rioters there, the police , up to the traffic police, should be put on heightened duty, but this is what we are saying, again, about how a normal state should work, but now, in this situation that happened, we can express hypotheses, that is, maybe he gave the team is, but if it really wasn't organized, i mean it wasn't just there that they were hired by these chitos. were the tangzhiks or someone, or let's say, they were somehow not prevented from doing it somewhere, then this explains a lot, if the fsb was not involved, then now a huge internal struggle will begin over the idea, because someone allowed it, and logical questions about why it was allowed will be raised, even if not in the public space there, this question will still be hanging in the air somewhere, that's why i say, we... we in the coming

days- in a few weeks we will see what the consequences will be, as you rightly said, where and how many victims there will be. well, this week ukraine experienced two extremely massive shellings, if you do not count the regular shelling of certain territories and regions. the first was focused on the ukrainian capital in the context of its own goals the second shelling took place literally. the next night was also massive, maximally combined and the largest of all large-scale invasions precisely in terms of energy. mr. oleksiy, do you already have certain conclusions as to why the russian federation is once again resorting to the tactics of destroying our energy system. last winter should have shown them that it, well, doesn't quite work, at least. why an energy engineer? in

principle, from a military point of view, this is indeed one of those pain points that can cause catastrophic consequences, such as for the economy of the state, it can also cause internal destabilization in the state, if the interruptions with that are not eliminated soon, well, that is, it can in principle. lead to a collapse, so i say once again that it is used for tactics or in the strategy of conducting military operations, the americans at the time, when they fought in the desert, they also had one of the priority goals was the power system, they acted, although in a completely different way , that is, if it can be said in terms of war, but still it was according to the rules, it was more or less civilized, why did russia give up right now with... before that, it seems to me that

after all, if last time it was tied to the winter season, the hope that in the complex both the blows and the winter consider such a cumulative effect rule, today it is most likely tied to russian plans for the spring-summer campaign, i.e. for the future counterattack. well, and one more point, which probably many people also paid attention to, that a blow was struck at, er, at, actually speaking, at one of the most powerful power plants in zaporizhzhia oblast, which is russian, which the russians have already included in their own new territory, and as far as i'm concerned, this is a kind of public signal to the recognition of the fact that... this power plant, that is, they no longer

see an option that this power plant will someday become a food and tell me, in principle, to what extent it can be considered that russia is ready to take such a path of creating new environmental threats, if it sees that it has no opportunity to seize the territory that was planned before the occupation of the future annexation, this is not even a question, it is a matter of chance. with literally on the strip hangs the as, because there, that is, there is a constant regime of pre-accidents, er, it is for sure that russia is not facing anything, and if you consider there, well, when these red lines are there, everyone once analyzed , that is, this is probably the penultimate step before putin can dare

to use tactical nuclear weapons, that is, it does not deter them at all, that is, we saw it from our own experience when the kakhov dam was blown up , huh and tell me please, mr. oleksiy, just recently the minister of defense of great britain grandsha and the commander of the british army tony radekin visited ukraine, and there is actually an opinion that the british are hinting to ukraine that it should concentrate on one of the directions, they advise to do it in the south itself and precisely to prepare some offensive operations there. if we take the experience of 2023, then many are from the military. analysts say that it was the blowing up of the kakhovskaya hydroelectric station that greatly adjusted and not in the best direction for us the plans of our military leadership for a counteroffensive, this is what you know, it was simply impossible not to count, can we say that the russians are still trying to resort to something similar,

to disrupt any of our prospects in the south? well, it's absolutely clear, although, let's say, uh , it's also obvious that ukraine now... doesn't have the ability to organize a large-scale offensive campaign in the near future, but even so, the russians will do everything possible to avoid at least local counteroffensives for that , to undermine ukraine's defense capability in general, well, actually speaking, nothing, nothing new, if we talk about or try to guess somewhere... and what our partners can talk about, what advice can they talk about, then of course, this is an exchange of ideas every time, but i would not consider it as some, like the russians, it is always that we are given some kind of command or given instructions, that is

