international economics in washington, d.c. and welcome back to the peterson institute for international economics. i'm adam posen, the institute's president, and we are thrilled today to have with us the honorable jared bernstein, chair of the u.s. council of economic advisors to president biden.to be talking about the benefits of full

employment. is in some ways the hottest and possibly the most important topic in macroeconomic policy, and i want to give full credit to jared and his colleagues at the c and doing research and advocacy and policy advice, most importantly in real time throughout the biden administration with the benefits of full employment in mind. the attention goes a lot rightly to the federal reserve and the so-called soft landing, but the attention in terms of understanding why it became a soft landing and what role fiscal policy and other structural policies played rightly is evaluat latest economic report of the

president. and if i can grab one of my free copies, these are of course free to everyone. the government publishing office has it online. , you can get your own 2000 page copy. but what is remarkable in the current edition that the cea has put out under jared's leadership with obviously and other key staff, is the first chapter on the benefits of full employment. not only why it matters, but bringing into the macro discussion the issues of monopsony, which is hiring power. as a distortion of markets. evaluating the long-term trends and to some degree why people

were perhaps too pessimistic about those in the past. looking about why and how a rising tide in this case lifted the smaller boats and arguably lifted the smaller boats more than the yachts which think could happen.we didn't l but did. so it is a very exciting time to be talking about the economic report of the president. before i formally introduce jared, just a that unofficially with jared here and the cherry blossoms task peak, start of macro season at the peterson institute. we have quite a lineup. of course nothin good as hearing jared. but we have quite a lineup over the next few weeks that we hope you will be joining us and maybe even c-span will need to come some of these events, including next week on march

27 -- excuse me, that is later this week. graham steele on the future of the u.s. banking sector. our semiannual global economic prospects event led by karen dinan on the us economy with remarks by tian le hang on the chinese economy a m on our lessons from exchange rates. an update on too big to fail with martin gromberg, the chair of the fcic and tobias adrien from the imf among others taking place wednesday, april 10. and then a horde of central bankers and those who love them in the following week. in particular i want to feature themes in this year's economic report of the president our joint conference with the imf on steerinstructural change. the latest in our biannual

rethinking economic policy conferences. are grateful to partnership with the whole imf and others on that. een roads, if we're going to have greater equality and deal wi■. ai, we havhée to be able to ster structural change and have it mean something more than it used to which is the oecd laundry list of liberalization. and we're very hopeful that our confere believe includes a colleague or two from the ca -- from the cea will be but again let's start off with the most important document on the most important topic of the day which is the benefits of full employment today. d we are indeed fortunate that jared bernstein and the council peterson institute for this discussion. jared has been chair of the 31st chair of the council of advisors since being

confirmed in the senate last june. he sve member of the cabinet but of course jared served as a cea me beginning of the administration and was a prominent voice in public as well as policy discussions on all the macro economic issues ofhe biden therefore this country. in policy he was previously chief economist and economic advisor to then vice president biden from 2009 to 2011 and served as deputy chief economist at the department of labor during the clinton administration. dr. bernn fellow at center on bd policy priorities from 2011 to 2020 and also spent 16 years in senior roles at the economic policy institute which of course understates he played a key intellectual leadership role in making the epi what has become. at the peterson before and

worldwide and in particular he ■ ha the juncture of inequality, macroeconomics, labor and tradea living standards of the middle class. i know jared's also going to open briefly with some remks loo shared a similar focus at that conjuncture of issues. but most of all today that we can all focus on the fact that full employment has been attainable and that the benefits have become evident and th i a positive challenge to macroeconomic policy going forward. so with that, let me invite jared bernstein to the podium. [alause]>> before im and others, i want to speak a minute or two about the tragic collapse of the bridge in baltimore.

