a mavik that can fly on a mission , use hovering, resets, turn back, again we complete its warheads and work on what is on the front line, what is behind the front line, what is far for special special operations in the rear, the body of the enemy, we are engaged in this , we do this with special units that understand the value of this particular complex, this is the osa complex. which, of course , is more expensive, but there are special targeting systems, there are systems that work under the reb of systems that work with other, let's say, forms of communication, that is, which hang, that fly on a mission, this is a different type of drone and this is a different history of bombers, which must be effectively developed, it is for today...

girls are collecting sitting in this in various organizations in schools collecting, it’s all interesting, it’s all cool, it’s necessary to do, but it is necessary to transition or develop in parallel with... the military system of a different direction on a different, different basis, well, this is something like that, well, that is, in fact, when the federal minister talks about the need for the standardization of drones, then in fact these are the processes that rather affect already today and a little on the past, yes, because relatively speaking, we are already standardizing this flow of cheap drones, and the other component is to raise the bar of requirements and here, for sure, the ministry of defense figures. there

, with the new commander of the military, they have to raise the bar of requirements for manufacturers, which they have to step up to and really provide those samples that will be much more effective than this and that shaft of these cheap drones, which we are now trying to provide at the expense of any options, that's how it turns out, it turns out even more difficult, because now we actually have combat drones on ourselves takes over... the ministry of defense has more contracting powers, that is, the general staff, which gives requests, but there is another problem, that it is not clear where the point of making a decision about which companies to contract is understood by someone, not by everyone, even by newcomers to the new agency, which procures from the procurement of the ministry of defense for a new team, sometimes they too. that

requests are coming, for example, from the general staff, they are still previous ones, probably from the previous iteration, maybe even now, but for now they are working on the previous iteration of contracts, where the companies don't know at all, sometimes it even happens that the company receives a request for contracting with the company for a drone that has not even passed certification, that does not have access to the operation of the code on... and in an urgent manner these issues are resolved for him, let me remind you of our conversations that we spent three to four months only on access to the operation of all these documents that used to be, now they have been changed to the creation of an experimental unit there, which on the front line six months earlier it was access to exploitation, and part of the companies are allowed.

that they receive these accesses to exploitation, conditionally speaking, on a long road, and some of the companies that do not even have a certificate, for some reason there are requests for their contracting, it does not come to mind at all, and this should be changed by new teams, that is, actually now, as i understand it, partly we have the inertia of the past there, and your company just got in front. under this inertia of the past, where you were simply exhausted by unnecessary procedures, instead of securing purchase. now the situation has changed a little, but we can see that the newly created agency is still working out the rules, and in particular, the most powerful of the companies and structures that have money, in particular the state special communications, i am told that within two months, the actual contracts through the ministry of 'links are not signed with mostly.

by the majority of suppliers, although about 40 billion hryvnias, in fact, these are the ministry of statistics and the state technical service, they are certain monopolists from the point of view of the volume for the purchase of these drones, does it arise? the question is for you, do you have contracts with the state intelligence service, and again , the lion's share is all volunteer funds and partly the ministry of defense? now there is no, and exactly what you said is happening, that is, we have provided all the information of the special forces, we know the head of the special forces, he is a good, decent guy, yura, he called me there last weekend or the day before, as it was with your father we show? they are ready, ready to enter into a contract, but i don't know why we don't enter into a contract, there is a request for the one that will provide this year's supply to the national guard, we already closed the contract for the national guard last year, you can ask those who came to us, whom we trained,

pilots and so on, their impressions, they are very satisfied with the complex, which means that now we are ready to contract in full. we use our own... money, unfortunately, we withdraw investor funds, volunteer funds, we are currently making 500 boards there, we will have them for a week, that is, we can already contract and supply from 200 to a thousand boards, depending on the equipment in month, and we are ready and willing to do it to contract with the state special forces, why there is no contract now, i still don't understand. all the data are provided by the ministry of defense , a new yevgenshtab team has arrived there by the ministry of defense , for example, it has its own procedure, but i am saying again what i said there in response to your previous questions

that the new team is dealing with the procedure, how it will do , i will say, as i see it, and it coincides with some theses that... fedorov said there, and now he wants to make a new head of the uav management there, volodya kupriy there, that is, they should actually give technical tasks, that is, the parameters that the drones should meet, not specify the company specifically, remove this corruption component, yes, that someone finished there, somehow managed to enter into this relationship, the contract. no, the agency has to evaluate the technical parameters of the procurement of the ministry of defense and look at the criteria that correspond to these parameters, price parameters, technical parameters, and contract with specific companies, then this separation goes to the responsibility for

