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tv   [untitled]    February 24, 2024 4:30am-5:01am EET

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theses, which mykhailo fedorov said there, and now the new head of the uav management, volodya kupriy, wants to do there, that is , they should actually give the technical tasks, that is , the parameters that the drones should meet, not specifically specify the company, remove this corrupt component, yes, that someone finished there, somehow there was able to enter this one. in the relationship, contract, no, technical parameters, the procurement agency of the ministry of defense must evaluate and look at the criteria that correspond to these parameters, price parameters, technical parameters and to contract with specific companies, then this separation goes to the responsibility for decision-making, and of course, that the units should already define their... let's say this,
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the vision from the front, and this is a permanent one, there should be such a connection of these three three components, without this, there will be some kind of constant lobbying of those companies that, for example , now, even after last year and or this year, there are some companies from those ordered by the general staff, they either cannot fulfill or do not want to contract with... by the state, therefore that it is more problematic with the state , it is better with volunteers, i.e. such questions already arise that they are determined, they cannot fulfill it, and the procedure is again carried out in a new way, and at the same time everything is delayed, and this is because of these procedural moments, which are not regulated , or somewhere someone has not signed, it is delayed, for example, the state intelligence service according to mine , there are data, there according to the sbu, there according to... according to the ministry of defense
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there or according to the guru they signed, for example, according to the national guard, they are bypassing them for some reason, so far not subscribed, maybe i'm wrong, it's that what they say is said by people involved in contracting with the state special forces, that's why, you know, when there are companies that can't do it yet, or can't do it in such options, but they have orders and they are contracted, and there are companies like ours, i know quite a few of them, with kaiton here... we will meet at the weekend, they , for example, are contracted for 15% of their production capacity, and they are the most, let's say, more contracted, talk to vadym yunik, they spoke to air reconnaissance, he says, i am contracted for about 5% this year, why are there so many delays, it is already almost march, this is, well, this is a problem, so it is necessary to contract such companies that are ready, we have our drones on staples. who are ready
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and who can, who can now supply, well, we can actually see that it is already the second month of this 24th year, and we are again following the rake that is still left from the previous year, that is, there are no orders, and what is interesting, first of all companies that have mass production products, they have fewer orders than these start-up companies that have appeared last year in large numbers , some absolutely illogical situation. and one more question of a technical plan, we literally have two minutes, is it true that there is already a problem, that many of these different fpv drones create a problem of lack of frequency resource, relatively speaking , a certain amount is supplied, and there is simply not enough bandwidth to effectively ensure the combat mission of these fpv drones, is there such a problem, or is it still well...
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far-fetched, no, it is not far-fetched, that's why i said above about what we too are moving into other frequency ranges, we are changing the frequency in we just had a conversation with valery borovyk, now we continue, it seems that we have a connection, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, i was interrupted, i just got a call from reb, so, uh... in fact, it’s me, it’s a problem, and it’s really due to the use of such chaotic, sometimes uncoordinated, that is, the activities of the rebbe, in which several units volunteered there for some letters or notes, which means that they are not, not, not all of them systematically it includes only self-defense, but at the same time drones other other divisions are falling, i, for example, how many weeks ago or?
