the solicitor general who argued on ha of the united states and were sort of asking the fer public defender who represented rahimi, there were som questions for him from the chief justice john roberts saying it sent your client by any definition a dangerous person? listen to the justices, what they think about the constitutionality of this law and more broadly we are listening to what the justices might say in this case that the effect of the gun rights cases going forward. announcer: amy howe, one of the founders of scotus blog, thank you so much for yo te.

>> grew in rognized that congress may disarm those that are t w-abiding, responsible citizens. at principle is firmly grounded in history and tradition. legislatures have disarm those who have committed seou criminal conduct or clues access to guns poses a danger. loyalists, rebels, miners, individuals with mental illness, fens felons, and drug addict. rahimi offers noisrical evidence that those saws were thought to violate the right to bear arms or that the second amendment was originally understood to prevent legislatures from disarming dangerous individuals are just right that the fthircuit held this as unkind additional because the founding generation

did not design domestic abuser in particular. they specifically approved the kind of demand for historic old twin. the apprchrom that second amendment's original meaning a ul enact this sort of regulatory straight jacket this court disclaims. i welcome the courts questions. >> would you briefly define what you meany w-abiding members on civil rights of course. >> i wou te that into it to constituents opponents with respect to those who are not laabing, history and tradition shows it is defined by those who have cmied serious crimes defined by the felony level punishment that n be aacd to those crimes. we think hisrynd tradition shows that it applies to those whose possession of firearms pose an unusual danger beyond the ordinary citizen with respect to themselves or others. >> this is a simple act.

i think we could agree these were criminal proceedings. what if someone is categorized as irresponsible for not storing firearms properly? >> so i think that there would be a history and tradition to support the idea that if someone has an release or their firearms in the rated other conduct that they are not fit to keep and bear arms, they would fit within this category of those were not -- >> hello you you had a list of classes and individuals who were excluded in your opening argument. below you included in that class or in those classes slaves and native americans. why did you drop those classes? >> we have not invoked those laws that this stage of the

proceedings because we think they speak to a distinct principle. a hook that at the particular point in time those people viewed as not being protected by the second amendment in the first sentence. obviously that was a odious classification but those laws were generally accompanied by stripping of other political rights or ability to participate in the political community. we think they were justified at that time on that basis. the reason we have not invoked them here is we are focusing on the more directly relevant laws that apply to those who are in -- indisputably among the people that nevertheless fit within this constitutional principle that the legislature has authority to draw lines and make judgments about those whose access to firearms will create that untenle risk of danger. >> is someone who drive 30 miles per hour and a five mile an hour zone, does that person qualify as law-abiding or not? >> i think that would not apply

to the extent that it is classified. we think history and tradition there supports a conclusion you can disarm those who have committed serious crimes, so it is not just any kind of conduct that is the defense would qualify. >> are you making a misdemeanor felony distinction? >> i think that is the relevant category with respect to law-abiding citizens. we are not directly invoking the law-abiding aspect of the principal because mr. rahimi did not have the kind of criminal record that would justify disarmament on that basis. arguments are directed at the standard. >> responsibility is a very broad concept. not taking the recycling to the curb. if it is a serious problem, it is irresponsible.

setting a bad example like yelling at a basketball game in a particular way. it seems to me that the problem with the responsibility is it is extremely broad, and what seems irresponsible to some people might not seem like a big deal to others, so what is the model? do you go back to what was your responsible in the common law, or let's take a poll and see if people think it is irresponsible to get into a fist fight at a sports event where tempers were running high or what? >> i want to be really clear that we are not using the term not responsible to describe colloquially anyone demonstrating a responsibility and many of those contacts that you just described in your hypotheticals. instead we read this course case law, the articulation of that in civil tracking that language of the order here. the responsibility being

intrinsically tied to the danger you would present if you have access to firearms. >> you were using responsible as a placeholder for dangerous with respect to use of firearms? >> correct, that is how we understand history and tradition and the reason we use the term not responsible is because the standard this court itself articulated in heller and repeated a mcdonald and repeated again in berlin -- bruin. it gets at the guide that some of the categories of people that can be disarmed may not be dangerous or culpable like those that are mentally ill or minors. they would present a danger if they were armed. >> there is no daylight at all between not responsible and who

is dangerous? >> with respect to the particular understanding of how the word is used the term is identifying those whose possession of firearms presents an unusual danger beyond the ordinary citizen that i would try the analogy to sensitive places in dangerous unusual weapons. those categories of people beyond the ordinary citizen possessed a particular danger that they have access to a firearm. >> so it is not a synonym for virtue? >> we are not. we think that. there was a direct link under the responsible for this principle to danger and to rethink the disarmament provision i'm defending here clearly satisfies that link, because it requires individualized findings of dangerousness and the legislative consensus that individuals present in this category represent the level of danger. >> someone who is guilty or

having a restraining order. someone poses a risk of domestic violence is dangerous. how does the government go about showing whether certain behavior qualifies as dangerous? you can imagine a more marginal cases. you've invoked the consensus among that states -- i don't think you'll get a lot of pushback because this is violence. what about more marginal cases? >> i should emphasize this is subject to meaningful judicial review with a couple of different categories. at the outset i would take the class that require individual's finding of danger and save those for the heartland as tested. we have a specific order here that mr. rahimi's conduct was dangerous to his intimate partner. then you have categories where categorical judgments that individuals certain --

the factors i would point to first would be the breath of the law because we know that the second amendment was intended to prevent disarming wide swaths of the american public in capturing people we think of ordinary citizens, that will be a problem. next i would look at the justifications and evidence before the legislature. like sensitive places. you can look and see if that place is dangerous if there weapons there. you can look at the evidence the legislature was consulting with regard to dangerousness, and then the third factor would be legislative consensus. some legislatures can be the first mover, and if multiple legislatures enact an unconstitutional law that does not give you say barbara, but i do think legislatures are best position to make these kinds of predictive judgments about dangerousness, and if you have the kind of incentives we see here that is entitled to a lot

of weight in the analysis. -- what would we do with that in this situation? >> so i don't think historical

attitudes about dangerousness would you controlling with respect to modern-day circumstances, and i would draw an analogy to dangerous unusual weapons. the court has recognized handguns were not in, possession at the time of the founding and might of been considered unusual weapons then, but that is not with the court would look at. >> is that because it is a new technology? the circumstance with respect to domestic violence clearly existed back in the day. i am trying to understand how the test works in a situation in which there is at least some evidence that domestic violence was not considered to be subject to the kinds of regulation that it is today. so when we are looking under that test for historical analogs, i guess a series of regulations that relate to

