there will be no more russia and the road to peace will be paved there, but after such statements the question arises: how, in what way, what has technically changed since the arrival of statesmen at this truly representative summit in switzerland, which makes it possible to believe that russia is going somewhere will come, agree to some negotiations and end the war. well, in fact, there is no adequate reason to think so, except that the bar for entry to this summit was set so low that almost anyone could join it, because... about the issue of nuclear security, the issue of the exchange of prisoners, the issue of food security, these are precisely the three topics that interested everyone as much as possible, and we saw a fairly significant outflow of people after the final communiqué was nevertheless rearranged so that there was also a mention of respect for territorial integrity and about the borders of 1991, i.e. russia initially, here it is worth reminding our viewers that they wanted to involve already after each of the nine points will be set up... a working group, and as soon as these

nine working groups groups will be able to go to understanding how to arrange the 10th point, i.e. documentary confirmation, the end of aggression and the impossibility of repeating such aggression, and only on this point it was planned to involve russian representatives, conditionally speaking, putting them in front of the fact, which fact we now want to put the russians in front of, i personally don't have an answer to this question, but really, if we want to have negotiations with them so quickly, if we... want to have a second summit quickly enough, then by then we need to have time to pass not only these three points, but to actually fulfill 90% of the agenda, which is simply not possible for me. well, if even 90% were put on the agenda, why shouldn't the russian federation ignore 90%, as it will now ignore 30. that's a good question, and really the only safety net that could make russia at least respond in some way , there was china, and in fact at the very beginning, as you... remember that

during the jeddah meeting of advisers, even during the meeting of advisers in malta, china showed some interest, and the presence of the chinese in jidi, in principle, at that time she still gave us hope that in fact everything could return to the right direction, and china would involve the countries of the global south more actively, and there was a belief that only the presence of china and its setting for some kind of dialogue would compel russia at a certain point to reach an agreement, but after scholz's visit to china, when china announced its so-called four points, now that... china was not at the summit, i personally do not understand what can make russia look differently at the results of the swiss meeting, especially considering what it's about putin said the other day that this is all profanation, this is an attempt to undermine russian-chinese unity, this is an attempt to generally aggress against russia, as he said there, the western masters of ukraine, his favorite wording, that is, as we want, at the expense of which to involve russia at the second summit, i repeat, i just have no... idea,

but if we really want it, then we have to work, at least carry out what was planned before, but maybe the chinese representative lihui was at the meeting of national security advisors in jeji , maybe he just thought it was ukraine will be ready to change its position, accept the conditions offered by china, there is freezing, cooling, lack of any guarantees, neutral status, and then you can, china will facilitate such a conversation, well , we saw that there is nothing like that, that ukraine continues . stay in your position and lose interest? the statement of our ministry of foreign affairs that they say there are points in the chinese formula that agree with our vision and we need to speak further did not help at all. in fact, it's the most important thing for me the question, it seems to me, arises now in this equation between china's own formula, china's attitude to our western vision and china's attitude to the russian vision, because these are three completely different.

approaches, and although the russian approach appeals a little to what the chinese said, it is much more radical, and so far we have not heard or seen the real position of beijing in relation to the russian plan, and therefore to understand whether china will be ready more to work with us, whether china will be ready to fully support the russian position, although now, regarding the supply of weapons, we see that china is possible and ready to support the unspoken russian position, or whether china will push the same initiative that china and brazil... did not want to do in the format of a bilateral summit of ukraine and russia in saudi arabia, while china's position for it remains unclear to us, until it is clear what interests he will pursue from these three parallel formats, i can only wonder what we should really bet on, maybe that we are promoting the continuation of the peace formula, as soon as the second the summit, as soon as possible the involvement of russia, this is precisely an attempt to show china that our plan is the only one that is advancing and... the only one that

has at least some perspective, and maybe china is interested in such a solution as a simple ceasefire, they they don't want anything, they don't speak, let's decide so and so, you will recognize donbas there. with russian, let russia agree that you join nato, you will become neutral, or russia there, let them agree that your territorial integrity will be ensured by your demilitarization, they just say, "cease fire, then talk." yes, indeed, china's position in this regard is very straightforward, but china's position is not actually mentioned, well, in such formulations, neither in our plan, nor in the russian one. before the ceasefire, the russians want the ukrainians to give up more than a third of their territories. we want to talk about the fact that a ceasefire is possible only when we have security guarantees and an understanding that in the future we will be able to liberate the territories, and in the future, even if the territory is free, we will be able to cement the non-repetition of aggression, and therefore, in

