seen a piece of paper, and that would indicate

if and all of the chief advise of president kennedy, who would taken over by president judson when he became president, the unanimous right in both presidencies in supporting the codes that was adopted until things got very difficult. and of could division should be it right. but i have never seen them. i know no evidence that president kennedy would have done know lyndon johnson. this was a domestic policy sage. he knew how to get deals done. he knew instinctively what to do. there are many who think he was out of his depth in terms of foreign policy. what is your view of johnson as a foreign policy president.

president johnson was saddled with the war from the first day in office. so you can't really judge what the foreign policy tends is of a president who was swallowed up in a way by by the war in vietnam without any question. johnson was a master in knowing the nuance of domestic policy, and he did not know the foreign leaders as well as he did the domestic constituencies. and so it didn't come. it's naturally to him as it did in domestic policy. but on the foreign policy

issues, other than the war in vietnam, he had a. very good relationship with our allies and our enemies with. he was very eager to come to some agreement with the soviet union. but everything was so overlaid by the war in vietnam. i thought president johnson was a formidable individual of in some ways it was could is tragedy that he'd been so much of his life to achieve that of his in order to be impelled to do that things that had not been made to focus. but i thought he was a strong figure. and i feel greatly respect and

affection that it is long been alleged that richard nixon's presidential campaign in 1968 tampered with the peace process by sending an emissary and an issue not to the vietnamese to urge them to withhold from negotiations with the north vietnamese because they might get a better deal from a president nixon. what is your view of that, dr. kissinger? well, i have no personal knowledge of whether that contact actually took place in the way it has been led. but assuming the story, if evidently correct. i do not believe that it had did whatever nixon did at any of the consequences that the that had been alleged.

you have remember this aspect of our relationship with the vietnamese the vietnamese. a vietnamese allies, the of is in a nearly desperate position. they needed our help. it is its central component. so when a peace process was going on, they had a tendency to agree to provisions we put forward on the theory that the north vietnamese would obviously take. right. so it. in 68, we experienced what nixon then experienced for years later, that when the point came actually to undertake the

negotiations and they would have to responsibility for the outcome, that then the south vietnamese leaders felt it necessary to demonstrate their own people that they hadn't been fooled. the united states to do this. and so they had studied a debate. about 70 dead. i'm sure president johnson in each day and no president nixon in our period. so it had already been settled. all right. so one of the key issues was actually to sit down at the table at that. of course, didn't produce necessity for the south vietnamese to sit down at the same table with the people who

had been fighting two overthrow them from the south. the vietnamese communists and so with that issue arose as it had went off to negotiate. president, you dug in and they started a debate about the way the negotiation could even start. right. we faced exactly the same thing in a different way. four years later, we made the tentative agreement which dealt with the north vietnamese, agreed to just vietnamese. they had agreed to each of the terms when we had discussed them, but win with they actually put forward put forward. we went through six weeks of

country reality about nuances and details. so that was in the period that would have happened with the nixon eroded note. and that. secondly you get to some delay between the announcement and the sitting down was in my opinion inevitable and that could but didn't did it. but one other thing to remember in the public debate, it is often alleged that people could have been made if somehow they had all that same table. there was absolutely no change of date whatsoever because on november two, two days after these announcements were made, the vietnamese published their conditions, which they never changed for the date of the judgment admitted relation and

for the date of the administration, which were the united states had to withdraw totally and form a coalition government dominated by communists before any negotiated could take place about anything else. so so the church, the administration of its reputation at that time was a public position that the vietnamese, north vietnamese had to withdraw before any withdrawal of americans could take place. so those conditions were maintained for the rest of the administration and they were the principal obstacle to the failure of the negotiations in the nixon administration until the vietnamese were defeated in

the sequel to the tet offensive. right. did johnson mention. because the one thing that nixon administration would not concede, it said we would that we would overthrow an allied government that had supported the united states in reliance on promises made by the previous presidents. and it shouldn't. it said north vietnamese agreed that the existing government could stay, which was at the very end of the nixon administration. it settlement with itif that i mentioned it only because america should not torture itself on the view that it could have had a settlement earlier if the president had been more

willing to dig, could not have had a settlement except footage setting out in which drawing unconditionally, which nobody would have supported, that there was a bob haldeman president nixon's chief of staff, said in a 1978 television interview. nixon had no intention of quickly pulling out of vietnam. he aimed exploit the rivalry between china and the soviet union to improve relations with both of them. vietnam was an expedient where america's bona fides, our intentions, our motives were being acted out. nixon believed that america had to negotiate from strength to prove its willingness to fight. vietnam became that place. how does teddy respond to that? does that characterize, in your view, nixon's position on the war. that characterizes part of nixon's position in the war?

