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tv   The Civil War  CSPAN  December 18, 2023 9:52pm-10:48pm EST

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cecily zander and i've got a little bio here and it says important official things about her that i'll share. but she came to me because gary gallagher recommended her. now, i don't know about you, but gary is a credible civil war source to me. you know, he generally knows what he's talking about when it
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comes to the war. and he said to me, this woman is gangbusters. she is on fire. and if you think about all the students that gary has mentored over the years, for him to give a particular endorsement like that to one of them, really spoke volumes. and i saw that myself in the work that i read from cecily when she first started doing guest posts for us. like this woman, she can write. she's got smart things to say. she's insightful. this is fantastic. and it's really been wonderful role as the editor in chief to watch her journey with emerging civil war as kind of this young, upcoming, brilliant, bright star. and to see her star rise as it has. and so this past year, she was named emerging civil wars news chief historian. and so it's really kind of exciting for me to be able to bring her out deep from the heart of texas, to bring her. i told her it's going to be like, you're southern w a taunt
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unveiling. yeah, if you will. like the good old fashioned days. cecily grew up in northern colorado, where she spent her childhood visiting army forts and historic sites across the american west. she attended the university of virginia, graduating with highest distinction in 2015. she then made her way north from charlottesville all to happy valley, pennsylvania. i'm a pitt alum. i don't know if i can say that she went to penn state there at penn state. she spent six years completing a master's degree in 2017 and a ph.d. in 2021. since 2021, she's been a postdoctoral fellow at the center for presidential history at southern methodist university, where she's completed the manuscript for her first book, which i'm told continues to change at the whim of the publisher. and so if you're searching for the book, write this down. army under fire any time.
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miller. transition. no, i see you. look at that. i can even read anti militarism in the civil war era. it's due out in five during she recently accepted a teaching position at texas women's university. when she's not writing or thinking about the civil war, she can be found cheering on her favorite sports teams watching classic movies, listening to lyle lovett or walking with mo, the border collie. that sounds so charming. and then she's going to ruin all that by talking about braxton bragg lee. come on. right. she's going to have smart things to say, and i assure you, you're going to leave. leave tonight with a better appreciation for a man who is one of the most reviled, easiest to make fun of, and most misunderstood figures of the civil war. ladies and gentlemen, my friend cecily nelson's an.
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well, i can't live up to that. chris also left his notes up here so i can know what he was really supposed to say about me. i'm going to set a timer here. i will say it's a little bit of a weird experience for me to go first in anything. my last name begins with a z and in the fourth grade my class was the last person in the entire school to get lunch and we lined up alphabetically. so i was the last student in the entire school to get lunch and i'm sure this did not have lasting psychological impacts that i'm still exploring in therapy. it's also difficult to go first and talk about someone like this, a guy you all know and know well. but i'm going to do my best. i'm going to try and keep my remarks around 40 to 45 minutes. so we can have some q&a, because i am almost certain you all have thought about braxton bragg and his eyebrow.
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is one of the best in the war. so i'll begin with that. i'd say as, as chris alluded to, a definitive ranking of civil war era punching bags would no doubt find braxton bragg near the top of the list. he might, in fact, take the top slot. one of the few victories that civil war historians have granted, the irascible north carolinian and bragg in many ways is easy to treat as a joke. he counted one real victory to his name during the civil war and really ask anybody credit for that achievement. chickamauga was due to the timely arrival of james longstreet's first corps of the army of northern virginia, a collection of men who had been trained and schooled by robert e lee and had already achieved resounding victories against a long list of the union army's supposedly best and brightest officers george mcclellan, ambrose burnside, joseph hooker and yes, john pope before going toe to toe with william rosecrans on the tennessee
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georgia border. but bragg was also one of seven men to rank as a full general in the confederate army, and he undoubtedly had the ear and the loyalty of jefferson davis. we'll come to that in due course. and commanded the second most confederate army for longer than any other officer overseeing a theater much larger in size than that in which lee's army of northern virginia operated and arguably of greater economic and logistic value to the confederacy, though i wouldn't say more political or military value. and none of us, i think it is fair to say, would have wanted braxton bragg job. i certainly wouldn't. i tell my students this all the time. i, i think if i was in the army the second day that my feet were wet, i would need to go home. i just i couldn't have dealt with it. and so i think i have to always take a pause and say these people were up against remarkable odds in terrible conditions and they didn't have allergy medication. so we might all give them a
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break from time to time. i'll just pause here to say i'm not here to compare braxton bragg and robert e lee. that's not really a fair thing to do. i'm not going to tom connolly this i'm not going to say that we should appreciate bragg on a level that we've appreciated. lee but i'm going to ask us to think about bragg's leadership, the ways in which it was compromised and how the people around him helped or hindered his efforts in 1862 and 1863, i already told sara and chris i'm going to cheat a little bit. i don't think i can fully give you an appreciation of bragg. and without talking a little bit about kentucky. so i'll begin there. i'm going to lay out the challenges he faced, which i'm going to contend no other confederate officer had to deal with, at least to the same degree or on the same scale. and then i will cover again cheating slightly that unceremonious ejection from kentucky in 1862. his joseph johnston esq retreat through middle tennessee, his attack at chickamauga and failed defense at chattanooga.
