strikes , the greatest intensity of hostilities, but also in order to point-wise move to some local offensive actions, or rather to carry out attempts, because there are no special results, but such a hidden partial mobilization provides sufficient resources both for defense and for some local offensive attempts . i don't think this strategic communication with the west is going to work, in my opinion, it's counterproductive, trying to show that russia is...so merciless that they will continue the war forever, it plays against the discussion in the west, where there seems to be the assumption that russia is more or less satisfied with the current front line and ukraine must find some kind of peaceful solution. if russia manages to convey the message that they are ready to go on forever, i think that will encourage the west to help ukraine more. this is the first thing that the russians have misunderstood, and i think the second thing that russia is wrong about... that time is on their side. in

general, the russian army is pressing in all directions, where previously ukrainian forces had success. a bridgehead on the left bank of the dnieper, in the south near the village of krynok. in the north trying to reach the oskil river. this area of ​​the armed forces was liberated in the fall of 2022. these actions have taken place before, but now the attacks are happening simultaneously in all directions. for too long, the west, nato, ukraine's partners have been preparing to provide the most important components for the war so that ukraine can continue the offensive. i think we should be concerned, i have no doubt that the ukrainians will be able to contain the russians, but at some point, if the russians continue to increase their efforts, there will continue to be tension in ukraine with uniforms and things like that until the russians will increase the pressure on ukraine and...

will achieve some success in a small area, so the west needs to roll up its sleeves and give ukraine what it needs, without the trickle-down approach that is so characteristic of western aid. covert mobilization in russia, according to the main intelligence department of the ukrainian ministry of defense, is more than 20,000 people per month. waging war in ukraine is the main task for the russian leadership, so it is nearby. with the mobilization , large-scale production was launched, which must continuously provide both the war itself, yes and those who decided to participate in it. while our partners were talking about russia's strategic blunder, russia's strategic failure, russia at that time was making principled decisions to increase production, attract additional resources from third countries, north korea, iran, and in conditions of exhaustion in principle already. of supplies,

ammunition, accumulated until february 24, that is, there really is a situation when it is not yet a total advantage, but from the point of view of production, russia has much, if not more, at its disposal now, and a paradoxical situation arises, when the event nominally has several times greater financial, technological, economic potential, but, unfortunately, cannot. to fully transform it into such a total military advantage and secure ukraine. prisoners are taken with battles, because several times even we had moments when they approached, they are surrounded, they are sitting in the basement, there are 12 people, you tell them there, surrender, get out, no, they shoot back. i also had a situation when a position was stormed, i too, i don't know how many times yelled for them to surrender, shoot back until the last one, until we occupied the trench. they didn't take a position there and

only one prisoner survived and he was actually lucky to survive, i say you didn't surrender before, he says: we were afraid. oleksandr was a lieutenant in the summer and took part in the offensive in the south, now he is already two steps higher in the army hierarchy, deputy battalion commander. his brigade here is a fire brigade that helps to contain the russian troops north of the city, where necessary stabilize the front. attacks happen every day. with such a schedule, it is impossible. so that this line is constantly standing, it moves at a slow pace, there are positions that reflect on us , there are positions that we return, yes , well, we will not change it, taking into account the ratio of forces that we have at the moment, i can say purely for our battalion, that is, for our area, well, according to my calculations, we ground, well... less than three

companies, at least, but according to the technique , you can see the same now in the fields, there are more than 10 units, only on our area, we missed the moment when in... they just started, that is, we went in for reinforcements, and already the same hot wave that happened, it passed, because the guys from my, well, with whom i used to serve and who before they are still here from another brigade, well, they say that , unfortunately, we were not enough at that moment, when the first waves came, but now we hold them back with joint efforts, let's shoot! after carrying out an offensive operation against a well-prepared enemy in defense in the south, the soldiers had to perform in practice as those who defend themselves. here, too , there are limitations and peculiarities, and its conditions are also complex. a huge concentration of artillery,

