proposition. all right, thank you. ap earlier today, president biden spoke at the 80th anniversary of d-day when allied troops liberated northern france from nazi occupation on june 6, 1944. marking a major turning point in world war ii. watch the president's remarks in full starting at 8:00 eastern on c-span, c-span now, or online at c-span.org. >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government. we are funded by these television companies and more. including mediacom. >> atcom, we believe what we do here or right here, or way out in the middle of anywhere, you should have access to fast, reliable internet. that is why we are leading the

way. >> mediacom supports c-span as a public service. along with these other television providers. getting you a front row seat to democracy. next, david eisenhow, the grandson of president dwigh eisenhower discusses his father's legacy and the impact of the allied invasion of france je 6, 1944. this event took place as part of a nference hosted by gettysburg college and the do dwight d. eisenhower society to mark the 80th anniversary of d-day. and for those of you, including me who did not know david and susan in gettysburg, we have a pretty good opportunity to get

to tell them, and particularly david's side of the story through this warmly personal and very evocative book going home to glory. which i treasure as one of my favorite eisenhower books. currently a lecturer at the eisenberg university of pennsylvania and director of its institute for public service, david teaches courses on communications in the presidency. his 1986 book is kind of his calling card. the book, for those of you who are young and unfamiliar, is eisenhower war, 1943 to 1945. it was at the time not just the bestseller, but part of the conversation about how the allies conduct did and ultimately succeeded in crushing the nazi regime. to this day it is considered essential work on the final two years of second world war. david's topic this afternoon is d-day and beyond.

let's welcome him. [applause] >> thank you very much. tracy, carol, all of the panelists, these have been wonderful discussions that we've had today. dr. simons, it is nice to run into a veteran of oscar candidate school. -- officer candidate school. i'm honored to be here today, delighted to be in gettysburg od delighted to participate in this program. my job is to bring it to a close by looking at d-day and beyond. my title is triumph and tragedy. the title of winston churchill's six volume of memoirs published after world war ii. and by trium and tragedy, he's referring to the triumph of western arms and the tragedy that the results of world war ii were less than a complete

victory for the western allies, as you saw. i would say these twin themes, triumph and tragedy, form kind of the undercurrents of the postwar, which is the childhood of most of us in this room. our world as we grow up, we found ourselves in contact with veterans, people who did not very speak often about their experiences with the war, but the war was pervasive in the country. we experienced the hilarity and the terrors of the 1940's and 1950's when the u.s. found itself in the western world locked in a cold war with the soviet union. all of it goes back to d-day. in that world we have heard described today. some of us had contact with europe, others did not. my first was in the note -- summer of 1962. my grandparents decided my

sister and i were old enough to go on a serious trip to europe. so we were going to have an opportunity to accommodate them on a 30 day tour of western europe in which we would visit many sites. this was kind of their way of talking to us about their world. they were not communicative about their experiences. the fact we were in gettysburg meant that indirectly, they were communicative. i'm convinced dwight eisenhower associated this battle with the battle of normandy. gettysburg is a 20th century -- 19th century -- normandy is a 20th century gettysburg. i think that being drawn to this area reflected that. rarely talk about the war. one of our favorite family stories involves a commencement in time, try eisenhower's brother milton, he invites his

brother, the president to deliver a commencement. you know how big a university penn state is. it is a logistical undertaking. thousands outdoors and the event is threatened by rain. you have a picture in the president's office. milton is wandering around on the phone, gnashing his teeth, what am i going to do. since june 1944, he said i never worried about the rain. [laughter] but in 1962, off we go to europe. we took an ocean liner, we disembarked, we boarded a train and went downtown by town by town along the normandy battlefront. all of these things.