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and so there's a handful of things i want to emphasize in my three key takeaways in the talk tonight are first, that confederate grand strategy beyond the operations of lee and his army was abysmal. i'm not going to that's how i'm going to put it. i'm not going to be kind about it. jefferson davis managed the war on the grand strategic level very poorly. the system of uncoordinated departments and disadvantaged most confederate officers, especially those who were not named robert e lee. second, the confederacy lacked generals who could get along regardless of their individual capacity d for command. and even though each of them was in their own way on our confederate writ and a strident advocate for confederate independence, the officers in bragg's army simply did not work together effectively. personality conflict defined the high command in bragg's army and accounted for much of the failure that army subsequently met with. and then finally, without a deep bench to draw on jefferson davis really had few other options to try and place of rank. and we can all spin out the
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alternatives and they pretty much all end up in the same place. and there wasn't anybody as good as lee to command the second largest confederate army. and some historians and some of you in this room may put this down to davis is blind loyalty to officers that he liked and appreciated. and we know the braxton bragg was certainly on davis is good side but i think it's important remember that davis was a pragmatist. he'd managed the entire army as secretary of war in the 1850s, and he probably knew when he needed to call in another option. i just don't think he ever felt he had one. and the ones who settled on ultimately didn't do very well. and on this last point, i'll note that talking about braxton bragg in 1863 is a sneaky way for me to talk about jefferson davis, too, and to some degree, joseph johnston. another one of the top ranking civil war punching bags, if you will, because they both worked alongside bragg throughout 1862 and 63, helping to create the conditions for chaos, but also having the authority to remove
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bragg from command at various points and refusing to do so. so. these two buckaroos are also going to get some attention today. all right. so historians invariably, i think, describe the confederate high command in the civil war as western theater with the single word dysfunctional. historians have questioned why confederate president jefferson davis did not t sooner relieve bragg of command of the army of tennessee, especially because davis knew as well a anyone that positive battlefield results in the west would have helped to sustain his fledgling nation in the face of superior resoces and manpower on the part of the united states. right. bo davis and lincoln have a sense of the importance of places like tennessee and kentucky. right. the west matters in the gran political, grand strategic picture of the war. bragg's tractability in davis. his stubbornness combined to produce decidedly negative results for the cfederacy.
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and throughout 1863, jefferson davis, in support of bragg, proved injurious to confederate hopes for independence, especially after the latter's failed invasion of kentucky. the abandonment of middle tennessee, and the failure to consolidate victory at chickamauga leading to defeat at the hands of ulysses s grant in the battle for chattanooga. unlike abraham lincoln, who recognized the successes of his western generals and promoted them to important command positions, jefferson davis treated the western theater as a dumping ground for some of the civil wars. most cantankerous and incompetent officers events in the western theater may not have determined which side won. the american civil war, but davis's management failures and loyalty to braxton bragg lag became a hindrance to the confederate fight for independence. and it's interesting because on paper, jefferson davis far out qualifies abraham lincoln to be commander in chief of an army. he had an incredible degree of military experience that he
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brought to the war. by 1861, he'd served in the u.s. army, the regulars. he'd graduated from west point. he'd held the office of secretary of war. and as historian frank vandiver observed, quote, davis trusted himself and meddled much, sometimes to a detriment, sometimes to success. and then vandiver notes, the davis quote, knew wars and generals and found it hard to leave the field to others and he liked and trusted some generals as himself. and these were favored long and over. well, okay, let's unpack that. the first name on vancouver's list of officers who were favored long and over well, braxton bragg and davis. his contemporaries knew this and they knew it was one of his great military weaknesses. and we need to go to no greater authority on this than ulysses grant, who pinpointed the problem immediately as grant, often does. quote, i speak advisedly when i say mr. davis prided himself on his military capacity, grant explained in his memoirs. he says so himself virtually in
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answer to his notice of the nomination to the confederate presidency. grant says it from day one. davis intended to take charge of the confederacy's military operations, and he tended to do it his way. even though he had a secretary of war, he had james snedden, he had people around him to advise him. he doesn't listen to them. and we know one of lincoln's great strengths is acting when he needs to, but listening to advice most of the time before he does act and he brings in people like halleck and grant and slowly assembles a team that can win the war. jefferson davis doesn't do that because jefferson davis knew better right. and we can we can go to a fight between these two gentlemen. two, two, really encapsulate that in brief. so when the confederacy is formed, they need to appoint general officers. they need to appoint them. and joseph johnston at the time is the quartermastereneral of the united states army. and he thinks great, i'm going to be the highest ranking officer in the confederacy because i'm the highes ranking