armored vehicles and, in general, a concentration of russian troops. you have to work very close to zero, if in rihivskyi. in the direction of the offensive, we worked, so to speak, ahead, much ahead, then here we work to overtake the enemy, but he is very close to our guys, we cannot send the whole package, and that is why we are so point-by-point, point-by-point, carefully, on this area bradley performed much better than on the previous one, because here we... have room for maneuver, here thanks to them we just restrained the enemy, we destroyed a sufficient amount of equipment, considering how much they tried to drive in, that is, all the armor, almost , almost all the armor, somewhere around 90 percent , who came to this event, they were destroyed, but just with the support of bradby, the crew

of uav operators lays out the equipment in the dugout, it is a training ground, so there is a lot of space, and there is no need to rush, it is different... from how you have to work on a combat mission . fighters fight as part of the 117th separate unit mechanized brigade, they have been in the working area for six months. we , one might say, were in a counteroffensive from the very beginning , starting in june, our, our platoon, our unit, from the beginning, from july to september, we were mostly engaged in reconnaissance tasks, that is, on drones , reconnaissance tasks, adjusting artillery, identifying the enemy's situational awareness. and everything that is connected with this and they started to deal with shock, well , they started to deal with shock-shock tasks from september, there were a lot of shells, first of all, back then, now there aren't that many of them, and we literally scratched the landings there every 50

m, then everything was on fire and we were sitting on the defensive, oh, i'm sorry, but now they just attack with meat. well, now everything is different, there are much fewer shells, as far as i know, and we work with slightly different means, that is , if it is not mavics, it is attack drones. in these few months, the fighters already have dozens of videos where they observe the enemy and then strike, as throughout the front line , drones, and especially fpv, play a very important role here. an important role, but a significant difference compared to other directions is that russian equipment over... there are no such videos, the infantry, which goes by the teeth, is our main goal, all the equipment drives behind conventional teeth, as they are called, in our this is a performance, the robot one is very rarely visited, and that is why it is such a scarce story, and that is why we mainly

work on infantry, and in dugouts, in trenches, ah, by various means there. atgms are different, but it has not been the first month that uavs are one of the main means of destruction in the vicinity of the village of robotyna and the protrusion that was formed in the southern part of peredova in the zaporizhzhia region. for yesterday, in fact, all the defeats, as far as i know, in our brigade, were made by fives. i answered the question, significantly affects, very much. yeah, in terms of infantry containment, at the moment... that's one of the most powerful things in general, i mean , i can't say they're sitting there having a cigarette and that's it, no, they're moving, they 're trying to move in small groups, usually scattered, but it is a constant

movement. viktor is from kherson, but he hasn't been on vacation for more than a year, so he's already back in his hometown after his release has not yet arrived. the situation in the south after the end of the main offensive is difficult, it is impossible to leave... we call this salient pisyun, and here the situation is approximately as it is called, that is, it has not become easier, no, it has not become easier, on the contrary, well, we are working on the salient, in we have an enemy on the left, an enemy on the right, an enemy in front, while they occupy the dominant heights, and it is difficult for us, but much more difficult for the infantry. when entering and exiting, you

keep the thought in your head, well, they burned you, you just try there with tactical actions to eliminate the possibility of impressing you, and so you always think that, well, you were definitely burned, and well , in principle, as valery fedorovych wrote in the article, the battlefield is transparent, everyone can see everyone, ukrainian units are still in... spirit assault battles in the working area. after the end of the main offensive, the ukrainian troops were wedged to a depth of 9 km and approximately the same width. battles are complicated by the terrain. russian troops remain on the heights to tokmok, the first large city on the offensive, about 19 km. if my respect infantry for what they do on the front lines. the front is actually held by the infantry, we only help them. everyone would like to see at dipstate... will see tomorrow morning that plus 5 km, but at what cost