this regard, it is possible to emphasize that negotiations with russia should begin as soon as possible, china will be able to use it to say, well, if you want, as soon as possible. we have not had, in principle, if we talk about so far, no hints from the heavenly side , the terms for which it was necessary to hold a summit at the level of heads of state right now, you understand, the expediency, why right now, what were the expectations, maybe something happened, this you know, it's in that... in the anecdote about two political analysts, which i can explain myself, well, you understand what's really happening, it seems to me that the explanation is completely, well, let's say, built into a logical chain that we need to start a format that will become irreplaceable in the future, as

we would like to see, in our positivist thinking, and therefore we need to have the first summit at the level of the heads of state governments, so that they can see all the importance of this, so that as many countries as possible join, get started. working groups and there is a second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth summit somewhere in the future, we have already reached some kind of vision, that is, this was obviously the logic of our leadership, but was it expedient to hold such a summit right here and right now as soon as possible the summit, realizing that china will not be there, realizing that a large part of the countries of the global south refused to participate, realizing that many regional leaders of the global south also said literally at the last moment that they were not ready to ... participate in such a summit, the feasibility such it was obviously not, that is, the logic is to launch this format and continue to promote it, if you proceed from the very positivist thinking of our leadership, well, there was such a logic, but was there practical expediency, well, practically the value disappeared at the moment when china

decided , that he and i are not on the same path, in principle, by and large, why then did russia and china struggle so much with this summit, or is it really the main struggle? was around the very presence of china, it seems to me that china was fighting only by the very fact of its own absence, he understood that huge bets were placed on him, both in ukraine and in the west, and that the global south would turn to him, that is, china constantly understood that he was the king maker here, that he could decide how successful he would be and or another initiative, simply because the participation of dozens of other countries depends on his... decision and depends in principle on understanding how much pressure it will put on russia, so what china did is absolutely clear, it saw that for it such complex formats and such formats intricately connected with the western point of view are inappropriate, he came up

with an alternative opinion, this alternative opinion was not listened to to the extent that china wanted it to be listened to, and china decided to pay attention to this ukrainian format for the time being. divide the peace formula, and as far as russia is concerned, russia mainly, as we have seen, pursued an active anti-summit policy and actively promoted the narrative that the summit would fail during the period when it was being prepared and with the involvement of china and with the active involvement india, and with the active involvement of many other partners of russia in the global arena, that is, for russia this issue was more difficult than for china. if china had the opportunity to choose, then russia was obviously afraid... that it might lose its partners, who are still ready to make its diplomacy a handshake and continue to buy russian resources, but by the way, about russian resources, many countries came to this summit, i don’t know , russia and china wanted them to come, they did not want them to come, but they did not stop cooperation because of this

economic with moscow, right? it is obvious that they are not stopping, it is obvious that some of them, especially those who now so meekly refused to sign the final communique, or who dropped out in the last two days. obviously, they can even increase this cooperation, because in fact, as lavrov said there, an anti-russian coalition has been formed, and everyone who is outside the anti-russian coalition can count on better discounts, they answered. can count on better treatment, they can count on the fact that russia will be ready to drain their own resources on even more favorable terms, so yes, unfortunately for these states, this will not yet in any way block the channels of cooperation with the russians, it must be repeated once again that until a complete ecosystem around the peace formula is formed, god willing it will turn out so that it will become mutually interesting for all sides of this communication, and not only for us, because we just want it to work, and besides... countries that have traded with russia will still have an interest in trading with russia, because we must remember that

the formula of peace in general, especially its component in in terms of food, in terms of new trade networks, in terms of safe trade and so on, it was done with the aim of other countries being ready to talk about a world without russia, so that other countries, they say, were ready to work with ukraine with the west and not have the same contacts with russia, of course it was very... an optimistic view of the situation, but based on these positions, well, so far the peace formula will clearly not bring such a result, and those who wanted to trade with moscow can continue with absolute peace for the time being to do this, in principle, what is more important now , diplomacy or weapons, or not even that, it is clear that weapons are important, how much can diplomacy strengthen weapons realistically in a situation where russia is forced to use diplomacy, well , it seems to me that our key diplomacy now has be directed in two directions, the first is the constant... actualization, even rather , of ukrainian topics in our western

