online at c-span.org. or download as a podcast on c-span now, our free mobile app or wherever you get your podcast. c-span, your unfiltered view of politics. >> on saturday, former president donaldrump will speak to votes for the greensboro, north carolina, ahead of next week's sur tuesday context. we'll have live coverage at 2:00 p.m.asrn on c-span. c-span now, our fe bile video app, and online at c-span.org. >> healthy democracy doesn't just look like this. it looks like this. where americans can see democracy at work. when citizens are truly informed, our republic thrives. get informed, straight from the source. on c-span. unfiltered, unbiased, word-for-word. from the nation's capital to wherever you are. because the opinion that matters

the most is your own. this is what democracy looks like. c-span, powered by cable. >> former am bass doctors to ukraine stook part in a discussion at the two-year mark of the ukraine war, they discuss foreign aid, china's relationship to russia and the resilience of the ukrainian people. it was co-spon intoird the u.s. institute of peace and atlantic council.

>> good morning and welcome. congress established us in 1984 as the public, nonpartisan, independent institute dedicated to helping prevent, medicate and -- our purpose today is to mark the second anniversary of rush upon brutal -- russia's brutal full-scale invasion of ukraine, and the 10th anniversary of russia's illegal annexation of crimea. it is an honor for us to cohost the special event with the atlantic council. joining us today are several former u.s. ambassadors to ukraine. we have ambassador john herbst,

alongside ambassador bill taylor and others. when russian troops invaded ukraine on the 24th of february in 2022, most people expected that ukraine would fall to russian troops in a matter of days. ukraine, against all odds, still stands. this is because ukrainians reject russia's attempt to occupy them. and are determined to defend their territory and protect their democracy. it's also the case because countries all around the world are committed to freedom and the international rule of law are standing with ukraine, we stood with you for two years and we will keep standing with you and we are determined to provide much -- as much support as we

possibly can. two years on, while allied powers are grappling with war fatigue and some question whether they can continue, ukraine continues to fight for sovereignty and cultural heritage against one of the most aggressive countries in the world. as we think about the path forward and the many challenges that ukraine and all of us are facing in trying to secure sustainable peace is a responsibility to remember and honor those who have fallen defending freedom. it is now our privilege to welcome to the stage the deputy chief of missions for the embassy of ukraine. >> thank you, everyone, for being here, a circle of friends

and i can feel that. thank you for everything you do for ukraine, during this terrible two years of full-scale aggression. every word you say and every message you bring here and elsewhere has helped ukraine fight for our common future. these are my answers to the question of ending the war and bringing peace closer. the less determine we are, the further prudent encroaches. the russia-ukraine war has been going on for 10 years, exactly 10 years ago they flooded the

ukrainian peninsula. unfortunately, the lack of international response has led us to what we have today. 200 rounds of talks between russia and ukraine got nowhere in 2014 and 2022. all cease-fire regimes were broken by russia. rather than seeking peace, putin was preparing for major attack that shattered millions of ukrainians two years ago. russian troops invaded ukraine from nine directions.

most countries did not believe ukraine would withstand, but we did. under more than 3000 guided bombs, more than 7500 missiles, more than 3700 drones, there was huge destruction, huge casualties. so many people died. so many people became victims of russian war crimes, whether torture, rape, using civilians as a human shield. basically whatever comes to your mind of war crimes was there and

is still there, what russians do to ukrainians. putin has made it clear that the only language he can speak is the language of war. we were able to withstand this genocidal war, but it is obvious that we would not of been able to do that without international support, without you. i want to express my gratitude to all americans, to all of you, to all our partners around the world for standing with ukraine in these difficult times. and not to allow russia to have that deadly advantage over ukraine. thank you for all who understand that giving ukraine weapons is

not to escalate but to deter the aggression. we been feeling for so long that we don't want to escalate the situation on the ground, not to provoke putin to do even more harm, it doesn't work. and we have proven that with the necessary assistance, we can show the results. we liberated 50% of ukrainian territories occupied by russia since 2022. cleared the black sea from russian military present. we destroyed one third of the russian black sea fleet. we secured the grain corridor, and at the same time we remain committed to conduct internal

reforms in ukraine, to ensure rebuilding the ukrainian economy, and that's during wartime. at the same time, the total enemy losses far exceed the ukrainian losses, but the difference is that we value every single ukrainian life lost. putin doesn't. that's why he is ready to send more and more russian troops to die in ukraine. on the other hand, we can see that the lack of necessary resources leads to new territorial gains by russia, and the example is evident.