was each field covered there from landing to landing, in particular there in june, in july, when there was, one might say, the main progress, it is very significant, just yesterday a fellow blew himself up clearly on a mine, which was the leading edge, well, probably in the middle of june, what was planned, it was a very complicated operation, very complicated, and not even everyone... an experienced military officer there , a company commander or even just an ordinary soldier, will be able to do it, but take into account that they sent people who had no combat experience, well, practically there in our country, i think that 20, maybe 30 percent, those who were in the this, and i already at that moment understood that it would not be as planned, but in principle it would have happened, if there had been a little more experience, if there had been a little more information about what this fate was. .. how fortified it is, how mined it is, and in general a little more data mining, i think we could

have a slightly better picture today, but even with all that, the result looks pretty good. with the help of the data of the deep state project, which monitors changes on the front line, it can be seen that the area of ​​the occupied territory from january 1 to... in mid-december of the 23rd year decreased by about 200 km, in some areas the ukrainian army managed to advance locally, other armed forces already had to withdraw. the first world war lasted many years, the second world war lasted a long time years at the beginning of this conflict, i said that it would drag on for many years, or at least i expected it. and this is what we see. historically, none can now push the other. i would n't call it a stalemate, but it's not 2020 to watch. third as a tie, neither side was able to significantly move the front line. ukraine has had small achievements,

russia has also had minor relative achievements. again, ukraine is much smaller, and from that point of view, it's kind of a tie, but again, ukraine is much smaller than russia, significantly less as a defensive force. at the end of the year, the defense forces of ukraine experienced difficulties in receiving help from western partners, including from the largest of them - the usa due to political processes within the country. this directly affects the number of artillery shots, the acquisition of equipment and everything that is necessary for the conduct of war, both right now and in the long term. what we see now is a solution for 50-60% of what is needed, and we should see 80-90 or 95-99 in the possibilities from of the event to do this, you need to bathe very deeply. and i don't see it, i don't see the probability that ukraine will be left, that it will be left

alone, that the west and nato will continue to support ukraine, the question is how much and with what, and this is what worries me, because until the west and western leaders admit that this is not only russia's war against ukraine, but also against the west, nato, a war against ukraine joining nato and the west. in addition to active actions on the ground, the ukrainian army in the 23rd year directed its efforts to strike the occupied crimea and the black sea fleet of russia. these drones are one of the main tools. to fight the aggressor at sea within a radius of 400 nautical miles. distances are long and transitions sometimes take a long time. that's why we always build tactics where there is a main goal and one or two spare ones. and the operation itself can last one night. the maximum we had was three days. it is extremely difficult,

because almost all the time the entire staff is in a frenzy. three days - it was two combined operations. when from one operation we turned the sides back, as they did not reach targets, and after that we took out the next berts to another target, to defeat, that very night we hit the patrol ship serhiy kotov. ukrainian intelligence has repeatedly published video footage of russian ships, there were also strikes in the open sea, as in the case of the reconnaissance ship ivan-khurs. in november in the village of chornomors. in the annexed crimea, two landing craft were shot down right at the parking lot. it sounds like a boat, but it is not the boat that we imagine in our heads, it is, if we take the classification, a ship of the fourth rank, even if we apply 100 sides to one ship at the same time, it will still be very effective and will pay off, because

a military ship of such a plan as serhiy kotov, for example, costs around 200 million dollars, which must be built for about four years , plus you have to train the crew, these are all very big costs for the aggressor state, and when we don’t even sink, but just harvest, and after that the ship stands for two or three months for repairs, this is a big blow for the russian federation, this is the first improved . a model that has proven its right to exist by 100%. we also have other models that we do not want to advertise yet, but which are already actively used against our crows. these unmanned boats made their massive debut in

