latino voters and shifting attitudes among that voting bloc. and documentary director james jacoby on his latest pbs frontline film crisis on campus, about how the israel-hamas war ignited divisions on college campuses. and then we'll discuss the latest on the israel-hamas war. this week's■: g7 summit in ital, the situation in ukraine and congressional news of the day with washington democratic congressman adam smith and georgia republican congressman rich mccormick. c-span's washington journal join in the conversation live at seven eastern this morning on c-span and c-span, now our free mobile app or online at c-span, dawg. and now a discussion hosted by the center for strategnal studie u.s. south korea alliance with experts on managing relations between the two nations. they also countering

china. from washington, d.c., this is just under 2 hours that afternoon, everyone. and welcome to csis. my name is victor charm senior vice president for asia here at csir and korea. chair professor at georgetown university. every year we look forward to an annual conference we do with korean national diplomatic the think tank or the research institute for the ministry of foreign affairs in the republic of korea. we had a very good set of discussions this morning, and then we're very happy to be with you here this afternoon. i'm especially glad to be doing this event today with all the good friends chancellor park chung hee, who was chancellor of the korean diplomatic academy. we go back decades, nearly half

a century from our graduate school days at a university in new york city, and then our keynote speaker, kim jung un, someone also i've worked with for many, many years. long time ago, when i was in the government, on the nsc, the ambassador kim was at the embassy in korea. he is later became held many senior positions. deputy national security adviser as well as director, former director of the national intelligence service. we will also have a chance to have a conversation with richard johnson, who is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy. so our good friends there be a public session that follows that. so all good friends, very important issues these days. and the u.s. korea relationship falling on from a series of very successful summit meetings. the state visit of april 2023, the camp david summit that the trilateral summit that followed

that. so it's alliance is an all time high, but there are many challenging issues ahead, which we hope to be able to have a discussion about this afternoon. so with that, let me give the stage to our our partner in this effort, chancellor pak tohe of the korean national diplomatic academy. please welcome him. thank you, victor. uh, i'm happy to be back at the csa. is a three year i always feel comfortable and intellectual challenging when i come back to csa. yes. and i always grateful to victor. my columbia's simply, uh. and when i just came into the csa building again, i come up i. i was a member of the presidential delegation of a

policy consultation. and then we had a iv setting here at the csa. yes, i still remem!>ber kind ofa comments from on one participant that the all what people from the administration said sounded like a noise. but what you are talking about sounds like a music. so the and then actually it became true. ever since the united states and korea have built up very rock solid relationship making extended it to transfer credible and reliable. furthermore, trilateral cooperation between the united states, korea and japan, there is substantial and then solidified and i think it kind of became a kind of backbone of indo-pacific strategy for and also between korea and japan. we are realizing what victor wrote in a dissertation alignment despite antagonism.

that's the title of his dissertation at columbia university. we are realizing it. and even thú4e element of antagonism is s moment. so the i think one one element to that, i wanted to emphasize that unlike your argument in your dissertation, gradual finality of the united states will strengthen cooperation between the two. i'd taken opposite view that the the push for deeper and wider alignment between korea and japan the role of the united states is critically important. u.s. security commitment and the us's security presence in the region leads us to get tightly aligned each other. so i think in order to move on and to keep our allies alliance and partnership resilient, we needed to make a continued efforts. and then i think we haveo go beyond that to seize that.

i wanted to focus on one is we have to go beyond complacency. i think we are going on very well. so we did such a good job and it's it's okay now. so relationship can't be better. that kind of a thing can lead to a kind of a complacency. and that is not enough. i think we have to keep pedaling to go farther and we have to institutionalize farther to strengthen the ties with a very concrete andoutcomes. and another see, i want us to go beyond this. the concerns about the future. so many i hear some expression like it remains very volatile as that. we can't yet assure whether we can go on forever and political streams can change the course at any time. so there is some worry, i think. i think we have to get out of this kind of defeatism. i think a, i want to emphasize

again that the alliance between us is not just a for one party, but both because it the alliance gives reciprocal benefits to each other. and we are based on mutual defense treaty. so it's a kind of mutually beneficial relationship between the two and the our alliance is supported by numerous actors and players. who are involved, including not just the government, but also congress. i think things like this. yes. s. and above all, by the people in both countries, because the people in both countries are support strong us korea alliance. so in that sense, i think we have to move on. so i hope we can have a very fruitful and insightful discussion today with all the respective members. thank you very much for your attention.

