let's talk about, well, somehow so concentratedly, why it was actually not possible to carry out a large-scale counteroffensive, because there are many conversations around this, some say that it was necessary somewhere in one place only, but the efforts were dispersed, or it was necessary somehow differently, well, what do you say, that is, what was necessary or not necessary, necessary or not necessary? there is no need to hesitate here, the answer is on the surface, not only is it necessary, but we are also obliged, because this is ukrainian land, and it is the duty of all those who have now joined the defense forces to return what was taken by the enemy, i also want to note that it is wrong to call the events in the azov direction a counteroffensive, or is it a classic offensive operation. absolutely textbook, right

here according to all the canons of military science, why did it fail, there are many opinions on this matter, in my opinion, the main reason was that it was not necessary to make three main strikes in three directions, it was necessary to choose one and concentrate all available efforts. near there, the second moment, the help that was supposed to be provided by our partners arrived late, unconcentrated, somewhat not in the volumes that was expected, and most importantly, unfortunately, the issue of the supply of aircraft was not resolved, but to carry out a large-scale operation... especially

in three directions at the same time, it is quite difficult in the absence of not only air superiority, but at least in the conditions of the existing superiority , so apparently these three factors played a decisive role. well, we still read a lot that there were disputes between the american and ukrainian military regarding the defense of bakhmut, and our command was reproached for being used in this area. shells and exhausted some units that could participate in the offensive in the south. in your opinion, was it worth defending bakhmut? it is not necessary to talk about disputes, there are no foreign advisers or consultants in the headquarters of the armed forces with whom you can argue. our partners, the same spectators in the stands, as well as the entire expert environment, which is outside the defense forces today. these are

the assessments of outside observers who are not familiar with our military plans, and, let's say, they see what they see, they look at it through the prism of their experience, their military science, their knowledge, and accordingly have, well, a difference from our point of view. as for whether or not it is worth defending batma, as soon as we started to advance and quite successfully in... in the zaporizhzhia region, the enemy immediately made efforts and became more active in the bakhmut area, with the aim of drawing our reserves there, making the intensity of fire drop support in the zaporizhzhia direction due to the need to support resource defense in the bakhmat area, and in principle this is absolutely expected and adequate actions of the enemy, which... compensates

with its activity in one direction the operational and tactical problems that began in another, it is logical, whether it is worth defending bakhmut or not, from a political point of view, the maintenance of any settlement is important, because it our ukrainian land, and we have to defend it, from the point of view of the military, if you are going to defend a settlement, you... you have to prepare it for defense, those who were in bakhmut, those who are in bakhmut now, do not talk about that , that there are some defensive structures there, some were prepared lines, positions, the city was not prepared for defense, these are purely tactical, local units of resistance, which were organized at the level of battalions of brigades, and not at the level of...

in my personal opinion, let's put it this way, it was worth immediately leaving for profitable for.. . for the defense of the border, having given the territory to the enemy, but preserving, first of all, human resources, no allies will give us infantry, and accordingly to preserve a huge amount of the same ammunition with the production of which the world defense industry is still not very good at, i am personally inclined to the fact that it was worth retreating, well, but that would, for example, lead to an offensive. er , the same infantry of wagner, which would not have stopped after they captured bakhmut, yes, i think they would have tried to go further, certainly there would not have been less of an enemy, but let's compare the situation in a mirror,

the one in the zaporozhye direction and the one in bakhmutsky, the enemy was building a huge number of defense structures, trenches, explosive and non-explosive barriers, they will put... minefields 15 km deep, which we overcome for six months, something prevented us so to do it ourselves in the bakhmut area, aligning the front line, shortening its length, hiding behind such structures, we would grind the same amount of the enemy as we grinded in street battles, but we would pay less for it, it seems, uh, but tell me, look, well, the problem was not only the enemy’s artillery, the problem was also that what zaluzhny wrote in his article, the saturation of drones and the impossibility of concentrating the force because of it, because everything is clearly visible, and actually this one

