sometimes people who cannot find their own children do not even know what to do or where to turn. if you suddenly find yourself in a similar situation and have no idea how to act, call the short number 11630 or write to the chatbot of the children's search service in telegram. here you will be provided with all the necessary advice. in addition, everyone who sees me now can already help in the search for missing children. allocate everything. a minute of your time and go to the website of the magnolia children's tracing service. here you can view all the photos of the missing. perhaps you will recognize someone in the end you will help to find. and now regarding the territories controlled by ukraine and a more or less peaceful life. unfortunately, children also disappear here, as the experience of the children's search service shows, the vast majority of them are teenagers who often just run away. we talked... on this topic with

a psychologist and collected a lot of advice for parents, which can definitely prevent a child from suddenly running away from home. one of them is about the importance of talking with children not only about everyday topics and matters, but also about their own feelings, experiences and fears. frankness according to experts, it will help not only to open up to the child, but sometimes even to receive support and help. show sincere interest in the child's personality, because often all our... conspiracies with children, and especially with teenagers, boil down to a few topics: cleaning, grades, maybe some other material points, but something completely different is important to them, it is important for them to talk about feelings , about experiences, about the world, about how everything is arranged, on the other hand, they may not be ready to be the first to do it, and it's your turn, you have to be the first to be talk about your fears, your doubts , your hesitations and feelings, and this will not only create a good relationship between and the child,

not only will it allow the child to open up to you in the future, but it will also help you to get support, to get help, to feel needed and loved in to his own family. congratulations, friends, with you is vitaly portnikov and our interlocutor, a well-known ukrainian historian, professor at harvard university, serhii plohii, i congratulate you, mr. serhiy, i congratulate you and the audience, you know, talking about the year 2023 with a historian is probably quite difficult task, because if we carefully... look

at the disposition of what happened in 2023 not from the point of view, let's say, ours, from the point of view of the people who lived the year 2023, but from the point of view of the historical one, we can see that this year is simply capable of falling out of history, at least ukrainian, at least the history of the russian-ukrainian war. since the end of 2022, the line of defense of ukrainian troops has not changed, the line of confrontation between russian and ukrainian troops. 23 remained practically the same as it was in 2022, the hopes for the offensive in 2023 turned out to be, one might say, unrealized, and now many politicians and ordinary citizens have practically the same hopes for 2024 as for 2023, so our conversation is as if it could have been on at the end of 2022, at the beginning of... 23, we expect

an offensive, we expect some special changes in the russian-ukrainian confrontation, but a year has passed and nothing can be done about it, indeed, despite extremely great efforts, sacrifices, the front line is not moved that is, there have been changes, of course, on the conventional front line in the black sea, which is extremely important. but not on land, the 23rd year began with fears and hopes, the fears were about the russian winter russian offensive, which was already taking place in january of the 23rd year, and hopes were for the ukrainian counteroffensive, in the spring, er, from the positives, what. .. the russian offensive

did not lead to anything, that is, in the end, it became the failure of this offensive, faced the condition of prihozhad's rebellion. but the negative, of course, consequences of the year are connected with the fact that it is ukrainian the counteroffensive did not achieve the goals that we all wanted it to achieve, and in this sense , our conversation today, it seems to me, is not as optimistic as it would have been a year ago, because the 22nd year ended with several ukrainian miracles or by miracles from, well, miracles, probably the correct term from the kharkiv operation battle for kyiv and at the end of the liberation of kherson, today we are in a completely different, different context, and most observers and commentators,

in fact, do not have such optimistic, optimistic prospects for the 24th. 24th, seems to be emerging as a year where it is necessary to... maintain the line that was maintained during the 23rd year and prepare for a qualitatively new war. you know, you talk about 2022 as a year of miracles, but to be honest, i never hope for a miracle in politics, it seemed to me that in 2022, the ukrainian armed forces used opportunities that, let's say, are given only once in a war, and this applies to... the political leadership of the country as well. the first of these possibilities is a misunderstanding by the russian federation of the character, i would say, national statements between ukrainians and russians. and this lack of understanding still continues, we saw it in the speeches of the president of russia vladimir putin on a direct line at the collegium of the ministry

of defense of russia, where he basically repeated the same thoughts about ukraine that he expressed in his articles and speeches even before the start of the war , and also the surprise effect. the readiness of the russian federation for a massive attack on the entire ukrainian territory with the use of a large number of troops allowed the ukrainian troops to defend north and not give kyiv the opportunity to seize other cities in the north of our country, and the effect of surprise allowed ukrainian troops to liberate the kharkiv region in 2022, but then the real war began, i would say, with the use of the necessary mobilization and... military-technical resources, and you need to have them for this and you need to be aware of how boroch will act, because in 2023 the ability of the russians to build effective defensive fortifications on the lines that they are occupying ukrainian territory, and also

