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television providers. giving you a front row seat to democracy. >> now a discussion on china's role and influence on the african continent hosted by the atlantic council. analysts highlighted china's economic interests in the countries of africa and citizens' attitudes toward democracy on the continent. this is nearly 45 minutes. >> good morning, it is a pleasure to be here. welcome to all our panelists and our guests. this is the original lightning talk, i will go to introductions, i'm jane muniga, i'm with the carnegie endowment for international peace african

program. i'm joined by three people in our international program. joe, who is right next to me. joseph azunka is the chief executive officer, he's previously been the program officer at william and flora hewlett foundation. if you have not -- i know they are online soy will also just do a quick summary. our next guest is oscar. oscar is, just told me he came from nairobi, welcome to d.c., it's a very cold day. oscar is a man resident fellow with the global china

foundation. he's a political scientist with 15 years of working experience spread across lecturing and consult tansy services. over the past 10 years he lectured at universities including comparative politics, international relations and political philosophy. he's published a number of general articles such as african affairs and the council on foreign relations. next, i turn to paul. paul is no stranger. he was here in a previous session. but i'll still go ahead and introduce mr. paul manturria of the african centers for studies. he researches and prepared written analysis on contemporary african security issue. his arias of expertise include chinese foreign policy, china-african relations, mediation and peace processes.

prior to joining the african center he was a consultant on south sudan. i think that's the introductions. i think we will go, like the previous session, the organizers of this conference, and thank you to atlantic council, it's good to be a lightning round. we're going to try to keep things moving quickly. there is some pop musician who wrote a song, "short and sweet." let's try to keep it short and sweet as we keep the questions going. we've been talking about the increasing china-africa relations and i want us to start on that conversation. i think it's interesting that we

frame this discussion. and the first question will go to you, oscar. and i want to ask, africa's interest in china then i'll come to paul who can tell us about china's interest in africa so oscar, africa's interest in china, how do african countries leverage their relationships with china to advance their own agendas? and diversify their partnerships? what is in it for them? >> thank you, jane. and thank you to our audience both here at atlantic council and those joining us virtually. it's interesting to join the session to shed light on african interests, talking about african countries from my own works. and from colleagues who are passionately -- who have

passionately spoken about this discussion. we frame the question of african agency from two perspectives. the previous panel have discussed and i know the ambassador dismissed a deal over global south. some flat form -- platforms if you look at published works, you know, the con sthoacht global south has been levitated to higher levels. but let me use politically correct terminology. developing countries. developing countries. and from that perspective we see african countries, you know, being part and parcel of that

group and if you read and follow the rhetoric of chinese diplomats, as others have said, they are very specific on the use of developing countries when they're referring to african countries. the reason of course that has a historical connotation and the idea here is to evoke the colonial sentiments and you know, forge that sense of shared belonging among african countries. seen from that perspective, african countries are simply a part of china's plan. we have shared history. we have suffered. and therefore we can be able to

engage on equal footing. you know, let's see partners, as equals. so we see china bringing in interesting terminologies like win-win situation. mutual benefit. just to extend and forge, you know extended engagement that we have seen since the turn of the century. obviously the question of what then is in it for african country, that's been the subject of our discussion. how are these countries

benefiting? paul and others in the previous panel have talked about bargaining power. who is bar gabeing and who is benefiting in this ebb gaugement? where is the place of african people in civil society? that's been a question myself and others have asked. and we have come to the conclusion that we are seeing more and more the african political elites driving and benefiting in this engagement to the extent that other sectors of society are also benefiting, is a subject of debate. but more importantly, as i let others join in, how then is the elite structuring this power relation?

that's important. because china is coming as a powerful -- the leet, speak on behalf of africans, in position to put up a strong fight against this powerful actor. that then gives us room to start now questioning the extent of power in place. >> thank you, oscar. you have raised an important point that i'm going to come back to joe. i know he has some perceptions. we'll move down, i want to hear paul's view of this. now we talked about china's interest in africa. let's take a look on the other side. what is china's interest in africa. so if you can frame your remarks

on that, and how does china's involvement in african development align with the foreign policy, b.r.i. and other things you mentioned. >> thank you. thank you so much. it is great, again, to be on another panel with colleagues that i've worked with, whose work i really admire. china and africa is part of china in the developing world, the emerging world. china in the world is -- china's engagement in africa are not divorced, in fact, i think they are a subset of its larger global. vision. so i think that's important. i might break it up in five key strategic elements. the first is china has a profound interest in reminding

african audiences an african stake holders about the journey it's traveled with them during the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. why is this so important? you see china understands that modern africa is young. by modern africa, i mean independent africa. independent africa is just, what, 60 years? this is yesterday. the gentleman sitting at this table belongs to the first generation of africans that were born free. all our parents were colonial subjects. so the memories of colonialism colonialism are fresh. countries like south africa, in 1994, it is like it was this morning. namibia, 1990 was 4:00 a.m..

