as criminal. >> as san francisco d.a. she promised never to seek the death penalty. it outraged critics. >> i think this district attorney made a very big mistake. matter of fact if i had known she had said that in her campaign i never would have supported her. >> harris favors federal legalization of marijuana. harris supports ending cash bail in private prisons and as prosecutor she favored second chances. >> i will tell you standing up for the people also means. it means challenging the policy of mass incarceration by recognizing the war on drugs was a failure. >> harris wants a ban on so-called assault rifles like the ar-15. america's most popular weapon. >> we need universal background checks and a renewal of the

assault weapons ban >> she supported a ban on handgun ownership. >> bill: more to come on that william la jeunesse in los angeles. thank you, sir. >> we shouldn't have to wait but a few hours or a few days or get this information out. i don't want to hear anything today to say that the secret service can't answer our questions. >> dana: the hearing we've been talking about on the senate side starting right now. let's get you to it. >> we're also attending the rally and also injured in the attack. let me be clear, this was an attack on our democracy. americans should be able to attend a political rally and express their political beliefs without -- without fear of violence. and political candidates for our nation's highest office should be confident that their safety will never be compromised for their service. although we're still learning

about the shooter's motive, this attack was a shocking reminder that the threat of political violence is alive and well in our country. by all accounts, this was an inexcusable security and planning failure. we need to get all the facts about what happened that day and how we can assure an attack like this is never, never allowed to happen again. today's panel witnesses leads the men and women who protect our top leaders and our investigating this crime. i want to thank them both for being here today. as well as the secret service and f.b.i. for a very productive and informative briefing with our committees last week. today our witnesses will help us begin to answer critical questions and get the information that we need to implement reforms that are clearly needed to strengthen security protocols for the u.s. secret service and the people

who receive their protection. the homeland security and governmental affairs committee has already begun that work. this discussion comes in the midst of a bipartisan investigation that senator paul and i have launched in which we launched shortly after the assassination attempt took place. our teams are still collecting critical information speaking to law enforcement and piecing together the details of this event. this past weekend, a bipartisan team of our investigators along with key staff from senators blumenthal and johnson's office traveled to pennsylvania to speak with local law enforcement officials reviewing critical information from security officials working alongside the secret service and to see the site firsthand. i want to thank the incredibly brave local law enforcement officers in and around butler county who responded that afternoon and who met with my

staff this past weekend. they have helped to answer tough questions as well as discuss in detail how the event actually unfolded. i also want to thank the owners of butler country farm show and the american glass research for alloying my staff and law enforcement to walk the grounds and examine the roof of the building the gunman was able to assess. we greatly appreciate your assistance. i've also requested documents along with senators paul, blumenthal and johnson related to security preparations, intelligence gathering prior to the attack and detailed explanations of the security response from federal, state and local authorities. as part of our ongoing investigation, we also seek to speak with additional federal law enforcement personnel including secret service agents who were responsible for securing the event. today's hearing is an important opportunity to ask critical

questions and to begin to give the american people the transparency and answers that they certainly deserve. there are still many unanswered questions. we need additional information about the secret service's advance planning efforts, the decision surrounding sniper and counter sniper team use, placement and coordination. we also need answers about what appears to be a problematic communication system that limited efforts to relay information and respond to events as they unfolded realtime. while today is focused on asking difficult questions about what went wrong, i also want to thank the men and women of the secret service who in an instant will lay their lives on the line to protect our nation's leaders. they have incredibly difficult jobs and must continue their mission no matter what our

committee finds. given their key role in oversight of both agencies represented before us today and it is very clear the u.s. senate is focused on a productive conversation that will generate real answers and real reforms. i appreciate all the work from members of both of our committees to help us achieve this absolutely essential goal. >> 18 days ago, a would be a says nine imagined to climb onto a roof on the stage where the leading presidential candidate donald trump was speaking. the assassin's bullet struck him nearly missing a fatal blow thanks to a last-minute head turn. tragically, not everyone was so fortunate. a beloved husband and father in the audience was killed, his life stolen in an instant. two others remain seriously injured, their futures uncertain. the lives of law enforcement officers working the event and

those in the audience have been forever changed. if the media has shamefully to other stories and google suppress images of a bloody donald trump and the resolve of our nation in the face of the attack, that the american people have not forgotten and we will not forget. there is no question that this was a monumental failure by the secret service. they had one job and they failed. we know that. what remains unclear is who specifically failed, how they failed and what must be done to insure that something like this never happens again. america deserves to know that those responsible for this failure are frankly not going to be in charge of securing the upcoming democrat national convention. we need to know that someone has been placed on suspension and someone won't be in charge of the next donald trump rally. now i was encouraged to hear the acting director rowe has initiated a disciplinary

investigation in addition to the ongoing secret service policy review. this is an important step. however, real accountability will require an examination of all the facts that are still unclear. this past friday we went to pennsylvania to meet with local law enforcement and document the scene. one of the concerning things my team was told is that no one from secret service has talked to them since the shooting. i don't know how an investigation into what failed can be conducted without talking to the officers and agencies relied upon to do much of the work. many questions remain unanswered about the planning and performance of the security for july 13th. while a host of errors led to this security disaster, we now know local enforcement officers were suspicious of the shooter 90 minutes in advance of the shooting. there are two glaring issues we need to focus on. first, why were the agr grounds and the roof left unattended? why was the agr building, the