thanks, chancellor pak, for your remarks. it's our great pleasure to continue our annual u.s. dialog with the korean national diplomatic academy next in the program. i have a pleasure and great honor to introduce our keynote speaker, the honorable kim jian. as many of you know, he is the former director of the national intelligence service of the republic of korea. he is a career diplomaty training with over 40 years of serving the korean government since he joined the ministry of foreign affairs in 1980. he served in many distinguished positions, including first for vice foreign minister in 2013, first deputy director and second deputy director of national security office at the blue house. between 2014 and 2017. and then senior secretary to the

president for foreign affairs and national security between 2015 and 17. director kim receive a doctor of dental surgery from the school of dentistry at the whole national varsity and the master of public administration for harvard university. please welcome the honorable kim jun with a warm round of applause. thank you. thank you. victor and alan, for giving me this opportunity to share my thoughts. empowering the republic of korea. u.s. alliance in the nexus of security and economy in recent years, we've seen a noticeable surge in volatility, uncertainty, and even chaos across the globe. this is a sign a sign that the world order, as we know it is

experiencing a dramatic increase in entropy. now, the question is, why is this growing phenomenon? the answer lies primarily in the rise of formidable revisionist powers, such as china, russia, iran and north korea. those stories are also being shaped by a surge in the radical technological advancements, particularly in the realm of communication and cyberspace. such the way for unexplained initial increase in thef misinformation, disinformation and divergent narratives. yet, following these shifts in the geopolitical climate, the moves to disrupt to change is the convergence of what is being texlrmed as illiberal regimes. these nations share a certain

attributes and authority on arctic territorial governance, anti-western stance, and are challenging to the established international conventions. it should predictably pose a significant threat to global stability and the existing international norms. chief among these nations is china regarded as potentially posing a substantial threat to the global order owing todel oft directly threatens the democratic values that lie at the foundation of oururrent international order. moreover, china's aggressive augmentation of its military capabilities and its position on taiwan is increasingly casting an ominous shadow over the peace and security of northeast asia and beyond. consequently, there is a shared

view in the global west on the threat posed by china's power and influence felt especially palpable in countries such as japan, taiwan and the republic of korea. turning our eyes to russia, the country appears to be on course for a major standoff with the west. it challenges the post-world war two security arrangement in europe while simultaneously raising questions about its geopolitical ambitions, its heinous invasion of ukraine is the most acute threat to the international order enshrined in the u.n. charter. as u.s. secretary of state antony blinken rightly condemned, the invasion is shaking the peace in europe and disrupt disrupting the security architecture that has been built over many decades.

hence the european union. the leadership designation of russia as the threat to global order, specifically due to its war against ukraine and ties with china, has struck a chord worldwide. in the face of these daunting challenges, we must ask ourselves what do we do next? how should thebal west address the accelerating entropy within the international system to safeguard global peace and stability? we need a conceptual framework to analyze from a geopolitical perspective the nature of these ongoing developments since through this lens, the unfolding phenomenon can be defined as a tussle over spheres of influence between the u.s. led global west and the chinese illiberal regimes. this is not a one on one game like tennis.

instead, it resembles a complex team sport where everyone plays a unique role and contributes to team. st multidimensional game. team global west captained by the united states, must lean into a playbook based on democracy, free markets and international alliances. echoing the strategies that war. the game plan includes a reliance on a strong network of allies, friends and partners unified by shared values, a robust military presence and the iberal international order. in contrast, illiberal regimes spearhead by china plays to a different playbook focused on state led economic growth.

