30, that's the end of it, i wish everyone a good evening and good news, goodbye, where can ukraine get shells for artillery, will the ukrainian army have something to shoot at, we're talking about this on bbc news ukraine live from london, i'm evgenia shedlovska. shortage of ammunition. felt on the front lines and the ukrainian military, with whom bbc correspondents spoke, say that they have to count every shot. what is ukraine and its western partners doing to quench the projectile hunger. if we talk about artillery shells, ukraine is counting on western help and wants it to increase own production. however, as they say... are ukrainian forces firing

more shells than their partners can provide, while russia is waging a war of attrition and increasing its arsenal. so what are the partners of ukraine doing? remember, the eu made a loud promise to give ukraine a million artillery shells by march 2024. well, as the president of the european commission, ursela fonderlein, said earlier , only 480,000 shells are currently being delivered or are in the pipeline, that is, less than half a million. and in this promised. the package from the eu includes various shells calibers, including 155 mm. nato caliber shells are one of the most demanded artillery ammunition for the ukrainian army, shells suitable for western weapons. thus, the united states has sent more than 2,155mm artillery shells since the beginning of the full-scale russian invasion. the usa provides the most military aid to ukraine, and by the way, on the eve of the new year, the white house agreed to another package of military aid. for 250 million

dollars, in which ammunition for nasams and hymers, anti-aircraft anti-tank missiles and artillery shells, including 155-millimeter caliber, is the last package that the biden administration could give without the consent of congressmen, while a much larger aid package of 60 billion dollars for a congressional hearing. how acutely is the shortage of ammunition felt at the front with... archer, she hit the east a month ago. this weapon helps the gunners of the 45th brigade to conduct counter-battery combat. this is what we knock out. their artillery systems and with

the help of this system it is practically deployed very quickly, we in a matter of seconds we aim at the target, hit the target and leave, and it is almost impossible to detect us. soldiers from the 93rd brigade are working in the bakhmut direction. this group works on an american artillery installation. much more for everyone, it is charged automatically, it is enough to reach the strongman , put the projectile on the tray, drive it, press this handle, count to four, and already the projectile is rifling in the soviet self-propelled gun, if the transmitter does not work, it was necessary to take a manual transmitter and send 45. so this is the time, well and there

were cartridges, like that, and a cartridge of 16 kg, here is gunpowder, the gunner takes it out of the tube , they are much lighter, these are tubes, there are charges in them, but if you open it, you can see the charge inside, it is in such a bag... plastic charges, oops, oops, this is a cluster munition, it is a fragment high-explosive, there is also light, smoke and long-range, well, we see. so far,

well, there are a lot of different types of ammunition for them. i accept a new goal, a shell, a newspaper, charge19, the military says that western support saves them at the front and brings them closer to victory. therefore , they are concerned that american aid for 60 billion dollars is now stuck in the us congress. we were transferred to this technique, because there is practically no 152-caliber, it is no longer even in those countries that could have given it to us

from their warehouses and reserves. now, mainly at the front, most of them are fighting with 155 caliber, if there is no lend-lease or support from foreign countries, it will be very bad. if military support declines, the problem of mass starvation could become catastrophic. these are 155 mm caliber projectiles. most of the western weapons, which ukraine received, shoot with this type projectiles and so their lack will make the big guns fire less. this in turn will have a huge impact on the front. for soviet equipment, stocks of shells run out even faster. artillerymen of the 22nd brigade have been waiting for hours for the command to open

fire. shot - only for very important purposes. western partners must also understand that if we do not restrain this influx. then they will go further and will no longer help us, it is necessary, but will defend their territories, and their people will die, not ours. so, russia is waging war against ukraine about the exhaustion that ukraine and its western partners are doing, my colleague abduzhalil abdurasulov asked the deputy minister of defense of ukraine ivan gavrylyuk about this. regarding the insufficient amount of ammunition, it practically applies to ammunition for artillery. it will arise, because of that in ukraine a decision was made to solve these issues by creating a powerful, powerful production unit for the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, in addition