russia's war against ukraine this year and have already caused significant damage to the russian fleet. in an unnamed location of them. there are dozens of units, some are already ready for use, others are still at the assembly stage. and on the one hand, it shows the scale of production, and on the other hand , the hopes that the ukrainian forces place on such technologies in the fight against the russian fleet at sea. their movement is solitary near the shore. they cannot afford to move freely in the black sea. and they take much more measures for their safety, which at the same time increases the load on the personnel who are on the ships, they approach the shifts much more seriously, equip their ships with additional

fire means for our impression, but at the same time, as i say, the staff is getting tired. and this is also in our hands. exactly freedom of navigation is one of the main goals of ukraine's actions at sea - says mykola belizkov. there were other strikes on military infrastructure on the annexed peninsula that affected the logistics and support of the russian troop grouping in the south. here's more, here's more, don't come, i say. the only problem is that this turned out to be insufficient to carry out a complex of measures. which is related to the isolation of the district, conducting an offensive operation accordingly, violation of the control system, provision, knocking out key elements the combat formation, frequency and quality of these strikes proved insufficient for such a critical mass that would make it impossible for russia to conduct systematic defense on the front line and create conditions for the breakthrough of this

front line by the ukrainian defense forces. after the end of the offensive in 2023, a significant amount of the equipment transferred by the west to the armed forces remains in service, but losses, breakdowns, and the appearance of new units require even greater efforts from western industry, and it is still far from the volumes needed by the ukrainian army , even after two years active battles at the same time , the ukrainian offensive showed that the training of fighters should be even more thorough. it is necessary to prepare forces for complex offensive operations. a relatively unprepared, inexperienced fighter can defend an obstacle. it is much easier than breaking through it, and this is the challenge that ukrainians face. more training assistance is needed, and ideally this should take place in ukraine, so that forces do not have to be drawn back to poland or somewhere else as close to the front line as

it is possible, advisors and instructors who conduct training in ukraine are what they need, the planning horizon is not very far, you know, we are thinking how to survive until tomorrow, or how to keep there, complete the task there and the like , that's why... that's why i don't know, it's very difficult to make any conclusions, to say that we're doing well, no, we're not doing very well, but we're working, we 're trying, we'll do it as long as it's enough forces former head of the general staff and head of the armed forces, viktor muzhenko u in a recent interview with the bbc, he said that he considers it necessary to raise the question of the transition to strategic defense with a concentration on countermeasures, which is logical from a military point of view, but the volume and level of ... assistance from at least some of the western partners rests on the achievement of the battlefield, and the transition to defense can significantly limit these potential achievements, okay, we

will, for example, reach a moment when there is an agreement between politicians and the military inside ukraine, which military strategy to choose for the next campaign and it will be really active defense on land, along with the combination of strikes on military targets in the temporarily occupied crimea, respectively, but it is also necessary for the partners, if... just to convey, but also to convince them, that is, to reach a consensus that the ukrainian military strategy for 2024 should be based on active defense. along with military calculations, there are political calculations. the main problem is that there is a conflict between these political military calculations. and this conflict was recognized by valery fyodorovych zaluzhnyi. he also, stating the fact that the defense dominates the offense, he admitted that we need to liberate our people, our territories. otherwise, starts as if with'. the specter of the freeze and all that we already went through in 2014-15. it is possible, but ukraine will have to explain what it is doing and

why, holding back the promise of greater opportunities, greater success in the future, if the necessary assistance is provided. i think that ukraine should really be honest, and i am sure that it is. in this sense , general zaluzhnyi's essay laid out the problem very clearly. yes, this is not a dead end, but a wizard. there will be no solutions until there are a technical and technological capability has been developed to offset the defense force, and this should alert the west to truly support ukraine. if at the beginning of 2023 it was obvious that the ukrainian defense forces were preparing for an offensive, now it is difficult to talk about it, there are too many factors that can affect it. this is especially related to armaments, military equipment, and financial support, so it is clear that to say... for sure what the scenario will be, will be the most likely, is very, very difficult, but it is necessary calculate all scenarios, in any case, well, now the planning horizon is one campaign, it is a little more than