ukraine is open to political sediment, let me be clear. that is why the president of ukraine is working on the first piece formula framework because it is the only realistic way to restore ukraine sovereignty and to ensure -- however, as we talk about this, we must be ready to win it, and indeed to win by force. this year is crucial. not only we, but putin can feel it. and the steps we must take, i'm talking about increased sanctions against russia, confiscation of russian assets,

when prudent feast -- faces justice in front of the international tribunal, but this will never be fulfilled without ukraine being able to fight for its future, for our future, that has been undermined so much already and can be ultimately ruined at any time. that is why eight for ukraine is so vital. we have more long-range missiles, air defense, munitions, in order to be able to be responsive to the russian troops. they exceed us in numbers. putin has said that the russian border doesn't end anywhere. and ukraine is a test for russia. if ukraine loses, russia will

turn ukraine sources against you, against the west. have no doubt of that. so either prudent is defeated or the whole international system collapses. there is simply no middle ground, i'm afraid. so the international alliances must be strengthened, no doubt. more investment must be made into our own security, that's for sure. but all this may be too late if ukraine doesn't receive the necessary tools now, at this particular moment. and if russia is not stopped in ukraine, the cost of restoring order in the entire world will be much higher. eventually, unfortunate, every

country around the world will be affected by russian aggression. let me finish saying that we might have to answer one simple question today. what world we all want to live in today, whether it is putin's world, or the world we have been working for so many decades to ensure peace and stability, working for our kids and our future generations. i thank you for your support. thank you so much. [applause]

we have a couple of other ambassadors in the room, i see. i see courtney, bob, probably others. got it. this is -- two years of this fight and as demeas just said this is -- this has been a harr time. it's a hard time. you're just back, just back yesterday, just off the plane. lead us off, talk about what you heard over the last week but

also about your careful observer of what's going on here in washington. denise pointed out the importance of the supplemental. s going on in washington, for a very simple reason. i believe strongly since week three of moscow's big invasion of ukraine, that as long as americans support for ukraine did not diminish, ukraine would ultimately win this war. of course, if u.s. support of ukraine were stronger, the war's end would come sooner. i've had my disagreements with the administration about longer ranged weapons to ukraine. that is the problem that has kept our policy to a mere

adequate response to the great challenge of russia's invasion of ukraine, which is a serious, direct threat to american corridors. but the inadequacy of an overall adequate policy is far better than the problem we face now coming from the quasi-isolationist right wing of the republican party. this is a relatively small group , no more than six or 10 really want to kill aid to ukraine. then there's another 30 or so for whom this is not a high priority. but in a republican house which only has a two seat majority, 6-10 people can do a great deal of damage, something that kevin mccarthy experienced, and mike johnson is not long too.

the senate has passed a package we all know of which would give ukraine 60 point $1 billion of assistance. absolutely essential assistance to maintain its ability to fight and stop a russian victory. the package has been held up since roughly the end of september, five months. i suspect this package of some kind will pass, perhaps a little bit less than the 60 billion. while speaker johnson -- i don't think we should dismiss this as malarkey, he understands america has a great interest of getting this aid to ukraine. if he put the bill on the floor, he would lose his job because that group -- folks who don't

understand america's national interest, the determination to make sure this doesn't happen. the good news here is that there's a second way to get that bill on the floor. it is called a discharge petition and it requires a majority of people in the house to sign. and the democrats and those who vote with the democrats represent a very sizable minority but there still short. there are at least 20-30 republicans in the house who really know this is important, and i suspect that it would be possible to get six or seven of them, maybe more if necessary, to sign that discharge petition. my understanding is that the speaker is trying to come up with a magic formula to put the bill on the floor without getting kicked out of the speakership. i'm not sure that is a possible task. i expect at some point in the not-too-distant future, that will be recognize. at which point he has a decision to make.