, it is most likely an exchange of ideas, it is possible somewhere, some, let's say, friendly advice, and well, it is not... not just, let's say, friendly advice, but it is advice that is based on on the information that is possible, whether it seems to them that they are not fully evaluated by the ukrainian leadership, or something data that are not fully known to the ukrainian leadership, that is, it can hardly be considered as interference, because in the same way, when you give advice, be it on a personal level or on some business level, you always take part of the responsibility. and tell me, in principle, how do you assess the effectiveness of these actions on the russian border and strikes on objects in belgorod, to what extent do they really add some, relatively speaking, additional value to ukraine in this war, and what is changing, it is difficult, difficult to give unequivocal

assessments without understanding the general strategic plan, because this is a rather risky operation, it is... a real operation, that is, it is resources, human resources, resources, material resources and risks of image losses, because the deaths of civilians, the shelling of belgorod and these front-line or border populated areas, even though they are destroyed mainly by russian aircraft, if we are talking about border populated areas, the picture still goes to foreign media, that is, it is quite... what a high risk for ukraine, that ukraine does not put, let's say on a level with russia, that they are the same, but i will repeat once again, and no, without knowing the general strategic plan, one must be very careful in assessing the expediency of such operations,

here, but at least if you look there at the discussions that take place in belgorod itself or in the belgorod region. well, it definitely has an effect, because there are few people who believe there anymore and you are asking the goals of special operations, asking absolutely logical questions that it is possible to empower the people there, and protect the people, mr. oleksiy, very briefly and lastly, do you think that the operations of the rdk, the legion of freedom of russia, the sivir battalion and the chekerian volunteers in belgorod? in particular , could they really disrupt the offensive of the russians in the kupyan region? well , here i can simply tell you a generalized assessment of the atmosphere of football every monday at 10:00 p.m. expert analysis

of matches, exclusive interviews, goals, goals, emotions, a project for experienced fans as well as for people who appreciate the non-committal. on football football format every monday at 22:00 on the tv channel espresso sharp presentation of facts and competent opinions. informational marathon with around september, saturday 5:10 p.m., sunday 6:15 p.m. we continue the saturday political club program, khrystyna yatskiv, vitaly portnikov and add to our conversation pavlo klimkin, diplomat, minister of foreign affairs of ukraine from 2014 to 2019. congratulations, mr. pavle, glory to ukraine. glory to the heroes, congratulations, saturday political club, and you, mrs. khrystyna, and you. so, let 's try to understand the situation surrounding

the russian terrorist attack, and from what aspect, how the events unfolded in general precisely in connection with with these western warnings, why did the united states and great britain make such demonstrative warnings about an imminent terrorist act, they formulated it that way, inevitable, and the russian federation pretended that there was nothing like that at all, and that it was all bourgeois inventions, why did the states do it? absolutely everything is clear here, and there are reasons that can be divided into three such dimensions, well , first of all, they have to do it according to their legal obligations, including international ones, and unlike russia the states treat these obligations somehow unconsciously. the second point is that there are a number of procedures between the special services. how to exchange such information when there is intelligence

about the possibility of terrorist attacks, the americans also receive, as far as i know, that on the eve of the boston marathon, remember, there was a terrorist attack once, the americans also received something, how detailed it is, i no longer know , but they still want this process of... to continue, well, and the third point, the americans should have officially warned their citizens, after receiving this information, because there are very clear, actually legislative, legislative prerequisites for this in the united states, they legally, not only politically, have to worry about these citizens, and these are the three reasons why on march 7, that's what you show right on the screen, the americans officially warned that there is a very high probability

of terrorist attacks, why did the russian special services not react, this is a question that we may not know 100% in detail, but we can see that, first of all, this is a real blow to image of russian... services, just as a full-scale invasion was a blow to the russian russian army, and especially it was a blow to the fsb, since the fsb had to do it in the first place, and in this context, when i hear the phrases that there one of these terrorists was looking for a window on the border, well, here is also a question for... sb, that after 10 years of war and two years of full-scale invasion, if it is not