we spent the morning at the white house trying to do all we can to help the president i finished speaking about this, he talked about the scope of the tragedy and how he is incredibly grateful to the brave rescuers who immediately got to the scene and talked about the people of baltimore and how we are with you. we will stay with you. he and the governor talked about maryland tough and while some were means something to folks in this room who know what i'm talking about. we will get through this andillh you every inch of the way. now turning to today's presentation, it is true thatlim past my peak. but i am still excited to talk about this subject with you. i want to thank adam. son i thought of. and pie, the first place i

thought when we thought about where we would like to present this information from the new economic report of the president. i want to thank my friend david wilcox who helps guide my thinking on this and many other issues. i have a brief set of comments and then adam and i will chat and hopefully take some questions. on february 5th, 2021, what i believe was his first economics, president biden discussed the urgency of his newly proposed american rescue plan by elevating the need to quickly get back to full employment. in fact, he used the phrase five times in that speech and i guess someb else controlling these because i didn't make that happen but ok -- he, ok. i'll do that if that's ok. not to bcobut i have this year. he pointed out that according to

cbo, if we don't take action it would take until the year 2025n. he cited outside estimates maintaining that if we enact the rescue plan, we could achieve full employment by the beginning of next year, citing the importance of standing up a nationwide vaccination program which as you recall did not exist when he argued we can get to full employment sooner. why was this new president invoking a concept that was here not much spoken about side of think tanks and even there mostly those that were labeled progressive or labor oriented? that's not a rhetorical question. i know the answer. it's that president biden has always believed that worker bargaining power is an essential ingredient to an omy that is fair, inclusive, and it stands in sharp contrast with trickle-down economics, grows the economy from the middle out, bottom up not the top, down, and that full employment supports the bargaining clout that he views

s why empowering workers would later be enumerated as one of the three pillars of bidenomics and why the benefits of full deployment new economic report of the president. i'll note here and as you see in front of you that the chapter was dedicated to my late friend and mentor bill sprigs who taught me this importance of full employment. i also want to recognize the ratner who is instrumental in our work in this space. this policy thrust invokes big important questions that the type adam alluded to. what do we mean by a full employment and what are the benefits? which policies help us get there andwhile cea touts the benefits, where the costs in terms of inflation? full employment sufficient to achieve our economic goals or other economic vulnerable groups

that need other policies to connect their fortunes to overall growth? the chapter answers all of these questions in some depth emphasizing both theory and extensive evidence, some of which i will share with you in a moment. but since i want to move quickly toward the discussion, i will only skim the surface of the answers here. i thought this was an interesting find from 1731. the statement here was that this is the earliest reference could find for full employment -- i know back then they used capital letters fairly randomly as i see it. i'm not sure we would agree about a universal shield furnace to everybody but that's not one of the benefits without. but i just thought it was interesting riches are diffused over the nation. that's a very clear statement of the equality premium we talk about that's associated with full employment. but the first question is what do we mean? for this crowd i'm sure it's a standard thinking that you could

the lowest unemployment rate consistent with steady inflation that's very conventional. ustar is a widely used guidepost. perhaps a more concrete perspective is that when unemployment is at its natural rate additional demand for workers is more likely to generate inflation than boost real income. that's in the chapter. dave and i did an interview right after we wrote the chapter and the firststion asked was, what do you think full employment is? what is the number. we looked at each other like, how could we not have epared forhat question? the new administration forecast that just came out in the budget has our terminal employment rate at 38 but therede confidence around this and other estimates i think would lead me to believe that based on current demographics, ust wlow 4, in th. turning to the heart of the

chapter which is the benefits of ree buckets. first the enhanced bargaining power i mentioned that comes with full employment distributes have relatively and absolutely less resources in weaker labor markets. employment's "equality premium" and the empirical evidence of that time and it's a chapter. i'll take you through that in a second. the second is the growth contention, consumer spending and an@n■ economy like ours helps promote steady and stable growth. the chapter says little about this but i've talked a t it in the context of the current recovery. and this dynamic has been especially important as excess savings have largely burned off and real earnings haveelpe cuthird, more speculative benefits around what has been called verdorn's law or reverse

the idea that full employment can generate gains to productivity growth through boosting the economy supply said. now let me take you on a quitoug with estimates of the natural rate of full employment which you know simply put our quite wide and varied -- are quite wide and varied. if we want to, we can talk about why there are so many different estimates of full employment but the point here is that, like many other variables,■& it's ben a number that's been tough to pin down. i will point out the straight line, the cbo ustar measure is one that gets used a lot in no small part because it is really easy to point and click and get to it. it is clearly far less nosy than the rest. it's also far less noisy than -- sorry -- is also far less nosy than earlier cbo measures. the reason is that they

a bit ago to something they call the -- that they referred to now as the noncyclical unemployment rate, which what they do is, i believe it was in 2005 q4,ooks l employment to us, so they assume that and back they estimate the noncyclical unemployment rate holding demographics which in this case are sex, education, age, and race constant. kind of a flat line. ok, now turning to more -- i'm going to buzz through this stuff. the idea of the rising tide lifts some votes more than others as adam alluded to. we now have the lowest black/ white unemployment gap on record. this separates it out for men and women based on work that did at the federal reserve. dave