either put the bill on the floor and risk his job, or do a discharge position that will take more time, play out, and get that bill to the floor which would then be approved by substantial majority. we had about 70% in favor in the senate. that would also make him a lame-duck so his position would not be anymore tenable than if the folks who don't understand america's best interest were to push him out. i've been saying not incorrectly, but not precisely correctly since the middle of december that would take two more months to get this passed. i'm saying the same thing now, but i think we're talking about six or eight weeks at a minimum and maybe more. this brings us back to the situation on the ground in ukraine. it is not a good situation. we all know the russians finally

took an almost completely destroyed town, a town which has as much significance as bug mood which they took in may or june of last year -- as bakmuht. it is a step forward and there celebrating it almost like the victory of stalingrad. there is a great deal of talk that this is the first of many gains for the russian military because in fact as a result of the shortsightedness or worse of the folks in the house who don't have a clue, ukraine has a shortage of ammunition. that's one of the reasons for the fall of the city. the second reason was the committee t of the administration is sending more advanced weapons to ukraine,

specifically f-16s. have we made the right decision several months ago to send hundreds of the f-16 to ukraine so they had them on the battlefield last year, the ukrainian counteroffensive would've been more remarkable on the ground. because the russians have abstention will air dominance, they were sending glide bombs at ukrainian visions and they had to retreat. so here is a clear example of bipartisan incompetence in the united states contribute into a bad result in ukraine and a blow against our interest. if ukraine were to lose this war, we would have to face russia coming into the west at a much greater cost. american leadership would be in the gutter as a result of this

failure of leadership. i think i probably said enough. >> excuse me, a lot of folks in ukraine, well-informed, well-intentioned, and more people outside of ukraine who don't know that much but have a you -- mutual tie, think that moscow is going to make serious gains in the months ahead. i've talked a lot of former military guys, there's a really great network of x generals. i don't think that's true. i believe that moscow can make small gains in the coming months even without the ammunition problem resolved, because russia is distanced from strategic

objectives and ukraine has the ability to limit their advance. what i've just said is heightened by the fact of the one really good thing that happened at the munich security conference. first and more important was that the presence of czech republic, a general commented at munich that there are hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition on the international market for purchase, and if the west would purchase and deliver to ukraine, which could be done in weeks, they would be notably better for the short term. canada has volunteered to bite. this is something that could be short-term help. let's watch this space. the prime minister of denmark, another states woman of mighty

stature, has offered ukraine weapons in the service of the armed forces of denmark because the danes are not at war, ukraine is, and ukraine is fighting -- with that we had such strong leadership in the great powers that are on us. >> you served early on, also when you came back, when you were in washington, you had something to do with some of the midyear decisions that the united states and ukraine made, the question about escalation

which has a nuclear component. do you want to make a couple of comments about the previous efforts and how they are playing out today? >> i think we've seen, actually going back to february of 2022, moscow has tried to play the nuclear card. three days after the major invasion was launched in 2022, our forces were put on a special alert status. the pentagon said we have seen no change in the russian nuclear posture and a couple of russian analysts said -- let me be clear, bladder repute and doesn't want a nuclear war, but he wants to use the nuclear card

to unnerve the west. i think mr. putin is the one -- there are a lot of russian television pundits who talk about nuclear war in ways that are considered borderline insane. my favorite one says we should drop nuclear weapons in this thing will be finished. pay attention to putin. in september 2020 to come just when he claimed that russia had annexed several regions, and he tried to say visa russian territories at our disposal. in september 2022, putin was

trying to do two things. he was trying to dissuade the ukrainians from marching counteroffensive and he was trying to dissuade the west to provide weapons to ukraine. but what we saw is you -- ukraine kept on fighting. ukrainians view this war as existential. if they lose, their vision of ukraine as a normal european democracy is gone. and so nuclear weapons didn't change that calculation. likewise, i think the west stumbled in the first couple of days but then the west came up with a pretty consistent reaction washington, at nato and quarters in london and berlin, that there would be catastrophic consequences to russia. i also think in the couple of

weeks afterwards, the russians or the kremlin concluded that it wasn't working with ukraine, it wasn't working with the united states and europe, and it was provoking a very different reaction in china and india and places that were important. if you then go and look in october and november of 2022, there is an organized effort by the kremlin to ratchet down the rhetoric. mr. putin in his discussion at the end of 2022, he asked, what about the nuclear threat, he said that's not part of russian doctrine, they're just trying to tarnish our good image. as the russian foreign minister agrees to language saying

nuclear weapons are -- it was playing badly with the audiences so it ratcheted down. food not think has been much more sober. looking at the impact of that threat, i think going back to february 2022, the biden administration has said they have two goals, support ukraine and avoid a direct nato russian military clash. where i would be critical of the administration is in balancing the goals, they have been overly cautious. they have referred to russian red lines that aren't really there. i think in the end, the administration tends to come to the right decision, but as john mentioned, it takes them a long time.