possible to close the border for a small group of terrorists, then what is the fsb about? so there are quite a lot of questions here, you can ask them put through someone, i think 10-15 minutes, and mr. pavle, well, taking into account, well, you know, putin's experience in relevant situations, forgive me, piss in... and so on, he should now concentrate on the statement that was published by the amak news agency , which is connected to idil, although idil herself does not particularly provide any evidence or refute this statement, well, it seems that she should be concentrating in that direction now, but she stubbornly, stubbornly, stubbornly stands on the fact that that it was not possible without ukraine, that the main terrorist in in the world right now it is ukraine. and this is exactly what the russian federation is struggling with, isn't it compromising itself with such behavior

in the eyes of, perhaps even its own voters, recent ones, definitely not in the eyes of its voters , uh, since the logic of propaganda there is completely different, and from the very beginning it was clear that internally, they will pretend that this whole story could not... be without the involvement of ukraine, externally, i think that they will sell a different story, a story about sympathy, a story about necessity. strengthening the cooperation of special services, the story of joint challenges in the fight against terrorism, i think that there will be another such full-scale approach in this sense, if putin decides that he needs to build such a line of communication

with the event around this, well , the line of communication with other special services will also be built, and i think... that here the main russian emphasis will be on the countries of the middle east, well, india and china, of course, but also on israel, here they will not miss these opportunities. and to what extent, in principle, can we say that russia can, let's say, see all its versions, really in this way continue to promote that this will affect... on public opinion in countries where people are, so to speak, realistic about information, because we know that terror is always such a moment where many people's emotions start to work, and not healthy sense. of course, what worries many of us when they see that the reaction to this terrorist attack is immediate and meaningful, and compare it with

the reaction to the latest russian strikes. panas, which sometimes seems so subdued and in principle not in real time, is playing here, of course, and psychology as well, but nevertheless, for the russian reality to submit it further and enter the information space of the west with the version that it is about ukraine, although america... was really warned and warned publicly, it will not really work, so i think that as i said, there will be two options, one for the west, one for russia itself, and there will probably be even three, one more adapted for non-western countries, where there will be

some kind of mix, so there will be several approaches. .. some propagandistic ones, which russia will now have to use, if we talk about what is happening now with the results of the presidential elections in russia, many people in ukraine do not understand why the west did not make any decisive statements about the illegitimacy of these elections and the illegitimacy of putin himself, but can the west even afford it? i think it can be allowed. but as of today, in fact, it is not known what this will lead to, it would cut off almost all contacts with the current russian regime, since, if you claim that putin is illegitimate, then who is legitimate in this country at all, since even according to the russian constitution,

this is a presidential republic, then immediately you need to cut off from communication. of all the russian ambassadors, they don't really communicate in the west anyway, but nevertheless, then it is necessary to question russia's vote in international organizations, in particular in the same security council, and then this is raising the stakes, to which, as you actually and they said that the event is not ready for today, because he made the event, he condemned the elections in the occupied territories, which... goes without saying, but did not actually extend this logic to all elections, one of the lines of how to explain this is related to the fact that many people in the west claim that, well, yes, they drew some numbers there, they threw something in, they played around

with quotation marks, but however, putin still has a majority today in today's reality. among the russian population, and the election, or what is called the election, he is still a vigraph. for putin, this is actually perceived as a weakness in the mentality that exists in russia. there, after the conviction , there should be actions, and if the event said, and if there will be elections, then accordingly there will be 1-2-3, but the same thing as the event did not happen. he said it before the election, not 1 2 3, and actually, you see, even the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the european union, which just happened at the beginning of this week. it did not lead to immediate decisions, i.e., as far as i know, various strategic options are considered there, but they are not stretched over time, and in modern politics

, what is stretched over time is always not immediately connected with the reason that well, mr. pavle, let's switch to a few interesting visits to ukraine, in particular, the national security adviser of the us president, jake sullivan, lynsey graham, an equally influential senator visited ours. country , but on the latter, it seems to me that there is a little difference between words and actions, considering that he did not vote accordingly for the aid of our country and other strategic partners of the united states during his time in the senate, but he says: you will receive attacks and you will what needs to be done, in particular with the kerch bridge, if i'm not mistaken. sullivan was more reserved, said i can't please you with a suitable ranged weapon just yet. and in general, how do you evaluate these visits, were there any specifics in them for you? well, i don't think you can call it a visit that jack salevan

