which carry their mission and the so-called defense for health. petro vasiliovych is a real warrior who keeps his word, who is devoted to his profession, who is devoted to his medical institution, to us, who understands colleagues, who understands pain, who is not afraid to take responsibility and do the job at any time. days, today it is very important, and usually, if you take life, each of us is surrounded by people, surrounded by many people, but if you ask yourself the question, will you go to the intelligence with a certain person, with pyotr vasyliovych, i am the manager, i would go to the survey. in total, 420 people work in this medical institution, of which more than 100 are doctors, so every specialist in white... in a coat deserves to

be thanked by all of us for their commitment to the hippocratic oath. lyubov gerashchenko, oleksandr kuga, espresso, bila tserkva. congratulations, friends, saturday political club is on the air on expresso tv channel, as part of our holiday marathon. antsin borkovskyi, vitaly portnikov, glory to ukraine. i congratulate you personally, i congratulate you on the day of ukrainian independence, the holiday that you dedicated yourself to on... extremely powerful, we understand that this is generally a collective matter, a republic, a joint matter of the polish-lithuanian commonwealth, so at one time such terms were used to outline what was common, unified , and we deleted this name from the act about state independence, and i have already told you that i crossed out the word republic with my own hand from the act on state independence of ukraine, because the republic did not please you, the republic pleased me all, but dmytro vasylyvych... who was actually one of

the authors of this final draft of the act, feared that if the act of independence of the republic of ukraine was written and the communist majority of the verkhovna rada of ukraine would notice that there was no ukrainian ssr, that was the situation, the independence of the republic of ukraine, and what about the ukrainian ssr? yes, well, he decided that they simply would not notice, they did not notice, and it was wise on his part, or on the contrary, it was such a reinsurance, yes, because very often we consume that. that we inherited, i am not saying that all the experience and all this is there, starting from the state border and certain things, that everything is bad, yes, that is , certain things turned into a plus, that is, due to inertia , ukraine moved, but very often we lost because of it, probably, well, i think that on that day all this hung in the balance, for us it seems that it was an absolutely predictable thing, something that the verkhovna rada met and proclaimed independence, and it could not have been otherwise, it could have happened 100,000 times, it was an effort, quite

serious, and a group of people who had opposition to their decision, and in the very people's council, among ukrainian national democracies, because many believed, and among them were volodymyr hrynov, the then vice-speaker of the parliament from the democratic opposition, and larisa skoryk, that there could be no independence of ukraine without the prohibition of the communist party, and the communists , for their part, believed that the independence of ukraine must . that the communist party will survive, because on this very day boris yeltsin in moscow banned the communist party of the soviet union on the territory of the russian federation, and in fact, between these two desires, it is necessary to ban the cpsu, and this was the main idea, or on the contrary to do everything possible so that ukraine becomes independent, but with communist. management between these two

desires had to be passed at this very moment, and the fact that ukraine did not begin to be called a republic is the result of this fear that we will not be able to declare independence in any way, in any way to vote for it, and i remember that until the last moment there were such fears, so i think that in the action about independence in... it will be reflected in general, when levko lukenka wrote this first draft that we saw in the morning, there was a ukrainian people's republic at all, he wanted, and this, by the way, i think was right, to restore the ukrainian people's republic, so that we don't just say that ukraine is independent there, the heir to the ukrainian ssr, no, yes, uh, we are simply restoring onr as we say, the justice of a century ago, relatively speaking, well, how latvia, lithuania and estonia restored theirs. state according to

the constitution, which ceased to be valid in 1940, but again we did not have a majority , unlike the baltic countries had a majority opana the majority, yes, it is possible, it would be worth correcting certain things, that is, when we talk about the self-reliance of the ukrainian people's republic, then it is possible to solve certain historical, historical-legal dilemmas much easier, when we, in particular, say, what should we do with the good ukrainian communists, but they were actually representatives of the soviet occupation regime, that is, if we consider that as an administration, yes, yes, well, as posypaks. but speaking, yes, that is, if the ukrainian people's republic was the foundation from which the current ukrainian independence grew, well, accordingly, this is the period of the 1920s and 1930s, so we have to perceive the builders of ukrainian statehood at that time, i am saying this in hindsight, of course, then it becomes