disarming dangerous people, i need to understand what that would enough. >> let me respond to the methodological point to respond to the specific questions you have raised. on the methodological point i do not think you could read bruin to restatements that specifically disarm abusers because that would impose on the government the development of a plan of origination and original meeting is not dictated by the happenstance of whether there was a law in the books in 1791 that happened to disarm domestic abusers. you have to come up with the level of generality and use history and tradition to help identify and discern the enduring constitutional principles that define and limit -- >> what if we had a hypothetical in which we actually determined based on historical record that domestic violence was not considered dangerous back in the

day? i don't know what we do with that scenario. >> in that scenario you would recognize it is consistent with the second amendment's original and enduring meaning that you can disarm dangerous people in the perception it permits today is not controlled by founding era applications of the principal. >> what is the point of going to the founding era? if we are still applying modern sensibilities, i do not understand the historical framing? >> the work they history and tradition are doing is helping to discern those principles in the first place. the framers did not ban firearms in schools even though they existed at the fountain, but the court to recognize those analogs in their historical bending of firearms in places where they present safety concerns and justify a modern regulation that does justify the banning of weapons in schools.

we are not asking the court to break new ground here and say today, section 922 g8 is a clear application of that principle. justice jackson, i want to push back on the idea and premise is that there was evidence at the founding that you could disarm domestic abusers. there was no evidence to suggest they would have thought that crossed a constitutional line, and the fact that domestic violence was subject to a very different legal and societal regime at the time and was not viewed as the kind of system that warrants governmental interference cannot be held against us now that we are thinking about how congress is reacting to the profound threat domestic violence prevents -- presents. >> one section of the provision at issue here is a finding that the person represents a notable threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner or child,

but another provision applies with the order by its terms specifically prohibits the use, attempted use or threatened use of force. that does not require a finding of dangerousness. why is this necessary and how can that be justified? >> ultimately i think it would have to find dangerousness to entertain the conjunction. this is a universal equitable principle that applies in texas and all of the states, and what it means is a judge who is considering a request for a protective order would not have a basis in law to enter that subparagraph prohibition on the use of physical force unless the judge thought that the forest was sufficiently likely to materialize. >> we are told in some of the amicus briefs that there are situations in which a family judge u.s. to act quickly and

may not have any investigative resources faces a she said-she said situation, and the judge says i will issue an order like this against both of the parties. >> i think that is largely a mischaracterization of what is happening in the state courts it day in and day out. with respect to mutual protective orders in particular the vast majority of states either prohibit outright or substantially restricted the entry of those kind of mutual protective orders, in the account is trying to suggest or insinuate that these state courts are nevertheless entering protective orders that are not justified by the facts and the law, and that flies in the face of the presumption of regularity that this court applies in this context. even the data on the ground do not bear out the assertions that family courts are reflexively

entering these kinds of protective orders. in this specific counties there were 522 request the resulted into 89 final protective orders. even as a statistical matter it is incorrect to say that invariably disorders are being entered without any basis. >> is there anything that a person who is subject to one of these orders can do if the person claims that there was not really sufficient notice or that due process rights were violated in some way or that any need for the protective order as expired. presumably the person could go back to the state court that entered the order, but if the state court is complete we are receptive to that is there any other avenue for relief? >> i think it is important to parse at different aspects of the question.

certainly the individual can challenge the notice for the hearing, so if the argument is i did not receive the notice or did not have an opportunity to participate that would be a defense because the section requires that. >> the person thinks that he or she is in danger and once you have a firearm. is that person's only recourse to possess a firearm and take their chances if they get prosecuted? >> no, i think the person it would have an advocacy see the ability to within the state court system to challenge the protective order, but i don't think there would be any basis to collaterally challenge that and ultimately this reflects the history and tradition demonstrating that there are certain categories of people where we don't have to tolerate the risks of armed domestic violence they would present even in situations where they might claim they need to have a gun for other reasons. >> there is no recourse before

the federal court? >> they could seek recourse in the state courts themselves and protest the notice and opportunity for hearing, but if a court has entered a protective order that complies with the restrictions, that a federal court can rely on that in enforcing this prohibition. >> is there any possibility of administrative relief? >> at the state level there are certain mechanisms where people can seek relief, and these protective orders are inherently time-limited. it varies a little bit at the state level. i've seen provisions that authorize the imposition of these protective orders from six months up to about five years of -- and most commonly they are in effect for just about one year. that also means that disarmament lasts only so long as the danger is in effect. >> the alameda county's public

defender's amicus brief says some restraining orders are permanent. is that true? and if that is true having to justify a permanent prohibition even if any danger is disappeared? >> i am not aware of state law authority that authorizes or that it routinely enters permanent protective orders. as i mentioned this varies across state law so i don't want to suggest that there is universal answer, but these orders are generally time-limited or provide mechanisms for the courts >> thank you. >> just to be clear, none of the situations that justice alito is pointing to are the fact of this case, correct? on the statute, and the constitutionality of the statute is what is at issue. >> that's right.

the fifth circuit -- to the extent the court has been left with the impression and some of these amicus briefs, that the protective orders are routinely entered without a basis to conclude someone presents the individualized finding of danger, i do not think there's any record of evidence to support that conclusion here. i would say this runs counter to the presumption of regularity the court ordinarily affords in this contact, but also runs counter to recognition and circumscribing of 922 g8 to confirm that those who have noticed -- >> in the end if there are due process failures in any system failure that would be subject to a separate college, -- separate challenge? i would like to go back to your law-abiding for responsible citizen category. i now understand why you think

it's appropriate. you think dangerous is limited because we have restrictions on the age of people possessing firearms and on the mentally ill , and i understand that not necessarily dangerous, but i guess the lack of responsibility or judgment could be questioned. >> what i would say is you few think they are dangerous, even if they don't -- if they are not culpable, if there's an inherent risk on their qualities or characteristics that doesn't and straits as to the ordinary citizen that allowing them access to firearms will present at risk of danger to self or others. >> if we use danger the way you are defining them, you don't need responsible citizen category? >> yes. i think these are essentially getting at the same

concept. we have tracked the courts on language and i think it would be important if the court wants to refer to concept of dangerousness to make clear it is not backtracking from what it said in heller, mcdonald and bruen that you can disarm those who are not law-abiding citizens, with the mentally ill being an exempt category. the court held up to illustrate that proposition. the term responsible gets out the broader term gets that those who might be harmed because of the risk of danger. i was going to say, if the court were to reform -- refer to concepts of dangerousness, it's important to be clear it's not backtracking to what it said in prior cases and not just the court is concept in the abstract, it is embedded in how second amendment analysis operates. the court said background checks are ok because they are intended to decide whether you are the kind of ordinary, law-abiding