these are recent experiences, countries that have been governed by people eats that were part of that. not all of them were armed. somewhere in the civic movement, in the civic space and so on. but the memories are fresh and i think china understands that very well. india as well understands that. in terms of the language you see, the diplomatic language you see when indian diplomats meet with african counterparts, it is fresh. i think that that's the first elements and it translates into diplomatic support. that brings me to my second point. that china is interested in the numbers. because africa, as a block, is the largest within the g7. it is the largest block within the nonaligned content in it. these are important forums.

for, you know, issues of international consequence and so on. like i mentioned in the previous discussion, african voting behavior in the united nations and other multilateral institutions is very potent. to not just china, but other power that well. i think that is key. the more voices china can recruit to support its policies, for instance, on taiwan, engine giang, hong kong, and so on are better for china diplomatically speaking. i think that is a key element. in terms of isolating taiwan, that's a clear manifestation of this. africa is a taiwan free zone in terms of diplomacy.

only one country recognizes taipei. and this was not the case even 20 years ago. that diplomatic maneuvering is extremely important. so, mobilizing representational strength. legitimizing china's emerging alternative multilateral architecture has emerged as a key strategic objective. china, from the end of the 1990's into 2023 has constructed 21 new multilateral arrangements. some of them compete directly with existing multilateral institutions like the world bank , imf, and so on. so, china has a keen interest in increasing and sustaining african and larger global south dissipation in these institutions. it gives them legitimacy.

it allows them to mobilize diplomatic positions. i think that is a key element. the other elements are of course, access, market access is very important. for over 10,000 chinese companies operating on continent. looking at data from the china/africa research initiative they found that the prophets that chinese state owned enterprises are making in the construction actually triple the amount of foreign aid china gives african countries over the same timeframe. so, there is a profit motive there. that's dominant. it is what we sometimes forget to address. non-shaping, as i mentioned in the previous panel, developing a military partnership.

that plays into the larger economic dimension of it. i mean chinese state owned enterprises are either the sole managers or financers of over 44 developments on the african continent. so it is a mix of commercial, political, cultural, and military interests, which i think is quite evident. >> thank you very much. that is a very good roundup. i have been taking notes. i meant to mention this. if you have any questions for any of our pinellas -- panelists, type in your questions and we will take those questions in the next 10 or 15

minutes. i meant to say that in the opening remarks. now we will go over to joe. i am interested in hearing more about this. i'm not familiar with it. what is interesting is there are perceptions we need to understand. what are the leads doing? i want to hear more about that and what your research is doing. >> thank you and thank you to the atlantic council. i appreciate the opportunity to share. i am happy to share more about this. directly to your question, about

influence and engagement on the continent impacting democracy. that is always a critical question we get most of the time. talking about where africans are in times of their commitment to democracy, on the continent, we have been in the business for 25 years today. in july we turned 25. we have helped africans across the continent increasing coverage from 1999, 12 countries, and now we are 40 countries. over the few years, the commitment to democracy on the continent is very solid. large majorities prefer democracy to any other form of government and reject other debt -- other non-democratic one man, one party military rules. military rule has been rejected across the continent by more than 75% of africans, something

i want to put in context. second, the commitment to democracy is not just in the u.s.. people are very committed to the institution of democratic governance whether it is free and fair elections, presidential term limits, rule of law. all these indicators have been very strongly endorsed by the majority of africans since 2014. so over the last decade we have seen this enlargement almost at the same level. a critical thing we have is africans demand accountable governance. we often put this question to africans. do you want a government that is accountable even if it is not very effective or ineffective government that delivers even if it is not accountable? in the recent years we have seen

this pickup very strongly and now it is the majority view on the continent. there is a deepening commitment to accountable governance. people prefer governance to be more accountable to them. then to just be effective delivering goods and services. i do think it is an element of deepening democratic values on the continent. to answer your question, how about the influence of china shifting from base views on the continent? i have mentioned the commitment has been growing very strong. the influence of china on the continent. when you ask people do you think that the influence of china, the u.s. or russia, that the influence has been generally positive or negative or you don't know? a slim majority of africans said the influence of china has been positive.