much easier to evaluate the kosiors, with from a historical point of view, you are absolutely right, but from a legal and legal point of view there is a certain problem, because latvia, lithuania and estonia re... renewed their independence in those state borders in which they were internationally recognized before 1940, moreover , the russian federation has appropriated to itself the district of latvia, the current pitalovsk district of the russian federation, the former abrene district, and the district of estonia, the current ivangorod part of the russian federation together with... the district is an internationally recognized territory of estonia, by the way, precisely because on august 27, 1991, the press secretary the president of the russian federation made a statement regarding the possibility of territorial claims to the former soviet republics that have borders with the soviet union, he specifically emphasized that this excludes any

problems with latvia, lithuania and estonia, why? because they knew for sure that it was latvia and estonia that could make claims against them, and not the other way around, that they stole someone else's... in this situation, and that this can be proven internationally in any arbitration, and so in in this situation , latvia, lithuania and estonia could restore their independence without fearing, let's say, the inviolability of their borders, and even more, they could indicate to the russian leadership, well, you recognized the restoration of our independence, but what about the pitalovsky district, uh, here and we have a completely different situation, because the borders of the ukrainian people's republic, such as they were recognized during the agreements between the german people's republic of china and soviet russia in brest, the wonderful brest agreements, these are not the borders of the ukrainian ssr, they are not the borders of the modern country, and a huge part of the internationally recognized territory of ukraine is not included in these

borders, so we have no other way out in the current at least the situation, as you can see from the ukrainian people's republic to... the ukrainian ssr and from the ukrainian ssr to ukraine, simply because the ukrainian ssr, unlike the dpr, was a recognized subject of international law, simply by virtue of its membership in the united nations, and in the united nations it was usually within those borders, ugh, in which it existed and declared its independence august 24, 1991. that is, as far as i understand, part of the former chernihiv voivodeship, which the russians now call the kursk province, yes, well, we are united. to ourselves we cannot and will not, because that would undermine the legal status of our recognized borders, as far as i understand, yes, well, we can talk about the fact that there are ethnic ukrainians there, but speaking of such an acute issue, yes, because people are discussing, asking the question, what should we do,

what should we do with kurtshchyna, well, very, well if, kurshchyna is the territory where ukrainian troops are stationed, repelling russian attacks on ukrainian. land, but this is an internationally recognized territory of the russian federation, we cannot do anything there , we can hold this territory until the situation stabilizes, or until the moment, if the russians succeed in knocking out the ukrainian troops, everything in general in 1991 was absolutely obvious to everyone that the borders between the union republics, by the way, the borders between the autonomous republics that were part of the union republics, are conditional borders, uh, the only possibility to survive without war was to recognize these borders as permanent , and by the way, practically all former soviet republics were ready to go for it, perhaps due to the difference in the conflict between armenia and azerbaijan regarding nagorno-karabakh, this was such a specific episode that began

in soviet times, when the leadership the nagorno-karabakh autonomous region appealed to the supreme council of the ussr with the demand to transfer the ngo from azerbaijan to armenia, and this was such an episode. so there was a real conflict between armenia and azerbaijan, everything else was basically based on the fact that we recognize the fixed border, but there was only one union. the republic that would not agree with this version of the development of events was russia, not ukraine. transnistria, yes, abkhazia, south ossetia, it was still 1990-1991. then, an attempt to separate crimea in 1990 in the second year of 1993, after the election of yuri myshko as the president of crimea, when in fact the head of the government of crimea with... ministers and the head of the administration of the president of the arc, all of them were russian citizens, specially

dispatched from moscow, exclusively with one goal, with the goal, as we we understand, to do everything possible so that crimea became russian, well, it happened before 2014 and before the war in the east of ukraine, that is, the whole problem is not ours, it is precisely in russia from... from the point of view of russia , it would be very profitable recognize the inviolability of all these borders, because russia itself has them the problems are internal, the question arises, how logical are the borders of, say, the republic of tatarstan, 2/3 of the tatar population of the russian federation live outside the borders of the republic of tatarstan, so the national contests of the tatar people, if they were to begin, would naturally call into question the stability of the borders of many sub entities of the russian federation. buryats who live. in three subjects of the federation at the same time disconnected from each other: kabardino-balkars and

karachay-circassians, each of these peoples is a relative of the other in another republic, but they, for inexplicable reasons, live in united republics where they are not related peoples. i can cite a huge number of such examples in russia, but instead of somehow deciding that the status quo is here, it must be nurtured, federalism, democracy, relations with the former... soviet republics must be developed there, they followed the path of expansion, what we are seeing is confirmation of this course? no, they probably couldn't work in a different way, because that's how it's built into them, yes, that is, the essence of their existence is deployment expansion, in order to try to maintain or observe the so-called imperial internal stability in this way, but if we are already talking about the year 1991, well, paradoxically, i have the impression that... this is incomplete the gkchp, which tried to seize and hold power,