partners, because we see that in the united states, in britain, pre-election socio-political escalation is increasing, we see that the ukrainian topic very often falls out of the general context, and of course it is important for us to emphasize that despite the elections, despite the peace formula, and everything else, unfortunately, russia still exists, and if russia exists, there are shelling , there are attacks on civilians. there is a need to provide weapons to ukraine, and the second big issue is that we started, unfortunately, quite late, literally in the middle of the 23rd year, but what needs to be done for sure is the search for non-western allies who are ready with we are actively working, we are talking about non-westerners geographically, because in principle most of those partners who work with us are, say , in the far east, such as south korea, japan, most of our partners from the global cock, they in one way or another consider themselves part of the western but i will repeat myself , part of the projectiles, a huge part of even the new equipment that can be supplied to us,

can now be found in those countries that did not cooperate with us so actively before, so these are two directions, the actualization of our topics with the old ones partners and allies, and finding ways out and opportunities for cooperation with new partners, it seems to me that this is the only diplomacy that will make sense now, this is the only diplomacy that will allow us to really get... the level of weapons, resources, financial support that will allow us to speak with russia on an equal footing, let's call it that. you have no fear, but from the official comments, such as i see, that now the holding of the measure summit, which can be considered a successful diplomatic action there, will be used in order to again begin to convince people that the end of the war is just a few more months away, wait a few more months and there will be a peaceful situation, russia will completely agree, because so many... states are opposing it, i can already see how it is going and it reminds me of a story

about two or three weeks in 2022, why can't you honestly tell people that this is a multi-year war with no prospects for a political settlement, so that they at least understand in which country and in which world they live and will live there for years to come, even if there is a truce and the end of the fire, let's not rule it out, because unfortunately, as much as we do not observe the communication of the authorities during the war, we see that our authorities... i don't know how to work with the management of expectations, that is, we are not so much talking about narratives that are used, we are no longer talking about messages that very often do not correspond to the real situation, it is just a real inability to work with the management of expectations, because for some reason it seems to those who form our policy, our information component, that if we convince everyone that everything will be fine well, if we keep this up for a long enough time, then people's planning horizon will simply get wet. people will feel a sense of imminent danger and they say that at some point everything will just be fine for them, or everything will become

so bad that there will be no need to explain anything. plus, they tried, our government, it is meant, as we saw, to promote this narrative to our western partners, which they say, everything is so cool with us that you can safely give us weapons now, because they say, we will endure, we will quickly do everything , and then you will not have to give weapons for so long. that is, the calculation is aimed at convincing everyone to the end that everything is very cool. it can be solved quickly, and therefore we need to be supported. no one wants to honestly say how difficult the situation is, because no one is sure that it will be possible to explain it both to our external partners and to the population. inside, because in one way or another, but if we started working for two or three weeks from the 22nd, then coffee in july in yalta, then it will continue again for two months, the war will end, if there is already one the course is taken, it is very difficult to get out of it, you will have to tell too much truth, and as you understand, it is always very, very difficult. well , it seems to me that our partners understand very well that they are witnesses of a multi-year conflict, they

said in the 22nd year that if the conflict does not end in six months, at least for 6-8 years, they are acting in this paradigm. long-term support for ukraine? yes, but, but somehow we continue to believe that we have to convince them that we can finish it quickly. accordingly, if we can finish quickly, then we are so cool, good, and it is safe for us to give any weapon that they say, if you give it for a short period, we will win quickly, and don't be afraid that you will have to give it for a long time, you can tell your voters , that we will spend a little money, and then this spending of money will end and they say everything will be fine very soon. as it once was and will be possible to think about the restoration of a normal economy, the fight against inflation and so on and so on, that is, the fact that our allies understand the state of affairs more realistically is one thing, but the fact that ours do not understand how partners perceive it, or how partners build their strategy, causes not only problems with the management of expectations, but also, by