had weapons been provided to the ukrainians more quickly, the situation on the battlefield might be very different today than it is in reality. >> steve, thank you, exactly what we needed on the discussion, and the possibility, even as pope francis said recently, reduce concern about this escalation. john, you were there in the run-up to the first invasion of crimea, and we saw that concern arising. i certainly didn't see that coming, and then you went to moscow. your next post was ambassador to moscow. you saw that aspect too. can we talk a little bit about both those periods in your

tenure. >> thanks very much, i'm glad to be with you today, if only via zoom. i was in the process of writing a memoir and not been able to get a number of documents from that period declassified. we all forget stuff, especially diplomats, we have too many things going through our minds at the same time. but some of those documents have helped remind me. i guess i would characterize my last year in kyiv, we saw a lot of things starting to develop and i would highlight three key points. the grade levels, the corruption had gotten to the point where everybody knew who the family

was, the group surrounding and many of them now living in exile in russia. they were in the process of -- literally we heard stories where they would print money and cash it at the markets and then carry suitcases full of dollars down to the golf, it was that obvious -- down to thegulf. i remember i think 19% was the support he had in the last poll before i left in july of 2013. the people who were the supporters of yana cove which -- the second big thing was the growth and power and influence of civil society. this was something that has grown over a long time.

all of the ambassadors who were there at the stage worked hard on this. this was a key part of american policy to support the development of civil society, even if we couldn't influence some of the political developments at the top, we could support those people who saw democracy, who sought a european future, who wanted to build a country that was very western light, a country that they thought -- a country they wanted to live in and they wanted their kids to live in. the third part of this is the european future. throughout most of my time in kyiv, we had a negotiation with european union over an association agreement. that association agreement gradually grew and grew in importance because the people of ukraine saw that as not only opening up the future and access to europe, being part of europe and not just part of the soviet empire, but it also, i think

many people felt provided a guarantee that the european union supported by the united states would be able to insist on rule of law and fight corruption and all of the things they saw the regime practicing at the time. we all know the story in november of that year, putin pressured and bribed him to give up the european union association agreement, and civil society, people went to the streets and i think everybody knows the history of that. i was back in washington at that point, i was told that i was being considered to go to moscow. i follow things pretty carefully, particularly when putin invaded crimea, war really started, but also started the subversion, for want of a better term, in the don boss.

i got to moscow in september of 2014, and of course by this time, you had lots of people in russia thrilled that putin had reclaimed crimea, nationalism was going strong, st. george ribbons were on everybody, it was a very nationalistic moment in russia. putin got a huge bump of popularity during that period. as i engaged in my initial contacts there, one of the things that really struck me was how little the political elite, and i'm defining this not just as people in the government, but people in the society, people who were part of the putin group , being business or whatever, they didn't understand ukraine at all. it was just striking, over and over again, people would argue

that, well, they must want russia. i'd been in the fortunate situation where between april of 2013 and the end of june, i was in those areas and talked to a lot of people. i kept finding myself in these conversations, private ones, saying what you're saying isn't true. i had to find a way diplomatically to get the point across that they were just not consistent. my bottom line here, and i will stop with this, is that i could see even then what we all have seen so much over the last two years, this delusion about ukraine, the unwillingness to understand that they did not

want to be part of a russian empire. it was very obvious back then. anyway, i will stop at that point, but i saw a lot of the seeds of what was happening. of course, the war was already going on in donetsk by the time thousands had already been killed, and we had a situation where the minsk agreements were being negotiated, the germans and the french working with ukrainians and the russians in the normandy group, but it didn't really go anywhere. i was very skeptical of that from the very beginning. it became pretty obvious when they came out for talks with prudence point man on ukraine. it was clear the russians were kind of feeling us out, trying to figure out where our bottom lines were on these things. but really, we were not in any mood for any kind of compromise,

and of course respected the germans and french so we didn't get deeply engaged in the negotiations, but we tried to keep track of what was going on. it was pretty clear that there wasn't much compromise. nobody at that time expected putin to do what he did in february 2022. but history has shown us how brutal that invasion is and how much it totally lacked understanding of what was going on in ukraine. >> and he's paying for that, you're exactly right, he is paying for that misunderstanding. >> this was a strategic mistake of the first order. and i think today, and i was encouraged by what john said, i wish we had passed the supplemental bill earlier, we can't make a strategic mistake at this point and not give assistance to ukraine. [applause]