decision-making, and of course, that the divisions should already define their, let's say, vision. from the front line, and this is a constant , so there must be such a connection between these three components, without this there will be constant lobbying of those companies, which, for example, now, even last year and or this year, there are some companies from those which the general staff ordered, they either cannot perform or do not want to contract with the state, because with the state about... more problematic with volunteers is better, that is, there are already issues that are determined for them, and they cannot do it perform, and the procedure goes through again in a new way, and at the same time everything is delayed, and this is because of these procedural points that are not

settled, or somewhere someone did not sign, it is delayed, for example, the state intelligence service according to my data there according to the sbu, there by the ministry of defense there or by... have signed up, for example, for the national guard, for some reason they are bypassing them, they haven't signed up yet, maybe i'm not right, that 's what they say, people involved in contracting with the state special forces say, that's why , you know, when there are companies that can't do it yet, or can't do it in such volumes to do, but they have orders and they are contracted, and there are companies like ours, i know quite a few of them, with skyeton, that's where we 'll meet on weekends... we'll meet, for example, they're contracted for 15% of their production capacity, and they are the most, shall we say, more contracted , talk to vadym yunik, the air reconnaissance spoke , he says, i am contracted for this year by about 5%, why is there such a delay, it is already almost

march, it is, well, it is a problem, that's why it is necessary to contract such companies that are ready and stand by us more quickly staples, our drones are ready, and... well , we can actually see that it is already the second month of this 24th year, and we are again following the rake that is still left over from the previous year, that is... there are no orders, and that it is interesting, first of all the companies that have serial used products, they have fewer orders than these startup companies that appeared last year in large numbers, some absolutely illogical situation, and one more question of a technical plan, we literally have two minutes, eh, is it true that there is already a problem, that there are many of these various fpv drones create the problem of lack of frequency...resource, when relatively speaking , a certain amount is supplied, and

there is simply not enough bandwidth to effectively ensure the combat mission of these fpv drones, is there such a problem, or is it still far-fetched? no , it is not far-fetched, that is why i said above that we are also moving to other frequency ranges, changing the frequency in... we just had a conversation with valery barovyuk, now we are continuing, we seem to have a connection, yes , yes, yes, yes, yes, it stopped for me, it is in i am just being called from the rebbe, so, in fact, this, this is a problem, and really due to the use of such chaotic, sometimes uncoordinated, therefore, also the activities of the rebbe, in which some. the divisions took a letter or a note from a volunteer there, which means that they

do not systematically include it, they only protect themselves, but at the same time the drones of other divisions are falling, for example, i was there a week or a half ago with a magyar, we met at kherson oblast, kherson oblast is in no less horror now, than after shelling, than there is in bakhmut avdiivtsi, it is clear that there is a head-on with... but kherson region is also being hit hard, the same story as it was there four months ago, when we went to strike, when khakhovka was blown up, yes, that is, there is no coordination such a constant one, as means of rap, and sometimes, and sometimes from units and pilots who launch drones, it is composed, that is where, for example, unconscious units. and unconscious leaders, that means, they hold the plot, there, for example, as in morpyehiv in the kherson region

, there magyar holds, there, in another there the square holds there and so on, that is, where there are conscious people who coordinate and were able to coordinate, then there is more or less clear work going on, including in the launching of drones, and in rebov complexes, in the work of rebov... complexes synchronization , and where, relatively speaking, there is no such coordination, there are constant losses, losses of their own drones that do not fly, which means that they are paid off by their own lots, as well as this problem with the frequency range, of course, because there is no equipment now , and this should be a different type of production will provide work on another. we are also working in other frequency ranges in this regard and we are working with western partners and

i know that our colleagues are also working, well, we will see, mr. valery, thank you very much for such important comments, i think we will spread them through defense express, because, well, the lack of a set of contracts is, well, in my opinion, this is a significant and serious problem of the current stage , in fact. thank you for including in our broadcast, let me remind you that it was valery borovyk, the commander. from the unit of attack drones white rel, further we will talk about the fact that the confrontation with the enemy takes place not only in the air, but also in cyberspace, there are also many complexities, many nuances that only specialists can explain to us, but we will talk about this in more detail after the advertising information block. vasyl zima's big broadcast, two hours of airtime, two hours of your time, two hours to learn about the war and what the world is about, two hours to keep abreast of economic news and sports news,

two hours in the company of your favorite presenters, presenters, who have become like family to many, as well as distinguished guests of the studio, the events of the day in two hours, vasyl zima's big broadcast, a project for smart and caring people, in the evening at espresso. we continue our war and weapons program, and we understand that the confrontation with the enemy takes place on land, on water. in the air, although no less fierce battles with the enemy continue in cyberspace, although the crossed people notice them only when it is already impossible not to notice. let's remember the situation. when the enemy carried out cyber attacks on kyivstar and communications stopped working, but experts see many more signs of such a confrontation with the enemy, know more details about the dynamics and risks that are forming in cyberspace, and which are closely related to our war, with the russian federation. therefore,