these tens of thousands of people who gathered at every train station, unforgettable scenes. the surging crowds in paris, copenhagen, and in london. as my grandfather calls on the british prime minister. a wonder of this scene, the euphoria of it, the sadness in a way. all of this was firmly etched into our minds. we came to grasp what an happened just before. as it turns out, that trip in 1962, dwight eisenhower was in part on a diplomatic mission for president kennedy. as he met heads of state, he was tasked with sounding out there flexibility on the flexibility of berlin, which president

kennedy felt the soviets were going to -- that ball later. several years ago, the kennedy library sent me a bunch of tape recordings of conversations between -- him and john kennedy -- my grandfather's briefing kennedy on visits i remembered. in other words, he would disappear around the corner, and conference with eisenhower, and he's conveying messages. briefing kennedy on these very meetings. then there is a fourth conversation on that tape, which brings me to our theme. a discussion on october 22, 1962. my grandfather is on this campus at gettysburg college. president kennedy calls. we are about to impose an embargo on soviet ships arriving in cuba. ■ñjohn kennedy is about to go on the air with a message to the world that we are engaged in

confrontation with the soviets, nuclear confrontation. at one point, john kennedy asks eisenhower an interesting question. he says general, my experts are divided. they think the soviets have undertaken this adventure in cuba in order to strengthen their negotiation position on berlin. the danger is if we move on cuba, they will move on berlin. ■the other half of my experts seem to think this is an improvisation on their part, they are looking for advantage. and so what say you? a long pause, and my grandfather says you will not see a connection between berlin and cuba. great advice. you will not see a connection. great advice. but to his credit, this is a

great to -- decision president kennedy made. it is a reminder of an adage my grandfather articulated many times that as president of the united states, dwight eisenhower was paid to make six decisions a year. and year. in october, 1962, kennedy made a good decision, he earned his pay that day. there is something else happening, the postwar, the war brought forward by normandy. we have intends conflict between the u.s. and soviet union. this is a bipolar international picture. if you are a student of international relations, you know the bipolar international order is considered to be inherently unstable. because again by one flag is only a loss by another. we have a bipolar international system of sorts, thomas friedman called it a system.

characterized by profound distrust between the principles made stable byua assured destruction. this is the world we're living in post-1944. i'm living in gettysburg at the time. i have other friends, they know what i was, i was actuallnnocenf these angst going on. innocent of the war for the most part. concerned about working on the farm, i got my first job there, $.25 an hour painting fences. ■2á>■rthat was my first job. i was fired from it in 1953. and then rehired that afternoon. playing golf with my granddad -- he said i allow my associates one mistake a year, and you've had yours. this was my infraction. i had stayed out too long over

lunch hour. i knew him as a golfer, rich hunter, i was aware of all of the wonderful visitors coming to the farm. i would say apolitical. i will have stayed that way, but i go off to amherst college in the fall ofnd see julie nixon, s at smith. i liked her. ask her out for ice cream, realize i had all my money on the cap going over there. so she paid the time the first time. i go back, this is a relationship that almost did not happen. i present myself to a proctor, and i say i'm david eisenhower, i would like to see julie nixon. and she says well i'm harry truman. [laughter] >> so this almost did not happen. but i persisted. so i became political because i became swept up in the great adventure of 1968.

this was a very stressful election. an election in which we get indications for the first time that we are going to move away from this postwar period. an election dominated by the vietnam war. it is characterized by a riddle of winning slogan -- it was nixon's pledge to end the war in vietnam and win the peace. america always wins wars to win the peace, we are going to end the war and win the peace. this was all a sign of change. one of the dominant impressions i took away from that campaign was the single-mindedness of it. therefore, the importance of mission to leadership, the presidency, a mission oriented job. what impressed me was the futility of attempting to exercise leadership for its own sake. some years later, i encountered a quote by my grandfather, we succeed only as white -- as we