responsible citizen in the first place, or when you are looking at whether someone's dangerous, is this the weapon they law-abiding citizen would need for self-defense? i think there's a risk of creating confusion aut that. >> thank you, counsel. i guess to get back to the beginning, why did you use the term responsible if what you meant was dangerous? responsible presents all sorts of problems and dangerous assertive a different set of considerations. if you thought that our prior precedents were talking about dangerous, it was confusing to find responsible being the operative term. >> we relied on the same phrasing the court itself is like we were trying already back at night to point out the category that's consistent with the original meaning under the second amendment and we followed

the courts leading. those who are not law-abiding responsible citizens. >> just to be clear, your argument today is that it doesn't apply to people who present the threat of dangerousness, whether you want to characterize them as responsible or irresponsible, the test you are asking us to adopt turns on dangerousness. >> correct, for those who are not responsible citizens. i want to be clear we think there are different principles that apply to those -- we don't think dangerousness is the standard there although there will be a lot of overlap defined by its own history and tradition. we do think dangerousness defines the category of those who are not responsible. >> thank you. justice thomas. >> if this were a criminal proceeding, then you would have a determination of what you are talking about, someone would be convicted of a crime, a felony, assault or something. but here you have something

that's anticipatory or predicted where a court is making the determination. just from an analytical standpoint, would there be a difference between a criminal determination and civil determination? >> i don't think it would make a difference with respect to whether the legislature can create categories of people who are considered dangerous or not responsible and that is informed by history and tradition here. it is not the case the only disarmament provisions existing overtime targeting those were dangerous are provisions that focus on those with criminal convictions. that's an important component of the law-abiding standard but we have a number of examples from throughout history of those who were disarmed even after civil adjudications or a civil like process. >> would you give me an example? >> for example, mental illness. this is what keller held up as a

criticism even though mental illness in the legal system has been adjudicated through civil proceedings. that was through for loyalists. the disarmament provisions on loyalists were those who refused to take a loyalty oath so there was not a necessity of a criminal condition. and so too for those who are intoxicated. i think there's a long-standing tradition here of recognizing individuals can be determined through predictive judgment to be dangerous in the absence of a criminal conviction. >> one last question. this is a judicial determination. would you be able to make the same arguments if it had been an administrative determination? >> i think it would be far more difficult to defend an executive branch or administrative determination because of a separate second amendment principle that guards against granting executive officials too much discretion to decide who cannot have firearms. there was some history about that in england of course, but

in the american legal tradition, these principles have been deployed through legislative judgments or through express judicial findings of dangerousness. i don't think we can point at the same history and tradition of giving executive branch officials that discretion. >> justice alito. >> suppose a jurisdiction enacted a concealed carry promoting regulation that is almost identical to the one we invalidated in except it requires an applicant to show that he or she is sufficiently responsible. with that reconstitution? >> if that were implemented through a system of executive discretion as i was discussing with justice thomas, i think there could be additional principles that come into play that would guard against that kind of licensing.

if someone's was in a mental institution of so forth, that could be deployed as part of the background check and bruen suggested as much. >> in response to my question about the provision that prohibits possession of a firearm by someone against whom an order prohibiting violence has been entered and the provision is not on its face require a finding of dangerousness, if i recall, your answer was state laws generally do require that and any way equitable principles require that. suppose someone is later prosecuted for violating that provision. would it be a defense for that person to say that the state law in question did not require such a finding and in fact there was

no such finding in my case? >> i don't think that would provided basis to challenge the order in the federal prosecution and we don't think there should be a system of as a pride challenges. what we know is congress is entitled to make categorical judgments of dangerousness based on history and tradition, even if there are edge cases where that predictive judgment wasn't actually necessary to guard against the danger there. if what you're suggesting is there might be a out there that is ordering judges to enter the subparagraph prohibition without basis to think physical forces likely, a person would have a strong due process challenge to that kind of law and that would likely be invalidated on the separate basis, but it doesn't provide due process if it's requiring courts to enter relief that the facts in the law don't support. >> justice sotomayor. justice kagan?

>> there seems to be a fair bit of division and confusion about what bruen means and requires in the lower courts. i'm wondering if you think there is any useful guidance in addition to resolving this case, but any useful guidance we can give to lower courts about the methodology that bruen requires being used and how that applies to cases even outside of this one. >> yes. i think there are three fundamental errors in methodology the case exemplifies and we are seeing repeated and other lower courts and this provides an opportunity for the court to clarify bruen should not be interpreted in the way the respondent is jesting -- suggesting. the first error is the respondent asserted here and other courts embrace the idea that the only thing that matters under bruen's regulation. in other words, you can't look at other sources of history that usually bear on original meaning. i don't think that can be

squared with this court's precedents which consulted a wide variety of historical sources. the same kind of evidence we've come forward with here about english practice, state constitutional precursors, treatises, commentary and state judicial decisions. all of that is evident -- evidence about the scope of the second amendment rights and i think the court could make clear it's not a regulation only test. i think looking just as regulations themselves, one of the problems with how courts are acquiring bruen is the level of generality which they pursed the historical evidence. court after court has looked at the governments examples and pick them apart to say taking them one-way one, there's a minute difference between how the regulation operated in 1791 or the ensuing decades and have section 922 provisions operate today. i think that comes close to requiring us to have a dead ringer when bruen said that's not necessary. the way constitutional interpretation usually precedes is use history in regulation to

identify enduring principles that define the scope of the second amendment right. we think you should make clear the court should come up a level of generality and not nitpick the historical analogs to that degree. third and finally, in many instances, courts are placing weights on the axis of regulation and there's no reason to think it was due to constitutional concerns. here, we don't have a regulation disarming domestic abusers, but there's nothing on the other side of the interpretive question to suggest anyone thought you couldn't disarm domestic abusers or dangerous people. in that context, i think to suggest the absence of regulation bears substantially on the second amendment is to take a wrong term. it is contrary to the situation in bruen where there was historical evidence to say states can completely prohibit public carry. against the evidence you might say that the absence of regulation is significant.