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guy who resigned their commission in the united states army. not so, says jefferson davis in fact, johnston falls behind samuel cooper, albert syey johnston and robert e lee. so he's not even the first johnston. he's he's his fourth and the second johnston and i mean, he was upset. i'll say that in march 1861, confederate congress had authorized the appointment of five officers to the great a brigadier general and the law stipulate to that quote the relative rank of each grade should be determined by the former commissions in the u.s. army. a perfect joe johnston has the highest rank, but it didn't distinguish between staff and line. and so johnston believed he was the senior officer. davis ignored this. he simply appointed the people that he thought were the best in the order in which he basically judged their military ability. johnston sends a crazy number of letters. he didn't have email or text. he was physically writing
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letters saying, hey, i don't think this is fair. davis received each letter, wrote insubordinate in on it, flipped it over and moved it to the side of his desk. davis wasn't about to hear it from joseph johnson, and they come to loggerheads, right? but this is how davis manages his military resources, right? he has five generals. he needs to keep them all happy. and he's not even able to do that. and the first shots of the war haven't even been fired at fort sumter. and davis has already got issues with managing his generals. i just need to give you a sense of how obstinate jefferson davis could be when it came to these issues and these two figures, davis and johnston, are going to be all over the western theater because when davis doesn't know what else to do with johnston, he kind of uses him as a stopgap in all kinds of instances. and i'll mention that a little bit more here as we go forward. so we know the braxton bragg begins the war, pensacola, he could have been overseeing the
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firing of the first shots of the war had lincoln chosen to resupply fort pickens rather than fort sumter. right at the beginning of the war. but fort sumter gets the title and we have bragg training men at pensacola. they're doing quite well. they're really enjoying him. they think he's a very good he's very good at taking the raw material of citizen soldiers and turning them into an army. he's actually quite noted for this. he ends up at shiloh. he's in the hornet's nest for much of the fighting. and then after the battle, when albert sidney johnston dies of his wounds appear gustav to tommy beauregard and you always do have to say all four names takes over command of the army and then decides he needs to take a little mental health day and he goes to a spa and he doesn't ask jefferson davis's permission. davis doesn't like this, he says, is out. braxton's in. so bragg takes command of the army of tennessee in. 1862, and from there he has to
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kind of form it into an army that will basically become the largest army in the western theater. bragg he had he had very little more than his relationship with jefferson davis to recommend him for this job, especially over other prominent confederate officers who were available for the post, including joseph johnston, who had been wounded at seven pines by the time and was available. he was waiting for reassignment to be designated to go back up to the majors. braggs in 1837, west point graduate, he graduated quite high in his class. that's why he goes into the artillery. he chooses his branch. he leaves the regular army. in 1856, telling secor tree of war jefferson davis that he could not see the use in chasing indians with six pounders. as he said, you could never catch ketchum. and it frustrated bragg. he he was considered a hero by many of his countrymen. there we have bragg and his
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planter days in 1856 and this was largely due to his actions at the battle of buena vista in the war with mexico. two critical interventions carried the day for zachary taylor's forces in that fight, bragg's employment of artillery against the mexican defenders in the city. the famous phrase a little more great, mr. bragg, when taylor advises him how to conduct the fight and also the defense of the american army's extreme left flank by jefferson davis brigade of a volunteer mississippi riflemen. so, so davis and bragg emerge as the two heroes of the battle, buena vista. they're tied together, kind of coming into the war. those who knew bragg in the old army varied in their descriptions of his talents and attributes. orlando wilcox, his letters from the war, his his diaries. wonderful. i would recommend it to anyone who's looking for a great union perspective on the war noted in 1850 that bragg was, quote, lean, dark complexioned with bright rolling black or dark eye heavy brows, correct low
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forehead. calhoun ish in its shape, determined looking, but easy and pleasant in his manner. he is rather a restless, nervous, pugnacious looking. cassius, i don't know how many of you remember your julius caesar from high school? read shakespeare or have studied a lot of roman history? that's not a flattering comparison in dante's inferno, cassius is one of three dudes who's in the deepest circle of hell for what he did right. the others are judas iscariot and brutus. so i orlando wilcox. i don't know if he was trying to be kind, but he certainly the comparison didn't flatter bragg. right. and the other story you all could come up here and tell it, right? the famous story of bragg in command of a far flung western post where he is a company commander. but the post quartermaster is away on some kind of duty.