my next interlocutor will be kostyantyn korsun, the former head of the sbu unit. in the fight against cybercrime, the founder of the emergency response center in the state intelligence service, now an expert in the field of cyber security. mr. konstantin, glad to see and welcome you to the espresso channel. congratulations! i wanted i would still like to continue this topic related to kyivstar, because this attack took place there at the end of last year, then the connection disappeared in all countries of kyivstar subscribers. why users couldn't join operators and so on. it was later reported that this attack was behind a hacker group, which is a full-time unit of russian military intelligence, but after each such attack, conclusions are drawn from both sides. i would like to ask you what conclusions were drawn, whether

our public and private companies should have drawn, or did they draw such conclusions, can we expect a repetition of such attacks and what are such unmasking signs of the enemy's preparation for such powerful cyber measures against our country? well, how can you detect signs of such attacks only if you have built a serious cyber security system that constantly monitors everything, studies, checks for vulnerabilities, and so on, but even with the presence of such a team, you can... not notice it, as was the case, for example, in the case of kyivstar, where there is a really serious professional team, and, but, again, it is not known what actually happened, or it was inside the network, or higher up, at the level of some management of the company, or former shareholders rearranged their people, it is not known, that is, no one shares and so on, but - signs, er, well, again, this is an unstable

working system, like, when everything is in order, but - you cannot perform some functions, well, what a suspicious activity, well, again, without a system of detectors, sensors, without an intrusion detection system there, it is practically impossible to do this without special tools, regarding the conclusions that had were made, well, actually look, in june 2017, ukraine was attacked by noute, and it was simply orders of magnitude more... large-scale both in terms of impacts and well, in terms of influence and results, in terms of financial consequences, than an attack on only one mobile operator, which, in principle, began to restore services in a day and a half, here, but the main conclusions should have been made by many different companies, organizations,

state and non-state even after, in the summer of 2017, and also... it concerns state institutions, which supposedly should have take care of national cyber security, or rather the construction of a national cyber security system , which was obviously not done, so everything remains as it was then, and before that there were powerful attacks, and prykarpattia-oblenerga, we had just such cyber attacks that the whole world flocked to, well to make sure that it is really so, that this is not a theory, but these are practical cases, and they have been studied, and this more than once. not two, not three, not five, there were such cases, although there were precedents with kyivstar, so, unfortunately, we currently have such a system of national cyber security, they don’t exist, but we have a lot of different cyber structures that seem to manage something there, manage something there, take crazy millions for it from

the state budget and from western partners, ah on... actually, well, that’s it for now that does not work, although in principle everyone has known for a long time how to build such a system, but here it is necessary to abandon nepotism and in-laws of brothers appointed to positions, be guided by professionalism, open competitions, transparent procedures of some kind and be guided by professionalism, especially if it is precisely about such a pure a high-tech industry like cyber security , here you know, you need to be a specialist, first of all , as i understand your answer, to summarize briefly, when we say that the military did not build fortifications, where are the fortifications, where are these concrete structures. as i understand it, we still haven't built such fortifications in the digital space , to put it briefly, well, if it's very simplified, then yes, because we have, well, each

organization is a separate network, roughly speaking, yes and here is a combination of sharing information about incidents, this is how it is with those fortifications, that is, and this exchange of information can only be built on mutual trust, but even if the key... participants of this exchange system are not professionals and cannot be trusted, then, accordingly, the exchange cannot be trusted will also exchange essential data, they will not be so sensitive either, and this is very, if very simplified, that is the root of the problem. and how do you assess our actions against the enemy in the field of cyber security, because there were at least two messages, the main thing is there the intelligence department, it seems a month ago... spoke about the fact that they had carried out an attack on the tax system of the russian federation there, it was a message from gur. i really did not find a corresponding reaction in russian sources.

then there was information that, due to cyber operations, it was possible to obtain a significant amount of documentation on military equipment there from a russian military enterprise. according to your estimates, we are operating on the territory of the enemy in the cyber sphere, are we having any success? do we need to create some more well improved mechanism mechanisms of influence on the enemy? and look, well, this cyber war is offensive, yes, offensive security, as it is called, that is, offensive security, cyber security, and it has been going on for a very long time, and i consider the cyber war there to be the beginning of may 2014, and its intensity is more, then less, in fact, but it goes on constantly, every day, few people notice it, from our side, well, there are strengths and weaknesses with both us and the russians, and we have volunteerism,