but here, there's nothing on the other side of this interpretive question. it shows you should not hold the absence of a direct regulation against us. >> thank you. >> justice gorsuch. >> good morning, general. i want to follow up on yours response to justice kagan. the level of generality question. do you think the level of generality -- i take your point you have surety laws, a lot of historical evidence. may be a historical twin. you are saying we should overlook that. in the same way, i think you would say the analysis also applies to the right side of the ledger. the regulation side and the right side. we are not looking for is it a fowler or musket. is that a fair understanding of how you see the law? >> yes, we think it applies in both directions, the rite itself

and understanding the limitations built into the right. >> you had a discussion about the length of time that some of these orders last. you emphasized that you're only arguing for a temporary dispossession. i guess i'm wondering on a facial challenge, do we need to get into any of that? normally we ask on a facial challenge, is there any set of circumstances in which the disposition would be lawful. there may be a separate band with a lifetime separation. is that how you see, too? >> i agree that would be a separate challenge, yes. a good reason to reject challenges as they come from the work because of traditional judgments that we support. >> along the same lines of that

aspect of it, given the plaintiff before us -- respondent, sorry, has been adjudicated as rc1 and found a credible threat, the dangerous argument seems most apparent. we don't know how much all states administers see two regimes. >> i agree this is a challenge and the court could find analysis to see one. i would make to responses. one is to say i think it will be difficult for the court to avoid the c2 issue. we have a pending petition where the fifth circuit has invalidated an application of the statute in a c2 context. unless you want to see me here on this term in this issue -- >> always delighted to see you. [laughter] >> we think it's an important part of the statute the second thing i would say is even if you wanted to confine your allow to see one, i think at the least you would have to reject some of the key premises of respondent's arguments in this case. that relates to the colloquy i had with justice kagan. the level of generality pursing

the regulation, the fact that we still don't have a domestic violence example. in particular the arguments that legislatures can't disarm anybody that persons can be disarmed -- >> all of that, got you. the same thing with due process. we don't have a due process challenge before us so we don't need to resolve any of that either. >> that's correct. he did not make a due process claim here. >> some lower courts have recognized a duress defense. 922 charges. someone has invaded their home and they use themselves a go may have illegally in self-defense. what is the government's view on that? >> i want to be careful here because i have not actually reviewed the cases you must be referring to. i would have to take a look at those to provide you with a well thought out government view on that issue. obviously, we recognize there are distinctive legal doctrines like necessity of defense that can come into play. i'm sorry i don't have that -- >> what would you counsel us to do about them?

i know it's not fitting in see you have not reviewed them, the but there are common-law defenses of necessity and duress. when it's not the subject of a protective order but home invasion for example. >> i would urge the court not to say anything about the doctrines here where we have a facial challenge and where rahimi is not making that defense. i would save it for another day how the court my thing about those issues where they are squarely presented. >> you very much. >> justice kavanaugh. >> to follow-up with your colloquies on the chief justice and justice sotomayor, i want to make sure i have the terminologies correct as you see it. one category you think the government can prohibit possession by those who are not law-abiding, and you said that encompasses serious offenses. is that correct? >> that's correct, we would defined by felony level punishment. >> ok. the second is the government can prohibit possession by those who are not responsible and by that you mean those who are dangerous. >> yes, those whose possession

of firearms would present a danger to themselves or others but they don't have to be intentionally dangerous, which gets at the culpability question. >> good, thank you. >> justice barrett. >> my question is on the law-abiding responsible also. i understood the use of that phrase in the prior cases to describe the would be gun owners in those cases. we are not talking about who might be able to disarm. there might be other people. but all of those people were law-abiding and responsible and there was no allegation that they were not. but it seems to me that in your brief and in parts of the argument the government is asking for that to be a test. i don't we presented it as a test. do you see a reason for us to used that as the test, law-abiding and responsible, given some of the ambiguities in that phrase? >> i would not describe it as a test. . i would describe it as a relevant category.

the shorthand to get us the idea that legislatures consistent with the second amendment can take action to disarm particular types of people whose possession of weapons present these types, of concerns either they committed serious crimes or present a danger. i would use this as shorthand in the same way the court has referred to the sensitive places principal or the dangerous and unusual weapons principal. >> so could i just say it's dangerousness? let's say i agree when you look at the surety laws etc. that it shows the legislature can make judgments to disarm people consistent with the second amendment based on dangerous, why can't i just say that? >> we agree that's what history and tradition show and defines the scope of those who are not as possible. we don't think dangerousness is a standard with law-abiding. i recognize we might have different views on that. we don't need to resolve that here. this is a case about someone who is not responsible in the form of being dangerous. we would be happy with the decision that said legislatures for time immemorial but american history have been able to disarm those who are dangerous.

>> you are>> trying to say the range issue, not applying dangerousness to the crimes? >> correct. we think there are additional arguments that can be made for felon disarmament and those defend -- depend on the unique history and additional interactive criminal conduct. >> persuade in a future case, yes. thank you. >> justice jackson. >> to clarify and what you said to justice barrett, the determination of dangerousness would be evaluated based on what modern legislatures think counts as dangerous. we are not bound to what qualified as dangerous back in the day? >> that's correct. we think once the court recognizes the principle that history and tradition support this durable principle you can disarm dangerous people, then the question becomes for follow on challenge, whether the legislature with respect where particular category as appropriately deemed these individuals dangerous, and therefore fitting within that historical tradition.

i think the inquiry there would not be confined to how the founders thought about dangerousness. instead it would turn on some of the factors i was discussing early with justice barrett about the breadth of the law and evidence that supports the legislative judgment -- >> the kinds of things we used to look at with the tears of scrutiny, what's the justification for this, is that what you're saying? >> no, i don't think this is just a revival of means and scrutiny. we wouldn't be asking a court to balance the intrusion on individual interest against the weight of the government interest. this is about whether the legislature has classified a law following with the principal in the first place. it's not about balancing those interests but looking at the legislature's predictive judgment of dangerousness and determining whether it's justified. >> let me ask about your first point about methodological error you identified in response to justice kagan. you say that the courts are focusing too much just on regulation, legislation and not

on other indices of historical tradition's. you were talking with justice thomas at the beginning. you seemed to suggest that the tradition with respect to slaves and native americans would not be subject to consideration for this. in other words, only the regulation as it relates to certain segments of society i guess count underneath this historic traditions test. >> the reason we have not invoked other laws is because we think there were applications of a separate principal under second amendment. those who are not considered among the people can be disarmed and that has the textual hook and the court in heller defined those is not part of the political community. when we look at how the laws operated, they stripped the affected individuals from all rights to participate -- >>

i understand that but where does it leave us in respect to the application of the test?i'm trying to understand if there's a flaw in history and tradition framework to the extent that when we look at history and tradition, we are not considering the history and tradition of all of the people but only some of the people as per the governments articulation of the test. >> i certainly think those laws were a part of history. we don't think they are part of history that are irrelevant to the separate issue here and pointed to a variety of other laws we think more clearly bear on the issue of when legislatures can disarm those among the people. >> and finally, let me ask you prospectively from the standpoint of a legislator today. we have talked about the retrospective view of this, when there is existing gun control measure challenged, how to be determined by looking at history whether or not it is constitutional but let's say i'm a legislator today in maine for example. i'm very concerned about what