the way, causes these resentments that were against the americans, causes a misunderstanding of why european partners or why format... gives weapons the way it gives, and this already directly affects communication, it already causes such situations when the western press literally comes out with rumors that biden and zelensky are dissatisfied with each other and do not want to understand each other , that is, it already is becomes not only a problem of communication to the outside, it becomes a problem of planning, and it is so embedded in our planning that we have to convince everyone that everything is great, which again, as i said before, i do not know how to get out of this situation normally , because... telling too much truth now is a real threat to such communication, and what is too much truth, really, you can dose it, so to speak , give it in dosed forms from monday to friday, so that everyone will understand on saturday , what the real situation looks like in prospects? well, what i mean by too much is to explain absolutely all

the punctures, explain the absolutely complete situation and clearly, openly say that yes we... were wrong from the very beginning, this is too much truth, it is not just to admit - from which time since the 22nd year or since the 19th, and normally since the 19th, but let's be realistic, most likely we are talking about the time of the 22nd year, that is, to explain why there were such decisions then, why there were not preparation right a month before the invasion, why in some areas, frukto in some aspects, the preparation literally failed, why did our partners receive not quite the correct communication during that period? why we rejected absolutely obvious things at the time, why such and such decisions were made at the turn of 22-23, how exactly the counteroffensive was planned, and many, many more questions. thank you, mr. oleksandr. oleksandr kraev, expert of the ukrainian prism foreign policy council, we are in touch. now let's talk with borys koshniruk, economist, head of the expert council of the ukrainian analytical center. congratulations

mr. boris congratulations. let's start with russia. maybe you can explain what... what will actually happen to the russian economy or not happen in connection with the sanctions against the stock market, because you know that the russian leadership, they are trying to pretend that this will not change anything in particular, that the dollar will be determined by the banks themselves, and the central bank will be known in the banks, and the currency system of the russian federation will be in the same state as it was, it is true or not, to a large extent yes, it is necessary to understand that really the lack of... an exchange mechanism for determining the exchange rate is a certain problem, but in our country, for example, the national bank essentially determines the exchange rate manually every day, although formally we have some mechanism for interbank currency trading, but in the meantime, in fact, it is determined by the national bank in manual mode, so

it is not critical for the russian economy, it will not be critical, although let's say the spread. expands what is not defined, and what's next, it creates a situation when the buying and selling rate will be more significantly different than when it is established during trading on the stock exchange, well, by and large, we can say that this is the beginning of some new type of sanctions or a continuation of those that were? these are the continuations that were, it is only, let's say, gradually, slowly, for the russian economy, but this is a long game, it is very necessary to constantly explain to everyone that all these sanctions will continue to exist for decades after this war ends. and these problems will be in russia for a very, very long time, moreover, again, i strongly emphasize that the purpose of these sanctions is not so much to stop this war as to

weaken russia as much as possible and make it impossible new aggression. well, when it comes to restricting the activities of chinese companies, let's say, which cooperate with russia, how much does it affect china itself and russian capabilities. restoration of the economy with the help of china, in my opinion, binding on one economy is always bad, it is a priori, and for russia it is an indisputable addition to the problem, for china, it is even a certain plus, because a market for chinese products appears, especially in the conditions growing problems for the chinese economy, so it is not so bad for china in this regard. another thing is that this one the sanctions regime, the so-called secondary sanctions, in relation to the chinese campaign, it only demonstrates that in essence

two global coalitions are being formed, aftarchy democracies, and a direct collision of these autotarchies is very, very likely, a collision of aftarchy with democracies, or an aftarchy reporting among themselves, no, unfortunately, at least at the first stage. clashes with the democracies, if they succeed, well, remember germany and the soviet union, and at first they divided their spheres of influence and so on, and then they clashed directly with each other. and in principle, speaking of such a clash, the extent to which china can afford such a direct conflict with the west, given its economic dependence on western markets, is almost maximum. if you take, well, look for logic, then under any circumstances a confrontation is disadvantageous for china, a war, and a long war is always a minus game, it is never

a plus game, but the problem is that the logic of the dictators who rule autotarkys, they have a completely different logic, and they very often their ideas about the world, they... actually project onto life, which can be absolutely others, and again , there were many such examples. what will the ukrainian economy look like after these strikes on the energy infrastructure, how far can it be assumed, in principle, that production can exist at the same level, work at the same level with the same profitability in conditions of no shortage of electricity and increased. tariffs, it certainly creates additional problems, we will now see that - that a greater number