, the internal production of its own ammunition of almost all ranges is being increased. of the former soviet union, one might say. work is currently underway on the possibility of increasing the production of nato calibers, i.e. 155 mm and 105 mm. regarding the 155 mm projectiles, which one does the western artillery use? how close are you to starting production and what will the capacity be? as for the 155 mm ammunition, we cannot talk about a large quantity, a very large quantity, but we have concluded bilateral agreements with a number of foreign enterprises regarding the establishment of joint production in ukraine of this caliber, and in the 24th year it will, in

principle, be produced in such a quantity that it will be able to cover the difference between the need. and with the help that will be provided by the partners, you do not worry that it will be possible to increase the armaments and in general the support that ukraine currently receives from western partners, not only the european union as an organization provides assistance to ukraine, but each european country separately, for example, last month "the federal republic of germany provided us with an aid package in the amount of about 1.5 billion euro, which included powerful air defense systems, artillery ammunition, and so on. for next year, there is an agreement with the netherlands and they

have planned funds in the amount of 2 billion euros to support ukraine. and next year, what new types of weapons do you expect, this creation. er, our own means of air defense against man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems and so on to build up our anti-aircraft shield, this is also what we expect er... weapons that will be supplied, which is created as a result of own, not own, joint production by the united states of america, this is in relation to the buk, in relation to the s-300, and also we expect to receive long-range missiles. so, in order to compensate for the lack of shells for artillery, ukraine is increasing the production of kamikaze drones and plans to produce shells of caliber 150.5 mm among others, says a representative of the ministry of defense. what are ukraine's needs?

it is interesting to look at the estimates made by the ministry of defense of estonia, so according to estonian officials, in order to maintain fire superiority, ukraine needs at least 200,000 shells per month, and thus during 2024, european and american stocks will be depleted and there will be a need for significant purchases of ammunition, such estimates, but what is russia doing in the ministry? in the defense of estonia, over the last year, production in russia itself and replenishment of stocks at the expense of countries such as north korea has tripled, reaching 3.5 million shells per year, and next year it will probably reach a million more. these are the estimates of the ministry of defense of estonia. there are not enough shells on the front, but the situation is not critical - yes says an officer of the 59th separate motorized infantry brigade named after yakov. serhii tsyhotskyi handziuk, my colleague olga palamaryuk spoke with him.

we all hear now, even western observers say that the ukrainian army is starving for shells, there are not enough shells, and there was even such information that the artillery sometimes has only one shell as opposed to ten russian ones, and what about shells at the front now? is there really this hunger and this lack? well, probably every specialist in his area will say that he lacks something where he works, yes, for more effective use and destruction of the enemy, i would like more, this does not mean that we have one projectile and no more, we have, but we should have more, by the way, the very first wave of attacks in the avdiiv direction was stopped by the artillerymen , then what happened when a large influx of equipment went, if so... the artillerymen with their fire, well , most of them, stopped this influx, that is

, they began to burn, destroy, i will say that it has been almost two years since then, but i am speaking now for artillerymen of our brigade, they are just specialists, they can be called snipers, you know from a target shot there at a distance of 20 or more kilometers, they hit the target immediately, plus the same work of drones, but at the same time russia... also use a large number of rebs, they constantly deploy them wherever possible, even on the very front they put their lines, and that is why we have a lot of losses along this line, that is, shells plus drones of all modifications, this is something that is constantly needed, the war has already become more modernized by the end of this year, we remember. statements that europe should help a million shells from the eu,

the end of the year, a million shells should be by the spring of 2024, and obviously this will not happen, there will not be a million, what do you see as a way out of this situation, personally, many times when you talk to the guys, you say, well, we have run out of ammunition, but really, what are we going to do, or there are no shells, what are we going to do? let's take shovels, let's take axes , we will really cut them down, that is, the fact that we will not surrender to them already, yes it is at all, these are all our boys and girls who accept today's participation in this war, the fact that we will not surrender to them, we will not accept them as winners, the so-called winners in clappers, that's for sure, shell hunger, i think that the leadership today, the leadership, the political leadership of the country understands this and he does it so that we still

have enough of everything, and if there is no information, then it will be when the time comes, how many shells we have and where, and where they will be and where we got them. well, that's it, until tomorrow. congratulations, friends, with you is vitaly portnikov and our interlocutor, a well-known ukrainian historian, professor of harvard university, serhii plohii, i congratulate you, mr. serhiy, i congratulate you and the audience. you know, talking about the year 2023 with a historian is probably quite a difficult

task, because if we look closely at the disposition of what happened in... 2023 not from, say, our point of view, from the point of view of the people, who lived through the year 2023, and from a purely historical point of view, we can see that this year is simply capable of falling out of history, at least ukrainian, at least history of the russian-ukrainian war, since the end of 2022, the line of defense of the ukrainian troops has not changed, the line of confrontation between the russian and ukrainian troops in 2023 remained practically the same as... it was in 2022, hopes for an offensive in 2023 have been revealed, one might say which did not come true, and now many politicians and ordinary citizens have practically the same hopes for 2024 as for 2023, so we are talking as if it could have been at the end