>> a modification to what john just said, i don't think putin's decision was a strategic mistake, it was a strategic launder. -- blunder. yesterday sweden got the -- to join nato. it has energized and enlarged nato. >> you're are absolutely right, thank you. before we open this up, let's assume that we do make this mistake, -- that we don't make this mistake, we do provide these funds, when that happens, as we all know, it will pass, it

will pass in the senate and in similar fashion on the house floor. so let's assume that. let's assume further that over the next year or so, there is progress on ukraine's part, and talk about winning the war, winning the peace, and identifying what the ukrainians really want in the end, after victory. what does this look like? what are they after? how can they achieve that and how can we help them achieve that? >> i think the title of this conference is the 10 year war, but it has actually been much longer. we are now reckoning with the solution of the soviet union,

the imperfect piece after that, not only in ukraine but throughout the former soviet union, and moving forward. ukrainian people have spoken, many, many times, through multiple elections, through two revolutions, and through the war that started in 2014 and is continuing now with russia's total war on ukraine that started in 2022. what the ukrainian people have said is that they want to live in freedom, they want to be a part of the west. they share western values of democracy and rule of law and the revolution of dignity was all about living according to the rule of law. going back to what john had noted, the russians didn't understand ukraine. i think in part they didn't understand that ukrainians are a

distinct people, a distinct culture with a distinct language and they are a distinct geographic space which is ukrainian. now they are perhaps beginning to understand that there is a ukraine and there are ukrainian people. ukrainian people know what they want, and on the one hand, i think russia didn't understand that from the beginning, or putin didn't understand that. on the other hand, they since that the changes happening in ukraine since 1991 that got a big boost in 2014, that was propelling ukraine in important directions forward. leaving russia behind, and that was profoundly threatening to russia. so how does ukraine when peace? i think winning the peace, is

started in 1991, but it continues today. it is part of all of the things we have been talking about, the three areas. one is of course security, moving forward with ukraine's relationship with other countries in the west, nato countries, and particularly making that relationship with nato as close as possible, and many of the people in this room would say ultimately with nato membership. we have a nato summit coming up in july of this year. the united nations has an opportunity to make history and let's hope it does so. on the economic side, again, this is something that needs to start now. we are seeing ukrainian people constantly rebuilt. they are rebuilding faster than russia is destroying. new look at the energy network, it is unbelievable, considering

the attacks on ukraine. ukrainians are managing to keep that electrical grid running and many other things as well. so the rebuilding continues, and one of the things i find particularly amazing in the ukrainian economy is that not only is it operating, it is innovating. it is light years ahead of anything we have in the u.s. you can get assistance to rebuild your house or apartment if it was struck by a russian missile. so that is ongoing. obviously there are plans to invigorate construction, that is ongoing as well, working with western partners. lots of big issues, how is that plan put together and to what extent is it determined by central authorities, to what extent are local leaders empowered to make decisions?

what sectors of the economy does the government boost and invest in? lots of big issues, and they are being addressed now, so that ukraine is ready when the peace treaty is finally signed. so that is important, and i would say it is a lot of historical precedents. fdr started thinking about what the piece would look like after world war ii ended in 1942. we need to be ready, all of us together. then the other piece of reconstruction importantly is, how does it get paid for? part of it is obviously bilateral partners, coming from europe. part of it will be institutional, like the world bank, like the imf. and part of it i think is going to be coming from russian funds.