this can be interpreted by professional critics of it of nixon, to mean that he fought so that he could do some other things that not what he thought. he thought that if america discredited itself by abandoning its commitment in vietnam, he could not do the bigger things that were needed in in order to make the war in vietnam fit into a global perspective. and to in that said and said, he said, this is not only about vietnam, but it's about trying to create a world order in which vietnam's had no longer operated in that. and it got it right.

you say in your book, ending the vietnam war, that the domino theory was real. the domino effect have played out. what would have been the consequences of not waging a fight in vietnam, in your opinion? look, the problem of any foreign policy decision is that you have to make it on the basis of assessment. you cannot prove true when you make them that they depend on the gentleman. and you can always come up with a counterfactual argument, a a person who had a great influence on our thinking. and i believe also to some extent on president said candidly about what prime minister lee kuan yew from singapore, one of the great men that i have met, he inherited

and with the per capita income of. 620 is into a significant country with a per capita income. of 55,000 without any natural resources based on the dedication and quality of the of of his population. he was convinced and to many others that if vietnam collapsed at the time that president kennedy injured and made that it, then the whole south asia would be would be engulfed and the same thing would then happen in indonesia, malaysia and elsewhere. and he maintained that opinion

until his death. and he was not a cold warrior. the abstract. he was a jet. of what it took to keep its little country secure. do you agree? i believe. i agree with that. and the. yes. so i think that the president who made the major decisions, had a reason for making them. yeah. in his 15 book, the last of the president's men, bob woodward writes of a january 1972 memo that you wrote to president nixon, updating him on the military situation in laos. president nixon wrote a handwritten note on that same memo, which read kay, meaning kissinger. we have had ten years of total control in the air in laos and

vietnam. the result equals zilch. there is something wrong with the strategy or the air force. and yet, the night before, in a cbs interview, dan rather, president nixon said of the bombing, the results have been very, very effective. i think their effectiveness will be demonstrated publicly. president nixon is saying the bombing is effective. privately to you, he's saying that they have done zilch. how do you account for that? he wasn't saying that. it's very one of the causes of my activism is that scrap of paper gets collected and then treated as if it were a legal document. here are the president's. they were 18 hours a day. they had constant and they write a note.

their adviser in frustration that it's still going on. and nixon had a way of exaggerating it, coming. i can tell you he would. then woodward called me up with it. if and he said, what did you do when you received it? i said, i did nothing. and he couldn't believe it. why would i do nothing? because i had worked with president nixon for ten years, played years and when you got a message like this, i had a tendency after a while to wait to see whether there'd be a

follow up. and the and and if you think about it, that is would be the normal way you have been on the assessment of the air campaign. you cannot perfect. we say that it achieved nothing. if you can read may not have achieved everything. did that he wanted and you do have to break it down and what the various components. were. and i think probably nixon might have slight exaggerated what he said publicly and he surely exaggerated it. fred friedman in a handwritten note, probably late at night and at it, i think one or to analyze

the documents that are floating around. from that point of view, i mean, what was the context in which the comment was made? right. but you had to. nixon is a very enigmatic person. and you write often that he would say one thing and mean another. so you had to judge when he was saying that you should know it didn't mean. i had a very clear idea of what he wanted to. and you have to understand. you cannot survive as security adviser. you have only one good attitude. that the president of the united states. right. and you be absolutely straight with him. and the most important thing and security adviser can do and must

do is to tell the president the options he has. sometimes he has to save the president from ill considered food moves. and if he you abused it you would utility. if it's it's that in it to nixon it's no generally known hated personal confrontation right and so therefore face to face confrontations it would like it would be possible that expressed himself ambiguously. but if you in any written exit, you could absolutely rely what