identify in life or in war, or in anything else. a single overriding objective. and base all considerations upon it. that is not only a reflection of leadership in general, but a reflection on his command as susan put it so eloquently this morning. one of the things that came out of that experience in politics determined as i had been as a kid to become a writer. if you're a writer, you write about things you know about. so i'm going to■e write about my grandfather. that is what i resolve to do. then we have an opportunity, publishers were innocent. i started a book going home to glory. this is familiar, i started with what i knew, going backwards. book in hand. a publisher to say you've done enough, let's put it out. the problem is we could not start that book. if you are going to deal with eisenhower retirement, you have to get back to the poignancy of

his last year in office. the great effort to end the cold war with a piece offensive and resolving our differences with khrushchev and the soviets. that is a very poignant story. you have to tell that story, but you can't unless you look at the berlin crisis of 1959. you cannot tell that story unless you get back to lebanon, syria, it goes you -- you go back to sputnik. then you have to take another step if you are going to understand sputnik. the affair of 1956. leads you to 1955 in geneva. 1954 indochina and korea, the 1953 election. korea, mccarthy, all of this. finally i throw up my hands and start on october 14, 1890.

dwight eisenhower was born. in texas. then you have another problem. he was born in texas. you want documentation. you find out he's not quite vid eisenhower, he's david dwight eisenhower. switched his name going to west point. he lists tyler, texas. not denison, texas as his birthplace. because texans tell me it is better to be from tyler. he neglects to tell the authorities, he had played class d ball in the kansas state league for two years. it is a great mystery about it. he's not going to admit this to west point authorities. some years afterwards, i am with the pr guy who claims he was with eisenhower in 1947. read patterson, who is a pr person in baseball. he says i confronted the general.

that there are rumors throughout organized baseball that you actually played in the kansas state league and our records say under the alias of wilson. our records say there are two wilson's. he said he's the one who could hit. [laughter] this is a hard place to start. so i have to jump. here in gettysburg, this is the training of a young officer. i look at his time with foxconn or, a veteran of world war i. approaching other places for the formative moment in his life. all of this is necessary for a full picture. but it is elusive. when does the big story start? perhaps the count in the late 1920's as germany begins to stir

as the postwar versailles order begins to crumble. perhaps the winter of 1933 when dwight eisenhower moved to washington and john mayer keynes writes an open letter in the london times to franklin roosevelt saying you have a trustee of all those who seek -- by recent experiment within the framework of existing society. if you fail, reform will fail with you, leaving orthodoxy and revolution to fight it out. that is written to america in 1933 saying duty will call. but it is still not a straight line. eisenhower was working for macarthur in 1933, goes to manila in 1937. what he learned there, i don't know. macarthur you may recall, they later became rivals. he looked back on eisenhower fondly as the finest clerk he ever had.

i looks back -- he did learn something from macarthur. said finest instructor of dramatics i ever studied under. what transpires there is elusive. but by 1939 in the outbreak of war, which is the call of duty to america eventually, dwight eisenhower is writing in his diary in manila. it does not seem possible people who probably refer to themselves as intelligent would let this situation come about. hundreds of millions will suffer private asians and starvation, millions will be killed and wounded because one man so wills it. a power drunk egocentric criminally insane and yet unfortunately, the absolute ruler of 89 million people. and by his personal magnetism, which he must have, he's converted a large portion of those millions to his insane schemes and to the acceptance of his leadership. successful in overcoming the

entire world by brute force. the final result will be germany will be dismembered and destroyed. this is an unbroken intention. an un-deviating intention that formed the mission of eisenhower's command experience in world war ii. there are still some steps to travel. still hopes pinned on the french army. the british army barely gets out. but then looking forward, some optimism. i love this quote including churchill as the evacuation proceeds. it is a sad day, that is indeed true. at the present time, there is another note that may be presen the feeling of thankfulness that if these great trials came upon us, there is a generation ready to prove itself not unworthy of those who laid the foundation of the laws in shape the greatness of our country.