there are steps forward with the guard to the three -- $300 billion of frozen russian money out there, and hopefully our congress moves forward on our part of that and that unlocks others moving forward. there is also that other word of reparations, but in important part is holding russia accountable and that is certainly true for war crimes issues but also true with regard to the rebuilding of ukraine. finally, on the values peace, on the political piece, what kind of a country is ukraine going to be in this new era? and again, the ukrainian people have spoken. it is very clear, they are not fighting this war to re-create the old system and make the oligarchs rich again. they are not. they are fighting for their families, the freedom and

future. they want it to be a better future. i am betting on the ukrainian people on that. i would just end with one other note, which is that, as a lot of people have eloquently indicated, not the majority of americans or even our elected leaders that throw up all sorts of arguments about why should the united states support ukraine militarily? i would just note that ukrainians have been brave, they have been courageous, they have been principled and resilient. they know why they are fighting, just like we knew why we were fighting in 1776. he knew why fighting. for us, there was no hope that we were going to win. we were taken on the mighty reddish empire, no hope. and yet we were determined.

we wanted to live in freedom, we didn't want a king, we didn't want to be part of an empire. with the help of the french and other countries, we won. and i think history can repeat itself. [applause] >> well said. well said, all. with that kind of opening, we have the ability to ask questions, and i'm going to ask for the mic right here. if you have a specific question for a specific person, please ask them. >> we are doing investment in logistics and procurement in ukraine already. my question is really what

happens if the russian empire fails, so we have a large reconstruction effort going on in ukraine and all of a sudden you have all these new republics and we can't ignore those. this could be a massive period of essentially reconstruction and development, and i'm just curious how we would handle that. >> i want to remind us that there are people who were concerned in 1991 about what would happen if the soviet union were to disappear or break up? well, it turns out they did, and the sky didn't fall. we were able to manage that. but it is a fair question. john, do you want to take a shot at that? >> i will make a start at least and others will have their own views. there are a lot of people out there who have been on panels

with people who said the russian federation would fall apart, that chechnya and other places will start pulling away. i've also read a lot of things by russians who are opposed to putin, who are opposed to the war, and who just don't think this is going to happen. the main argument there is that all of the people in these regions have a vested interest in staying part of a federation, even if it is in much more economic peril than it is now, perhaps. so if i had to bet, i wouldn't put much money on this. i'm not a betting kind of guy. i would say that it would not, at least in the short term, but as we've seen in this war and the last 30 years, it is pretty hard to predict specific events like this. i remember being on the soviet desk when yeltsin went out in

the woods and they basically got rid of the soviet union. there was nobody i grew up in the intelligence community or analytical or academic community who had any idea that was really going to happen that quickly. everybody knew the soviet union was going to come to an end, but it surprised us. so i don't have a lot of confidence in saying that i wouldn't see this falling apart. as several have mentioned, the problems in russia involve putin spending a huge amount of money on the war which is also driven the russian economy. a long-term trend economically, demographically, has only gotten worse as a result of this strategic decision to invade ukraine. and i think a lot of people know about that. the more i read about this, the more convinced i am that russia will have its nuclear weapons,

but it will not have an economy, it will not have the demography come think of all the places now that don't have men or women able to work because so many have died in the war. it is a folly in many ways for the long term for russia. >> thanks, john. anything else to add on that? introduce yourself. >> i am a senior adviser in the asia center. i'm going to give you an asian perspective on this. however, i must say in the late 1980's, john herbst, steve

pfeiffer and i had a front row seat in the embassy in moscow for the beginning of the end of the soviet union. so we have a long sweep of history in our minds here. i'm now asia oriented, i was in burma 20 years ago, so i'm watching russia from an asian perspective. i think what you're missing when you talk about future influences on russia is what is coming in from the east. the chinese are in the process of repopulating siberia. there are millions of chinese there now. they have built industries, and another one of putin's strategic blunders may have been the alliance he has made with xi jinping, because xi jinping has much larger ambitions than whatever's going on in ukraine. and i think we need to look more carefully what is coming at them from asia.

right now we hear about this extreme, strictly unprecedented friendship between china and russia. we read about in the papers, the russians talk about it all the time of the chinese to a lesser extent talk about it. even in this unprecedented period of relations, chinese academics chinese media, and even the first secretary of the chinese embassy in >> chinese embassy talk about as a chinese city. the chinese claims vis-a-vis. tg hidden. i have written about this going back three or four years ago. this is where at some point,

this would be a little bit provocative today. you will find a natural u.s. russian partnership after moscow gives up. i know you are like that -- you do not like that. and to speak to my ukrainian friends. once russia gives up its imperial ambitions in ukraine, it will be able to understand a problem with china. just as we have defended our interest in our principles, not strongly enough, to stop the russians in ukraine, we would have a similar interest in doing the same keeping russia territorially intact at least the far east so that russia has economic gain. there is no doubt that russia is a long-term danger. the russian position is driven