has happened in that community and my people, the constituents are asking me to do something. do you we -- read brew in as step one, going to the archives and trying to determine whether or not there is some historical analogue for the kinds of legislation i'm considering? >> no, i think bruen requires a close look at history and tradition and analog to the extent they exist and are relevant for purposes of articulating the principal that once you have the principal locked in and here that could be you can disarm those who are not responsible or dangerous, i don't think it's necessary to effectively repeat the same historical analogical analysis for purposes of determining whether a modern-day legislatures disarmament provision fits within the category. instead i think you would look at the factors i was articulating earlier in response to justice barrett about the evidence of dangerousness,

consensus view whether legislatures think of this circumstances being dangerous, the breadth of the law and other factors. >> but if the principal has not yet being established, what do i do as a legislator? >> if there is no relevant principal along with slot light-sensitive place regulation or dangerous person, you would conduct a bruen analysis to help identify those principles of the constitution that defined the scope of the second amendment right, but it wouldn't just be a hunch for a particular precise historical analogue. i think that's a caricature of bruen and that makes the second amendment a true outlier. there's no constitutional right dictated exclusively by whether there happened to be a parallel law on the books in 1791. >> thank you. >> thank you counsel.

>> thank you, mr. chief justice and may it please the court. my friend described several times the government principle that in this case, they are not relying on any analogs that were direct it at people who were not part of the people, outside the community, national political community entirely. that means loyalist laws are off the analogical spectrum because loyalists were also pervasively deprived of all the rights of the people and citizenship. they were enemies. the government said so in the amicus brief. in response to justice gorsuch about how the courts of appeals handled self-defense, necessity and duress, we cited on page 11, it will show you how they handle it. there's effectively not one, even brief possession that lasts a little longer while being

chased by people, not enough. there's no real keeping for self-defense exception to the principle. i think it was justice alito's question of duration of protective orders. by default, they can be permanent and i'll obama, colorado, montana and washington, no limit in florida, michigan or vermont, 10 years in arkansas, five years in california ohio and south dakota. in texas where the default is two years if a judge finds or a finding is made felony violence is committed, it can be five years and the time is told like when someone's in jail. while it may be the case that if we counted whether 51 or 52, it is not the case that they are short. the danger with any kind of historical inquiry is like the person looking down a well. it feels like what the government is doing is looking

down the dark well of american history and seeing only a reflection of itself in the 20th and 21st century and saying that's what history shows. when congress enacted section 922 g8 in 1994, it acted without the benefit of heller, mcdonald and bruen so we should not be surprised they missed the mark. they made a one-sided proceeding that is short, incomplete proxy for a total denial of a fundamental and individual constitutional right. at this time i would welcome questions from the court. >> council, would you take a bit of your time to recount exactly what happened below in this case, not in the district court but in state court for smart >> in state court, we know little for certain. we have the order which was an exhibit to the federal complaint which reflects certain findings and we have shown those are common in this one county in texas.

if you did an electronic search of appellate cases in texas with the words credible threat and physical safety, i think you would only find three unpublished appellate cases from this county. there are words in it but it was not a disputed finding. it was an agreed order. my client who was unrepresented and the tarrant county district attorney entered into a stipulation, the order was entered, the language was in the order, and that's it. i believe that more happened. we can figure it out if we pull out the records, but those are not relevant. what happens in civil proceedings doesn't matter for the purposes of 922 g8. >> what does matter is we are assuming dangerousness or irresponsibility, take your pick , and we have a very thin record

and i'm trying to get a sense of what actually happened in this case. >> there were allegations in the federal presentence report which made their way into the opinion below. if i could distinguish between the facts the court found for purposes of fixing a sentence in the case and the facts that could be contested at a jury and subject of the guilty plea essential to the conviction. in terms of the former category, there was a finding that there was a physical assault and someone had attempted to intervene and mr. remy had fired a gun into the air -- mr. rahimi had entered and fired a gun into the air. the federal report found those actions preceded and were the cause for the protective order.

>> counsel, you mentioned the self-defense duress necessity concerns in your opening, but this is a facial challenge so we have to ask, is it unconstitutional in any application including cases where the circumstances don't exist. we don't have to address those in this case, do we? >> your honor, i think we do have to because the existence of such a defense is part of the crime. if the lower courts have consistently held, or is is rare -- hence tooth rare -- >> i have not heard that in a while. >> that plays into the facial analysis of the statute. one of the areas we diverge is that facial versus as applied distinction. even this court finds that

distinction amorphous sometimes. but in this case, by a facial challenge, we made the elements specifically targeting conduct presented by the plaintext. >> if i were to disagree with you, there would be an as applied challenge available later in those cases? >> if you were to disagree with me, yes. >> the same when it comes to temporary disposition. but that is not what is necessarily for us in a facial challenge. we have to ask if it's unconstitutional in the facial challenge. >> that test i think is primarily remedial and comes up in the civil context where someone is suing to enjoin the enforcement of a statute, so the salerno test comes into play.

typically that assumes a valid application of the statute and then the complaint is either there's too much outside or my case is outside. ours is a facial challenge in the way lopez was a facial challenge where the facts of lopez were clearly in congress' power. the court found the facts of the case where person eight -- person a was going to pay lopez $40 to give the person c the gun after school. the statute itself is not in the congress power to enact. so that failed as it existent, the pre-amendment of the gun free school zones act on its face. >> i want to go back to your conversation with justice thomas and touch about what you said to justice gorsuch -- gorsuch about the thinness of the proceeding. she did submit a sworn affidavit about the details of the threat. it's not like he just showed up

in the judge said credible finding of violence. >> i know that to be true, and it is a matter of public record. so i don't mean to suggest that, i mean in terms of what was necessary for the federal prosecution. what we could have defended the case on for the federal jury. what happened before whether it was good or bad does not matter under the statute. we take that as a given under this course in lewis where there is a conceited constitutional problem th the underlying felony prosecution. >> you have not raised a due process challenge either, right? the second amendment challenge strictly speaking. >> that's correct. lewis says congress intended when it passed the gun control act in 1968 is that those matters are off the table. in lewis, there's no doubt there's a violation of due process, however there no fifth amendment claim against a felon