an important political point is that the political leadership of ukraine, which in 2022 could count on, i would say, the unconditional support of the western world, faced a situation when it is necessary to persistently... have this support both in the political and diplomatic sense of the word , to win it, and for this i can also say that many were completely unprepared, indeed, in fact in the 22nd year it was possible to win in what putin called a special military operation, and on the 23rd year, the situation has changed, in fact , putin... began to prepare for a long war back in the 22nd year, in the middle of the 22nd year, when the relevant tasks were given by the ministry, that is, the country's economy was being restructured on a military basis, on military rails, etc. then i remember that i and probably many

other people who received this information actually thought that this was planning for the future from the point of view of russia, which will not happen. that is, we all believed that in one form or another the phenomenon of beautiful people associated with the great russian losses, associated with disappointment, and it appeared, but the regime survived it, and today we are really, we are really in a completely different situation, it is said that the methods by which we acted both inside the country and outside . in fact, today we have already exhausted ourselves and we need a change in the perception of horizons, a change in the way of thinking , the way of discourse as well, that is, in the west, and this is where i understand the situation more, so to speak,

an argument that was extremely important in the 22nd year, about the support of democracy, about the victim of aggression and so on and so forth, begins to be less and less active when... so the money that goes to the united states of america exceeds 100, 100 billion dollars, that is , here, here is a completely different argument. a completely different idea should appear, this is a question about the future of the event, actually it is that on monday a special issue of the wall street journal appeared about the past year and the next year, there was my article on this very topic, the fact that i tried to convey to american readers and those who make decisions, and of course a change, a change of approach is needed. in ukraine, but here i leave this topic rather to you, that is, i am in ukraine, but more,

more i understand, of course, what is happening in the west. well, by the way, i would like to stop with you on this point, because i really, by and large, encountered a situation when i felt not only in the west, but also in... ukraine the surprise that i always had, when he met with the assessments of the so-called sovietologists. absolute understanding of the political situation in russia. it was absolutely obvious to me that everything that happens to the beautiful, around the beautiful, is conscious actions that strengthen the authority and power of russian president vladimir putin. and that even the so-called prigozhin mutiny was a carefully designed special operation aimed at strengthening the russian regime. no matter how it ends, because it must be remembered that... the entire pogozhin special operation was directed not against putin, but against

putin's closest entourage, putin was simply offered, so to speak, with the help of this march to moscow, which did not happen, and maybe never should have happened, choose a more understandable one an entourage that will more effectively fight against ukraine, and this helped to destroy the very institution of private military companies, that is, to finally bring russia to the rank of a totalitarian state in which there can be no alternative military groups, by and large. this is how it has always been in the history of russia, you remember, the history with peter the first and the riflemen, by and large, the russia we have, as a strong, cruel, empire ready to fight for foreign territories, took shape just after the rifle rebellion, and in this regard there is historical works, and pictures that we all saw in childhood, if not in museums, then in textbooks, and when he is exactly the same political situation. all historians turned out to be paralyzed, as if they had not read and did not know anything, both specialists and

analysts, i was surprised, i will tell you often, well, i apply history a little differently in relation to the prigozhin rebellion, for me it is a classic repetition of the situation since august 1991 , when one of the cold. chicholops rise up in order to attract or return attention, the attention of the owner, that is, the same kryuchkov and others came first to pay homage to gorbachev and actually tried to stop this signing of the treaty on the renewed union then, because the renewed union meant that they all had to resign, and the coup ended with the fact that they ... the guys returned to gorbachev again, to ask him so that he would forgive them.

that is, the riot was about the situation and maintaining one's positions inside, inside the top. and that, this is the same thing that i saw in prigozhin, because the deprivation of prigozhin's army meant, also meant a physical threat to him and his life, and the fact that he rebelled, he... did not stand up against the tsar, he rebelled in the name of the tsar, as, as, as happened quite often in russian history. what, what became clear in 23, and what was not in 91, is what did not appear in, say, yeltsin, that is, a conditional yeltsin, navalny or someone else, was completely outside , outside the political field, outside the possibility to mobilize. the same muscovites or someone else, in support or prigozhin or in defense

of putin, and then depriving putin, that is, here this moment is excellent, and the fact that in russia they are not against the tsar, but for the tsar's benefit, well , that's it, so the story is long enough, long enough and old enough. well, i think what you said is very important, because it means that... the russian political leadership has come to some good conclusions since 1991 . yeltsin was a person who resisted the communist party of ukraine for a reason. he represented an alternative center of power. there was a general election. the popularly elected president of the russian federation, who could also rely on popularly elected people's representatives deputies of the russian federation. by the way, if we recall the shooting point with you, then there was also an interesting story there, because peter i, who fought with the shooters, somehow knew that his opponents could rely on the authority of a more legitimate monarch, the eldest son of the tsar, ivan, tsar ivan, and tsarina