you see a fairly clear cyclical pattern although not much happening in the 2000's. i think that has a lot to do with the fact that the really full employment periods in the recent history, the latter 1990's, the current period, cycf this racial gap. that was r and such. this is the same exercise with the employment rate. and here we have the hispanic versus the white gap in the epop and again you see in the■b peri, you see a cyclical increase there, though more linear than the unemployment oéene have a ns in the chapter. this one inspired by some work

just in wolfer's had done. it looks at the cyclicality of the on employment rate and thwhat you see here on the lefts that groups with the lowest average in employment rate over quite a long period so groups unemployment don't have much variation in the unemployment rate. the absolute change in the unemployment rate over ns -- you're college educated, you are less exposed to cyclical ups and downs, but if you are someone with high school or less, you have average high unemployment and your unemployment rate goes up and down a lot more and recessions and recoveries, so this is absolute change, down in recessions, up in recoveries, behind the black/white gap closure i showed you in a moment. one of the benefits of full employment is this dynamic of racial equity in the labor market.

you see the same thing in the lfpr. the cyclicality of it is that groups with a low average have more variation in their labor force participation rates relative to those with much higher lfpr, so this is something i will come back to later when i talk about the possibility of lasting supply-side gains. this i take on something you may have seen less of before. it talks about how the job ladder becomes more accessible to less advantaged■ workers in periods of full employment. we know that in strong labor markets, workers are more likel. i will talk about that one i talk about the recent beverage curve research. but higher quit rates mean tha f full employment becomes even more accessible to vulnerable workers. what the chart shows is when the implement rateshing rate rises e

for black workers than white workers. at least in my work, that is a perspective i had not seen before. job to job switches, more advantageous for less advantaged workers in periods of tight that's a great finding. this is just a transition rate for disabled workers, from non-participation to employment, and you see a nice uptick in the full employment period of the latter 1990's and the last expansion and where we are now, again not much in the 2000's. i argue we were less apt with employment. this is a particularly important story right now. the quality premium. here you see wages for t10th ane workers.

they grew together. they are growing in real terms, which is good to see. in this expansion, you see the 10% -- 10th percentile pull ahead, so you have full employment generating more wage. this is a deeper dimension of the kind of premium i was talking about for full employment in terms of where the benefits■) disproportionately flow. here we are simulating the increase of a more flat labor market, but it's symmetric. you could flip this around if you wanted to do a more tight labor market, but it shows how households -- now we are talking about household income. this is a broader context. here you see the change associated with a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate cap. a larger unemployment rate gap or negative output gap, you see

that for single mother households, black households. that turns into a 2% loss of annual earnings, and the grading it shows does not really matter much for high income families, particularly for black households, single mother households, really the middle of the elasticity. it's either unity or greater than unity. again, because that is income, it includes both a wage effect and analysis -- and an hour's effect. the hours effect is a potent part of this. groups of lower lpr's having a more cyclical response toú8e i wondee seen before. this is the change of the labor share in the unemployment rate gap. as you move to the right, the

gap grows. you see when you have a negative gap, labor share is increasing. that's a fourth-quarter change in labor share of income on■ the y access, so that correlation shows a negative correlation between output gap and labor share growth for labor share of national income. ok. to and staying at full employment, this is, as i mentioned, another one of the second.ns that -- hold on got myself a little turned around here. my pages. here we go. what i just took you through is a subset of the benefits. by the way that

full employment is no panacea. we include a detailed discussion of policies that go beyond the policies, hud care, and housing. -- health care -- antidiscrimination policies, childcare, and housing. as i showed a moment ago, labor supplyocyclical. that's what i showed you with that "live from paris are due to plot. persistently, full employmentn m the sidelines, and this certainly tracks the current expansion in ways that i think are very important. this shows prime age labor force growth, year-over-year percent change, and it shows that for prime age workers, the increase

in the last couple of years has been historically quite strong. that mountain youbeen quite impe expansion. i should point out that research shows both foreign and native workers are playing a significant role in that labor expansion. currently, lomen aged 25 to 54 is a tick below the entire rate on record, which dated back i think there's a case to be made in terms of supply-side gains related to full employment overall. how long they last is up for grabs. second and much more relevant to anaconda -- to an economist audience like this one, economies will try to prevent unit labor costs from rising. the labor share figure i showed you earlier shows they are not entirely successful in so,