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so bragg is temporarily serving as post quartermaster. as company commander. he makes a requisition and as post quartermaster, he says it's been improperly submitted. he returned it. he fills it out again as company commander, making argument that he hadn't done wrong the first time as quartermaster. he says, no, you've still not done it correctly and don't argue with me. he forwards it all to the post commander who says, my god, mr. bragg, you've quarreled with every man in this army. and now you're quarreling with yourself. he had a reputation right? and there's two great versions of that story. and one is in porter alexander's memoirs. so even bragg's fellow confederates told that the others in ulysses grant's memoirs, so probably the two greatest memoirs of the war. right. tell the story about bragg. of course, it's an absolutely silly story, but i think it captures a fundamental element of his personality, which is that he liked to argue, but he was very good at organizing. so, you know, being a
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quartermaster probably suited him more than being a company commander. now, though, he commanded the confederacy's largest army for nearly two years, bragg's not been a favorite subject of biographers. so you could put the stack of biographies of robert de and braxton bragg next to each other and you'd wonder, you know, how many trees have been sacrificed for one, less so for the other. he's got four major biographies, of course. the original by don seitz was done in the 1920s. there was a two part version that grady mcwhinney started, and he got so tired of bragg that he never finished it. i mean, really, you've taken down a biographer in addition to most of your army and it was finished later by a graduate student of mcwhinney as judith halleck. and then earle has his most recently written, i think, a very fair and balanced biography of bragg that tries to get at some of the problems that bragg faced. but i think the lack of
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biographers is not necessarily due to the fact that bragg is insufferable. it's because he didn't write a great deal about the war. there's no really substantial or serious set of papers that he left behind. although he helped to found the southern historical society papers, which i'm sure many of you are familiar with, became a kind of paper project of record for many confederates after the war, helped to really support and bolster the flourishing of the lost cause mythology as a portion of the conflict. bragg never wrote for the publication, even though he was on its board of editors or any other about his wartime experience as he dropped dead, of course, on the streets of galveston, texas which having just come from texas in the summer, relatable. it's a 115 degrees in dallas today. and and my border colleagues downstairs he's more than happy to be sleeping in virginia then going for a walk in dallas. so bragg's biographers agree on
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a few key things he never grasped the tactical intricacies of the war as at least not on the same level as many his contemporaries, the ever reliable porter alexander relates a story of bragg shortcomings in fighting for the confederacy. i don't need to recommend that book to any of you, but if you haven't read it, what are you doing here? no offense, kurt. i mean, i know we want them here. bragg alexander said, quote, never could understand a map and it was a spectacle to see him. wrestle with one with one finger, painfully holding down his own position and. i mean, porter. porter had a way of describing people room most assessments. no, i'm despite saying that bragg was not a great tactic or genius. i think an understatement. he excelled in administration. and in the spring of 1863, leonidas polk, who will recur in our story as a villain of course, recommended that bragg become inspector general of the confederacy because of his, quote, peculiar talent for the
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difficult and disagreeable tasks of organization and discipline. in other words, bryan can organize the materials and army needed, but not convince his officers and soldiers to fight. and i think that's pretty fair, man. i think nowadays historians have a really great appreciation for the part someone like montgomery meggs played and convincing and helping the union war effort, having someone who could manage supplies and logistics do it well is important. and we know one of the huge problems that face the confederates in 1863 and into 64, especially in the western theater, was the inability to get supplies where they needed to go. and maybe if you use someone like bragg and his talents for that kind of thing and move him over here, he's much more of a help to the confederate war effort suddenly and, you're not having to send the president on a train to mediate a quarrel between a bunch of officers and the confederate army, which we'll to in just a second. but we'll start with the confederate invasion of kentucky. just briefly, this is one of the great abraham lincoln quotes and sort of endlessly both sides
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were obsessed with kentucky, of course, both lincoln and davis had been born there not very far apart from one another. blacks and bragg invades kentucky in 1862, pretty much similar, heinously, with robert e lee's invasion of maryland, bragg actually stays in kentucky a little bit earlier and then a little bit longer is. and then lee manages to stay in maryland. there's also a third northern invasion under henry hopkins sibley from texas into mexico. but we don't need to go into that. no offense to pat kelly and his his call. i will say glory to pass is wonderful because my home state of colorado single handedly saved the union by beating a bunch of texans and i live in texas now, and i will say that happily. and but bragg's invasion of kentucky kind of gets under way and culminates in the battle of perryville, right? on october 8th, 1862, when union lovellusso's union troops march on to the springfield pike
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and major general william hardy responds bdispatching benjamin cheatham confederate division into the union left flank. the confederat overwhelm alexander mccook, first corps and don carlos buell failed deploy any reinforcements along the union le. we know now thiwas because of an acoustic shadow that prevented buell. so he said from heing any of the fighting. and although philip sheridan, in one of his early actions in the war, attempts a counterattack late in the afternoon, by the time darkness fell, bragg could reasonably claim tactical victory as his troops held a substantial portion of the day's battlefield at perryville. so, of course, a bragg sits overnight and thinks i've reasonably won this battle. it's time to retreat. he was desperately short of water and supplies so he determined to withdraw and retreat from the bluegrass state. he was also in possession of intelligence that earl vandoorne had been badly defeat in an
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attempt to recapture corinth on october 3rd and fourth. so knowing he was outnumbered 2 to 1. and i want to say in this case, it is not george mcclellan numbering. he was actually outnumbered 2 to 1. he hadn't made up more troops. and there possibly could have been bragg could evince little hope in his odds, improving, but the retreat creates an uproar amongst his subordinates and in the confederate press. this is the groundwork. this is why i had to start in kentucky, because the discontent with bragg begins in the wake of the kentucky campaign. the richmond whig lamented the bragg's move into kentucky, quote, turned out simply to be a fizzle. while the memphis appeal commented, the retreat was a sad finale to a campaign which had been expected to bring about the redemption of kentucky. quote of what good results are such victories productive if straight away we must relinquish the state to the occupancy in possession of the enemy to lose kentucky, a neutral border state was one thing to lose tennessee. on the heels of the kentucky