the problem would not have changed in any way if we had a little more or less artillery there, and i am not even sure that it would have changed much if we had. aviation was added, i.e. the problem of saturation with drones and their countermeasures, it remains, and it is somehow not entirely clear to do something about it, first of all, it is not necessary to measure by quantities, whoever spends the available resources more efficiently, accordingly, gets better results, we have army of drones, we have something for the ministry of defense, drones are purchased by the state special service of communication and... technical protection of information, it is not at all clear what she got in there, the ministry of culture on television collects for drones for the state border service, our enemy simply evicted woodmurks from the trading centers of merchants and launched

the production of unmanned aerial vehicles of various types there, two approaches to solving the problem of obtaining dominance in the tactical unmanned aerial vehicle segment. operational units, you can talk about it, and you can do it, but whoever can handle it better will get the result. second moment, countering any system that is controlled via a radio channel can be arranged accordingly by suppressing that channel. the enemy also suddenly brought a huge number to the battle line. small radio-electronic warfare systems, local ones that cover small positions, separate units of combat equipment, and accordingly we are trying to do the same, but so far we are losing in terms of volume. one more point, in this case the small

means of radio-electronic countermeasures, which are small on platoon reference points, on a single tank, self-propelled gun, armored personnel carrier, such a product in the world. technology of the required scale simply does not exist today, this is a discovery that happened in this war, and whoever adapts faster, according to the situation, gains an advantage, but look, well, here are all the stories with drones, with the fact that it is now very an important force on the battlefield, for example, the provision of aviation, or those f there 16, which we have all been talking about here for a long time already? she is able to change or significantly change the situation in this situation on the battlefield, how do you rate? it depends on what you fear more, air defenses or enemy aircraft? now the picture looks as follows: for

objective reasons, we have not seen air battles between planes for a year and a half, because both sides. war, do not risk flying deep into the enemy's territory and try to operate from beyond the reach of each other's anti-aircraft weapons. from the sides, the second moment, the enemy lost a huge number of highly qualified pilots who started the war, 324 aircraft lost, this is about 350-400 pilots who died, will no longer return to flying work, or are in our captivity, eh, accordingly, this factor has an equally serious effect, because the qualifications... on the other hand , people who pilot various types planes, well,

definitely fell. the next moment, we do not see the use of aviation on a massive scale, all that the enemy now has can create an advantage over the battlefield, where the operation is carried out by a force the size of a reinforced battalion, a battalion-tactical group. we do not see squadrons being used, much less regiments or aviation brigades , the same thing happens on our side, and it is explained by the fact that we simply do not have aircraft, so if suddenly we receive any type of aircraft from the allies, it will not automatically mean that we have gained some advantage, who has a greater range of detection of an aircraft in the air and a greater range on board means

of air damage, in fact , will dictate the further development of events, but definitely receiving aircraft from the allies will allow us, first of all, to level the situation in sky, secondly to drive off an enemy that is using glide aerial bombs on front-line targets, it will be a... a very great relief to the forces on the ground, yes, yes, it will be a very great relief indeed, especially as far as aerial bombs are concerned, yes, i agree with you, absolutely, let's take a commercial break now, a very short one, and after it we'll talk more, maybe about some plans and what we see in the future, oh, i went for a walk, water, there 's not enough ordinary water here, drink reo. i'm saving myself. reo. you 're ready, honey, ready, took reo. reo - water

for special medical purposes. vasyl zima's big broadcast. this is the big ether, my name is vasyl zemaye, let's get started. two hours of airtime. two hours of your time. many important topics. today we will discuss with you for two hours to learn about the war. now we will talk more about the war. serhii zgurets is with us, and what is the world like? and now , yuriy fizar will talk in more detail about what happened in the world, yuriy, good evening, please. two hours to keep up with economic news. time for that talk about money in wartime. oleksandr morchenko is with us. alexander, congratulations, please. and sports news. review of sporting events by yevhen pastukhov. two hours in the company of your favorite presenters. thank you very much to elinia chechenna for the information about culture news. natalka didenko is ready to tell us about the weather on the day of advent, as well as distinguished