with a strategic investment through initiatives like the belt and road initiative to expand its sphere of influence, including the global south. their strategic centers around consolidating relationships with the so-called non-western countries, with their pre game y amplify its sphere of influence. the game between the two competitor terrorists plays out on a global field where each team strives to score goals across multiple arenas, which include military strength, trade, technology and cultural influence. they deploy a combination of plays of hard and soft power, as well as a symmetric power like influence operations. what then, could be the path for the global west to triumph in

the game of influence? for team global west to prevail, a harmonious and well-coordinated strategy is needed. however, policymakers in the team, especially those in the united states, ought to examine whether any of the following three elements can compromise. a coordinated effort led by the united leadership vacuum. number two, divergent interests. number three, lack of trust. and communication. first, the question o&yf leadership becomes paramount. any effectiveand decisive leadership that provides clear direction. if leading players, especially the united states, shrink from this commitment, the integrity of the alliance and partnership will weaken. shift in leadership. domestic political turbulence or

simple indecisive news can inevitably undermine line cohesion. second, divergent interests to should align conflicting national interests of member countries, constrain the alliance and partnership disputes over priorities or objectives or policies may lead to internal rifts. finally, we must foster trust and communication as essential as they are. we breathe trust that-> within g alliance and partnership breakdowns in communication or creeping suspicions among members can weaken unity. the lack of transparency or misunderstanding can erode trust. those hindering effective collaboration can, upon reflection, on these three factors.

yes, policy makers, along with their, must pool their collective wisdom toward a coordinated strategy. you should bolster and maintain solidarity by harnessing the power of the alliance and partners for the strategies to ultimately guide the global west to a victory. it needs to aim to expd west toe here. a multifaceted approach quintessentially diplomatic, economic and strategic is key. that brings us to the defining elements of this winning strategy. first, share the vision and goals. second, open communication and trust. third, complementary capability. and lastly, fleadaptability. firstly, a strong alliance

begins with a shared purpose and goals. when participating, participating parties are share a clear vision, what they aspire to achieve together. it fosters commitment and collaboration. secondly, effective communication is sinha qua non. nothing can replace the power of ■dopen dialog. transparency and information sharing trust is the foundation of successful alliance and partnerships. it requires active involvement, commitment and dedicated support of every player involved. thirdly, the alliance and partners partnership need to complement three capabilities each partner should bring unique the table, such as expertise, resources, technology, or something that complement one another.

forming a robust combination amplifies the alliance's collective effectiveness. finally, the importance of flexibility and adaptability cannot be overstated as the geopolitical landscape evolves rapidly. so must the alliance and partnership flexible to enable its partners to respond and adapt to cnging circumstance as the alliance and partnership become stronger and more resilient? by being open to changes, pivoting and learning from every experience. with this strategy, we are should be the key complete, competing playing field. while the geopolitical game over influence spans the globe. the global west would be wise to zero in on east asia. especially towards northeast asia. this region holds significant geopolitical importance. standing at the epicenter of the

hegemony competition between the united states and china. let's take a moment to grasp this. northeast asia is the linchpin. we are powers like china, japan and the republic of korea converge. and to that, add to that a few critical geopolitical flashpoints. the korean peninsula, taiwan and east china sea. this region, courtesy of its location and proximity to these key players, is a significant arena for the strategic interests of the united states and china. the region isomic powerhouse win intricate network of trade relations between the united states, china, japan and the republic of korea. china's rising economic influence, particularly in this

region, is a calm often played to shape political outcomes exemplified by the case. the installment of the fed, a system in usf k in 2016. and as we very well know, the tug of war led by the u.s. and china is not solely about power. it is also battle presenting contrasting models of governance and development. northeast asia stands as a stage for these models, swaying other nations affiliations and policy. and the let's not forget the multi the ramifications of this competition in northeast asia have broader global implications. there is the region is not merely a region. instead, it's a mirror, a reflection of the expanse. it was strategic rivalry. we are the choices made within its boundaries.