he would say. and if you look his record, he he was a very strong president in sticking to it. beijing convictions and he took enormously difficult decisions and there was no ambiguity about. but it better to discuss with him in writing than as a face to face confrontation. and but will find in going through the archives which are now available that most of the key decisions. when i was a security adviser were based on memoranda and not on conversations. the conversations played a very role in creating the mood and

establishing country that can look context. but when a precise decision was needed, it was best do it in writing, which i think is a good way anyway. in relations between president and key people right. tom johnson mentioned your commitment, the peace process and the fact that you in 1973, along with your north vietnamese counterpart, dr. won, the the nobel peace prize, there are many who allege that you are a war criminal due to the systematic carpet bombing of laos and cambodia. why was that bombing necessary to our strategy in winning the war? well, you know, by now in my mind it's so i have heard. sure. i think they would all a criminal should not be thrown

around in the domestic debate. it's a shameful reflection. the people who use it. they did. what was the situation? sure. first, there was no bombing, so that is absolutely true. but it's situation. was it followed in that an administration did north vietnamese moved forward? division division into the poor areas of vietnam and cambodia on cambodian soil and it established paid serious from which they launched into. into vietnam and. the divisions were put there in opposition to the to the local

the to the cambodian government. in the cambodian government told to build who would say as a represent of lbj that if we don't areas it didn't kill any cambodians that they would close their eyes to it. the lp j administration decided not to do this because were already on the pressure domestically and for other reasons did no better than i do. but then the. when nixon came in nixon had already said before you tube of us send a message to the north

vietnamese that he was eager to to negotiations in the third week of the nixon presidency. they started an offensive in which every week. 500 up to 500 americans were killed in many of these attacks. more than half of these attacks came from the areas that were occupied by those four divisions into cambodian territory and the after had suffered. 1500 casualties, nearly as many as we'd severed in ten years of war in afghanistan. nixon ordered an attack on the

base. within five miles of the vietnam border. that very centrally unpopulated. so when the phrase carpet bombing is used it is i think, in the sides of, the attacks probably less than what the obama administration has done in similar areas in pakistan, which i think it satisfied, and therefore, i believe that what was done in cambodia was justified. and when we eventually wiped out the base areas, the casualties went down by 80%. and and so don't really decisions and i would bet that sooner or later any president

would have had to do it because it's one that if you fight a guerrilla war and permit the areas from which the the killing unit of the guerrillas would as is dead, then you are in a hopeless position. yeah, those i would security adviser. i strongly favored it, but i was not because i was to come in. but it did matter. i'm certainly strongly supportive of it. it correct and it was in the american interest and the civil casualties from this bombing along the five mile street. if, what, 55 we have to have

could have another thing the argument against doing it was that with a neutral country but it country that had four divisions in its soil. it's not actually a neutral country. and as the leader of cambodia sihanouk told the johnson administration that he would in a way welcome this bombing when we didn't actually did it. they have a inquisitive attitude, said at a press conference. i don't know what goes on the part of my country in which no cambodians live and which is occupied the vietnamese. if any cambodian is killed or

even a bullock gets killed, i will protest. he he never proved. toward the end of his life, robert mcnamara stood on the stage after publishing a book and expressed regret over the war. how it was waged. he said the war was futile and that his conduct was wrong. comma terribly. have you any regrets on any of the actions that you took in vietnam? no, we took all of it to make tactical mistakes. i believe that the american. and those of us who worked with him were acting on the basis of

debate judgment at the time and to i. i think we admit mistakes were made at. it. but in the course of discussing the vietnam one should discuss how one can learn from these. but i am proud of that service. and. i must say. bob mcnamara was a really good friend of mine and i have huge regard him. but one should not tell. what that came to me after

after. one should stand by one decision. right what is the biggest lesson we should draw the war in vietnam? dr. kissinger. to it is. that from the war in vietnam, i would say the dilemma of american foreign policy in general is it we have lived behind to create oceans. and the lucky part of the country is lived in the center part of the country where the country's for endangered in could not develop in the same way it had in asia and europe where people are being bred together. so therefore american there the tendency to think that peace is