but one way to stabilize unit labor costs is to discover efficiency gains that were not ■cessary to tap in the. speare the problem is that by assumption, any firm operating inside its production ould have been competed out of business. so i recognize that that explanation collides with some assumptions in micro, but i think that's ok. others have made this potential collection. -- this potentialon see the cit. between persistent employment and lasting supply-side gains. secretary yellen did so inand it into the questionrom 2016 have a quote, the evidence of highly persistent beneficial impacts on the supply-side economy in past events is not strong.

this does not say that they don't exist but that they are not strong. also like them, we do not dismiss the possibilityf a linkage between full employment and lasting supply-side gains. we have seen a bit of productivity acceleration in the current expansion, as this slide shows, although largely back on trend -- that's a trend from 2017 to 2019. it's level is back on trend andh some nice work suggests it takes two to three years or at least it took two to three years in the 1990's to idey trend in pr, but we also think wherever you land on the full employment argument, the fact that it yields such strong equality dividends is reason enough to elevate it as a policy goal. to argue it alsoust

permanently raise lifestyle may be getting a little greedy. that keep us at full employment, we want to focus on not learning the wrong lesson from the post-pandemic period and particularly the inflationary episode we e way through. the idea that fiscal and monetary policy should be used to fill monetary gaps seems butd the next time out, policymakers will incorrectly assume that countercyclical policies are necessarily inflationary, so we focus on supply, demand, any persistent full employment of the past few years and kwthr relationship to the rise of inflation over hundred 21 and 2022. we argued the collision of pandemic-induceddemand that shiy towards the very goods that were most■ supply constrained contributed to the rise of inflation.

demand, we argue, was boosted by the accumulation of excess savings, which in turn related to sharp reduction in pandemic-induced spending on services and travel, supported by strong fiscal and monetary support throughout 2020 and 2021. we write, given the developments over the years since the previous assessment, the cea has found more evidence■a supply factors played a key role in both inflation's rise and its subsequent decline. consider that if full employment where the main cause of the increase in inflation, the subsequent disinflation in the economy has experienced, should have brought about substantial slackening of thehowever, the me so-called sacrifice ratio, the amount of increased unemployment or reduced economic activity, requires lower inflation during the recent disinflation since the peak in june 2022 suggests otherwise. over the period coved,includes a available when we published the

book, the disinflation has labor market slap -- labor market slack or job loss. kind of in the spirit of the find that supply chain normalization, even on its own or interacted with slack, and that80% of the disinflation in the core pce through q4 of this year. we have come to view nonlinearity in this curve as important, a point i raise here in this space. we have our own sli showing

non-linearity's using msa-level data. thus far, we have been progressing down a part of that curve where the sacrifice ratio is low. th raises questions about the last mile and if there will be a tougher slog back to target on the flatter part of the curve. we also look at this analysis the the lens of a curve that ought to be especially steep at high openings. another non-linearity. the idea is that vacancy drives relative to the number of unemployed, it becomes increasingly hard to fill■> job. that leads to a sticky unemployment rate relative to -- relative to additional vacancies. they posit correctly so far that the job openings rate could fall without an increasen job losses or rise in unemployment.

alternatively, olivier at all argue that such high rates of vacancies were due to a decline in matching efficiency. matching efficiency would markedly improve, they predicted that declines in job openings could be affected by increased employment, which they showed to be historical irregularity. we do not know if their mechanism was correct or(u■z if matching efficiency did improve. it is the case that the unusually high level of job to job switching, which tends to reduce matching efficiency among the unemployed, has come back down post-covid. at any rate, the slide shows that job openings have fallen substantially with little rise in the unemployment rate. at this point, our analysis shows substantial disinflation generated by supply-side normalization, including some

degree of realignment of supply and demand in the labor market while maintaining full employme conditions. none of this is to suggest that countercyclical policy had nothing to do with the run-up in in in our model, slack by itself in a model where slack is interacted with the supply chain variable, explained a little of the pandemic this chapter shows president biden's urgency to quick get the labor market back to full employment has yielded deep and important benefits at both the micro and macro levels. if there is one work, it is that empowering workers through full employment labor markets remains one of the most important economic policy goa there is. thank you. [applause] l@>> thank you, jared.