came. lynsey's visit is somehow too much. i say this with respect to him, of course, i have known him for many years, and as far as i am concerned, that linsey who was, well, friends, or maybe political friends. mccain's partner, and i well remember my joint conversations with them there, remained in your memories, in short, but vitaliy put it very clearly with a smile, and now lynsey is such a classic trumpist that, in my opinion , almost no one in today's republican party can afford to go against trump, since the chances of getting elected fall many times over, well... but, that linsey largely repeats trump's logic there with the loans there for ukraine and so on and so forth, it

doesn't really surprise me in today's reality, as for jake, well jake just never passes by, he always comes to discuss strategy, approaches, and i'm sure that his visit is generally about logic, what, how can we do with... what the administration is ready for at the stage of the election campaign, what it would like to see from us, what it can provide itself, that is this is such a serious conversation because sullivan is in some sense, i don't know if he is biden's right or left hand, he trusts him, and you know that sullivan, he is perceived by many of us almost as a politician, but in the american . in the sense he is not a politician, he is an appointed person directly by presidents , who works under the president, that is, a person who is responsible for

coordinating all activities in the field of national security, and the source of decisions in this field is directly president biden, this does not mean that sullivan's influence there is somehow limited, he really is crazy that is, all these decisions converge on him, but nevertheless, he is not a politician in our sense. and tell me, mr. pavle, that there was a meeting of advisers on national security issues here in kyiv, at which it would seem that mr. saliv, and we still do not know who was at this meeting, why it was held, why suddenly the previous meetings were covered in different capitals, in different cities, they said that they were related to preparations for the summit, which... and is supposed to take place in switzerland , which is now being prepared by the ministry of foreign affairs of this country, but this meeting of advisers, in fact, it turned out to be so secret that there is no information even in the telegram channels,

which can invent any news, you can even order this, no information about what was it, and the question is definitely not for me, i think that if you write something in your telegram channel, then this blockade there will of course be broken. well , the national security advisers, if we are being serious here, they can afford not to report what and how they are doing, since again they are not politicians, we are used to a different logic during the war, since we have representatives of the armed forces, representatives of special services usually have the opportunity to address society, but for western... societies, this is not really such a classic approach, i don't particularly remember national security advisors going out in europe. in the public

sphere, sullivan is of course an exception, and this is a different approach, which is characteristic of the american system, and mr. pavle, we saw this week information from the financial times, in particular, that there are certain reservations among our american partners regarding the strategy of the defense forces ukraine to hit refineries on the territory. of the russian federation, of course, that ukrainian officials and representatives of the office the president mostly denies this information, the us does not put pressure on us in this regard. what the numbers tell us: the uk ministry of defense says in its latest report that at least 10% of russia's refinery capacity is actually affected, meaning frozen at least

for some time. in your opinion. how sensitive is the world oil price for the united states right now and does it make sense, again, that the states have some reservations about us? i am not sure that this is the terminology of alya dekabrats here is optimal, but you are right that this is one of the most sensitive issues for europeans. super sensitive, but even more so for americans, because for them the price of gas stations is a certain indicator of which way life is going, especially for those who live outside of large cities, have cars there with a large volume of engines, for them the gas station that happens there every other day, if the price...

increases, the tank there is significant, that is, it affects everything, and as for the conversation about the blows we inflict on russian refineries, here, as they say, in odessa, there are two big differences, the conversation about this pressure, eh, it is difficult for me to comment on what the financial times writes, i assume that such a conversation could take place, but this does not mean that someone there... comes to us, calls and says: no, for any conditions are impossible, because yes, yes and yes, and such a conversation, as a rule, takes place in the logic of what can be, what is the logic of this, what can we achieve, what are the risks of escalation, what are other risks and so on, but no one will tell you about this, because the americans, europeans, all our friends,

officially take the position that they are not are encouraging strikes on russia and don't know about them, so in principle no one will comment on this to you, and by the way, i do not rule out that something like this conversation, or something similar, may arise after this event in the moscow region, since on the other hand, the actions on the russian territory may in... this reality, cause a different response, in which the stakes will be raised, but this does not mean that the conversation turns into pressure, but whether there was such a conversation, i cannot but confirm that, no to refute, as they say, thank you, mr. pavle, pavlo klimkin, diplomat.