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so, we made a little bit of it. the results of the 23rd year and we are talking now with viktor kyvlyuk, a military expert of the center for defense strategies, a colonel of the armed forces reserve, we will try to predict something that may happen in 2024, and you know, let's start with a certain one, you probably also saw these thoughts in bilt about

the fact that in the 24th year they will try to fight back. there is all of donbas, and well, donetsk and luhansk regions, leave, then there to the dnipro, and then there, on the 25th year of the seizure of new territories, how do you simply feel about these such predictions, as far as they can be at all, well, how realistic, or what are such predictions made for at all, they have an election coming up, and despite the fact that it is an election without an election, the first person is worried about his rating and tries to prove to the electorate that she predicts the future, what she has in her plans, that the state under her leadership has not lost geopolitical influence, that they will have something to do in the future, they have not laid down their weapons, everything

is going according to plan, they are successful, and so , speaking properly, by calculation on the internal consumer and such statements are made, but tell me, well, what would you call the achievements of the ukrainian defense forces in 2023, which laid down some things that can, well, be developed in 24, not in terms of importance, but more - less chronologically, the first such event is the fight for solidarity, it is a raid... when our troops calmly and plannedly retreated to an advantageous line and, stopping the enemy, made it so that no one remembered solidar for probably at least seven or eight months. what is happening there, why is the enemy stationed in in the lowlands on the ruins of the settlement,

it is unclear, no tactical gains, no influence on the operational situation, but an example of organization. this is a good example of whist actions, it may still be needed, the battles for bakhmut are certainly heroism and courage, the resilience of servicemen, all that happened at the tactical level is a contribution to the treasury of tactical skill, this experience of fighting in the city should be seriously analyzed. studied and widespread, as well as the actions of the assault units in the southern bakhmuto in the battles for klishchiivka and andriivka, also an example successful actions, when we defeated the larger formations of the enemy with limited forces, not only forcing them to retreat , but also defeating, well, at least their combat

units, of course, the support units there... it is difficult to get, interesting to such rather military-political, than a military achievement is ukraine's declaration of six areas of the black sea as dangerous for navigation. suddenly, a country with very limited means of warfare at sea imposed its own rules of the game, and the enemy was forced to hide from all black sea fleets throughout the black sea coast. a very good move, very... strong, the use of unmanned naval strike means, well , let's say, somewhat changed the imagination of conducting a war at sea today, very interesting are the actions of the main intelligence headquarters, which firstly, first captured, brought it back under

control ukraine's drilling platforms, in the black sea, after that several raids in crimea, a window was broken in the enemy's air defense system and in the enemy's radar reconnaissance, through this window a number of missile strikes were made, which disabled the headquarters of the black sea fleet, destroyed a submarine, several cruise missile carriers , this is also a very instructive example of how comprehensively and systematically... it is possible to penetrate the enemy's defenses in selected directions and inflict enormous damage on him by asymmetric means, because neither a damaged missile corvette nor ... an underwater person, by the end of the war they will not return to the formation, if they will return at all, well, the attack on the headquarters of the black sea fleet, where

a meeting was taking place at the time of the hit and a significant number was destroyed staff officers, both land and sea, this is just as great an achievement, and here i would add the offensive operation in the zaporizhzhia region, this is... the first attempt at a large-scale offensive, several operational groups of troops were simultaneously in combat, unfortunately , all this from the outside seemed like three separate operations, and not one big offensive strategic one, maybe we didn't understand something or didn't take care of it, but this is a very positive example. if you take into account the problems and shortcomings, in the future this experience will also be great valuable, extremely interesting and worth sharing is

the experience of capturing the bridgeheads on the left bank of the dnieper by the marines of ukraine, kherson region, purely tactical actions led to the operational collapse of the enemy's troop grouping the dnieper, now their commander is forced. throwing into battle the incompletely formed 18th general military army, it cannot achieve any results, it suffers huge losses, and at the same time it cannot do anything with our bridgeheads yet, i think that the size of the bridgeheads will increase, our goal is to push back the enemy's positions artillery and anti-aircraft defense positions of the enemy, help further to the left bank in order to give the purely civilian population on our, on the de-occupied bank of the dnieper,