proscribed gorbachev in the crimea, in foros at the dacha near varto, and so on, and so on, that they just helped everyone, that is, this weak attempt, it caused the fact that we did not receive its updated soviet union, yes, that is, the communists received a certain, how to say, vov. the wolf ticket in the eyes of society ceased to perceive them, and a certain initiative of a political plan appeared among the local communists, who were no longer ready to submit themselves, the same kravchuk, yes, that is, he did not go with the cow as a communist, he already went with the cow , as a ukrainian patriot, yes, a representative of the titular nation, which is engaged in state-building, that is, communists, well , de facto, they have become morally untouchable, well, the question here is that we don't even... to the end really understand what actually happened on august 24, 19-23, 1991 in moscow. officially, it seems that

on august 24 or 25, the new union treaty was supposed to be signed, but the question arises, who would sign it? it was not going to be signed by all the republics of the union, at least in ukraine no one was ready to sign some kind of union treaty, that is, there was a large number of soviet republics that did not... were going to join it, these were latvia, lithuania, estonia, their independence not at the moment was recognized by the soviet union, this happened only after pochu, georgia, ugu, armenia, azerbaijan, because the parameters related to the karabakh conflict were not defined there and both republics were not satisfied with the actions of the union center, the republic of moldova, ukraine, this how many already, eight, yes, and who was left then? russia and the countries of central asia? ugh. and plus armenia. no,

armenia was not going to sign, because i say again, it had a problem with karabakh. if she signed the alliance agreement, this one the problem would be recognized by her as non-existent. they did not sign. plus belarus. central asian countries, russia and belarus. and the question arises, what did they want to disrupt at that time, because this agreement was in any case very conditional. there was one more problem, which was a problem for me, simply speaking, that is , if they had already bothered to arrest, put... in custody gorbachev, why didn't they bother to put yeltsin in custody, and not only yeltsin, that is, well, the bunch implies some kind of systematicity, here it was was not done, so they sent general varennikov, it seems, to kyiv and so on, sent other emissaries, the state security committee cells tried to work on the ground, but

simultaneous arrests were not made, that is , why didn’t they go for it, why... they they didn’t keep it all, is it the declassification of the kgb at that time, or different ideas about what should happen next, well, here it seems to me that there were different factions in the state security committee itself, firstly, secondly, not very it is clear how the vertical obeyed them then authorities, as far as they could count on such concentrated efforts of the power structures and the authorities as such in the field, they... were afraid of an open confrontation with the leadership of the russian federation for one simple reason. boris yeltsin was the universally elected president of russia. in general, this was their big mistake, that they allowed elections. gennady yanaev was not only not the universally elected president of the soviet union. he was not the president of the soviet union at all. he was a person about whom the majority of the population of the soviet union

learned on august 19, 1991. i well remember the election of gennady. yanaev as the vice-president of the soviet union, i was then at the congress of people's deputies of the soviet union, and i then asked mikhail gorbachev why he proposed this candidacy in the first place, none of us from the people who covered this congress of deputies , who worked with politicians, could not understand this, it was no one, this person was known exclusively for his tendency to alcoholism, but everyone says that there boris yelson was prone to alcoholism, but boris yelson was really a person who could do a lot... people in not only russia, vodka can be a hobby for you, well, for many, it is a hobby, but when vodka is a meaning, for the sake of which you achieve some kind of success, you are

unlikely you can effectively manage something, and everyone perfectly understood that this is nobody and nothing. and so this person might have feared that if he ordered the arrest of the president-elect of russia, it might lead to greater excesses than it would seem, and might cause quite a negative reaction. leaders of other republics, who were also presidents, who were ready to somehow cooperate with the gkchp, but in conditions where they were sure of their own inviolability, because where there was really an attempt to establish control over the situation, it was... both in tallinn and in reza , and in vilnius, there were already special forces units there, they stormed there, the hotel where the latvian government was, they did it there, because they believed that these were foreign people, the same pskov division, yes, that these were foreign people, these were the leaders of the popular fronts, but this nomenclature, yeltsin was a representative of this