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blow would be another matter. all together and a trio of highlights there on the screen talk aut these gentlemen in a second. as all eyes turn toward 1863, criticism of bragg and the complaints voiced by the commander's subordinates started to raise questions in jefferson davis's mind about bragg's suitability for command. on october 23rd, the war department summoned bragg to richmond to give an account of the campaign, and bragg's great antagonist lay it as polk also gets summoned to richmond. so you have two guys that really don't get along. reporting into jefferson davis, polk says the bragg has lost the confidence of the general officers of the army and recommends that joe johnston's supersede bragg in command of the confederacy's western theater. writing to kirby smith, davis argued in response, quote of the generals. cooper is at the head of the bureau. lee in command of the army in virginia. johnston, still disabled by the wound, received at seven pines
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and beauregard was tried as commander of the army of the west. he continued, quote, bragg succeeded to command, organized the army and marched to the support of kentucky with efficient troops. so so davis sees no problem with the retreat. these invasion of these northern border states were meant to do several things. and we all know this fairly well. right. but more than anything, to take agricultural pressure off places like virginia and tennessee in these growing seasons and bragg achieves that. and he also brings back several weapons, several thousand sort of small arms and guns back for his army, as well as food and the citizens of kentucky, just like citizens of maryland, hadn't risen up, responded to bragg's call to throw off the yoke of their oppressors. davis and lee and bragg believe that the citizens of these border states wanted out of the union and what they came to find in these fall 1862 campaigns was that the people were pretty much fine with being where they were, so they may pick up a few more
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soldiers, but not as many as they thought. so. so davis proves at this juncture, unwilling to believe that bragg could be as combat and as he was reported to be and instead of removing bragg, he decides to place joseph johnston in command of a new department that the command of bragg, edmund kirby smith and john c pemberton. and he sends bragg back to the field. and in november, bragg renames his force the army of tennessee. he absorbs much of kirby smith's army. when davis dissolves the department of east tennessee and he divides it into two wings. so he's clearly thinking, this works for lee, right? but i hate to break it to braxton bragg leonidas polk and william hardy are not james longstreet and stonewall jackson. th never were going to be. you vehem, they're har polk and nathan bedford forrest, who's going to be the equivalent of a jeb stuart. and again, even on stewart' worst day, when he's somewhere in pennsylvania, he's certainly not supposed to be nathan
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bedfor forsts half the cavalry officer. that jeb stuart is right. and so you have the same organization because it wksn the army of northern virginia but it's not going to work in bragg's my bau william j. hardy doesn't really want to do any more wk an is necessary at any given moment. and i empathize. but you're trying to win a war, so maybe show a little enthusiasm and on it is polk as edward porter, alexander famously observed of him, god made a bishop. he didn't make a general. and this really comes to a head at stones river, which happens right, right on the cusp, 1862, in 1863. and the fighting stones river. and i would commend to you the wonderful new book by bert denker and caroline davis that's available for sale in the back on the bottle. we've needed a great study of the fight for a long time, and we have one now.
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the battle with stones river did little to restore bragg's reputation in the minds of his peers his subordinates or his soldiers. so those three categories that you kind of need to appease, but it did nothing to damage his reputation in the eyes of jefferson davis. so once again, bragg comes out of a disastrous campaign with support of the confederate president. so by the time bragg confronts william stark in murfreesboro on december 31st and january 2nd, 1863, he was on the verge of losing control of his army. and though his men fought hard and defended the city of murfreesboro for two days in the face of their numerically superior federal foes, bragg again wins a tactical victory and then says, time to go home. so he withdraws his army. in the days following the battle and the late in hostility of paul carty and benjamin cheatham turns to full blown mutiny. by early january of 1863, the intrepid observer arthur james lyon freemantle, another wonderful civil war name, noted
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that the commander of the tennis army of tennessee at the time so bragged appeared, quote, sickly cadaver, fierce and haggard. thanks. in the afternoon wrath of the battle. his observation, right. fremantle's observation was hardly a ringing endorsement of bragg strength in the midst a physically grueling campaign. and i will make the point here, bragg was sick. he was very, very sick. a lot of the time. he suffered from sort of serious stomach issues, probably allergies and tons of stress. and i'm sure many of you have seen the picture of him where he looks almost like like an emaciated sort of he looks like what freemantle described. and again, it's not an excuse, but just a reminder, they didn't have ibuprofen. i genuinely think like two ibuprofen a day would have significantly improved braxton bragg attitude, outlook, and possibly performance certainly does. mine. so we have a physically sort of
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defeated bragg and he's about to be mentally assailed by his commanders. but davis once again says, i don't doubt braxton bragg. i think he can do his job. davis dispatches joe johnston to the army in the wake of the murfreesboro campaign and told johnston that if johnston felt that the situation between bragg and his corps commanders had become unredeemable for davis, his confidence in bragg was not shaken. but if johnston felt that he needed to make a change because the officers and the troops just didn't trust bragg, that johnston had the remit to do that, right? he could do that if he needed to do so, davis says. i'm not going to make a decision. but joe johnston, if you want to create a problem, you go ahead and that puts johnston in a tough position right at the same time. louis wig fall, who's a texas senator to the confederate congress, a kind of one of these hilarious, true 19th century