equal loud and clear on the global stage. in view of this strategic significance of east asia, the strategic alliance and partnerships established under u.s. leadership such as orcas, quad■+if fend for and ipf are extremely crucial in terms of 5enhancing the global west's sphere of influence vis a vis th o liberal regimes, most notably chi. but the key to success in this competition lies in the robust and agile bilateral alliances between the republicf korea and the united states and the united stas and japan, combined with a strategic trial, mutual cooperation among the republic of korea, united stas and japan. these partnerships are pivotal in these strategic relationships. several elements demand our

attention and focus to start with a commitment to the shared values is a fundamental strength in the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law forms the foundation of cooperation. second, enhanced strategic dialog through regular high level meetings to coordinate policies and address security concerns from the central part. frequent military exercises and intelligence sharing become the lifeblood of a strong ally. third, according the approach to regional threats such as north korea's nuclear ambition and china's regional assertiveness must guide our strategic posture into operable development of advanced missile defense systems and joint development of other critical military technologies should form a part of a

strategic playbook. third, the economic security is equally vital. demanding collaboration on supply chain resilience technology, use standards and novation in advanced technology. lastly, we must deepen our synergy in pioneering technologies such as ai, quantum computing and biotechnology. robust and resilient supply chains in strategic sectors must be forged, namely semiconductors and batteries. building regional partnerships and preemptive strategies to handle potentially supply chain disruptions will enhance the alliance's overall resilience. fortunately, these seas are being. this is how we in song in joint statements adopted during seven meetings between the united states, the republic of korea and japan. a strong testament to our shared

commitment and vision. notable among these are historic milestones such as the leaders joint statement in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the alliance between the united states and the republic of korea and the spirit of camp david joined the statement of the republic of korea, japan and the united states, together with the camp david principles and the commitment to consult the outcome of the camp david summit should the light our path astith the illiberal regimes, unilateral actions that could potentially compromise the spirit and commitment of camp david should be avoided. our uny is. critical and is present. abraham lincoln wants the famous famously said, a house divided against itself cannot stand. in particular, the historic camp

david trilateral summit jointly inaugurated a new era of trilateral partnership, and reaffirmed that cooperation between the united states, japan and the republic of korea advances so security and prosperity of oupe indo-pacific region and the world. as the fact sheet of the trilateral leaders summit at camp david describes these initiatives. if faithfully implemented, will not only help the us, rok and japan to reinforce their bilateral relationships respectively, but also steer the region toward a future that is a secure, prosperous and dynamic. therefore, that the camp david outcome and shore as an enduring beacon as we navigate this era of a competition against illegal, illiberal regimes. the leader of the free nations

should ever act unilaterally without appropriate consultation, taking steps that might risk undermining the spirit principles and commitments so deeply ingrained in camp david that the wise words of president abraham lincoln serve as a constant reminder for unity. as our friend, agents forge ahead. a house divided against itself cannot stand. thank you.

thank you very much, kim. for those remarks. well, now move to t nrogram, whh richard johnson as our featured conversation. let me introduce richard. he is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy. where he is responsible for a lot of things, nuclear deterrence, policy, arms preventing, the proliferation of wmd related materials. cooperative threat reduction. chemical. biological. radiological and nuclear defense. a whole variety of things. he was also on the national security council in the obama administration as director for nonproliferation. but i think one of the most interesting things about richard is he is probably one of the few

people in the us government that has worked on denuclearization. are the two major denuclearization negotiation policies, right, with both iran and with north korea. he was a part of the u.s. delegation for the joint comprehensive plan of action, the jcpoa, with regard to and then he was delegation of the six party talks with regard to north korea. that's actually when we first met, was when richard and i were working on the six party talks.n working on it much longer than i did. he was also one of the when we were in the face of disablement with talks, richard, was the disablent motor. so he was actually on the ground at yongbyon nuclear facility. i went twice, actually 27 and 28. 27 and 28. so he is a graduate of claremont mckenna and princeton.