names, nazarbayev, or karimov, or niyazov, could ask, well... today they arrested him, and tomorrow you will arrest us, well, listen, we have more control over kazakhstan or takmenistan than you do, and we could to be one moment, another moment - the role of mikhail gorbachev. here we are talking about the arrest of mikhail gorbachev. in the summer of 1991, i met with igor smirnov, the first president of the self-proclaimed transnistrian moldavian republic, in one of the hotels of the cpsu central committee in moscow. before and after the meeting he held in the verkhovna rada ussr, then its head anatoly lukyenov. at this meeting were the heads of transnistria, abkhazia, south ossetia, gagauzia, and i think there were certain territories there that were considered such territories, let's say, with

the possibility of using them as a union center, remember, then there were attempts to create interfronts in... because i simply do not know him, but i know for sure that the leaders of transnistria, abkhazia, south ossetia, and gauzia were there, because i know this from igor smirnov and from the first president of the self-proclaimed republic of abkhazia vladislav artsen, because they both told me about this meeting, but smirnov told me more about it, ardzima just informed me that he was at this meeting, shortly after we met with... with them in moscow. smirnov told me that lukyanov required them to be unprepared at the end of the summer, because at the end of the summer a normal would be established. the constitutional order in the russian federation in the soviet union, in general, that there will be no such union treaty, which strengthens the position of nationalists, and that, in principle,

at the end of the summer , stability will be restored and they must be vanguard stability, by the way, the leadership of the so-called pmr, it supported the gkchp, please, a few hours after the start, but the president of the soviet union, mykhailo g., came to this meeting for a few minutes '. he was there, he basically, as was typical of him, didn't say anything specific, but he demonstrated by his presence that he knew what anatoly lukyanovich was doing, that the very meeting of the president of the soviet union with the leaders formations, the very existence of which contradicted the constitution of the ussr, well, in the case of transnistria, for sure, it was simply the teraspil district with several other districts of moldova, but there are many of them. about what he was talking about, and that is why after that i always had questions about what it was in principle, and to what extent the entire leadership of the soviet union

, led by mikhail gorbachev, was ready to sign a union treaty with the leaders of the union republics, that is, to what extent gorbachev was isolated or self-removed at this point to see how much of it associates will be able to restore this pseudo-stability, simply at last. we have closed this extremely fundamentally fundamental point yes, but one of many, yes, when we talk about the role of ukrainian elites, yes, we understand that apart from the street, apart from ukrainians on the streets, apart from our population and in general, well, the desire to get that or another status is sovereign, so were the ukrainian communists, for example, there was a ukrainian or soviet kagibist, general marchuk. the deceased, yes, he was not the head of the kgb, the kgb was headed by a general halushka, no, he was the head of the fifth administration then, it seems, not anymore, he was the deputy head of the kgb in the ssr, it seems that he is no longer the head in

the fifth round, if i am not mistaken, there was kravchuk and so on, that is, there was was not difficult, after all, that is, there were a number of figures of the communist system, yes, but who , in principle, as far as we understand, they wanted to create a certain model, which model they wanted to create, now i named a few names, each of these ... people there were different ideas about what might happen next, i can absolutely relate to that to say clearly, because i discussed this model with each of them, that is, the concept of kravchuk, marchuk, or ivashko, that is, they did not agree, concepts, i took marchuk out of brackets here, because he began to actively participate in these events after the declaration of independence, at the time of the declaration of independence, general tsgolushka was undoubtedly the head of the committee, and only with his departure did general marchuk begin to have real opportunities for real... participation in the political life of such people, and i would like to remind you that even after the declaration of independence was kravchuk's attempt to send

a civilian politician to the new security service of ukraine, he proposed yemts sr., not morchuk, for this position at the beginning, it's just that the verkhovna rada of ukraine did not agree with this candidacy, so there were also disturbances there, but if talk about these main people in reality. and the head of the verkhovna rada of ukraine and stanislav gurenko, the first of all parties of ukraine after the resignation of ivazhko, so these were three different approaches, absolutely polar. so ivazhko's approach was gorbachev's approach. it's hard for everyone was obliged to gorbachev, he was the stake of the party of ukraine after the resignation of volodymyr shcherbytskyi. it is simply impossible to imagine the weight of these people. shcherbytskyi was a person who applied for the post of general secretary of the central committee of the cpsu, one of the main associates of leonid breyeshnyi, and was hardly a person who was not known