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characters, offered one of my favorite suggestions of the war. he said that james longstreet and braxton bragg should just swap places so so sir james longstreet should go command the army. and then bragg should be lee's immediate subordinate and i'm sure had robert e league caught wind of this, he would have said, pass. absolutely not. me and longstreet are about to come to blows. and you want to put bragg in my army? no, thank you. but we all had a point. so there's no antagonism against bragg in the army of northern virginia. well, fair enough, i suppose, but i don't think robert e lee or james longstreet wanted that to happen. other people, more or less convinced that there's anything wrong with bragg. kate stone, one of my favorite female diarist of the war. i love her diary. so much. broken burn. just a wonderful diary. i'd heard that bragg had been replaced by john stone and thought it a shame she was really upset and because that was her theater, right. she's living living near
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vicksburg at the time. betty ridley blackmore, who lived near murfreesboro during the campaign, thought bragg had won a great victory there and quote, when the history of this war is impartially written, it is my deliberate opinion that to bragg will be awarded the praise of having done more with his men and means than any other general. the war, i hate to say to betty, no. but she was confident in them. i think that's nice. there were it was not 100% loathing of frank, but joe johnston proved reluctant to assume command of the army of tennessee, despite knowing how little faith bragg subordinates had evinced in their commander as colonel david urquhart, who served on bragg's staff recalled in battles and leaders arrival, was hailed with joy for our army, specially wanted him as their commander. the result quieted the bad feeling but did not restore harmony between the corps commanders and their commanding general. so even joe johnston couldn't fix the animosity. johnston assesses the situation and explains to davis that he
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could not effectively command the armies of both bragg and pemberton. and this is my point about confederate grand strategy, right? johnson is in charge of several different armies simultaneously, but he doesn't really have the authority to tell any of them to go anywhere or do anything unless jefferson davis specifically gives it to him. and then johnston is reluctant to exercise that power, and he didn't want to do it. he stressed that bragg's army was closer to robert e lee's in virginia than to pemberton's in mississippi, and davis couldn't centralize military authority in the western theater if his armies were so spread. and if davis had to choose whether johnston needed to oversee bragg or pemberton more closely, the choice was clear john pemberton's way worse than braxton bragg. he needs a babysitter. and that's what johnston ends up doing, right? he ends up going to baby's head. john, until the fall of vicksburg. but the fall of vicksburg meant far more at that time, sort of psychologically, because it allowed the union to complete the anaconda plan, at least the mississippi river leg of it,
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because pemberton couldn't defy the assault of grant and sherman. so bragg was left his own devices in middle tennessee. and so union general stark rosecrans reinforces his army for six months before launching his tullahoma campaign, which achieved another long held federal ambition clearing middle tennessee of a substantial anthere's the murfreesboro map for you ther and my favorite map of the anaconda plan, if you ever get a chanlookt that map closely and zoom the's just chaos in texas and i think in arkansas, it literally help me. i n't know, it's wonderful. so rosecrans reinforces and then launches into his tullahoma campaign, which is going to cleatheeder army out of middle tennessee from murfreesboro down to tha segeorgia border at chickamauga, whereranss maneering. and rosecrans should get a lot more credit for how brilliant a
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campaign he conducted means. that two major positives for the united states emerged in the summer of 1863. and you also have the repulsion of lee from pennsylvania and the anaconda plan in circles. the seceded states. and the reason this is so important in bragg's case is. rivers right. i think, neal is going to talk to us later tonight about how important rivers are in this pivotal year of the war. but rivers are the one way you can penetrate the confederate heartland and especially tennessee. the cumberland river really leads right to nashville, and that's a major confederate supply depot. and so losing middle tennessee is disastrous. and so brad graham has a lot to answer for as he maneuvers through the tennessee mountains down chattanooga. but he gets there and begins to reposition and reinforce his army. and james longstreet is on his way from the army of northern virginia. but as longstreet's chief artillery supporter alexander points out in his memoirs,
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instead of waiting for longstreet's entire corps to arrive, bryan brings on a battle with rosecrans before long trades artillery is even off the train. five of longstreet's brigades remain out of range of the fight, but bragg brings on the fight. and alex ender was not upset at bragg for this. he was upset at early on it as polk, and we all know why because polk was told to launch his attacks at daylight during the battle and bragg wakes up and hears no sounds of gunfire, fighting or anything, and he dispatches an aide to figure out what's going on with lee on it as well. and the aide arrives to find polk eating breakfast completely unconcerned with the fact he has not followed orders. and when the aide inquires what has gone wrong. polk affirms that his heart is overflow ing with anxiety for the attack. and the aide says, we'll make the attack then. and alexander really blames polk for bringing on the battle. or for for for miss undertaking
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the the strategy the confederacy had wanted to pursue. but this doesn't change fact that james longstreet's arrival is perfectly timed to exploit the gap that william rosecrans creates in his line. and and he's able to win the day for bragg's army. right. i also love to tell the story here. and i have it now. william rosecrans disaster at chickamauga is. funny for a lot of reasons, but my favorite is that it gave abraham lincoln the opportunity to utter one of his funnier barnyard stories and that was that rosecrans, after the battle, looked stunned like a dog hit on the head. i've never seen a dark kid on the hood, but i imagine it's very funny and the idea that lincoln had is excellent and i really enjoy it. it's one of my favorite civil war stories, so you have stunned the dark william rosecrans and
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accidentally victorious braxton bragg and bragg says, i've actually won a battle. it's not even a tactical draw. i could claim a victory. so what i should do is let rosecrans retreat. yeah, yeah. so he did. he did it. he. he allowed rosecrans to fall back chattanooga while his army looked down on the city from atop the high bluffs of missionary ridge. he had not consolidated the prize and mutiny once again threatens his command. this is a theme in braxton bragg army in the days and weeks that followed the battle, rancor ripples through bragg's army, confederate cavalry general nathan forrest flat out refuses to ever serve under bragg again. i think this is when he says he's going to punch him in the face of bragg, tries to talk to him. i don't think bedford force great control over his temper. if i had to guess, james longstreet writes, secretary of war, james said, and he says, the situation in tennessee is going to be hopeless until davis replaces bragg.