about the same, 37 percent, have the same view about the united states that the influence has been generally positive. in the previous survey we conducted between 2019 and 2021 we asked africans for future development of their country. which country's motto is the best you think for your country to imitate? u.s., china? a former colonial power? at that time the u.s. was far ahead of china. 33% chose the china model and 32% -- sorry, 33% chose the chinese model and 32% were in favor of the chinese model. so when we check it if people are drawn to the china development model, does that affect the commitment to democracy? the short answer if -- is no. there is no relationship between

a preference for the chinese model and how they feel about democracy. when you look at it separated from the u.s. model, the levels of commitment to democracy, the preference for democracy, rejection of authoritarian identities including one party rule, as well as commitment to democratic norms and institutions is just the same, no different at all. so that answers part of your question. in our analysis one of the most corrosive factors when it comes to commitment to democracy is corruption. when people feel either perceived or real corruption as being important, use either commitment to democracy go downwards. even with that we have the majority committed to democratic norms on the continent. we have seen that from countries where there is rampant corruption beginning to take down.

at this time this has implications for geopolitics. so whether it is the west, china, or another country if we turn a blind eye to corruption for geopolitical expediency, which are signaling to citizens democracy does not matter. i think that if we have international action engaging in africa fighting corruption that will be key to a commitment to democracy on the continent. >> interesting justice -- statistics. i am wondering if there is contradiction beginning to emanate in the continent? we had signals especially in your opening remarks instead of looking at countries looking to be more democratic we have seen a lot of coups happening.

some countries are still heavily invested in china. i would be interesting to hear if you see a contradiction? this is open to any panelist. is it the passive influence of china in africa when it comes to democratic norms? is that just a myth? do we believe it is something else? >> from the data side when it comes to military rule and military intervention, and we have to make a distinction between those, military rule is objected to by the majority of africans. only a few countries, parking a fossil and -- burkina faso and mali prefer military rule to other alternatives. when it comes to thinking about

military intervention in particular, if your elected leaders abuse power, do you think the military should intervene? that question is critical. at least a small majority feel that if the elected leaders abuse power the military should intervene. the intervention is not for military rule. but, they want some correction to account for this spiraling out of control. how do you correct how this is happening now? i think that is where the attraction to military rule comes in. the second factor is the military tends to be the most trusted institution on the continent. when you ask about all democratic institutions in the continent the military is always on top of the list. so trusting the military and feeling they can step in to correct something going wrong is probably what is appealing to citizens. i do not think that the contradiction. they want change. but how will that change come?

>> i want to add another question. you have done work on some of the chinese military bases established under the continent. is this also a signal showing there could be something happening here with influence? >> that is a hard question. but, china at the moment has only one overseas military base that we know of and it is in djibouti. it's a naval base. if we look at what that base does, the diplomatic language china has used to describe what the base does, it has been billed as a light footprint, so-called, paired with a british base in kenya. it is night and day.

what the british have in kenya is of a magnitude that cannot be compared to that base in djibouti. but i think there were other elements china was trying to exploit. that is it is not the only one in the djibouti neighborhood. there are many other foreign powers that want military bases in djibouti and in that sense it made it very difficult to find raise why china is establishing the base because you are all basically in the same board. china will find it difficult in any other african environment. because, djibouti is very unique. should china go ahead and establish a base in other african countries this country it would be very visible. it would be very conspicuous. the chinese boots on the ground will be seen.

that is something that the people's liberation army has a deep aversion to for ideological reasons. so that is what i would say in terms of that base. also how china has reacted is very interesting. there has been variation in how the chinese government has reacted to these clues. in niger china was initially very forceful, basically demanding release and saying that china does not support this kind of action. but, that was because their relationship was very close. china has economic equity. after a while china became quiet. the military leadership, there were meetings and so on and some of those equities have continued. in mali, the exact opposite and in burkina faso there was

silence in the new rain that has which from taipei to beijing. china might not have wanted to ruffle those feathers. i think the chinese reaction to what is taking place in the region tells us something about china's intent when it comes to civil society organizations. there is no report i do that does not build on their data. there have been some headwinds. the vast majority of africans prefer democracy to the one-party state. that means there's not much china can offer in that space given the nature of the chinese political system.

we see this criticism mainly coming from ngo's and professionals. you might tour imitate chinese experiences in different domains. i think that is a key element. if africans welcome chinese influence, but that welcome does not tempt down the demand for democracy, that tells us something. that is what i wanted to throw out. it would be a hard sell for china. because, the demand for democracy is very strong. >> this sounds very nuanced. there are a lot of players happening. it is not just a binary. it is not just an easy way to look at these things.