of 2022, at the beginning of 2023, we expect offensive, we expect some... special changes in the russian-ukrainian confrontation, however, a year has passed and nothing can be done about it, indeed, despite extremely great efforts, sacrifices, the front line did not move, that is, there were changes, of course, on the conditional front line in the black sea, which is extremely important, but not on land, the 23rd year began with fears and hopes, the fears were about the russian winter russian offensive, which was already taking place in january of the 23rd year, and hopes were for the ukrainian counteroffensive, in the spring, with

the positive thing is that the russian offensive did not lead to anything. in other words, in the end, the failure of this offensive was due to the pryhozhad rebellion, but the negative, of course, consequences of the year are related to the fact that the ukrainian counteroffensive did not achieve the goals that we all wanted it to achieve. and in this sense, our conversation today, it seems to me, is not on such an optimistic note as it... would have been a year ago, because the 22nd year ended with several ukrainian miracles or miracles from, well, miracle, miracle, probably correct term, from of the kharkiv operation, the battle for kyiv, and at the end of the liberation of kherson, today we are in a completely different, different context, and

most observers and commentators are actually not so optimistic. optimistic prospects for the 24th. the 24th seems to be an important one, it is a cry where it is necessary to hold the line that was held during the 23rd year and prepare for a qualitatively new war. you know, you talk about 2022 as a year of miracles, but to be honest, i never hope for a miracle in politics, it seemed to me... in the 22nd year, the ukrainian armed forces used opportunities that, let's say, are given only once in a war, and this applies to the political leadership of the country as well. the first of these possibilities is a misunderstanding by the russian federation of the nature, i would say, of national statements between ukrainians and russians, and this misunderstanding still continues, we saw it from the speeches

of the president of russia vladimir putin in a direct line at the collegium of the ministry of defense of russia, where he basically repeated the same thoughts. about ukraine, which he stated in his articles and speeches even before the start of the war, and also the effect of surprise, the russian federation's unpreparedness for a massive attack on the entire ukrainian territory with the use of a large number of troops allowed ukrainian troops to defend the north and prevent kyiv from capturing other cities in the north of our country, and the effect of surprise allowed ukrainian troops to release in 2022. kharkiv region, but then a real, i would say, war began with the use of the necessary mobilization and military-technical resources, and they must be available for this. and you need to be aware of how borog will operate, because in 2023 the ability of the russians to build effective defensive fortifications on the lines they

occupy on ukrainian territory turned out to be somewhat of a surprise for many, and there is also an important political moment, that is, the political leadership of ukraine, which in 2022 could hope for, i would say , the unconditional support of the western world , faced a situation when it is necessary to insist on this support both in the political and diplomatic sense of the word. choose her, and before that i can also say many turned out to be completely unprepared, in fact in the 22nd year it was possible to win in what putin called a special military operation, and in the 23rd year the situation, the situation changed, in fact putin began to prepare for a long war back in the 22nd year in... in the middle of the 22nd year, when the relevant tasks were given to the ministries, that is, the economy of the country was being restructured on a military basis, on military

rails, and at that time i remember that i and probably many other people who received this information actually thought, what is planning for the future from the point of view of russia, which will not happen, that is, we all believed that... in one form or another , the prigozhin phenomenon would appear, associated with large russian losses, associated with disappointment, and it appeared, but the regime survived it, and today we really, really are in a completely different situation, it is said that the methods we used both inside the country and outside its borders have actually exhausted themselves today and... it is necessary changing the idea of ​​horizons, changing the way of thinking, the way of discourse also, that is, in the west, and this is where

i understand the situation more, so to speak , the argument that was extremely important in the 22nd year about the support of democracy, about the victim of aggression and so on and so on, begins to be less and less effective when, therefore, the money that goes. states of america exceed 100 , 100 billion dollars, that is, a completely different argument and a completely different idea should appear here, this is a question about the future of the event, actually it is that on monday a special issue of the wall street journal appeared about the past year and the next year, there was my article on this very topic, what i was trying to do to convey to... e american readers and those who make decisions, well, of course, a change is needed, a change of approach in ukraine, but