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most of bragg's division in corps commanders meet in secret and write a petition to jefferson davis to ask the bragg be removed. and jefferson davis is like, i'm going to have to go out there. i'm going to have to go deal with these people. and that's what he does. he gets on a train from richmond to tennessee. and the meeting that follows has become like a core part of the narrative of the army of tennessee. dysfunction. as davis gathered bragg and his subordinate s in the army's headquarters and at each officer to give their opinion of bragg's leadership. while braxton bragg was sitting there staring at them. h.r. departments would have just. it's a fiasco. it's an h.r. fiasco. the meeting, as you might guess, did not go in bragg's favor. every officer present to a man, jefferson davis, that bragg lacked the capacity to command the army of tennessee. there's william rosecrans. they're like a duck. how bridges. biographer of confederate general and bragg. antagonist sir daniel harvey
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hill noted the quote. bragg listened passively to the success of statements that he was incompetent, saying not a word, but as simon b buckner remembered it a little confused. and i think the whole situation encapsulated davis's management failures as commander in chief prior to the council had offered to resign. and this is not like a robert ely situation after gettysburg. only he's like, i guess i'll resign. and davis is like, no, you're not going anywhere. davis should have taken bragg at word, but he doesn't. so there shouldn't have been the need for a referendum on bragg's leadership because bragg had offered to resign command. he knew he was in a difficult spot. and when the preponderance of opinions suggested that bragg should be removed, jefferson davis said, no, i'm going to keep him in command. and davis claimed it was because he had no viable option for the post passing over beauregard johnston and longstreet in favor of his friend braxton brown. the only personnel decision davis made was removing daniel
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harvey hill and replacing him john pemberton. gee, thanks. who had already become a confederate pariah following the surrender of vicksburg, though they had nowhere else to send daniel harvey hill. i mean, they've already sent him west once because lee couldn't deal with it. where's it going to go? new mexico. and in chattanooga. william rosecrans days were numbered and we know why. it's one of the three fellows on that side. there's a picture of bragg i was referring to. that guy's a twig. on october 17, rosecrans was relieved of command and replaced by a ulysses s grant. and we all know this story. write the latter officer's rise in the western theater had produced signal victories at fort henry in donelson shiloh in vicksburg, and removing the confederate threat at chattanooga would allow the union army to establish a supply hub and operate deep into georgia and alabama without chattanooga. the march to the sea would have been far less likely to succeed, and without grant may not have finally convinced the lincoln administration he was the man likely to turn the tide against robert e lee. all grant had to do was dislodge
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bragg's, and he did so by exhibiting the bulldog qualities that would come to the fore in the overland campaign the following spring, as he recalled in his memoirs, quote, the victory of chattanooga was one against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason. bragg's making several grave mistakes, and bragg's personal exhortations on the battlefield, daring the fight to save the hides around chattanooga that his men make a stout defense fell on deaf ears in the midst of the battle. bragg had failed militarily, and he also failed at a critical moment to his soldiers that he was the best man to lead them. and in the wake of that battle at chattanooga, jefferson davis finally said, all right, braxton bragg is not up to the task of commanding the army. and he accepts bragg's resignation on november 29th, 1863, and both bragg grant find themselves bound for their national capitals in the months that followed. bragg to serve as military adviser to davis, davis just couldn't see a way to get
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himself clear of braxton bragg and grant to assume command of all union armies. and lincoln bet his presidency that grant could be the man to defeat lee in the combat theater that mattered most for morale and public opinion in lincoln's reelection. davis's stubbornness in retaining bragg yielded disaster later and established the conditions for lincoln to put grant in charge and through open the gates to georgia. so that william t sherman could make its people howl. we can know briefly in defense of davis and bragg, there have been no better option quoted general in the full acceptation of the word as a rare product. scarcely more than one can be expected in a generation. but in this mighty war in which we are engaged, there is need for half a dozen. that's what bragg wrote. he certainly never found his half dozen, and he certainly didn't find them in the western theater. one of my favorite sketches here of the fight at chickauga and a great ambrose bierce aphorism after albertson johnston's
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death, he could hard find one general in the full acceptation of the word. who could command the army in the western theater, joe johnston or beauregard, who he clearly distrusted, were no better than bragg. there was polk who porter alexander referred to has basically incompetent or william hardy who we kw sed away from assignments larger than corps command. i respected the fact that none of bragg's successors, whether they were joe johnston or john bell hood, had improved upon his record, underscores the point that it was lack of talent across the board that influenced davis decision making in regard to picking commanders in the army's western theater. but by way of conclusion, i'll say that at every critical moment of his tenure in command of the army of tennessee and there are some of the generals we're talking about and confederate prisoners at the chattanooga railroadep. depot, after grantonhe tt, braxton bragg failed to achieve victory. and under his leadership, e confederacy lost. kentucky effectively abandoned
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tennessee, and helped to convince the lincoln administration to put its trust in its grant. that might be the most egregious sin of all. more stubborn resistance at any point have given the confederacy an agricultural or economic lifeline protected the fledging nation's most valuable advantage and vast and difficult to occupy geography or done more to cast doubt over the military abilities of the man who would eventually turn the tide of the war in favor of the union. but jefferson davis high estimation of his own abilities and braxton bragg lack of tactical sense and determination proved to be a losing combination. the war in the west might not have been so easily lost, and the fate of confederacy might have hinged on the fortunes of more than one army and more than one commander. but as it turned out, in 1863 and beyond, robert e lee had to make a stand for his adopted nation with the army in northern virginia alone in the civil war as western theater. braxton bragg helped to ensure confederate defeat. and thank you all and how to take questions.