i am looking at oscar. i also want to hear from your experience. understanding the whole governance. do you see any influence there? i just want your feedback on that. >> paul has led to an interesting point where he mentions african opinion. i totally agree with that. that will go with my working paper i completed in october. the same issue, using that data. exposing variation in african perception around a module. you had joseph speak about the variations i demonstrated.

for our audience to expose how different publics view chinese engagement. for example, looking at especially western and central africa, how do they perceive africa? in open countries like kenya, zambia, and africa? i do not have the exact digits. maybe joseph has more to read into this. but, you find that countries that are open arm hypothetically best. for example, kenya, zambia, south africa.

you know, trying to be more open in terms of how china is engaging in different sectors. for example, in kenya, civil society is very collectively strong. any chinese engagement, if ethiopia, for example were to enter constitutional talks about like access to information, disclosure, transparency, accountability civil society and organizations have filed a petition to the courts and we have had courts even saying that financial engagement around this did not conform with the constitutional principle.

so, that in itself both further with a discussion on democratic governance. and how, then, china is aware of this institutional variation in africa to the extent that in some countries it is able to carefully adjust local circumstances compared to other politics. >> thank you for those insights. i want to go back to something mentioned earlier. china has been also great on training, offering that for government officials and even colleges. this goes to a question that has also come in on platform.

what role, or, is there any impact on any ideological political training on what china is offering african countries? >> look, i will say three things. one, i think china, more specifically, the chinese ministry of education has understood the value that africans attach to education. to skills building, to professionalization. it is almost a mantra in africa that education is essentially the key to everything. it has been that way a long time. so the idea of improving one's

educational qualifications abroad, whether it is india, singapore, australia, it does not matter. it is hugely popular. and i suspect that that might be contributing to the upwards barometer. this is a question i wanted to ask joseph. for africa one of the reasons why the perception of chinese influence has been positive is that the argument is often made it is because of infrastructure. i wonder if education might not have something to do with it? because, china before covid was educating more african civilians, students then any other industrialized country and that changed during covid. it is unclear whether it will pick up the next forum for

african corporation takes place this year and it remains to be seen whether china will up their offer. but this is key. the thing with these students is the visa overstayed in china are far less than what you have in the u.s. or any other country. i think the chinese really enforce the immigration law. these colleagues go back to the african continent. so one might make an argument that china is in fact, or rather, chinese educational institutions, and, they are not perfect. you know. but, one can make a reasonable argument that that capacity has been developed. nevertheless it's popular. as to whether students are swayed or professionals are swayed to go back home and implement the chinese way of doing things, i think that's nuanced.

i think there is a sophistication about this and i think a lot of the opportunities are looked at as opportunities. what worries me is when you compare the visa rejection rates of china, and for instance, the u.s., last year, our visa rejection rate in this country was 74% of african students, professionals that wanted to come to the u.s. for training. 74%. it has been at that level for many years. when you look at the visa rejection rates from china, the chinese visa rejection rates are anywhere between 10% and 12%. so i think that the chinese understand this is popular. and it is low cost. but i think it is high-impact.

that is what i would say considering the educational patterns of the chinese. >> i could go into a whole tangent with that, but that is for another panel. we have barely one minute left. i will now come to the short list. china's influence continues to go within the -- grow within the african continent and globally, making global headwinds at a force to contend with. how do you foresee this relationship going? what is the trajectory? >> i think it will be mostly economic. on the economic front is where i see the relationship growing. as well as education as was just mentioned.

increasing more education in china, i see economic impact blossoming in the near future. >> i think it is economic. as china's economy slows i think that the chinese will ramp up of their soft areas of culture, education, and so on. they know it is high-impact. i think we will also see an increase in things like strategic mitigation. this has been growing on the african continent as a strategic tool african communities are using to hold chinese state owned enterprises accountable. we have seen this used successfully in zimbabwe stopping chinese investment in a coal mine located in a very sensitive bio diverse park. we have seen this in kenya with the decision of the court of

appeals that came, that queried the chinese sgr. there are quite a number of other african countries where we have seen a strategic education becoming a key tool. i think that will burrow in the coming years. >> thank you, paul. >> what joseph and paul have said, allow me to add the political. future prospects of chinese and africa's relations will depend on the political economy. the reason i am saying political economy is a reference to 2020 one action plan. a lot of points were directed towards elevating political engagement for quite some time. the talk has been atomic, economics, economics. there are a number of political

issues now coming up, people to people exchange for example. party to party exchanges are also taking place in a number of south african countries. >> thank you. so political. thank you to our panelists. [applause]. it has been a wonderful session. thank you so much. thank you again. we will take a 10 minute break. thank you. >> today the odysseus scecraft will attempt to land close to the on's south pole.

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