normal among people among countries. and when did it war or when there is instability? it is sort of an accident. it's sort of an unusual condition which you can remedy, by one set of actions, after which you can go back to a condition of great stability. but most deep international preference are caused by circumstances that have a very long time to develop. so to answer your question. we clearly. we've been involved. in five to which we, in effect, lost. we ended each of the wars with a wide public consensus. there was an 80% support for

everybody of the initial act, but after some period of time, the people say, we have to end it and you need an extrication strategy. well, the best extrication strategy to to get out. but you cannot to call that defeat. so if you end a war, you should not do it for objective that your kids it's dead. and if you cannot describe objectives that you can sustain, you shouldn't entered a secondly, you have to distinguish you i mean as a country between those things you will do only if you have allies.

and do what you must do because your national security requires it regardless of whether you have allies willing to. you have to make that and we have to look at this as i would apply the criticism to almost all administrations not to to not to get into the conflicts unless you can describe an aim that you're willing to assisted. and unless you are willing in the extreme to sustain it alone or to know when you have to end it those elections, you have to do it all from vietnam and it and but we ought to have learned to moderate domestic debate

because in the course of the vietnam war what started reasonable debate about whether we were engaged in a operative that we could match to but it formed into an attack on the moral quality of a american leadership. and when one teaches it, people that basically patriotic for 20 years, that the arab criminals and the at fault then you you can get a political debate that becomes more and more violent and we suffer from it in of our current right political debate. that is one lesson we should draw from from the vietnam war which all too that we should

moderate it the argument. but make them deeper based on that view. how would you assess the war in iraq? the war in iraq. that. fateful. i ultimately i supported it. i had my different kind of war. i thought we would withdraw after was overthrown. i sort of the bush want type of war. we failed to make in iraq and maybe in syria. that we made failed to make that effort that analogies which goes back to my original point namely

we look at these countries if they were one unit right. and then we see a ruler that is oppressive and we say, let's get rid of this ruler. and then the people of iraq or the people of syria have a democrat government it can reach to its stability. but what has happened in iraq and in was at the end of world war when the european victors organize a group of tribes rallied. ethnic entities. one of them was syria that had a majority of sunnis and a

minority of three of which in syria are called alawites alawites. and in iraq, it was the opposite. it had a minority of sunnis and a majority of shias. so in each case, the american president, let's get rid of the top guy and we will have stability. but getting rid of tough guy for it is a conflict among the various minority groups who are then fighting for preeminence. and so we have to that that when we get into nation building, then we in september we have to engage nation building. and so i think we did not

understand the complexities of nation building at the general preposition in several administrations right. ditto. i would have said devoted iraq. we got into something deeper than it is at the beginning. dr. kissinger has graciously consented to take a few questions from the audience. and i ask him another question as you wish to ask questions queue up behind the microphones are on either of the aisles. i ask please that you ensure that your question is in fact that a question and not a statement and that you be as brief as possible in in and asking that question. dr. salame, it's impossible to ignore the election as it plays out. you sit in a. 14 interview with scott simon,

national public radio, that you think hillary clinton would make a good president but you intended to support the republican nominee. i'm not going to get into the. is it is it fair to say actress or that that 2014 was a long time ago? or are you still inclined to support whoever the party nominates. i have made any pronouncements. fair enough. i if i might. you look kind enough to say i couldn't send to add the questions. i insisted on entering, which insisted. i wanted to give the audience

audience. i must say to dr. everlasting credit, he called me several weeks ago and said, i want to take questions from the audience. i'll take any question that they offer to me. i ask that you ask your question again briefly and in in a civil manner. and we'll start with this gentleman on the left. dr. kissinger, when the accord was signed in the last in 1962, they they carried the vietnamese to honor the honor the neutralization of lives which didn't happen. and they they not acknowledge that that accord was. in your agreement, you had a set aside expectation of the north vietnamese moving their troops out of cambodia, laos. and that didn't happen, as you as expected by the negotiators. how do we fight it?