in possession even if the underlying felony is unlawful, so we take that as a given when we come to a statute like this. even if we could show a due process issue with respect to the issuance of the protective order, that would be no defense against the federal prosecution. if i'm wrong about that, i'm happy to hear it. >> it would have been in the state prosecution potentially. you could've had a due process argument and raised it there. >> you are right and that gets to an important point. because congress has made this a per se automatic disarmament and tied it to the issuance of a protective order, there is no due process required before a court enters an order in and joining me from committing physical abuse against someone else. that's not a protected right. we have a proceeding designed to adjudicate small rights or no

rights and then based on the findings of that, we take consequential actions that go against an individual's fundamental right to keep arms, citizenship. i'm not aware of any due process that would apply with respect to the part of the order that 922 g8 cares about, the one that says you cannot abuse that person. in that sense, there's no due process claim. congress -- >> you are not saying before a protective order is entered there's no due process rights and individual has come are you? is that the position you want to take >> >>? for a g8 order -- >> i'm talking about the state order. the duke process clause is silent before a protective clause entered against an individual? >> to the extent that it's for bidding physical abuse, i don't think you have right to due

process before that is entered because you have no right to abuse anyone. >> you have no right to murder someone, but you -- we give you a trial. there's always process before life, liberty or property is taken from you. the measure of due process defends on circumstance. i'm surprised to hear you say the fifth and 14th amendment due process clauses don't apply to an individual who is being subject to a protective order. >> i think depending on what the protective order required. those probably kick in. in the same way this were true disarmament proceeding. this court i don't think announced the criterion that would be required in something like a red flag law. everyone's attention is focused on the loss of firearm rights. there would be certain requirements and we could argue it would need to be clear and convincing evidence but

certainly would need to be fundamentally fair because this is a fundamental right. that's not what any state does. there's typically no incentive and often no real opportunity to contest to the issuance of the order and in many cases, people are happy to consent because they don't want to be -- >> > want to clarify, you're right you don't have the right to commit islands but this order says a lot more. he is prohibited from communicating with his family, going within 200 yards of the residents. i think it paints a different issue with the due process rights that might apply. >> i agree. the due process clause would impose limits against involuntary termination of access to one's children for instance. if that's what i implied, i did not mean to. i don't mean to suggest the due process clause doesn't matter. >> may i ask about your basic argument here? i'm just going to read a sentence from the brief and i

wanted to know if that's your central argument. it says the government has yet to find even a single american jurisdiction that adopted a similar band while the founding generation walked the earth. is that what we should be looking for, and if we don't find that similar band, we say that the government has no right to do anything? >> i think that's largely what bruin says. however, i don't think it has to be so narrow. if the government could affirmatively prove from the historical tradition of american firearms laws, or the way we have treated other constitutionally protected rights. if they could tie it to one of those historical traditions, that would be good enough under the logic of bruin -- >> i'm not quite sure what the answer means. i took that sentence to be saying we are looking for

regulation that even if it's not every job is essentially targeting the same kind of conduct as the regulation under review. the solicitor general told us that was the wrong approach and what bruin really directs courts to do is think about various principles that were operating at the time, whether those gave rise to a particular regulation that was near identical to the one under review. so i guess i'm asking you to comment on those two ways of understanding bruin. >> i think both methodological opinions lead to the same result . it's not just about domestic violence or a ban punishable by 10 years. that's the way some of the amici have described. i'm saying there's no band. no history of bands for people part of the national community.

i'm seeing the plain text of the second amendment and the early commentators like st. george tucker and william rauf said if you're just keeping the firearm -- >> that suggests you are looking for a ban on domestic violence, and 200 something years ago, the problem of domestic violence was conceived differently, people had a different understanding of the harm and the right of government to try to prevent the harm. people have different understanding with respect to pretty much every aspect of the problem. if you are looking for a ban on domestic violence, it will not be there. >> justice kagan, i'm looking for a band. the criminal punishment for just the keeping of a firearm. it is a slot on the loss of status of citizenship or being outside the community. i'm looking for a band that applies to a rights holding

american citizen. i suspect the response to that is criminally approved felony possession but felons are so different. there's a long tradition of denying people -- convicted of infamous crimes. if i could set that aside, there's no band. at the time, when the people of the time wrote about it, they wrote that there's no right to misuse of firearm. the allegations made against my client, we do not content that's against the second amendment. the behavior that's protected is the keeping of arms. i would concede there's a strong historical tradition of providing more restrictions against the right to public carry because that's where you encounter other people. this is someone keeping a firearm in his own home. the oldest american tradition of the federal government, which everyone agreed with was 1968.

it is late 20th century. so we disagree at a fundamental level whether there is this tradition. >> so your argument is except for someone convicted of a felony, a person may not be prohibited from possessing a firearm in the home. is that correct? >> i would add one more caveat. that is if severe criminal punishment will result because that is something heller itself and bruin itself took into the balance. the right that's protected is the right of someone by keeping the firearm for lawful purposes, how does the regulation infringe on that ? is it a small fine or loss of the weapon? if we figured out you had a weapon in your bedroom, you have to pay for it, but you will not

go to prison for 10 or 15 years or get felony liability. i think all those things together are important about the band because it is not based on rights to citizenship. it's a total ban and punishable by an incredible amount of prison time. >> let me give you an example. if a state judge determines a man has repeatedly threatened to shoot the members of his family, has brandished a gun, has terrified them and there's a restraining order preventing that man from possessing a fire arm any place including the home, is that constitutional? >> i think the answer is probably yes. i would want to know more about the historical tradition but certainly courts have always had broad power against the people who are brought before them. >> so the difference but -- you

see between the order and prosecution for violating the order is the fact that the latter imposes a felony punishment? >> that's one difference and an important difference. another is that the defendant had a real opportunity standing before the court to say number one, i didn't do that or number two, something was wrong with me , i will never do that again and i will move across the country to ensure they will be safe, but i'm frightened to be without my arms. so you'd have a chance to entry with the person putting in a restriction. if the restriction itself was unlawful, the person would have a chance to appeal it to a higher authority and say that the judge got it wrong. this is not lawful under the constitution or the substantive law. all those things are different in the situation you described and i think they are constitutionally significant

between that and what we have here. > are you suggesting if there's a sufficient showing of dangerousness, that can be basis for disarming even with respect for possession in the home? >> it's much closer for me because i've yet to see a historical example of that applied against a citizen. it would certainly be a last resort situation. >> to the extent it's pertinent, you don't have any doubt your clients a dangerous person, do you? >> i would want to know what dangerous person means. >> someone who is shooting at people. that's a good start. [laughter] >> that's fair. i will say this. imagine a statute that have been written is what zackey rahimi has been accused of statute. prescient legislators ahead of the game. if you've done all of these nine things and it has proven to a constitutionally significant level, you don't get to keep your gun. we will take it from you.

constitutional, 100%. >> i thought you just said no, there's no history of any kind of band for anything that doesn't relate to felonies. >> i want to be clear there is no one that i found anyway. i think it would stem from a courts historical equitable powers or the rights of the government to literally protect someone from imminent danger to life and limb. there are examples, the early justice of the peace manuals that talk about if you see someone on the way to commit a crime with a weapon, you can take the weapon and don't have to institute proceedings immediately. however you do have to institute them quick after that. >> i'm so confused because i thought your argument is that there was no history or tradition as justice kagan just said of this disarmament and circumstance but now sounds your objection is just for the process.