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i was with a magyar for a year and a half, we met in kherson region, kherson region is no less terrible now, than shelling, than in bakhmut, avdiivtka, it is understandable. that there is a head-on collision , kherson region is also being hit hard, the same story as it was there four months ago, when we went to hit, when the tile was blown up, yes, that is, there is no such constant coordination, both the means of rep, and sometimes, and sometimes from the units and pilots who launch the drones, it is formed, here where on... for example, conscious units and conscious leaders, that means, they hold a plot, there, for example, as in the kherson region, in morpehiv, the magyar holds there, there, in another, the square holds there and so on , that is, where there are conscious people who coordinate and were able
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to coordinate, then the work is more or less clear there, including in drone launches, and in ... relatively speaking, if there is no such coordination, then there are constant losses, losses of their own drones, which are not arrive, which means that they are paid off by their lots, as well as this problem with the purity range, of course, because there is no complete set now, and it should be a different type of production, which... will ensure work on other, other, other frequency ranges, in this regard, we are also working with western partners, we are working, and i know that our colleagues are also working, well, we will see, mr. valery, thank you very much for such important
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comments, i think that we will spread them through defense express, because well the lack of a set of contracts is, well, in my opinion, this is essential a serious problem of the current stage, in fact. thank you for including in our broadcast, i will remind you. that it was valery borovyk, the commander of the white eagle special unit of strike drones. and then we will talk about the fact that the confrontation with the enemy takes place not only in the air, but also in cyberspace. there are also many complexities, many nuances that only experts can explain to us, but we will talk about this in more detail after the advertising information block. exclusively on the air of our channel. greetings, friends, on the air of politclub. on espresso tv channels. the most relevant topics of the week: russia's war against ukraine, the war in the middle east, the crisis on the border between ukraine and poland. topics that resonate in our society.
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drone attack on kyiv and other cities of ukraine, drone attack on moscow and other russian cities. analysis of the processes that change the country and each of us. the country should get. portnikov and guests of the project: we are bored, because there is nothing to fight about, let's go out, they help to understand the present and predict the future, for the world the second trump's presidency will be terrible, a project for those who care and think politclub, every sunday at 20:10 on espresso. greetings, this is svoboda live on radio svoboda. we have already come to... the following shots may shock you. news from the scene. live drone attacks, kamikaze. political analytics. objectively and meaningfully. there is no political season. exclusive interviews, reports from the hottest points of the front.
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shot. svobodalai, frankly and impartially. you draw your own conclusions. vasyl zima's big broadcast, two hours of air time, two hours of your time, two hours to learn about the war and what the world is like, two hours to keep up with economic news and sports news, two hours in the company of favorite presenters, presenters who have become kind to many, as well as distinguished guests of the studio, events day in two hours, a big broadcast of vasyl zima, a project for smart and caring people, in the evening for espresso. we continue our "war and weapons" program, and we understand that the confrontation with the enemy takes place on land, on water, in the air, although no less fierce battles with the enemy continue and in cyberspace, although people who have crossed paths notice them only when it is already
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impossible not to notice, let's recall the situation when the enemy carried out cyber attacks on kyivstar and the communication stopped working, but experts see... many more signs of such a confrontation with the enemy , know more details about the dynamics and risks that are emerging in cyberspace and that are closely related to our war. with the russian federation. therefore , my next interlocutor will be kostyantyn korsun, the former head of the sbu division on combat with cyber crime. the founder of the emergency response center in the state intelligence service, now an expert in the field of cyber security. mr. konstantin, glad to see and welcome you to the espresso channel. congratulations. i would still like to continue this topic related to kyivstar, because this attack took place. at the end of last year, then all over the country kyivstar subscribers lost their connection,
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users could not connect to operators and so on. it was later reported that the hacker group, which is full-time, is behind this attack by a unit of russian military intelligence, but after every such attack, there are certainly conclusions drawn from both sides, i would like to ask you what conclusions you... have drawn, should our state and private companies have drawn, have they drawn such conclusions, can we expect repetition of such attacks and what are such unmasking signs of the enemy's preparation for such powerful cyber measures against our country? well, how can you detect the signs of such attacks, and only if you have a serious cyber security system built with which... for all monitors, studies, checks for vulnerabilities and so on, but even in the presence of such