well. it's a general proposition. you can say at least until that north vietnam must. the olympic record for breaking agreements. the 1962 agreement on those. so if. general i presume the dates know what convinced that allowed forward the key to vietnam that if one believe that vietnam was important to the secure ity of the united states, then one had to keep loud falling and the north vietnamese dubbing. and he it's a reported and i believe did recommend to the

incoming it admitted trade that they make an issue of loud and seem to imply that he would favor the you would see some american troops to achieve this allowed being. let's complete country in which to achieve this objective. the. kennedy administration. was not willing to put forces but it threatened that it might as a result they would a neutral rotation agreement. and deadwood broken by the north vietnamese almost immediately. and it turned out into a into a. supply base and all the supply routes, most of the supply

routes of it through those. in 1972, when the nixon administration made its agreements, we had a lot of practice in violating north vietnamese agreement of the. but we were faced near certainty that. the countries vote an end to the war no matter what what action would be taken. and secondly, we that the provision and serve the vietnam agreement if we could enforce them, would also protect the other two countries. we thought that the south vietnamese forces that existed could withstand all but all out

attack. and we would have in force only meant to. it would the agreement if there was an all out attack, then what they gave destroyed that possibility. and then the country legislated a prohibition against any attempt to enforce the agreement at. so. so. so with that, no. what might have happened. but you're right. it by the time that these agreements were made. in 1972, the american position that integrate did to a point where those were the best that were available. and it goes back to the point made earlier. we must it if end towards all to

make sure that they domestic paid for it can be sustained. that in part it is by the ability of the administration. but the opponents have to understand that if they think if they achieve objectives, they undermine all confidence government, then of course, no strategy strategy. yes, ma'am. thank you. my name is genuine, but voice of the enemies americans. dr. kissinger is it is widespread that you have fixedly agree to arrange for china to take over the paracel islands in 1974. on whose behalf that you do so. and given the current south china sea situation and all the concerns in asia and

indo-pacific. what advice you give president sisi? president obama. and i'll. secretary kerry. thank you. i'm not sure i fully understood the question. it's the question that we definitely that agreed in. 1974 that china could take over. so i'm not quite sure understand. restate the question if you would very, please. yes, it was understood that the u.s. under your supervisor, as a signatory of the security adviser, had a range so that china could take over the paracel islands in 1974. so that we don't lose that area to russia. okay. now, today, what would you suggest us do on behalf of the national security of the us?

and given all the attacks that china is doing on the us, on all fronts, do you think the agreement that you side with mao and liu mao in 1972, 71, 73 and oh, that time is quasi of our 58,000 deaths, up to american soldiers. thank you. well, first of four for the benefit of. the two or three takes, it's gratitude to you who made that, who may not know what the repetitive, delighted. those that perished fellow elizabeth. if if a group of islands in the south at sea located between china and vietnam and the

depending on from which point of land you measured, the distance the the closer to vietnam, to china in. anyway, a disputed issue of the chinese claim these islands because hundreds of years ago it chinese emperor drew a line in the pacific near the philippines, and he did everything on that side belongs to china. so and check i take good at he claimed these islands the vietnamese. also claim claim these islands at the american position with respect to the islands. if the consistently that we do not take a position on the

sovereignty of the islands in 1974 in the midst of watergate they were in the middle east. i can assure you the buried fellow are not foremost on our mind mind, but no agreement that was ever signed in which we gave a right to occupy the period fellow islands. no, i have decided to. everglade did. and so i think you're you're not valid. the there was no specific negotiation. with the us. thank you, ma'am. what was said.

yes, sir. your question, mr. i was a south vietnamese soldier who spent ten years in government. this prison, thanks to the police agreement that you say with the hanoi in. 1973 for 47 years ago you fought. you are you are sure my president, the two that you will support you will add up. you will send troops to help our nation, our country to defeat. to defeat the north vietnam be if they invaded. but you did nothing. and the result is that vietnam fought the communists. hanoi and i expect that you should answer the question what we learned from vietnam, that we would never betray any ally, that depend on us and trust us very much.