99% by putin. there are russian experts who understand this. they cannot talk about it, it is a fix for putin, every bit as much as the united states as the principal adversary. >> thank you very much. bob and then toby. [laughter] >> i am a former colleague of everybody on this panel. i want to come back a little bit to what john was saying about russia and what is going on in the medium-term future. we launched a new round of sanctions against russia related to the middle east. they are full of reporting that the sanctions have not put russia under any pressure and the economy is doing well. i'm curious if you get a sense from any or all of you as to what pressure there is?

the economy is doing ok and the sanctions are not working. you have control of dissidents and people who want to have a different policy. he is under no pressure, how does that change this equation? this seems to me that he has not under any kind of pressure. >> thank you. do you want to start a response to that? >> yes, a good question. i think i may make a couple of points. i have never thought that putin would be necessarily pressure to give up his views. i agreed with john the idea of empire, they will have to tailor this back because russia needs to focus on modernizing its country and looking forward to the 21st century and in the looking back to the 19th century as their model. i think that as long as putin is

around it will be hard to do that and he is going to push back against anybody who would make that argument. i suspect over time the political elites are going to, the oligarchs and others, they will eventually push back although i read this morning that a oligarch had his assets nationalized yesterday after putin criticized him last week. putin is taking assets from western companies and giving them to other members and creating new economic elites dependent on him. he is working on these things to maintain his support among the elites. everybody on this panel knows that in the end what changes in russia is one political leadership changes, they come of at the hands of the elites.

i think that does not undercut the argument that i was trying to make and others have made much more eloquently than me. this is a long-term disaster. for russia. i had a speech from a fellow who works at the american enterprise institute who has done some demographic work and absolutely is fascinating. to see how this country is falling apart. the life expectancy of a 15-year-old in russia is now less than the life expectancy of a 15-year-old in red -- yemen. it is staggering some of the statistics of things they have discovered. it is the long-term they are doing and nobody can even factor in the soldiers, they have produced 515,000 as the number of casualties that russia has

suffered inside the ukraine alone. these are all, some are criminals from present but the other able-bodied men who they need for the future, a demographic problem before. i guess my sense is that putin will do everything he can to not just keep the war going because he is investing his whole future and legacy in this, but he will be as ruthless as he has to be to try to stifle any opposition and to try to show the world that the people of russia still support him. if you want to look into that i think the best guy writing is an individual, he is analyzing what is going on inside of russia, the attitudes of people towards the war of the future. i will stop there. >> any other comments? >> i think there is a widely

believed misconception about the state of the russian economy. you mentioned the economy is doing ok and i heard jack keane, a formal general say the same thing this morning on tv. that is based on the use of official russian economic statistics. which i think, amazingly, the world bank and the imf use those russian economic statistics to come up with growth rates of two or 3% for last year. why did they want to believe the official russian statistics when putin is trying to demonstrate sanctions have no impact is beyond me. a professor at yale wrote extensively about this and he has done economics in the embassy in the mid-80's with the cia expectations. officials serving statistics, we know how well that turned out. i would take those with a grain of salt, i hope shaker. >> the question is is there

pressure on putin, i think it is really hard for us to know. i do not think we have, john was mentioning that the courts came out of nowhere, i think it is hard for us to know what is going on in the inner sanctum. when i look from far away, where the -- i think we all agree that if there for free and fair elections putin could win, making sure that navalny not only goes to the furthest away present in the arctic circle, but he is making sure he is dead. he is taking any body of them i have a prayer of getting some type, help me out in a dish? any legislation and taking them out of the balance and you will see any not to mentor on all of the other repressive members we have -- but you will see not to

mention all the other members. it is a sign of authoritarianism but it is not a sign of strength. he must be feeling some pressure. >> thank you. >> sorry, steve? [laughter] >> the economic side, just a second ago, with john and what john said, you accept russian state statistics, last year, russia massively increased its group, the expect -- the expectation of the economy is going up, is not making the life of the average russian better. his second point is, you get back to what is already said, the importance of the west making clear that it's commitment to provide ukraine with the weapons and ammunition and the will to continue the fight.