and the most important fact about his biography, i hope you don't mind me saying this, is that he is a jeopardy! champion. one time, one time still. that's true. that's one more time than most of us. but it's really a pleasure to have you here with us. oh, i'm sorry. i should have. so, i'm victor cha, senior vice president for asia and professor at georgetown. and i will moderate the conversation with with mr. johnson. so i thought we could start by talking a little bit about something that you worked on the declaration and the uncg, the nuclear consultative group. this was these were products of the state visit in april 2023. i know you played a big role in this. could you tell us sort of from your perspective, how you think these things are going now? i know that you are coming up on are you recently had an acg meeting just overnight. oh, all right. okay.

so great. if you could give us your view on how you think these these two new instruments of the alliance are working and are they doing the job? yeah. so, first of all, thank you, victor, so much for inviting me. and thanks to csis and candia for hosting this. also, great to see a lot of longtime friends, including kim holien. even he who also we worked a lot on some of these issues. so really a stellar cast you have today. so as you alluded to, we did have the third meeting of the nuclear consultative group really overnight. so it's still technically june 10th. so. but my colleague, my boss, dr. vipond, during along with deputy minister cho chong rae from the korean side, hosted this meeting in seoul and it was extremely successful. i know that there's already a joint statement out and i will not read it to you, but this of course, as you say, comes out of the washington declaration and the april 2023 summit. and i think it's really a

demonstration of the strength of this alliance. i really align myself with the words that kim pujan just said about the importance of alliance as the bedrock for the work that we're doing in the region. and we really have that ironclad commitment. wef really mean that when we say there's an ironclad commitment to our allies in the region, to the republic of korea. in this particular case with the ncg, but also with japan and across the board, we're making progress in the nuclear consultative group, just the establishing of that group, i think was very important to demonstrate how we are elevating the discussion that we're having on nuclear deterrence issues. but the work that we're doing is really key, whether that's from information sharing to joint planning and execu ation. the big outcome of this meeting was the agreement or signing out of four four formally to be, you know, published soon a set of shared guidelines and these guidelines really serve as kind

of the principles and procedures upon which the will serve to really look at nuclear deterrence issues in terms of policy and posture. and this will really be the foundation upon which we move forward. in the ncg on u.s. okay. cooperation. we've also done a lot of work, important on joint and combined planning, execution of what we call conventional nuclear integration or cni. and really that's to leverage the fact that, of course, the united states is the power that has nuclear weapons. but the rock, as it was just mentioned in this speech, isreas conventional capabilities. and so how do we make sure that those capabilities are integrated with work that may have to be done if, god forbid, we have a nuclear crisis on the peninsula? and i think we're making real progress there. but we've also done and i hope this speaks to a professor's heart, some real work on education and the work that we're doing together as an alliance on speaking to each

other about deterrence and an emerging course that interagency officials from the republic of korea have now participated in. we've now done two rounds, which is really, really great. and then finally, because the best way to understand how to operate in this sort of world is to practice. and so we are doing more and more of what we call tabletop up exercises or courses. and we have at least i believe, three coming up over the course of the next year, including a military to military exercise. so that's just really just touching the wave tops of all the work that we're doing in the ncg. but i have an entire little team in my office that's dedicated to it, including somebody who comes to us from csis. so thank you very much. but really, it is one of the top priority issues for my team, but honestly, for for the department as a whole and for the work that we're doing across our strategic partnership and of course, our key alliance here. that's great to hear.

it's really sounds like a full agenda of things that you all are working on. and we want to thank you for joining us on just coming coming back from that from that and cg in seoul. richard. so if we look back one of the at least the discussion that happened in in the think tanks and around town in april of 2023 when the washington declaration and the ncg were announced, was that some of this wn we were seg in south korea of a wave of public opinion with when it came to the whole question of whether south korea should acquire nuclear capabilities, as you know. well, the context of this was the sixth nuclear test by north korea, really. i mean, xafrankly, since you wee on the ground in yongbyon, that was many years ago. u we haven't had anybody in north korea or had any real negotiation since then. not now.