thank. i have great for these questions from the from vietnamese. they had a right to sing that to be had promised him support through the. number of administration. including the one in which i served when vietnam collapsing. it was impossible to convince the countries to pass and he additional funds. we're talking now but 1975 they were 35 other nations that had signed on to the agreement when it was made in 1973.

we appeal to all of them and then of them was willing to act. it was one of the saddest moments of my life. and all of us who were in the the day of the evacuation of was of the saddest moments of my life. and of all of those who had been at sea, the dedication of vietnamese, the dedication of those people who served there, a little of it you. it is that to judge that i have sympathy for you. question and i hope no as american leader of day gets as

similar questions. but the fundamental failure was the division in our country. without that, we could have managed it. yes sir. 119. do you know how to turn it on or is it is it working now? there you go. i don't did it. he just identified himself. i think the question was gunshot 198 infantry record, vietnam 869 after the telephones of after lbj refusing to run again after walter cronkite, there was peace honor as a scribing. yet it cost tens of thousands of casualties. would it have better to skip the honor and dodge so many of the casualties getting out earlier. but with would it be given fact

that peace with honor was took such a toll in terms of human life. would it have been better just to withdraw all together? is that a fair. yes. that the invasion is historic. the invasion of cambodia of the the extended time of the us soldier certainly later 6970 sustained a lot casualties. should we have withdrawn? we should have just withdrawn and dispensed with honor. thank you. if you look at the american can political debate there was one if you look at. position of the democratic party at that time, you will find that nobody. in 1969 and 70 recommend it. unilateral withdraw that the of

the johnson administration would that the vietnamese troops had to withdraw food and six months after that american withdrawal was dead. so. a unilateral withdrawal of american forces in the middle of a war declaring we cannot stand the consequences of this war. i don't know anybody who recommended it at that. it did. but two years later, we would talking about increments of withdrawal that relatively few casualties. in.

was the war of words all these casualties. but of course, if you lose the war, you say, but what it achieved in any event was that the that the. the southeast asia was not over and did probably made it contributing factor to the opening to the opening to china. but it was a bitter ending. i do not blame you or any administration perhaps the fault is not in the stars, but in all of ourselves. thank you. but it is just a statement, dr. kissinger, this is the last question on on the right here. thank you. hello, kissinger. it's a pleasure to hear you speak this evening. and i've always been a fan. yours finding fascinating. i may not agree with you always,

but you're an interesting individual and influence our world in many ways. the war on drugs was issued under nixon and the long term of it. we have more people in prison in china. 70% of our prisoners are not violent. do you think the war on drugs was worth it and? do you think it should be continued into the 21st century and you think we should continue it or look at it as a failure? or was it a victory? what do you think of that war on drugs and how it's affected it in the last 40 some odd years, the war drugs, domestic policy matter, what it affects. yeah, it was under nixon. i, i don't think any statement i can make on the war on drugs. fair enough. with the the significance. but i want to make one other

point here. my observations are directed at an american and the american audience. i have great sympathy for the vietnamese who didn't. and, of course, their perspective has to be has to be different. and i'm sorry. that, because of any action the administration in which i, i was involved in, but i it it is historic, tragic that america found so divided and could not solve its domestic debates. so that it could come out of the war with it. so that was more compared with

what on a bipartisan basis it did. and it and that religion we should. dr. kissinger, have made your mark on history. what will history say about henry kissinger? i'm sure. i heard. i have, i have no objection about it. i had the good fortune of being able to come to the united states then most of many of the people with whom i grew up were killed in germany. so i've always been deeply grateful to this country. and i know what it represents to the in the i've been lucky in

able to execute my concerns as my profession. and so i'm i'm not involved in what i'm doing in order to get history written about me. extensive record and some people people will be said although i must say the way the mass of material that is produced no in the internet age you i'm not sure whether you can see history will come to a vintage from it anyway. that is not my concern. i try to do the best i could and i do it. i could say so anyway.

it's. we are. we are not only grateful to you dr. kissinger for being our honored guests tonight, but for serving your country as a as a in world war two. we have many veterans out there and including yourself. and i would ask now that you and be recognized by this audience. thank you for your service. dr. kissinger, thank you so much for your tonight. thank you all.

the matter i.