sophia, who was then, kings. in the moscow kingdom, she could also appear as a representative of the interests of the legitimate monarch, because by and large, if we are honest, peter i was a usurper of power, he took it from the hands of the legitimate monarch, who had the legitimate right of succession, and the russian political elite should be given its due , it is clear that there are no alternative centers of power and even centers of opposition in the russia that putin is building, which, according to his opinion, belong to return to the borders of the soviet union. in 1991, and maybe further, it should not be, this was not realized by alexei navalny, who returned to russia, not realizing that he was signing a de facto death sentence for himself, and that his political influence in this future russia would be reduced to zero, but we had it understand, i think you raised several topics here, one of which seems to me to be more important

than the others, which is the ability of the russian authorities to learn. based on experience and mistakes as well, that is, in addition to the conclusions regarding yeltsin since 1991, other conclusions were related to the fact that now national autonomies do not have any special rights compared to other subjects of the russian federation, that is, a repetition of the collapse of the soviet union and constitutionally. impossible within the same framework in the russian federation, and the last few years, this is what the russians are learning, that is, we hear about it on the battlefield, we hear about it from our military, from the commanders, and in this sense, to underestimate the enemy is absolutely absolutely, so to speak, the biggest

mistake that we can make today . it seems to me that it is important not only not to overestimate, it is also important to understand correctly, and i have a rather serious conclusion that russia is not understood more in ukraine than even in those countries that have never been part of a single state body together with russia , it's me confusing, because just as russians are not ready to understand russia, because they consider ukraine, because they consider it an extension of the russian civilizational organism. and every time they meet with another development of the situation, they believe that these are some wrong ukrainians who simply need to be destroyed, all the others are correct, they do not draw any conclusions, they simply believe that some people who are on the payroll of the department have picked up, or even are supporters of some nazi ideology there, as vladimir putin says, and if ukraine is cleansed of

of all these people, then all others will be the same russians as all the russians of the kremlin, just like ukraine. believe that russians cannot be different, and every time they meet with proof that everything is happening in russia completely differently than in ukraine, they simply fall into a stupor, so i will repeat myself a little in one of the interviews, but with interviews in print, not on television, i once , just thinking about it, said that er... we know that ukraine is not russia, and we have overcome it, but we are surprised to discover that russia is not ukraine, that is, we are surprised by russia , because to a certain extent we also impose our way of thinking, our mentality on them, we would never start this war, and we would never conduct it in the way that russia

conducts it, well and this is what valeriy zaluzh says, but i was surprised what would happen. russia did not stop the war when such a large number of victims, yes, yes, yes, yes, and from this point of view, and here i will, so to speak, pull the blanket over myself already institutionally, in fact, what we need in ukraine is rethinking russia, we need actually decent russian studios, because we, we make the same mistakes they do. who do not investigate us, do not study us, and we have the same situation, this may not be a popular opinion, when the main trend now in ukraine is that, in fact, it is necessary to cancel all-russian, but we need knowledge about russia, without this, without knowledge and awareness, not only of our

biggest neighbor, the most aggressive and deadly neighbor, well, our future looks very doubtful, i want to support you, mr. sergey, because i believe that this is the idea of ​​canceling russia, so to speak, this is a trend of resentment and deep contempt, which is connected with... with russian victims on the territory of ukraine, however, if ukraine at all wants to survive as a sovereign state, even more so, if ukrainians want to remain on their territories, as a nation, because this is also an open question in history, now that we see all the determination, and a long struggle, we should know russia better than the russians themselves, but we read the history of russia in the interpretation of the conditional karamzin, in the interpretation of the conditional ... solovyova is now in interpretation of language. you wrote ukrainian history. hrytsak wrote history, his interpretation of the history of ukraine. we know

that ukrainian civilization itself began there with the way hrushevsky saw the history of ukraine. then there was the famous suptelny textbook. you can list it, list it. ukrainian historians who wrote the history of ukraine, which differs from its russian version. a question for us. van: which of the ukrainian historians wrote the history of russia? where is she? i think that this is absolutely urgent, urgent task. i also thought about the example of the poles, from whom there is much to learn, but they have such a world-renowned history of russia was created by richard pipes, an emigrant, a jewish emigrant from... poland, interwar poland, his father was originally from lviv, from galicia, which , which has become not