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a team, you may not notice it, as was the case, for example, in the case of kyivstar, where there is a really serious professional team, but again, it is not known what actually happened, whether it was inside the network or at a higher level at the level of some management of the company, whether the former shareholders rearranged their people, it is not known, that is , no one shares and so on, but - signs... uh, well, again, this is an unstable working system, as if when everything is fine, but - you cannot perform some functions, well, what a suspicious activity, well, again, without a system of detectors, sensors, without an intrusion detection system there, it is almost impossible to do this without special tools, regarding the conclusions that should have been made, well, actually, see in june 2000. in the 17th year, ukraine was attacked by norya. and it was
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, well, simply orders of magnitude more large-scale, and in terms of impacts, and well, in terms of influence, and in terms of results, and in terms of financial consequences , an attack than an attack on only one mobile operator, which, in principle, in a day and a half started to restore services. here, the main conclusions should have been drawn by many different ones. companies of state and non-state organizations even after the summer of 2017, and mostly there it concerns state institutions that supposedly should take care of national cyber security, or rather the construction of a national cyber security system, which obviously was not done, so everything remains as it was then and until these were powerful attacks, and the carpathians obblenergo, we had just such cyberattacks, which the whole world flocked to... well, to make sure that this is really the case, that this is not a theory, but these are practical cases
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, and they were studied, and this is not once, not twice, not three, not five, there were such cases, although there were precedents there with kyivstar, so, unfortunately, at the moment we have they do not exist as such a system of national cyber security, but we have many different cyber structures that seem to exercise something there, manage something there, take on it... millions are said there from the state budget and from western partners, in fact, well, this does not work yet, although in principle everyone has known for a long time how to build such a system, but here it is necessary to abandon nepotism and in-laws of brothers appointed to positions, to be guided by professionalism, open competitions, transparent procedures and to be guided by professionalism, especially when it comes to... just such a purely high-tech field as cyber security, here you know, you need to be
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a specialist, first of all, as i understand your answer, to sum it up briefly , when we say that the military did not build fortifications, where are the fortifications, where are these concrete structures, then as i understand that in the digital space of such fortifications we have and still not built, to put it briefly, well if it is very strong. yes, because we have, well, each organization is a separate network, roughly speaking, and this is the combination of the exchange of information about incidents, it is with those fortifications, that is, a... and it can be built on this exchange of information only on mutual trust, but if the key participants of this system of exchange are not professionals and cannot be trusted, then accordingly they will not be exchanged, they will not be trusted, and they will not exchange essential, such sensitive data either, and this is very, if very
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simplified, this is the root of the problem, and how do you assess our actions against the enemy in... in the field of cyber security, because at least there were two reports, the main intelligence agency there, it seems a month ago, said that they had carried out an attack on tax system of the russian federation, this was the message of gur. i really did not find a corresponding reaction in russian sources. then there was information that due to cyber operations, it was possible to obtain a significant amount of documentation on military equipment from the russian military. enterprises, as per in your opinion, we are operating on the territory of the enemy in the cyber sphere, are we having success, or do we need to create some more improved mechanisms of influence on the enemy? and look, well, this cyber war is offensive, and offensive security, as it is called, that is, offensive security, cyber security, and it has been going on for a very long time,
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and cyber war, i consider the beginning of may 2014 there. and its intensity is sometimes greater, sometimes less, in fact, but it continues constantly, every day, few people notice it, from our side, well, there are strengths and weaknesses with both with us and with the russians, and with us it is volunteerism, it is a multitude of different decentralized organizations, teams, more precisely, not organizations rather, but teams of volunteers, or semi-volunteers or... because in some state practically every force structure has its own unit for offensive cyber operations, but the problem here is that decentralization is good, because there is no single center, but the fact that there is no single center is also a weakness, because the single center is designed to coordinate efforts,
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that is, it is necessary to somehow combine this model, and in we need to combine decentralization with... coordination, because very often there are cases when some groups interfere with the work of other groups, hit on other people's goals, well , uncoordinated, the effect is not what it should be, and each of these offensive groups, it has some achievements, but very, very often exaggerates sometimes, well, that is, they really reported about a powerful attack on the tax system, but the tax... system did not really notice it, in fact, and the same with other things, and there are cases, when really serious achievements, they are not clearly enough, they communicate clearly there, and people simply do not know about them, although in fact they are very serious achievements, that is why we do not have a single center for coordination,