even in the ukrainian party apparatus, his main position in the ukrainian party apparatus was the secretary of the kharkiv regional party committee, one of the secretaries , then he was sent to work in afghanistan, in a few months before his appointment as the head of soviet ukraine, gorbachev also sent the first secretary of dnipropetrovsk for several months. party, but it was also absolutely a position, not without its weight, and it was difficult to simply be an obedient executor of gorbachev's will, he was needed by gorbachev for one reason, the reason, gorbachev understood that when creating these models of the alliance agreement, he could not rely on russia, that’s in general, imagine, ugh, in fact, the head of russia, but you can’t rely on russia, because russia is a different leader, it’s a typical dual power, the tsar ion and... petro, yes, putin and beslan, well , the ukrainians are going to kursk and putin is going to beslan and the caucasus, well, roughly so, and he

decided that the main support of... moscow will be soviet ukraine, and to lead this soviet ukraine should be a loyal, obedient person. and he failed this mission completely because he was unable to work with the ukrainian party apparatus. ukrainian party officials, who made up the majority in the parliament, considered him an absolute upstart. ugh. that is why ivashko happily agreed to be elected deputy general secretary of the central committee of the cpsu a few months after he was elected chairman of the verkhovna rada of ukraine. for ukrainian communists it was. fiasco, they were in awe, but also difficult, i spoke with him, after his election as the deputy general secretary of the cpsu, i spoke publicly, it was an interview that was printed, and he spoke about the leadership of the communist party of ukraine out of open hatred, as about people who did not live up to his expectations at all, he did not hide at all that his main desire was to leave ukraine, that is, this

mutual antipathy was absolutely... obviously, that means that ivashko was a representative of the moscow, if you will, party school, who saw ukraine simply as a support for moscow, for gorbachev's moscow, but not moscow, he was not one such person, another such person, was the last head of the administration of the president of the soviet union, hryhoriy rivanko, the former first secretary of the kyiv party, so it was one such group of people, the gorbachevs, who wanted ukraine to occupy a prominent place in the renewed union, and then there was stanislav. stanislav gurenko was also not going to fight for the independence of ukraine. his idea was completely different. he was going to head the cpsu. he was not going to be the executor of mikhail gorbachev's will. he believed that he would be able to take revenge, which volodymyr shcherbytsky did not take, that he would be able to stop all these pseudo-reforms. and he basically believed that if he managed to

get rid of gorbach. the next candidate for the post of general secretary of the central committee of the cpsu. it's him. this was obvious at the last congress of the cpsu. grurenko was the favorite of this party. and for whom gorbachev was afraid, but hated him. and she despised vazhak as the deputy general secretary of the central committee of the cpsu. all the people who were in gorbachev's orbit, from yehor ligachev, who was the head of the conservatives, to oleksandr yakovlev, who was the head of the liberals, were no longer for these people... if you imagine that the putsch would have come out, well, i'm sure that on at the next extraordinary congress of the cpsu, stanislav gurenko would be elected general secretary of the party's central committee, and ukraine would become a real instrument of the collapse of reforms, because there was practically no restructuring in ukraine, it started only after the election of yevazhko and at a very slow pace, so it was a different concept, therefore gurenko with incredible

enthusiasm... accepted puch, supported him fully, together with varennikov came to kravchuk, and after puch continued to fight, literally, i was at his press conference, on the 25th, it seems, or on the 24th of august, when they were already burning documents, and he was saying that the communist party of ukraine would still remain the main, driving force in our country, when i started... laughing somewhere there you are on a chair, he started shouting at me vitaly, stop this laughter, let's see which of us will laugh last, i tell him no , stanislav, i will laugh last, not you, it's just the age difference, what are you making up, so i was sure that he had collapsed, but he was one step away from power in the soviet union, just at one time iryna kalynets, a well-known iconic ukrainian

dissident, yes, the wife of the ukrainian poet ihor kalynets, she once told me that, unfortunately, we then, the communists then tribune, not the government, that is, the communists went into the shadows and into the shadows power, when we talk about apparatuses, in business, in banks and so on, well, like gorenko, he became a big businessman, by the way, what did he do then, well, he had some financial assets, then he became the chairman of the committee on the economy of the supreme well, he didn't go anywhere, he was just no longer ... weight, but he had a business, he was quite a serious player at his level, not at this level, i say again, this story got him down because he wanted moreover, for him ukraine, as well as for ivazhko, was not something self-sufficient, those people are not in power lost in ukraine, they lost the country in which they wanted to rule. well, now the third position is kravchuk. kravchuk led the communist sovereign, of which there were few.