only one, but one of the most powerful and determined, and we have this task ahead of us, i remember the words of the then minister, or excuse me, people's commissar of foreign affairs litvinov, in the 1930s, who, in a letter to... a colleague, wrote that the west, when it talks about the soviet union, does not understand anything, the poles understand, but they understand too well, so we have to find ourselves in the situation of the poles, who understand russia too well, so well that for them it is this idea was uncomfortable. well, here is an important point, if you mentioned richard pipes, i suddenly remembered one of his theses about russia, theses, which, by the way... he was able to write after being in the soviet union many times. he said that, in his opinion, russians very often lie simply

out of love for art itself, they lie for the sake of lying, because lying itself is a part of life and a part of survival, and it seems to me that the russians do not really understand ukrainians here either, because if a ukrainian lies, he lies for some purpose, in his there is a purpose, and by which he wants to... to hide or slander or distort information, and the russians can lie just like that, a person who has never lived in russia, i lived in russia, for many decades, i can confirm this thesis of pipes, she will never understand it, ever when she is betrayed, deceived, they will look for the purpose of why she was deceived, and she was deceived just like that, and this is the same mental difference that is important, and it is very important for me to understand to what extent ukrainians will be aware of the extent to which these two civilizations, which... . have been together for so long , actually different, uh, yes, that is, the question, the question, i think, is also connected here with

the empire and - a certain form of the empire, in which , well, let's say, we talk about byzantium, sometimes we talk about the east, where in fact the truth is surrounded by many, many... untruths, that is, and this, it became, it became a cultural code, pybes also very interestingly turned out to be surkov's favorite historian, because pipes, even in the 90s, when everyone admired the fact that today, tomorrow russia will become fully democratic, pipes said, as a historian, that it is simply impossible, that historically, historical, so to speak... cultural dna and genotype is connected precisely with authoritarian power, and sorkov, who welcomed pipes in moscow and showed russian translations of his books,

spoke about that , that he'. understood, because for surkov and for the people around putin, it was also the legitimization of their authoritarian rule, but however pipes is used, it is clear that he understood many things that his colleagues did not, and this understanding was connected, i would say, primarily with the experience of polish history, because the poles and eastern europeans were looked at as outsiders in the 90s, when they... were knocking on nato's door and asking to let us in, which means we looked like some kind of urban fanatics, but today, today, we know enough, enough good thing they were right, and those who didn't were very, very wrong, i remember the words of zbigniew brzezinski at one of the conferences devoted to nato and the expansion of nato, which

was a controversial topic in... in the united states of america, he said then, it was about 10 years ago, he said that if it had not happened, today we would have discussions in the united states of america not about ukraine, but about poland, so this is this this this this experience we still have, we, we get it, we get it at a very heavy price, but it cannot be released on it either you need to build self-awareness. understanding the enemy and the way for the future, well, this is an important question, because if you talk to an average ukrainian about the further course of events, at least this year, you will definitely hear from many that russia will collapse into several parts, by the way, the president of russia also spoke about this vladimir putin of the federation, as one of the measures regarding russia, just at the end of the year, he mentioned it, because this is another such conspiratorial one, i would say. the theory that

the russians adhere to in order to justify their aggressive actions, and we adhere to the opposite, and that putin will die there, his regime will self-destruct, and everything will be fine, but here there is another question, and whether the ukrainians themselves are ready for a long-term neighborhood with a strong, aggressive, tough russia, which will be part of this world of dictatorships, if you will, partners, or an equal partner, or rather a geopolitical neighborhood. china, do ukrainians understand that it is precisely with such a russia, which will exceed ukraine many times over in terms of demographic potential, economic opportunities, and possibly military power, that ukrainians will have to live, perhaps the most fundamental for the survival of our state for ten years, and what they are ready to do so that this neighborhood does not lead to the disappearance of ukraine from the political map of the world,

this is the reality for which we must... prepare and prepare for, miracles do happen, especially in authoritarian and personalistic regimes, because there biology, biology is the biggest, most important factor, but counting on a miracle absolutely would be the biggest mistake, in fact it would be suicidal, i.e. suicidal strategy and... tactics, we, we must learn to live in these, in these new conditions, of course, and plan, plan not only for the next, next month or next year, for the next decades, a strategy must be developed, tomorrow there may indeed be another beauty, there may be some, some extremely serious changes in moscow, but...

but we need the reality, which was actually understood by the same richard pipes, that authoritarian systems, and aggressive systems, imperialist systems, do not change, in one day or in one week, they change, but this is a very long process that can take decades, and this is the strategy that must be developed in ukraine, regardless of who is in the kremlin today. and whether this policy is actually genocidal in relation to ukraine, or suddenly a new yeltsin or navalny appears on a white horse, that is, we are dealing with a historical empire with certain codes of behavior and cultural codes, and all of them, all of them these codes are aggressive and

threatening, threatening to the neighbors, this... this is a story of centuries.