>> i'm not making judge ho's argument only. the law before us right now is a band passed by a legislature. you can't get around it. you can't even ask the state court to say i will accept a stayaway order, just give me permission to keep firearms for my own defense. that would not prevent the band from taking place. it has severe penalties and it applies everywhere, even in the home. i think all those things make this statute unconstitutional. i understood the question to be, what about something else? would that be unconstitutional? but we need a full workout on the history and tradition. that something i don't think the court can answer in this case because there's no such law before the court. >> it's a facial challenge and i understand your answer there will be circumstances where someone is shown to be

sufficiently dangerous, and why isn't that the end of the case? you just need to show there are circumstances in which the statute can be constitutionally applied. >> this statute doesn't take any firearm away. because there's a historical tradition of separating people from their firearms when there is an imminent threat of lawful violence and i think it's consistent with the court's traditional equitable powers that if nothing short of surrender would protect life and limb, the court can order surrender in the same way that if the police see someone is suicidal, of course the police can take the firearm away. they cannot keep it forever and they can't put someone in prison for 10 years because hhad the firearm. >> so i hear you isolating bands at the legislature as opposed to circumstances in which the court might have particular facts in this way.

is that what you doing? bands by the legislature are different than when we have facts of imminent potential danger and someone runs to the court, there might be history of that but that's different than a ban by the legislature such as what's happening here? >> yes. >> so i'm just trying to understand, your brief does indicate you are aware of historical bands, laws banning firearm possession by disfavored categories of people. the government talks about this as well. do you agree those kinds of bans we don't look at or care about when there's history and tradition here? >> yes, i don't want to speak for my friend. i understood the government's position as we don't want to speak for those laws in this case. it might still be on the table for someone outside politics.

number one, they are awful, terrible laws and we should not give credence to a suggestion that a legislator in 1870 in the south -- >> but we have a history and traditions test. i'm a little troubled by having a test though also requires some sort of culling of history so only certain people's history counts. what do we do with that? isn't that a flaw with respect to the test with mark >> the bruin test starts with a text. the court can make sure it is textual interpretation and correct and consistent with the understanding of the amendment. in the situation you are describing, those laws are not people part of the community. they were not seen as the people. when the laws challenged included in this court -- the

court was not dealing with a disarmament law but other laws targeting the groups. >> does that mean only>> foundational era as opposed to reconstruction era sources are on the table here? >> for purposes of the second amendment at applied against the government, absolutely, only founding era sources. people who understood they were bound by that. i don't see these steps of bruin as separate pieces. the court is trying to get at the meaning of the text. >> and in your view with respect to domestic violence, are we looking for history and tradition in the reconstruction era about how regulation was happening in the circumstance of domestic violence or no? the government says it can be done at the level of regulation of interest people with respect to firearms but you seem to be

suggesting and i think it's going back to the question justice kagan asked, that we are looking for reconstruction era sources. i suppose that applied to the regulation of white, protestant men related to domestic violence. is that the level we are focused on trying to find a history and tradition? >> no, your honor. i may not have been clear before, i think it's the founding error -- era. >> i apologize, the founding era. >> the founding era and it has to be the people. >> the people doing what though? do we drill down further and say it's the people which in that case did not include all the people but we identified the relevant people being relegated -- regulated. is it enough being regulated to dangerousness or are we looking for a regulation concerning this

set of circumstances? >> it does not have to be specific to domestic violence. interpersonal violence, dueling, robbery. society understood dangerous people, danger existed but they rejected at every point the kind of dangerousness disarmament principle the government is advocating. >> do you think congress can disarm people who are mentally ill and have been committed to mental institutions? >> setting aside and innumerate if problem in the district of columbia or something like that, all the examples the government cited our post-civil war sources . if not -- i think maybe. >> i will tell you the honest truth, i feel you are running away from your argument. the implications of your

argument are so untenable that you have to say it's not really my argument. it seems your argument applies to a wide radio of disarming actions, bans, what have you that we take for granted because it is so obvious that people who have guns pose a great danger to others and you don't give guns to people who have the kind of history of domestic violence your client has or to the mentally ill or what have you. i guess i'm asking to clarify your argument because you seem to be running away from it because you can't stand for the consequences of it are. >> your honor, i am running away from interest balancing. i'm aware the same argument could have been made in bruin, heller or mcdonald and were made

in those cases. legislators made a judgment it's dangerous to have people carrying weapons about. it's dangerous for handguns to be possessed. the current -- court did not defer to those early 20th century judgments about dangerousness. instead the court said we will follow our understanding of the original public meaning of the text as illuminated by the historical tradition of firearms regulation at the margin. if there's no such tradition, if you couldn't -- i'm supposing if you have examples of people having removed firearms, that historical record has not been built because that's not the law we have. i believe it's there and we can give additional examples where we could find support for that, but if there were no historical support we would be left with what the text says which is you have a right to keep arms.

in that sense, that would end. >> thank you counsel. justice thomas? >> just to be clear with your argument, you say their proceedings in state court, let's assume there was no 922 consequence. what would be the effect of that order? you would not be challenging that order? >> i wouldn't be challenging the order, but mr. rahimi minds. >> the reason i'm asking, you made the point that was a small matter and it has huge consequences. i think you said even if a respondent moves to another state or across the country, the consequences would be the same even though he would present no danger in texas.

just to be clear, you are not challenging the state court aspect of this? >> that's correct, your honor. >> in your language it was a per se violation or automatic violation of 922 and that is your problem? >> the possession of firearms, the bootstrapping of a proceeding that is one-sided and does not have any historical connection to the loss of citizenship rights. bootstrapping that is a conclusive presumption to a right the federal constitution parent he's against congress -- guarantees against congress. >> there was some talk about processing this under the due process laws later on or as applied challenge to this. how would you see that taking place if this is an art dramatic -- automatic disarmament?