thank you very much, jared. as a capital official, he always has the smallthe tragedy in bal, i think that is even more applicable. we are all grateful that jared d his team has brought to bear on this issue. what i would like to do is i'm going toutckly. then we will turn to our audience. this is all on the record. >> al go an extra five minutes. >> you can go an extra five? great. what we will do is take two pairs of two questions. thk first up, picking up on whee you ended up, there was a great deal of debate and concern in

2021-2022, including from predecessors of yours, cea chairs in previous democratic administrations, aboutpolicy pog the economy. you have been very clear about where your analysis takes you and in your analysis, it isi wat on the allocation of variants in the last couple years, but more in terms of the applicability as it goes forward, that partly, as you and the town hall have argued, what was a unique or at least unusual supply factors, truman -- driven by the pandemic, energy response. does this experience feelrelev's

call it normal time, that with the inflation effects directly from slack via fiscal policy, be more felt under different circumstances, or does this have more general applicability that people have been too concerned about in the pa? that one should really give a lot of weight to the unusual dynamics of that fiy remains largely innocent and is not proven guilty by this episode. i have tried to stress in all of my discussions, including my words here today, that none of that s nothing to do with it and, in fact, i was, i recall, in the press briefing and say i do think the rescue plan is

, and i was pretty confident ion was right. i think that there are a number of facts you in that direction. nonlinearity is really important . i think you have shown the importance of that, and i think nonlinearity'function of a highd supply chain and labor supply as well, bumping up against quite strong demand. fiscal policy played a role in sustaining the strength of demand. that is why we thought it important interact with slack and fiscal policy in the model. one of the biggest lessons i think everyone should take away from this is what you'supply-si. don't assume it's going to do what you want it to. of course, a 100-year pandemic is a particularly challenging data point if you have not gone through that.

generally speaking, i think the comments i made in the talk and what i just reflected here suggest a f fiscal policy respoo negative output gaps remains really important, really full employment as quickly as possible is the best policy and be mindful of your supply-side. >> thank you. a second question, something that i did read the report before i got my lovely hard copy, something which was not featured either in the report or chapter one of the report or your discussion today, when you talk about labor supply has been the surge in immigration we have seen the last year or two in the u.s., which, frankly, most of the peters institute welcome, though it is obviously controversial in places, but just analytically speaking, when you talk about the improvements

in labor supply, howe return of both documented and undocumented workers to the u.s. affect labor■z supply, and doest actually suggest -- being wishful here but maybe you agree -- thato the u.s., at least, are not a major determinant of domestic worker bargainingshowed workers had bag power rising even as we have seen the rise in migration. >> immigration increases supply and demand. that is important to remember. i shouldsart has said unequivocally that the border is broken and needs to be fixed, has presented extremely ambitious and in my view potentially highly effective policies to fix the border, and the opposition has largely

treated that as a political football as folks are trying to solve a serious problem. with that said, the increase in labors been documented, as i mentioned in my talk, as coming from both foreign-born and native-born sources. when we about supply chain on snarling, if i'm being more disciplined, i say supply chain and labor supply improvement pr- plays a role there. >> thank you. now i'm going to turn to the audience. we have standing microphones to my left about 2/3 of the way back in the room. that's a so you can appear on tv. we also have a roving microphone. when called upon, please identify yourself, name and affiliation, and please pretend at least you are making a question instead of a statement. >> given that my time is short.

>> the person in the very back, just put down your hand. if you could make your way to that microphone, and then we will come back to that microphone. ank yo you're on first. >> there seems to have been a global tre wrehe response rate in a lot of labor market surveys have fallen quite substantially over the past decade or, and what you had recently is that coupled with pandemic-era shifts in work and practices. this seems to be leading to concerns about the quality of the source data we are getting on the lab mari guess two issue. one, do you share those concerns about the quality of labor market data? and two, what would you suggest we do to rectify some of the issues we have seen with the response rates?