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so i'm going to take an eternal lesson here. i want you all to tell me what you thought about sicily. i told you she was a rock star, and he hasn't passed throwing tomatoes yet. so i going to take a few questions, a couple of reminders. i'm going to ask everyone to stand up, state your name, where you're from. i'm not going to give you the microphone. so don't try to take from me and please ask a question john. don't stand up to make a statement. it's not an academic conference. that's right. with that, we'll have time for just a couple of questions. give me time to weave the room. i'll come up here first. danny clements, washington, d.c.
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are based on your reading and your study of of bragg. let's say that he was replaced, given the options. who would you pick. i, i, i, i know. it's very funny. i would tend to think joe johnston, but i think you would have needed to impel johnston to consider occasionally an attack. i'm of the opinion that johnston is actually strategically fighting the war. the confederacy needs to fight, right? because what the confederacy needs to do is wear down union willingness to continue to try and invade this massive territory and strategic retreats are one way to do that. if you delay them long enough, they're going to get frustrated. and if johnston had been able to attack, say, during the atlantic campaign, if he'd been able to attack sherman a couple of times, delay that result, it would have had disastrous, disastrous effects on northern
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morale, which reaches its low point as sherman is marching toward atlanta. but i think you needed johnston to understand that retreat, retreat, retreat needed to have an attack in there occasionally. so i think johnston is fighting the kind of war that actually strategically makes the most sense. i think he had an understanding of that, but he didn't know how to balance the need to occasionally. it's sort of launch an attack in to continue to create that, delaying process because if you force sherman to fight occasionally, he's going to have to take time to recover. and he can't so relentlessly just press you into the defenses. so i think johnston is the answer. and of course, johnston has those communication difficulties with davis that he has to also figure out. we talked to the boss a little bit better, too. yeah, we can continue to chat. i think someone we've got another one in the back. tim robbins from williamsburg and the question i have is you started your talk and you stopped several times saying that bragg was a punching bag.
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yeah. does he deserve that title? mm. not a lot of meat on those bones. i don't think so. and but i think you have to consider what he the resources he. i think sometimes the personality with these with these buckaroos gets in the way of the kind of reality. and he's a difficult human being. but a lot of us would be difficult if we were under that much stress and in pain and trying to win a war to establish a new nation. there's a lot of sort of external pressure being exerted on bragg. and this metaphor has been on my mind recently. sometimes that creates diamonds. in bragg's case, we don't quite complete that process. i also think bragg was severely compromised by having people like this under his command. i mean, any time be lee
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didn't like someone, his army, st them to bragg. he's like, it's your problem now. that's not fair to bragg. but robert e lee is successful and winning, and he gets the sort of the ability to say who he wants and doesn't want. right. he's the team captain and we're picking teams. robert e lee gets to pick first and he's taken all the guys he really wants and trusts. and bragg doesn't have the luxury to create an army that functions on that level. so i will continue to use bragg as a punching bag. i mean, the problem with me is the two civil war figures i'm most interested in are braxton bragg and gyampo. no one is ever going to invite me to talk anywhere. it's. there. that's an academic conference. thank you. time for one more question. i actually got to it's very still from fairfax. stand up. don't hurt your posture there. number one is, did bragg actually help davis once he moved to richmond? and number two, in terms of
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chickamauga, is it really really, really just a coincidence that longstreet struck a wide open space in the middle of a battlefield. it's too great questions. i think the first one first. i longstreet is launching the attack. it's just like a terrible accident of timing. um. and failure on the union part to communicate is at low here. he is not. okay. well, i'm going to say ask ed. he's got a wonderful book about longstreet that's going to come out and down the line. and i think he he gives a really good kind of answer to that question. i do think in some ways it is coincidence, but but longstreet is also doing what he's supposed to do, which is a habit that not all of bragg's subordinate officers always demonstrate it in terms of did bragg help jefferson davis? he might have done if davis would have listened to anybody but jefferson davis.
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i think bragg is not super well used as a sort of military adviser. again. i think davis's best move with bragg would have been to make him the confederacy's montgomery mags and doesn't stick around long in richmond. i don't know if they got tired of him or whatever, but they did send him right to north carolina, to the coast there, and that's where he ends up at the end of the war in 1865. and i'm sure they saw him coming and just know this really, it's over. braxton bragg is here and going to the kingdom of daniel harvey hill, of all people, too. yes. yeah, that'll work. so, ladies and gentlemen, cecily nelson. jan, thank you all.

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