>> i would be interested to read how it would proceed. my understanding is you cannot raise it in the 922 prosecution. in the state court itself, when it has been raised in state court, they typically point to the federal statute at site, congress said it's ok. i think 922 ga plays a role in that sense. if the issue is that you have tied a larger constitutional right to a smaller right, it's not clear what imposes that due process requirement on the state court, so i think that this was an agreed order because it does not have counsel, he does not have the ability to do it, and he is ultimately willing, i guess, to submit, maybe to avoid the attorney fees, which is a

way they get people to agree to these orders. that would not be fundamentally fair system if it were a red flag or disarmament provision. >> justice sotomayor? ok. justice gorsuch? >> one thing i want to get your response to in the government's writ. the government noticed a background check system that congress has created to not sell firearms to prohibited persons. domestic violence protective orders are incorporated into the system, which resulted in more than 75 1000 denials, the government says, based on these protective orders the last 25 years. under your argument, that system can no longer stop persons subject to domestic violence protective orders from buying firearms. just want to get your response to that. >> i think that is wrong for a couple of reasons. first of all, the same system

incorporates state privileges against firearm possession, so if there is a law or provision, it could be incorporated into the background check system. second, i would have to concede there is a historical tradition limiting who citizens, people within the community could provide residents to outside the community. it could be that historical tradition would support a restriction on commercial sale of arms. that is an argument that could be made in favor of that sort of provision or process that would not go away with 922 ga. just a highly technical matter, i understand that to be a function of 922 ba, which is restricting what they licensed firearm dealer can do, not ga, which is a restriction on possession, which is what my

client went to prison for. on the other hand, if you have a right to possess a firearm, certainly the acquisition of a firearm is closely connected to that, and constitutional implications would come into play. i just don't have a firm view on if a law that operated more like some of the earliest 20th-century laws that deal with the acquisition of arms, that might defy constitutional scrutiny. >> so it's possible the government is correct? >> no, i don't think it is possible. it is possible it would be unconstitutional to deny people the right to purchase firearms from a licensed dealer. i suspect that both existing law and constitutional law would allow those same people to be denied if we worked our way through the relevant provisions that are keeping them from doing it. >> thank you. >> the training order prevented

your firearm -- prevented your client from possessing a firearm and immediately a tandem license, was that unconstitutional? >> to take issue with the second part of the question first, that language is in all of these orders. >> let's go with the order's language, putting 922 aside. >> i think the answer to that question, then we would bring the whole record before the court, and the client agreed to the order, so it would be very difficult -- >> what you are going back to the process. >> right. >> she had the affidavit. let's imagine they go back and forth. let's imagine it's the most wholesome process. she testifies, he cross-examined her, would it be constitutional to deprive your client of his

handgun license? you said there is no analog of this kind of domestic violence. quickly analog would be in terms of what court could do through equitable power. >> if the finding was nothing short of seven or of firearms would prevent damage, that would be constitutional. i don't know if that answers your question or not. >> i guess i'm just trying to get a clear answer to if we are looking for historical analogs related to domestic violence or something broader. you suggested -- your brief i'm now revisiting suggests the government make no laws punishing members of the community for possessing firearms in their own homes

based on dangerousness, irresponsibility, crime prevention, violent history, or any other character trait. so you just say there are no bands that relate to any of those things? >> that's my understanding of the historical record. >> if the government were to convince us there is a ban related to dangerousness, do you lose? i thought your point was even if there is some dangerousness tradition, it has to be about the mystic violence -- domestic violence. >> that's not my point. people could argue that, but i don't think -- certainly, there is some point at which someone could be separated from a firearm. this law does not do that at all for anyone. this is just can you be punished for keeping a firearm? i think that the text of the constitution says no. early commentators would say no, at least as far as congress doing. in terms of the level of

abstraction, i don't see how this case presents that because there's just nothing -- no ban, no bands against right hold -- rights holders. >> thank you, mr. chief justice. my friend began his argument this morning in response to a question from justice kagan saying that he does read bruin to require the government to come forward with a precise historical analog in order to justify a modern-day firearm regulation. i think that is a clearly incorrect reading. unfortunately, it's a profound misreading that many lower courts have been adopting, and i think it important for the court to understand the destabilizing consequences of that reading in the lower court. just as was -- just last week, the court invalidated the prohibition statute on its face as applied to the most violent and horrific crimes imaginable on the theory the government did not have a sufficiently precise historical analog.

several district court have credited perception by armed criminals who have multiple convictions for criminal assault, drug trafficking, armed robbery, clearly violent crime because we do not have a historical analog, and the court has also invalidated on its face the provision of federal law that prohibits possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers, again on the theory that we don't have a founding era analog that is sufficiently precise. i think those are clearly untenable. they are profoundly destabilizing, and bruin does not require them. once the court correct the misinterpretation, i think the constitutional principle is clear. you can disarm dangerous persons, and under that principle, section 922 g8 is an easy case for three reasons. first, it requires an individualized finding of

dangerousness. i think i heard my friends concede today that those findings do suffice for disarmament, and he questions if the process in state court judicial proceedings is sufficient, but that ultimately is a procedural claim that should be adjudicated under the due process clause, and i think it ignores two fundamental features that are relevant here. first, section 922 g8 guarantees noticed in a hearing and only permits disarmament in those situations as the first fundamental protection of due process is validated under this provision, and second, that there is a presumption of regularity that exists in this context and suggests all these protective orders are fundamentally flawed or inherently unreliable i think would override that assumption in this case and be profoundly unsettling for the state courts that are on the front lines here trying to protect victims of domestic violence. i think as well, these principles equally demonstrate

d2's validity. the second reason why this is an easy case is because there is a legislative consensus. it is not just congress, but 48 states and territories share this view that armed mystic violence needs to be guarded against and that disarmament is a permissible legislative response, so i think that further fortifies the congressional judgment. the third reason why it should be an easy case is because it does guard against a profound harm. a woman who lives in a house with a domestic abuser is five times more likely to be murdered if he has access to a gun. it's not just harm in the home. it extends to the public and two police officers as well. i was struck by the data showing that domestic violence calls are

the most dangerous type of call for a police officer to respond to in this country, and for those officers who died in the line of duty, most are murdered with handguns. history and tradition confirm common sense. congress can disarm armed domestic abusers in light of those profound concerns, so we asked the court to correct method of -- methodological errors and reverse. >> thank you, counsel. the case is submitted. >> all this week, we have been showing recent supreme court cases the high court is expected to rule on by the end of its term and talking with reporters about some of the legal issues involved. on friday, we will hear two oral arguments on states' ability to restrict how social media companies moderate content on their platforms. watch these supreme court cases at 9:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. you can also find all of our supreme court coverage