the planning horizon was at the end of february, the beginning of march 2002, but unfortunately, really, if such a situation, that many factors are starting to play against ukraine, and the biggest problem, the biggest challenge is to keep the coalition that was formed in the spring of 2022 and to keep it from the point of view of at least the idea that russia should not win, ukraine should not lose, that is , yes, it's a difficult task, but we understand challenges, we understand the tasks before us and we have no other option but to solve them little by little, providing our partners with appropriate arguments, why any attempts to negotiate with russia here and now are meaningless and why, on the contrary , additional efforts are needed to strengthen the bargaining power. what we see now is that ukraine has recognized the situation and decided that if

2024 will be a transitional year, where it is about putting the arms industry into operation, getting new technologies, leading technologies for drones, for example, other such things, it is wise to go on the defensive, because there you will have an advantage by acting. technology and the situation at the front, and russia seems to be driven by calculations and putin's desire to win symbolic victories, rather than what would make sense from a military point of view. the fighting in 2023 was overheated by premature political statements about future success. ukrainian offensive. in reality, the result did not live up to the expectations of society in the broadest sense of the word, both in ukraine and abroad. now there is almost no talk about the future course of the war

publicly, and... which influence the success of hostilities remain the same, these are people, equipment, ammunition, but with every month the use of new technologies of each side has more and more weight, these were donbas realities, my name is roman pogolych, see you soon . there are discounts on parastetom 10% in pharmacies under... the traveler knows what helps, every day, every hour, every minute we receive a lot of information. the most anticipated event of the year, what is really happening at the front, what are the losses of personnel and

equipment on the battlefield? how evaluates our successes the international community and what is moscow lying about? from the stream of news coming from all over the world, we single out the most important ones. the world is closely watching whether there will be weapons for ukraine and what kind, and what the russian occupiers are whispering about behind the commanders' backs. news, summaries of the week - this is a review of only important events, significant and reliable events. these are analytics, fact-checking, professional comments. about this and much more in today's issue. in plain language, accessible to all viewers. greetings, iryna koval is in the studio, and these are the results of the week on the espresso tv channel. news, summaries of the week, every saturday at 21:00 at espresso.

the most massive shelling of ukraine in the past year, the draft law on mobilization, which caused criticism and controversy in society, about the great loss of the russian fleet, about this and much more in the issue today. they beat almost everything that... in their arsenal. the most massive russian attack from the air. inhumans killed and injured peaceful ukrainians in homes, a hospital , and a shopping center. additional mobilization. the government submitted the bill to the verkhovna rada. society is outraged, commander-in-chief valery zaluzhnyi will be happy any way of involvement in the ranks of state-owned enterprises, and the ministry of finance does not yet know where to get funds for such plans. from so much.

as much as ukraine needs, as much as we can. changing the rhetoric of the countries of the world regarding the provision of aid to our state. greetings, iryna koval is in the studio, and this is the news, the results of the week on the espresso tv channel. we have not seen how many targets on our monitor at the same time, - said the spokesman of the air force of the armed forces of ukraine yuriy ignat. in the morning of december 29. the russian federation carried out the most massive shelling of ukraine in passing year on friday morning, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of ukraine, valery zaluzhny, wrote about the situation in the country. he noted that the enemy attacked critical infrastructure, industrial and military facilities. in total, the russian federation launched 158 aerial targets over ukraine. air defense forces shot down 27 drones. and 87 cruise

missiles. unfortunately, at least 37 people were killed in several waves of attacks. more than 160 civilians were injured. but in addition to military facilities, the enemy targeted the maternity hospital and a shopping and entertainment center in dnipro, to a hospital and residential buildings in kharkiv. in a number of civilian objects, in particular, the homes of residents of kyiv, zaporizhzhia. dnipro, odessa and lviv. in 5 hours, the enemy army released almost all types of missiles, except calibers, on the territory of ukraine. well, traditionally, when striking ukrainian border towns, russian weapons fly into the airspace.