i know you were in the obama administration. no offense. three of our administration or the trump administration, but not the sort of negotiations that were taking place in six party or an agreed framework. it's been a long time. and so i think there was some heightened this led to a rash of public opinion polls in south korea said somewhere between 60 and 75% of south koreans thought that they should have nuclear weapons. so i guess one question is so you feel like the ncg and the washington declaration have have addressed some of these concerns and your general thoughts on this whole question of these these public imprint, this public opinion on the issue? yeah, no, thank you very much. i mean, first of all, to say it's to remind everybody that our colleagues in the republic of korea at the highest level have clarified that they're not seeking to nuclear weapons. this has been emphasized. they've emphasized their commitment to the global nonproliferation regime. and that's what's in the

it actually notes the long standing and, you know, extremely impressive of commitment that that the rock has had to its npt obligat■ions contrast to the dprk, and also reiterating the south korea's full confidence in the u.s. extended deterrence commitment. and so i you know, i don't stay up at night worrying about this because i feel like we have a really, really good understanding of each other. but we understand where thens a. we understand the public's concerns on the peninsula and frankly, concerns that we have in the u.s. system about how do we deal with a growing north korean threat, not just from the nuclear side, but from the ballistic misse cruise missile , biological, you name them all? i do think it's important, though, that when we talk about the issue of deterrence, it's that deterrence is, as we talk about it, we talk about the concept of integrated deterrence, which is looking at all of the different kinds of forces, the military tools, the nonmilitary tools, the nuclear

tools and the non-nuclear tools and. when you put all of those together, nobody can match us. and that is and part of that extended deterrence or excuse me, that integrated deterrence is extended deterrence. it is that alliance system. and so anything we can do to ft■rstrengthen that, which is wy we're doing the work we're doing in the ncg. that's what we're doing in terms of public opinion polls, i guess all i would say on that is, first of all, i ally appreciate the work that ccs has done recently on polling, which i think tells a mo nuaedstory ae that's a little bit more reflective of what we hear, which is that we do think that this work is assuring and reassuring to our allies at all, but also to remember that these are not either or decisions. and i think it's been useful. i've seen some polling that's also kind of asked the question. if you had to pick between having useful care on the peninsula or the or the uk having nuclear weapons. there's sort of no question it's stick the alliance, it's usfk, ' alliance's. and so i think we need to

portant. this is why we do meetings like the ncg, why we have public demonstrations of our commitment to the deterrent, including things like for the first time in over 40 years, nuclear ballistic missile submarine visiting pusan as part of the first and cg. it's we do other capability demonstrations but it's also more about the underlying frameworks in which supports that. an's the images. then there's the real work place. being i said it at a previous event a few months ago that i don't think we've ever had this high of a level of collaboration, commitment and trust on extended deterrence than we've ever had with the united states and the republic of korea. it's certainly at a whole new level. i me -, what's being done now? i think you know, having been a long time observer of the alliance and at one point in its manager, it's like a whole different ballgame now. it's playing at a completely different level. the the work that we did that

richard, was to found that some of these views with regard to sout korea as interest in nuclear weapons was was a bit inflated in the sense that the there are some public opinion polls that showed that. but if you looked at the majority of them, the numbers were much lower. and if you looked at opinion, it was actually a majority who were not in favor of pursuing nuclear weapons. but let me ask you on the ncg, so you what how much i mean, i know most of the discussions are obviously very private and quiet, but is there a public because, as you said, like the reassurance is the public aspect of this is also important for the for the public to know that extended deterrence is there and it's something they can see people working on. yeah, and just to be clear, i'm not coming off of a plane. my colleagues are still there. so i look very fresh faced for having just gotten.

off of a plane. but yes, this is an important part of deterrence is signaling and demonstrating how deterrence works. and so whether it is the work they were doing and obviously, as you said, we can't say a lot in public, but just the mere fact that we are now publicize more regularly when we're doing tabletop exercises, tabletop exercises, is that account for the potential for the dprk to use a nuear weapon, which is things that we didn't used to do. the fact that that will be announced, that we have announced them when we've done them, that we have had regular of u.s. strategic assets in the region, whether that was the sbn, whether that is, you know, landing a b-52 by a korean american pilot, by the way, which was very, very cool recently in the rock. and you you hopefully are all on twitter and following u.s. forces. korea and the department of defense. and you'll often see great photos of when we do bomber task forces, you'll see that wonderful picture of, you know, a u.s. aircraft in the middle. but flanked by our oc fighter jets, i mean, this is something that we do regularly. and i think one of the important