how important that will be because i think if you are in the russian public or the russian elite and even in a circle, at some point you have to ask yourself how long can you continue this fight and continue to see your husbands and sons and brothers coming back in body bags from ukraine? because of one man rhetoric and his obsession with ukraine. the western commitment is very important and that has impact on both how the russian elite and russian public view to this. -- view this war. >> during the clinton administration -- was in the clinton administration and when i recall strongly in the early period was the distrust of ukraine at that time. it was corrupt, not a reliable

partner, and without the reliable partner was going to be russia. obviously, a lot has changed. it is an important point because it is the way that we treated the country on the way we had expectations and the ability to work with it, i think it is really -- we had a big learning curve and you guys have done a fantastic job educating the rest of us. about ukraine. you know that anyone who was a russian major had very little to do with ukraine. in any way. i see people shaking their heads but i am just, from everything else, and it was important when ukraine became able to stand on its own. our education did not prevent it and i know that you would know a lot about the declassification.

they have been doing very much, but there was a focus on russia, almost exclusively in terms of economics and whatever and we have spent two years helping russia with its economy and by the third or fourth year we ran out of steam, does that sound familiar? when we talk about ukraine and russia problems i think we are talking about and it it states what you have -- the united states problem. your discussion of russia has been almost exclusively putin's russia. my question is what are the russians who are the other russia? how do you view them? do they have any role, the exiles were any of the groups to play, they still do talk to ukrainians? they do not advertise it, but they do. is there anything that can be done here to build that lower level of trust or -- that is the

wrong word, understanding? and in europe, is the whole discussion about decolonization? it is a crazy word but they need to decolonization of the russian empire and we ought to listen to them. this is to you, i like 1776, i'm a big fan of hamilton. for most americans, i wonder if the real analogy and to europeans this is for sure the analogy is it is 1936. everything like that. i really think that we should be talking in terms of what happened after that? 1776, maybe for the supreme court it is important both for the rest of the world, it was a long time ago. >> thank you.

two good questions. do you want to have a people to people question? the 1770 61? this will be the last question. john and others will be here to answer questions after we wrap this up. >> i think that the people people issue is something that -- the people to people issue is something that we have stated, there are mental maps and people who work with us, we work hard on this. even in russia when i was there from 2014 through 2017, my wife and i traveled as much as we possibly could to the embassy officers and they traveled as much as they could and reach out to artist local people but everywhere we went we would have lunch or dinner with russians who had been rants coming to the

united states, educational or the open world grants, it was a good chance to reconnect with them. i do not think that our current ambassador is able to really travel and do that much right now. i do know from talking to her that she and her staff are working to the extent that they can. it is a limited staff and i think everybody knows, to maintain some of those people to people ties. i know that there is a lot of people in this country and academic institutions and others where they're staying in touch with russians who are in exile who have been outside of the country for obvious reasons. i think we need to continue to do that. as i look back, this will resonate with most of the others on the panel, one of the great things the united states did in eastern and some to europe since

1991 was to invest their money. we could have invested more in different grants and people to people kinds of programs. it builds the understanding of our own countries, the relationships, often not official, but hybrid relationships and that certainly when the moment comes, we are going to have to, we are investing some money now, but we need to continue to do that. building from the bottom up as it were to try to regain some of the ground that has been lost during the last two years in particular. >> thank you. 1936? >> i think there are probably other points of history or years we could look to to make different points about this war. i agree with you that 1936 is a very apt analogy.

this is an existential war for ukraine, if russia keeps on, it will be a very sad time for ukraine. i think that what we all recognize is this is not only an attack on ukraine, it is an attack on the west and an attack on the u.s. and nato and it is an attack on the international system. and as denise said at the outset, what kind of a world we want to be living in? if we do not step up now, we are going to have to deal with the russian threat and russian action later on. it will not be a good time of our choosing or a time that is advantageous to us and it will perhaps involve american's on the ground. i think that is a dangerous proposition not only for us, but for the world. i agree on the 1936. >> and gray statement, thank you for that.

let me also thank the others for the cooperation and cosponsoring of this. thank you all, stick around. [applause] >> and coming up first lady jill biden speaking at an event in

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