of nuclear power units will be forced to be put on technical preventive maintenance, and summer in order for them to be able to work effectively in winter, and i have already discussed this thesis, i do not want to scare anyone with it, but i do not rule out that the russian madness may reach the point that they will... begin to strike at nuclear plants, moreover, i emphasize, they cannot cause a nuclear disaster with this, and that is where the nuclear pile is located, it is located in very protected zones, conflations, which simply cannot be destroyed there by rockets or an airplane, but can significantly damage the equipment that is engaged in the production and transmission of electricity , this maybe in this case too... the situation could be even worse than it is now, that's why we talk all the time about nuclear security, i understand, no, we

don't talk about nuclear security like striking nuclear plants, how about these constant mantras of russia that it can use nuclear weapons, because although again the history, including the only case when it was used by japan, and ... the strike on nagas nagasaka's hirakhshima, well, it is known that they did not lead to the fact that japan surrendered, the surrender of japan was as a result of the fact that, despite the agreement with japan, the soviet union started a war, occupied a significant territory in majura, and accordingly , the japanese army simply could not begin this and after that they already announced the surrender. "what is the general state of the economy in ukraine today, what to do with the current ukrainian economy". well,

you know, start, finish, you can talk a lot. it is obvious that , first of all, mechanisms should be created that would stimulate the work of small and medium-sized businesses, because large business to a large extent is in worse conditions, because they are hit more often. in this regard, small and medium-sized businesses are less dependent on such attacks, but on a different basis. on the one hand , it is necessary to create the conditions for it, and we definitely need some kind of adequate and transparent and honest conversation with society regarding mobilization and economic reservation, business cannot function in conditions of paralyzing uncertainty, when they do not know who and how they can join the armed forces, and will be done completely by accident, in this

undoubtedly creates big problems, there are questions completely inadequate monetary policy of the national bank, extremely opaque, corruptible, and this also creates problems for business, for determining what to do, what will happen to the exchange rate, because it is actually determined manually by the national bank, what it does with interest rates, and what the way he stimulates lending, even in war conditions, he rather kills this sphere with his policy. and so on, that is, the question of what needs to be done is more than enough, another matter is that i do not expect at the current level and professionalism, and ethics, and i don't know what's there , experience and so on, those who are currently in power, they are able to do it effectively, and there is an understanding of the real economic situation in general among those who manage the ukrainian economy today, i think that no, well

, because this is... the so-called dunning kruger effect, that is, people, due to their incompetence, do not realize that they do not, that they do not understand what is happening, but they do, they are absolutely sure, that they understand what is happening, but when they start talking, and then you understand that the situation is actually terrible, because these people are talking outright delusion, and... this applies to both the government, the national bank, and the president's office. if we talk about the situation to the extent that they can, reforms can take place now, but in the current conditions of the war. are demanding reforms, how realistic are these demands? eh, let's decide what this mantra about reforms really is, you know, goebbels writes a phrase there: when i hear the word

culture, i grab a gun, you know, when i hear the word reform, i also have a desire to grab a gun, why? because reforms are a tool. first you have to understand what you want to do, you have to clearly define what you want to do, and then, based on that, you start using certain tools, and reforms in this case are the very tool that you need to do for to achieve those... goals that you want to, well, want, aim for, if you don't understand what to do, really, and that's not there, well, i'm tired of it give this example, but it is very eloquent the statement of the prime minister that ukraine should become the raw material center of europe, well, what do you want from a person with this level of understanding, so that he knows what he

needs to do in the country, well, definitely . and unfortunately, this is not the problem of one person, it is the problem of those who were brought to power in 2019, despite the fact that i have never been a particular fan of prime minister arseniy yasenyuk and groysman, but they look simple against the background of these giants of intelligence, what should be the measures for stabilization of the economy, wartime, in this sense then from your point of view. again, this is what i said, you need a completely transparent monetary policy so that there is access to credit, completely transparent and clear for business the situation with the exchange rate, what will the national bank do, because the exchange rate depends completely 100% now from the national bank, well, it determines the exchange rate with which, excuse me, from which foot they will stand and what they will do with the exchange rate, because they are in such conditions when it is not transparent.