>> we want to make sure that you can escape, so if you could pose your questions, and then you will respond, and then we will come back. >> thanks. terrific presentation. i look forward reading the chapter. hopefully it will give me some insights for my own work going forward. question is, i know when you look inflation in the past few years, you did a big comparison with other countries. have you thought at all about on this topic, the benefits and costs of labor market tightness? it seems to me there's a really quite a range of experiences both across countries and■q over time that could be informative. >> or it could be a good research project. rm>> i have done a bit of it. i'm wondering if you have looked into this, have thoughts on it.

quick let me start with the ■8 data question. that's a great question. let me point out lee tucker, who is here from our staff. i had a meeting with him but was raising exactly those points. talk to him afterwards and he will tell you what we are thinking. the quality of u.s. labor market data remains very high. when youe a survey, i know it's a poster child with a response rate has been in the 30's or something like that lately -- what you have there is , you know, just a wider confidence around the timate. it does not mean the estimate is wrong, just that it has a larger standard error, and that is upon. i think this is a fantastic agency that well aware of these issues, and are thinking about ways to improve them.

i guess what i would say is -- oh. the very interesting thing going on right now, and i'm sure you know this. i think it was embedded in your question, the diffenetween employment and payroll survey and household survey. the pa been picking up immigration better than the household survey right now, so that is an important thing to think about and to look at. speaking, at least in the context of the presentation i gave, i feel very confident in the quality of the indicators we are using. i mean, it's a great idea and would be a great project, and we have looked a little bit at that. i think the labor market and the fiscal policy emphasis are different in us versus them. in europe, much of the focus is on keeping people on the job. we did a little bit of that. maybe more than a little with

the paycheck protection program, but broadly speaking, our significant fiscal spend was in unemployment insurance, checks, money to the state, and i think the fact that we have a 70% consumpe a 55% consumer spending economy made a big difference here. our fiscal policy went to consumers who have really carried the baton in keeping this recovery going. there fingerprints are very much on the macro dynamics i talked about. i suspect is it's a little different in europe. i think one should do that exercise because the inflation reports are global. in addition, disinflation is somewhat global as well. we have done better than many countries in terms of disinflation, but others have engaged in some of that, too, bui think when one engages in that study, it is important to pay attention different

fiscal policies. the different policies that were implemented and their impact on full employment. for one thing, our unemployment y up and came way down. that was not the case in many countries. it did not go up as much or come >> thanks very much for this presentation. some economists say we are moving from a disinflation every time where structural forces were pushing down inflation to more demographics, globalization , to a time where pressures will be on the opposite side. i'm wondering what you think of that argument and in light of this, how might that change the risk/reward around running a high-pressure economy that's kind of what you are advocating? >> sure. i think the lesson of the last

-- virtually thed! lrs we were e chapter most closely which i think would be the last 40-plus, 50 years, would be that given flatness of the billets of -- of the phillips curve, one can full employment economies without unduly worrying about pressures, and of course, if you just look at the basic architecture of the economic theory behind all this, inflation sh bwhat i tried to ds that persisted in the pandemic, persisted through nonlinearity with constraint and supply and recognizinghat that was very much a piece of pandemic economics, notructurally inventn

the economy going forward. i cannot claim to know what the phillips curve will be on the others of this. maybe it will be a little bit steeper, but i can tell you that through all the forecasts, i think the ones that have been the most accurate have inflation continuing to stay on trend, so we come away from this chapter with a very view that full employment and stable prices can very happily live together, and that is from the perspective of working people. >> great. i think we have time for one last question. >> thanks very much for this presentation. i wonder you feel about policies to ensure the kind of physical response that you are suggesting is nde.

because as we know, the pandemic kind of open■g a window for tax credits, higher unemployment, and so on, but that is a not easy thing. speaks to uplifting the profile of automatic stabilizers . my colleague at the councilwritd i think that work is very strong . it has interestingly been challenged on both sides of the aisle politically, and sometimes many politicians do not want to have choice taken. they want to have discretion, but i think there is at least among economistsned legislatorsw that whatever can be more

ese things, to the extent that there is political back and forthnd delay, can cause real pain that can be avoided and should be avoided, as i have tried to point out, botht the micro level and at the macro level. i think while we can have good and should have arguments aozbot automating elements of stabilizers in the economy, i think we wouldro supportive of that, what is most important is that the next time we get a downturn that i'm pretty convinced that we will be hit with the voices that say wei think that would be a huge mistake. >> thank you. thank you all for joining us toda online. we are proud and glad to have been able to host the honorable jared bernstein, the 31st chair

of the council of economic advisers, for a presentation on the first chapter of the economic report of the president, 2024, the benefits of full employment. thank you very much. >> thank you so much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2024] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [indiscernible chatt]■b■■ñ■u■"