this is a lot of different decentralized organizations, teams, more precisely, not organizations rather, but teams of volunteers, or semi-volunteers, or in some state, practically every force structure has some support. work for offensive cyber operations, but the problem here is that decentralization is good, because there is no single center, but the fact that there is no single center is also a complexity, because the single center is designed to coordinate efforts, that is, it is necessary to somehow combine this model, and in we need to combine decentralization with clear coordination, because they happen very often cases when some groups interfere with the work of other groups, hit on... on someone else's goal, well, uncoordinated, the effect is not what it should be, and each of these groups is offensive, it has some achievements, but

very very often exaggerates, sometimes, well, that is, they really reported a powerful attack on the tax system, but the tax system did not really notice it, the same with others, but there are cases when it is really serious. achievements they communicate with well not brightly enough brightly there and people simply do not care about them know, although in fact very serious achievements, that's why we don't have a single center for coordination, decision-making, strategy development, coordination of tactics, coordination of actions between different, we have 7 minutes left, i have a number of questions, and i want , so that we are no less. three issues were clearly discussed: firstly, the situation is related to the fact that the accounts of our media resources began to be actively hacked,

there ligant, ukrainian truth, partly espresso, and information is posted there, which actually, well, was related to that we are there apparently unsuccessful retreat from avdiivka, these actions, they are carried out by whom on the russian side, and how can we defend ourselves if our resources. can't defend themselves, who should they turn to for help? well, the point is that we have media resources - well, i think, one of the key elements of the critical infrastructure, because through the media it is proven, well , some public opinion is formed, and some important critical important news is proven, so russians always value the media - it one of the main goals along with state bodies, along with eyelashes military objects , the media is also included in the top ten key goals, and here you have to rely on your own strength, because

, unfortunately, state structures will not help much, although they can harm, but to engage in and develop your own cyber security, the media should have at least a few specialists , specialized, who will be engaged in this, and you also need to study, a very serious contribution, this is a cyber genius for every employee, everyone who is involved in the media , regardless of whether it is the host of a rating show there or an ordinary employee... an employee, an accountant, i don't know, manager, everyone who has access to internal resources must take some basic courses in cyber science, to which they will be told, the basic rules, thanks to which, well, because in principle, effective cyber attacks by russians, they are based after all , but if you investigate and find out where it all started, then everything starts with something banal, it's a short password 1 2 3 4

5, it's a click. that link that came in the messenger, is there a lack of a vpn connection or something else, well, some very simple, banal, primitive things, so here cyberscience, cyber education and simply education among media workers is a simple, cheap, but very powerful tool, and because this is basically what everything is based on, respectively, professionals and staff training, here are two key areas on which you should... focus , we heard you, and one more question, how do you feel about the fact that this application army plus will be created in action, that is, in the phone for the military, where there will be documents, complaints, reports, it became known literally there, well, i saw the day before yesterday this information, how do you feel about it initiatives, are there positive aspects here, or

are there rather more risks here, what are your assessments, what proposals? the question is controversial and unclear, there is not enough information to give an assessment, because it depends a lot on what kind of application it will be, with what functions, what data it will take, where it will be processed, how it will be transmitted, well, clearly, there are many technical details, as far as i am concerned it is known that the military already uses several different applications there for different tasks, let's say, and there are quite a lot of them. and each of them has some specialized function, there are some for drones, some for artillery, some for personnel, for the bhs there, for internal reporting, for reports , there are many different ones, as well as another army plus this application that was announced, it is not entirely clear what it will be for what functionality is intended, first of all, it is necessary to determine from the functionality already with the technical

implementation. where, how will the servers be deployed, what will be the architecture, what technologies, how are they interconnected, how far will it be possible for the enemy to get data, or stop the operation of such an application, whether it is harmful to transfer files there or to spy and so on, that is, until it is a declaration, on the basis of which it is extremely difficult to draw any conclusions, that is why i do not have answers to these questions, and we literally have 3 minutes, we are even less. .. i think that the answer to your question, to this question of mine, which you will ask now, i think will still be a reason for our further conversation with you, i would like to find out and understand what is the essence, relatively speaking, of the situation, when there are a number of these software solutions for the armed forces, there is a delta, there is a nettle, but they are not adopted due to certain nuances in the relationship between the state special communications and the ministry of defense, the impression is that the state special communications acts as a certain monopoly

for certification. those things that are developed for the military themselves, and there is a certain misunderstanding between these two structures, is this really so, if so, then the main reference points of this confrontation, in the following programs we will continue this topic with you, in the most interesting place our guest, there we lost connection, now we are. we are restoring it, yes i am here, that's great, did you hear my question or should i repeat it? yes, no, i understood, we have a state special communications agency, well, such a regulator, a monopoly on everything that allows or prohibits the use of various applications, and including its action extended to army systems, and...