here i leave this topic rather to you, that is, i am in ukraine, but more, more i understand, of course what is happening in the west, well, by the way, i would like to dwell with you on this beautiful thing, because really i er... by and large i met with the situation when i felt not only in the west, but also in ukraine , the surprise that i always had when i met the assessments of the so-called soviet experts, and the understanding of the political situation in russia, it was absolutely obvious to me that everything happening with prigozhin around prigozhin is a deliberate act that strengthens the authority and power of the president of russia, vladimir putin, and that... even the so-called prigozhin mutiny, is a carefully designed special operation with with the aim of strengthening the russian regime, no matter how it ends, because it must be remembered that the entire progozhiv special operation was directed not

against putin, but against putin's closest entourage, putin was simply offered, so to speak, with the help of this march to moscow, which never happened, and maybe never should have happened, to choose a more understandable environment, which will fight against ukraine more effectively, and this helped to destroy the institution itself. private military companies, i.e. to finally bring russia to the rank of a totalitarian state in which there can be no alternative military groups, by and large this has always been the case in the history of russia, do you still remember the story with peter the first and the riflemen, by and large and russia, which we have as strong, cruel, ready to fight for others territory of the empire, developed just after the shretchi rebellion, and on this occasion there are historical works and... pictures that we all saw in childhood, if not in museums, then in textbooks, and this is exactly the situation, mr. serhiy, all historians turned out to be

paralyzed, as if they didn't... read and didn't know anything, both specialists and analysts, i was surprised, i 'll tell you honestly, well, i apply history a little differently in relation to prigozhin's rebellion, for me it's a classic a repeat of the situation with august 1991, when one of the slaves or the serfs are rising in order to attract... or to return the attention, the attention of the master, that is , the same kryuchkov and others first came to bow to gorbachev and actually tried to stop this signing of the treaty on the renewed union at that time, because the renewed union meant that they all had to resign, and the coup ended with the fact that these guys returned to

gorbachev again, asking him so that... he would forgive them, that is, the rebellion was about the situation and maintaining their positions inside the top, and that, this is the same as i saw in prigozhin, because the deprivation of prigozhin's army also meant a physical threat to him and his life, and the fact that he was rebelling, he was not rebelling against the tsar, he was rebelling in the name of the tsar, yes. as it happened quite often in russian history before, what , what was revealed in the 23rd year, which was not in the 91st year, is what did not appear in, say, yeltsin , that is, conditional yeltsin, navalny or someone else, was completely outside, outside the political field, beyond the possibility of mobilizing the same muscovites

or someone else. in support of prigozhin or to protect putin, and then get rid of putin , that is, this moment is there, it is excellent, and the fact that in russia they do not stand against the tsar, for the benefit of the tsar, well, this, this means from, the story is quite, quite long and quite old . well, it seems to me that what you said is very important, because it means that the russian political leadership made some good conclusions from 1900 in 91, yeltsin was not just a person who resisted the gkchchp, he represented an alternative center power, was universally elected, popularly elected president of the russian federation, which could also rely on the people's elected deputies of the russian federation. by the way, if we recall the rifle riot with you, there was also an interesting story there, because peter was the first to fight against the riflemen, one way or another he knew that his opponents could

rely on the authority of the law. the monarch , the eldest son of the tsar, ivan, tsar ivan, and tsarina sofia, who was then the tsar, in the moscow kingdom she could also appear as a representative of the interests of the legitimate monarch, because by and large, if let's be honest, peter i was a usurper of power, he took it from the hands of a legitimate monarch who had a legitimate right of succession, and the russian political elite must give it its due , it is clear that there are no alternatives. the centers of power and even the centers of the opposition in the russia that putin is building, which, according to his opinion, should return to the borders of the soviet union in 1991, and maybe beyond, should not exist. this was not realized by oleksiy navalny, who returned to russia, not realizing that he was signing a de facto death sentence and that his political influence in this future russia will be reduced to zero. but did we have it? i

think there are several, several. you raised, one , perhaps, it seems to me more important than the others, is the ability of the russian authorities to learn, both from experience and from mistakes as well, that is, in addition to the conclusions regarding yeltsin from 1991, other conclusions were related to the fact that now national autonomies do not have any special rights compared to other subjects. of the russian federation, that is, a repetition of the collapse of the soviet union and it is constitutionally impossible within the same framework in the russian federation, well , the russians have been learning this for the last few years, that is, we hear about it on the battlefield, we hear about it from our military, from commanders e.