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decision-making, development of strategies, coordination of tactics, coordination of actions between between we have 7 minutes left, i have a number of questions, and i want us to have time to speak at least three questions clearly. first, the situation is related to the fact that the accounts of our media resources began to be actively hacked, there ligant, ukrainian truth, partly espresso, and information is posted there, which actually, well, was related to the fact that we there, apparently, unsuccessfully conducted a retreat for... these actions are carried out by whom on the russian side and how can we defend ourselves if our media resources cannot defend themselves , who should they turn to for help? well, the point is that we have media resources - well, i think one of the key elements of the critical infrastructure, because through the media it is proven, well, some kind of public
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opinion is formed, and some important, critical, important news is proven... that's why the russians always important media is one of the main goals, along with state bodies, along with the military, military facilities, the media is also included in the top ten key goals, and here you have to rely on your own strength, because unfortunately, state structures will not help much, although they can harm, but engage in and develop their own cyber security, there should be at least a few specialists in the media. specialized, who will be engaged in this, and also need to study, a very serious contribution, this is a cybergenius for every employee, everyone, who in the media has... it doesn't matter if it's the host of a rating show there or an ordinary employee, an employee, an accountant, ah, i don't know,
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a manager, everyone who has access to internal resources must necessarily take some basic courses cybergyenes, on which they will be told the basic rules, thanks to which, well, because in principle , effective cyberattacks of the russians, they are still based, but if you investigate there, dig into what. everything started, then everything starts with something banal, it is a short password 1 2 3 4 5, it is on the clicked link that came in the messenger, is it the lack of a vpn connection or something else, well, some very simple, banal, primitive things, that's why cyber science, cyber education and just enlightenment among media workers is a simple cheap, but very powerful tool, and because that's basically everything is based respectively specialists and personnel training, these are the two key areas on which we should focus , we heard you, and one more question, how do you
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feel about the fact that this application army plus will be created in action, that is, in the phone for the military, where there will be documents complaints, reports, it became known literally there, well, i saw this information the day before yesterday. how do you feel about such an initiative, are there positive aspects here, or are there rather more risks here, what are your assessments of such proposals? the question is controversial and unclear, there is not enough information to give an assessment, because it depends a lot on what kind of application it will be, with what functions, what data it will take, where it will be processed, how it will be transmitted, well, a lot of technical details are clear, as far as i am concerned it is known that the army already uses several different... there are applications for various tasks , let's say, and there are quite a few of them, and each of them has
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some specialized function, there are some for drones, some for artillery, some for personnel, for the bchs, there for internal reporting, for reports , there are many different ones, as well as another army plus this application that has been announced, it is not entirely clear what it will be used for... what functionality, first of all, it is necessary to determine from the functionality already with the technical implementation, where and how they will be deployed servers, what will be the architecture, some technologies, how they are interconnected, how far it will be possible to get data from the enemy, whether to stop the operation of such an application, whether to transfer malicious files there, whether to spy and so on, that is, until it is a declaration, on the basis of which it is extremely difficult. draw any conclusions, so i have no answers to these questions. and we literally have 3 minutes, maybe even less, i think that the answer to your question, to this question of mine, which you
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will ask now, i think, will still be a reason for our further conversation with you. i would like to find out and understand what is the essence, relatively speaking, of the situation when there are a number of these software solutions for the armed forces, there is a delta, there are nettles, but they are not adopted due to certain nuances. the state special communications and the ministry of defense have the impression that the state special communications acts as a certain monopoly for the certification of those things that are developed for the military themselves, and there is a certain misunderstanding between these two structures, is this really so, and if so, what are the main reference points of this confrontation , in the following programs, we will continue this topic with you. our guest is at the most interesting place , we lost communication there, now we are restoring it, yes, i am here, that's great, did you hear my