so it is a matter of time. we wind up about where today's conference began. there is a point, and that is the tehran conference of 1943, where the following things can be said. what happens to dwight eisenhower prior to december 1943 is necessary for a full picture of his life. but none of it is predictable, none of it could have specifically prepared him for the responsibility he undertook then. by contrast, what he does between december 1943 and may 1945 makes it predictable and inevitable he would be president of the united states. this can also be said of americans. i don't think anything can happen in american experience prior to 1943, that prepares us for the massive effort of 1944 and 1945.

yet what happens between 1944 and 19 45 makes it predictable and inevitable that the u.s. assume the preeminent position that we did assume in the postwar. all of this unfolds at the tehran conference. we've had presentations on strategy, i can have this i think. ask people to sort of step back from d-day. to understand what is happening in the fall of 1943 at tehran, the first meeting of the british prime minister, american president and soviet premier in history for years into the war. they come together to see whether there is a common strategy, common interest. that is unclear in advance of this conference because everyone had been proceeding more or less the penalty, the u.s. and britain in alliance. we are also, i think another significant thing, we are about to change strategy. what is significant about changing strategy in the fall of

1943, the place is working. germany is losing the war. they are being driven back in italy, on the eastern front. we now have command of the seas, germany is under round-the-clock day and night bombardment. if you lose it and we are winning, why interrupt a winning strategy? we are proposing to basically shut down or stop the advance in italy, gather up our resources, gather british resources, go back to great britain. operation across the channel which is thet hazardous thing you can do in a war and take on decisive targets germans will defend in the end. we are not attacking weakness, which is standard, we ar attacking strong. the answer is i think defeating germany was an objective, but

not the only objective. defeating germany with the u.s. and great britain, assuming a major role in the outcome. it becomes an overriding imperative by the fall of 1943. this is fundamental to the self-confidence and the preservation of the democracies looking towards the postwar era. will the soviets cooperate? turns out they are going to cooperate. they not only indicated they would cooperate with our effort to claim a decisive role in this war. therefore a decisive portion of the rewards, they insist on it. and in other discussions, which i noted in eisenhower's war. this is where the book starts. discussions between churchill, roosevelt, and stalin. there is a fascinating discussion betweens% them in 19. stalin and churchill are

, typically roosevelt is moderating. stalin is seeking a guarantee from the british that germany will not be allowed to rise and invade the ussr a third time, having done so twice in this century. a military bargain here, the red wi gthey advance from the west. compress germany between two fronts, achieve total defeat of germany. but what will guarantee russia that this will not happen again? and churchill says while the fact we are here together, we have mutual interest, should constitute a guaranty. we are all talking about the same military operation. we were present assurance. stalin demands a guarantee. churchill finally says stalin, no guarantees possible. nothing is final.

the world goes on. all we can do here in tehran is make the world safe for 50 years. 1943 to 19 52. two generations in power to follow, 25 plus 25, will have one thought. that is avoiding the last war. and 1992, a new generation will come along. it will take chances and be in a position to take chances long after the stability and the memories of that conflict have become historical, and not immediate. in any rate, the tehran conference breaks up and the overlord operation is the prime decision of reaagain, italy becy theater. the americans and british launch the long-awaited opening of tro.

the soviets advance from the east, they launch coordinated offensives. and together, think of this as the pendulum, edgar elen -- edgar allen poe, germany crushed between two walls that impose a great victory over germany. this is in the air, as was said this morning, the germans expect the allies to do this significantly. they don't expect the allies to pursue a victory strategy. they expect them to pursue a strategy if they did. that is claiming a major share in the outcome of world war ii forcing the decision. not allowing it to happen, but forcing it. 51 commodes with described by one of the participants, said the western front is a priority. what hitler's notes in this, is anything on the western is

decisive, we can trade more time in the east. this the great internal debate, german principally, over how to meet the threat of invasion. they have to go through the process we did, debating the suitability of the beaches, where we are likely to come. the alternatives were normandy, which was kind of edgy alternative. then the conventional alternative. i think one of the virtues of our intelligence program is what it is is reinforce german conventional wisdom. however, people who did not think conventionally thought normally would be -- normandy would be the place. rommel, commander of army group b, and adolf hitler. so normandy is a feature of the plan from the very beginning. and the difference is the pot

and clay is in instantly fatal target. if we successfully invade and move inland, this is instantly fatal for germany. it is threatened and germany proper is threatened. normandy is fatal eventually. they have an option to contain normandy perhaps. they have an option to defeat it. so they shut the door by garrisoning it as heavy as they do. and they leave the door ajar in normandy. however, one thing that i would add to the presentation on the german command debate over this is the commander of the german forces in the west is a particular figure. he had defeated the french and the british in 1940.