the opportunity to live and work more or less peacefully, the defensive operation in the vdiiv direction is a very interesting treasury of achievements, the enemy launched an operation at the same time, attacking in 14 directions, and our group turned out to be ready... for this, that is, our scouts worked, the probable nature of the enemy's actions was very accurately predicted, and the defense stood its ground, being ready to the corresponding repulse of such a large-scale offensive, the situation there is difficult, not critical, but difficult, but we showed what we are capable of, so perhaps those events mean the most to me in the 23rd year, well, in addition to what was shown on what they are capable of, well, in principle... in principle, they destroyed some sufficiently serious enemy forces, which is also important in this whole situation, but you know, not so long ago there was an article in the new york times, where it was written that

as if between the united states and opinions differ in ukraine about how to wage war with the russian federation, the american opinion the military seems to believe that ukraine should focus on defense, now to arm itself, well somehow to concentrate there, to produce weapons in the end. and - at the same time, well, not to counterattack, i did, at least i understood it, but it seems that ukraine still wants to conduct offensive actions as well, in order to have more advantageous positions, and in general, is it achievable in practice to go on the defensive and or at all, well, if, you know, it is correct to talk about some deaf defense, well , first of all. war is a good reason for any media to remind subscribers that that the media exists, publications in even

the world's leading media are a reason to talk, but not a reason to adjust military plans. as for purely expert opinions on this matter, which, however , are spread in a slightly different environment. the idea of ​​blind defense is a doomed idea, defense can be successful only if it is active, but the scale of activity should be discussed, i would advise those who are interested in the problem of war to re-read the interview that the bbc took from the ex commander-in-chief of the armed forces of ukraine, general muzhenko. he shares his vision and recommends moving to a strategic defense with periodic counterattacks, but i share

this one. point of view, because if the enemy does not impose our will, in the end he will seize the initiative and force us to play by his rules, this is the way to advice, look, well, of course we understand, and at least we have already heard it from the russians, that the russian the occupying army is still going to take offensive actions, this year they did not succeed in large-scale actions, but we heard... for example, at putin's press conference, he said there that they had already concentrated 600,000 of their troops there , precisely in the area of ​​hostilities, er, well, actually, how do you assess them, this capacity for such a larger scale offensive and what its directions might be, well , somehow let's try to predict their actions, everything

is much simpler from the fact that... the person who says that he is putin, there are two, three of them there, this does not mean that in fact, this happened, all the available forces and means of the enemy were drawn into hostilities today, he has practically no operational reserves and absolutely no strategic reserves, he has formed two armies 18 and 25, both for two months , as you ... the infantry forces the enemy's military leadership, these unprepared military units of the formation to throw into combat operations, based on what we see now and what the

enemy leader said at the press conference the other day, the following can be concluded: before the elections, which are to be held there in march, the enemy will try to reach the border along the oskil river in the kharkiv region. if he succeeds, next year the enemy will try to capture kharkiv region completely. today we... we see that out of four tank divisions, having three in the kharkiv direction, the enemy was unable to do absolutely anything, except to lose a huge amount of combat equipment and advanced 2-3 km in some directions. to say that suddenly some miracle will happen and they are still on the banks of the oskil river will come out, i don't see any chance. a little further south. bakhmut

, in the same way, in order to take full control of the donetsk region, the enemy must break through the lines in the area of ​​bakhnuto and avdiyivka, then fight in the temporal ravine somehow in pokrovsk and then move another 80 km through kurakhov, with an advance rate of 2 km per month . they will go there for 40 months, mathematics says so, so they have a chance not only before the elections to fulfill the tasks of the russian president and take control of the luhansk and donetsk regions in in full, there are absolutely no chances. the battles near avdeivka, the enemy has a colossal advantage, but he is fighting there not for a military victory, but with an informational pretext for the elections to announce that we have achieved

victory, but so far the victory is kind of conditional, it turns out not very well, enormous resources are being spent, and i think that this hard struggle, sometimes in favor of the enemy, then in our favor, will continue there for more than one month, even further, to the south, zaporizhzhia, zaporizhzhia region, the southwestern part of donetsk region, the enemy is leading defense we unfortunately we do not have enough resources to develop our offensive, but in some areas we are confidently overcoming the second defensive line, if we focus on developing this success, it can fundamentally break the operational situation at the front. kherson region, i really count on what we have.