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question, should i repeat it, yes, no, i understood, where is the special communication, we have such a regulator, a monopolist on everything that allows or prohibits the use of various applications, and including its effect extended to army systems, in... this is modern war, it needs rapid development of technologies, which absolutely inevitably involves the use of high-speed internet, cloud technologies, hosting in the cloud, real-time data exchange is very, very fast, without this we will not win, we simply will not win in any way, but the regulatory framework of state special communications, it stopped developing sometime in the 90s, and it operates very much according to... white norms, guests, and everything else, she is trying to change there, but without success, plus the structure is extremely corrupt, and we can see it from the arrest of the chairman and deputy
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chairman. vierzh pedzvizh nabu on suspicion of embezzlement of funds for the construction of information systems, and as corruption is a corrupt structure, it tries to influence also the military systems, the army, the armed forces, the ministry of defense, uh, and accordingly, well, they have little understanding of the value of these systems for waging war, but they understand very well their interests are not to allow, prohibit, impose... some restrictions that slow down the system, that is, they do not understand, do not want to understand the importance of this for the armed forces, that is why law 1062 was adopted by the verkhovna rada, which can be placed , that is, it is not revolution, but such a significant step forward in the development of military systems, ah, which will allow the military to determine the requirements of information protection themselves and to implement them themselves,
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and this pa... for these comments, we will definitely continue this topic with you, because it is an extremely important topic, these nuances are important, we will talk about them in more detail in our next issues, i will remind our viewers that these general trends related to cyber security were explained to us by kostyantyn korsun, an expert in the field of cyber security, a person with considerable professional experience in this queen, therefore to speak briefly, in fact, despite technological developments, there are still a number of bureaucratic ... procedures, complications that do not allow us to realize the potential of our companies in the most effective way, we need to do something about it, speed up and make really progressive decisions, very i hope that such conclusions will be made by our bodies of executive political power. stay tuned to the espresso channel, there will be a lot of interesting information in various components.
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see this week in the judicial program control with tatyana shustrova. an apple from an apple tree, what scandalized the judges' children? ivan ablov, celebrating new year's eve, killed a person. but how did the daughter of a supreme court judge inherit the knack of successfully buying real estate? i am a successful woman, entrepreneur and investor. congratulations, judicial control is on the air. institutional reboot and personnel renewal. judicial power on the basis of norms of professional ethics and integrity is the basis of the judicial reform currently being carried out in ukraine. its successful implementation is the main requirement for our further path to the eu. we will talk about how successful the transformation is and whether the moral and professional qualities of justice officials meet high standards today, but
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first to the news. pavlo vovk, the former head of the scandalously liquidated district administrative court of kyiv, will not become a judge of the cassational administration. the higher qualification commission found him unsuitable for this position. despite the fact that this qualification assessment should have helped the wolf to avoid dismissal. he obviously, realizing that the chances of getting a position were not enough, did everything, so that the assessment does not take place. through his lawyers, vovk filed objections to the majority of the members of the central committee and the entire composition of the commission in general. but the commission in turn refused to challenge each member present. ahead of vovka is a basic check for compliance with his current position. based on its results, the higher quorum commission either recognizes him as suitable, or recommends to the higher council of justice that he be released. it will be recalled that the ex-head of the kyiv district administrative court, pavlo vovk, is involved in the case of interfering with the work of the court and influencing the adoption of certain decisions for money. in 2020 nabu announced vovka to his deputy yevhen
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ablov and others. five oask judges are suspected of creating a criminal organization and usurping power. oask itself was liquidated at the end of 2022. however, despite all this, the wolf still remains the judge. moreover, he continues to receive wages. for the past year , he received more than uah 1,600, doing absolutely nothing. andriy leonov, the former judge of the babushkin district court of dnipro, cannot come to terms with the court's verdict for a $15,000 bribe. submitted cassation appeal that year in march the higher anti-corruption court found leonov guilty of extorting $30,000 and actually receiving $15,000 in bribes for passing a judgment in criminal proceedings. leonov was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment with the deprivation of the right to hold the position of a judge for a period of three years and with the confiscation of all property. the appellate court confirmed this verdict. however, leonov is desperately trying to avoid punishment.

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