in addition to being unrealistic, about the ability to mount a panzer counteroffensive, a great intent in western democracies. he felt that they would fold if they hit -- this is his appraisal. in 1940, and he would be brought back to power, reinstated as commander west in order to launch the then counteroffensive in 1944, which is an expression of german disregard for the allies. rommel by contrast had fought the allies. he knew what we were capable of. so rommel pleads in the compromise described today happened. another thing i would add to that is the determination of the german troops, also the interesting happenstance that a

quarter mo in france or russia e east european. a lot of people say that means they were lesser troops. their loyalty was doubtful. they are not going to fight that hard, etc. yet max hastings writes much has been written about the poor quality of the german troops defending the china coast. preventing the allies almost everywhere from getting their objectives. on the american beach omaha, but them close to defeat, even before the crack units of the ss battlefield. let's say you are in the 709 field division. let's say there is a regiment attached to themaha. and you are a russian. you were in the red army, given a choice when you fall into captivity. either start up a war in a work camp and start it, or serve in

the german army. the soldiers in france were the ones who opted to serve in the german army. let's look forward. when the war is over, people are going to ask where you are from. and you are going to be repatriated. how is it fair having ussr back in germany? this is why the 352nd and to -- infantry division goes into combat on june 6 with 50,000 -- 15,000 effectives. they had 250 effectives. they fought to the last man. the last round of ammunition. the last rations. they were desperately fighting to fend off the allies. they had everything to lose. so we are going up against a very formidable army and one that was determined to prevail. we talk about the positioning of panzers and so forth. i'm talking now, i have already

embarked on eisenhower's decision in 1944. th morning, gathering the resources necessary to make this operation work. that is an important decision. it also means expanding the target area. morgan had come up with a three division landing who we now substitute a five division landing with airborne elements. he does it through montgomery. the idea is we must gather our resources. that means bringing the air under control, gathering landing craft. it means insisting on annville drag goon and things like that. eisenhower has obstacles. we have alluded to that already. one is british strategy. the idea of avoiding a world war

i by direct frontal assault on german positions. he had to overcome that. i happen to be in a minority, but i believe his most peaceful ally in overcoming that was winston churchill. churchill was a person who pledged an invasion of northwest france as the british forces in 1940. something that in every critical point in allied conferences seems to come down on the side of roosevelt. he facilitates this even as he raises questions about it. be that as it may, british ring strategy await the fall of the soviet union. much like our come -- containment strategy and the cold war. that is a major obstacle. after all, we are winning the war. wire we going to run risks? the british are quoting marshall bob thomas who is in captivity. they say the only chance is to defeat your landing. are you even considering this?

another, he has to overcome suggestions by his air marshals that they can win the war on their own. that the landing is completely unnecessary. point blank isweek in february f the --, which was by april 1944, 26,000 acres comprising the city centers of 43 major german cities had been completely destroyed. we are operating at will over germany. the marshals are saying, vandenberg, who was in the allied air force, why undertake a highly dubious operation? in a hurry when there is a sure way to do it? it is much better to win the war than to undertake such an operation for a war that has truly great risk.