things that we often forget here is sometimes this gets attention when the dprk does something, you know, provocative and people say, well, what are you going to do? but the more important thing is, is that we do these kinds of demonstrations all the time. and that is really what deterrence is about, is an enduring commitment to our ally and to the region. and so sometimes you may not be paying attention to it. i mean, this audience is because of what you you are. but we do this all the time to do that reassurance. we just had, for example, a test of a minuteman three icbm team to demonstrate that that part of the triad is successful. and in fact, we're trying to be even more transparent about that2. in recent years, even pre announcing that we're doing that to demonstrate to potential adversary is that we're not testing our icbms as a response to their provocative behavior but actually that we have this pre-scheduled because we always want to make sure that we're ready to go if we needed to be. and so there's a lot of public elements, there's a lot of private elements as well. and we'll do our best to

continue to bring forward what we can. but i said this in a previous event also, but i have a team that i think almost literally every week has some sort of dialog or discussion with our colleagues in the republic of korea at some level, this is not just i mean, it happens once or twice a year. it happens every week, right. let me slightly shift topic. so we're running out of time. so let me ask you to because you have to get back to your real job instead of sitting here talking to us. let me ask you to question one is, so you're a veteran of these negotiations, north korea, denuclearization negotiations. could you give us, you know, your assessment of where we are right now in terms of that? and then second and perhaps more difficult question is, in the expert community, we're very worried about this relationship with the between the danrussia's really spurred by the war in ukraine ammunition and and whatt means from a proliferation perspective on the dprk side in

the sense that the kind of put it bluntly, i don't think kim jong il would have gone all the way to russia for just food and fuel. so your thoughts on both of these topics? yeah, and i'll try to be quick, because you're right. i do. i do need to go, but i enjoy these discussions on denuclearization. i mean, you know, not to be a little bit boring, but, you know, our position has not changed. and it's been the same since the beginning of the biden-harris administration, in which i was a part of that development. we make very clear that our goal we say this in our nuclear posture review, for example, that our goal continues to be the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the korean peninsula and what the dprk is doing is a serious threat to international peace and security. we continue to say that we're prepared to meet with the dprk without precondition, and we obviously will do so only with close consultation with our allies. ah, okay. japan and others from a deal from a dod perspective, the best thing that we can do is to do all the things that we just talked about, which is to

continue to undergird extended deterrence and demonstrate that we have that flexibility to feel forces, including nuclear forces of any type, and to demonstrate that any diplomacy would still be undergird it by that deterrent. and then the other thing that we are very focused on is enforcing u.n. security resolutions, including the work of the proliferation security initiative. and i might use that as a segue way to your second question, which is that we're extremely concerned with this collaboration in cooperation we see with russia and the dprk. i had some data here that says something like the dprk has now provided rsi than 1000 containers of military equipment and munitions, which is of course, a terrible outcome. it's a violation of the u.n. security council resolutions on north korea, a violation on russia's part, by the way, in addition to the dprk. but we're alsooncerned that that those funds could be used and funneled into the dprk nuclear and ballistic missile

programs. on the flip side to your comment, we're also concerned that russia may be helping the dprk in a range of areas, including surface to air missiles, production equipment for ballistic missiles or materiel or other advanced technologies. and so we have to keep a very close eye on this and connecting the dots to the u.n. security council, it was extremely unhelpful that the russian federation veto the resolution to maintain the independent panel of experts on sanctions implementation. and, oh, by the way, china didn't help either by abstaining from that. and china could also do a lot more to enforce those sanctions, so could say a lot more on that. but just to say it is something we keep a very close eye on and it is concerning that we're now talking about north korean missiles being used by russia against ukraine.chard, i want tr your service to the to the nation and to the alliance, and thank you for taking the time to be with us today. really appreciate it.

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