so the air marshals are a problem. eisenhower has to centralize control of the air in his command and set them to the task. not defeating germany eventually, but supporting our forces ashore now. that is something susie has alluded to the many conferences, the disagreements, the command disputes, which are legendary. expand the assault, and finally, his job is to -- great mass, the numbers have been itemized. 6000 ships, 12,000 aircraft, 60,000 men. and applying the air and naval superiority to maximum effect. this mass is such there is an interesting episode, and we were

talking about this at lunch. he goes to a place in belgium in 1946. interrogating german marshals. my grandfather's chief of staff decided to interrogate him. according to the interrogation that i read, smith gave the field marshal several opportunities to complement the fighting prowess of the british and american forces at the day, gave them several opportunities. and he declined. to complement us. then he tried again and declined again and waved it off saying all you did was you marshall more airplanes and basically bombed us. said i could not address the point because i planned it that way. that is exactly what we did.

>> this was in place by april of 1944. assuring the acuity of the american, british, french elements, and i think we touched on that also today, thatsty of . if the conflict is personalized, eisenhower versus montgomery, it is easy to notice their differences. montgomery is the supreme army professional. he's a person with a passion to tidiness. he's a person of coldness, he is a monkish student of war who understood the contact -- understood the conduct of military operations, a consummate trainer, motivator of troops. in the final analysis and various profiles i have read, one trait stands out. of the german marshals. montgomery was a man with an iron will to prevail.

eisenhower is called a politician. i talked to leonard hall, chairman of the republican party of the 1950's. i said what do you make of the fa the generals call him a politician, and the politicians who served with call him a general? he said the two finest national politicians i saw in my life, and this was a career going back to teddy roosevelt, how the warrior smith, and dwight eisenhower. guilty as charged. he is a politician. he was somebody who managed conflict. a powerful motion -- emotion must stir the abilities of a great military leader. a military leader to succeed, whether that be ambition in the case of caesar, hatred of the enemy in the case of hannibal,

pride in the great of henry the great -- in the case of henry the great. what i encountered from dwight eisenhower, was a person, commander of relentless clarity of purpose with an absolute will to win. this is the spirit that he brought to his command. he framed discussions. he did not permit anyone to advance a proposal unless they could justify it on military grounds. in this shaped the dialogue within his command and kept everybody on the reins. it was his mission definedhim bf staff in february 1944, "you will enter the continent of europe and in cooperation with other united nations, wage military operations aimed at the heart of germany." and that is his mission, and everything would be justified in light of that. i would say that by june of

1944, we were in a position that decision number one had been made and we succeeded. we were ready to go. the solidarity of the american and british forces is assured, a difficult transition. but we are ready to go. and decision number two is to launch the attack. my favorite vignette, we talked about vignettes, one of my favorite characters of the war, ramsey. bertram ramsey was the man who organized the dunkirk evacuation in 1940. now his commander-in-chief of the naval forces assigned to supreme command. it is about two days before the invasion. they are in a jeep the two of them. ramsey asks the trooper to pull over, he steps out and looks out over the fleet, which is gathering in southhampton, portsmouth and so forth.

he looks over that tremendous scene. he said it is tragic and■ ironic the stage is being set for such great sacrifice. but if out of it comes peace and happiness, who would have it otherwise? on it goes, depends on a weather report. eisenhower gambles on a weather report and orders the invasion forward on june 4. about 9:00, according to people in the room. he's presented with the factors. he sat in silence for five minutes. then he gave the order. this decision turns the war, sends the war in a different direction. some years later, the 25th anniversary of the day, there is a symposium in abilene after my grandfather's death. one of the participants was admiral friedrich root, who was

rommel's naval advisor on d-day. he was in command of the naval forces. at one point in the conference, he said "on june 17, 1919, i was yo officer preparing to scuttle a german destroyer. 25 years later on the morning of the day plus one, june 7, 1944, i realized they had established a permanent beachhead and the war was definitely lost." so that is what happens on june 6. the war is now definitely lost for germany. but we have to make it so. because all of these germans are going to fight to the last round of ammunition. all of the germans whose family are being held hostage at home. the maniacal logic of the nazi regime, we are going to have to make thisap