shooter's perch, left outside the perimeter? local law enforcement told my staff they specifically flagged the vulnerability of the building to the secret service and were told it would be taken care of. clearly these vulnerabilities were not addressed. second, why was donald trump allowed to take the stage and why wasn't he removed from the stage when a suspicious individual was taking increasingly suspicious activities? over 20 minutes before president trump began his speech the secret service command center had been made aware of an individual with a range finder. at least ten minutes before it was confirmed the secret service's counter sniper team had been made aware of the suspicious subject and provided a photograph and detailed description. why was the event not delayed until the individual was found and checked out? interviews with local law enforcement paint a different picture in critical places from what we've been told by the secret service in other briefings. now we need to hear from the

secret service agents responsible for security that day. our committee has formly requested interviews with those agents but haven't yet been allow i had the speak to them. i expect director rowe today to tell us when we will be allowed to talk to these people. let me close with this. mistakes, grave mistakes were made on july 13th. but that does not take away from the bravery of dozens of federal, state and local officers that day. we're grateful for their sacrifices and professionalism and they deserve the truth now also. it is our duty and our utmost responsibility to insure that we learn from this failure and hold those responsible accountable. >> now like to recognize chairman durbin of the senate judiciary committee for his opening remarks. >> thank you, senator peter, a rare joint meeting of the two committees and we have matching jurisdiction and the most efficient way to getting to the

truth. we've all seen the movies, read the books, the international assassin with sophisticated technology, elaborate plans, well honed skills sets out to kill a leading political figure in the united states. but how does that match the reality of what happened in butler, pennsylvania? when a 20-year-old introverted college student outsmarted one of the most sophisticated american law enforcement agencies in history came within an inch of killing a former president of the united states? that's why we gather today to ask these hard questions. there is more to this story and other aspects we ought to consider as well. we cannot lose sight of the fact it contributed to the violence on july 13th. widespread easy access to ar-15 military style rifles. while we rely on the secret service to protect elected officials there are unique

challenges they face in light of the proliferation of weapons of war on our streets. pennsylvania allows individuals to openly carry a loaded riffle without a permit and assault rifles can be purchased from unlicensed dealers without a background check because of dangerous loopholes in the gun laws. the same kind of firearm has been used to carry out mass shootings in newtown, uvalde, las vegas and high land park, illinois killing dozens of children and adults and injuring many more. looking across that dais i realize we have our differences on many i shall jules but when it comes to the protection of president and president shall candidates we should stand united. it is essential to a functioning democracy. i hope this hearing can be an example how we will work together on a bipartisan basis to not only understand this shocking event but to insure it never happens again. we must do this without the incendiary language and

conspiracy mongering that too often dominates political discourse today. ongoing investigations by the secret service and f.b.i. are critical. congress, the victims' families and american people deserve transparency and accountability now. i will turn to my partner ranking member lindsey graham. >> thank you, mr. chairman. several of us from the military and military background. if this happened in the military, a lot of people would be fired. and if a lot of people are not fired, the system failed yet again. having said that, the people who are brave and jumped on the stage to protect the president need to be applauded. we need to learn what happened, make corrective actions, but somebody has to be fired. nothing is going to change until somebody loses their job. thank you. >> it's the practice of the homeland security and governmental affairs committee

to swear in witnesses. if our two witnesses could please stand and raise your right hand. do you swear the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you god? thank you, you may be seated. our first witness is ronald rowe, junior, he is currently the acting director of the united states secret service. prior to this role acting director rowe was the 23rd deputy director of the secret service. he has had a distinguished 25-year career in the secret service from coordinating major security operations to collaborating with other government and law enforcement agencies. additionally he served as the chief of staff to the director, as deputy assistant director for the office of protective operations and deputy assistant director for the office of intergovernmental and legislature affairs. mr. director, thank you for appearing before this committee today. you are now recognized for your

opening statement. >> good morning. chairman peters, durbin, paul and graham. and distinguished members of the committees. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. the critical part of secret service mission is protecting the current and former government leaders. attempted assassination of former president trump on saturday, july 13, 2024, in butler, pennsylvania was a failure on multiple levels. i join you and all americans in condemning the horrific assault on former president trump, corey comperatore, james and david dutch and extend my deepest sympathies to the comperatore family and my sincere wishes for the two others continued recovery. i want to commend the heroic

actions of the secret service on july 13th. special agents shielded the former president with their bodies while shots were still being fired. selflessly, willing to make the ultimate sacrifice without hesitation. i am extremely proud of these actions and those taken by the counter sniper team to neutralize the threat that prevented further loss of life. i applaud the actions of our tactical teams that responded so quickly. i would also like to express my gratitude to our federal, state and local partners. we rely on these critical relationships which have developed over decades of daily collaboration to secure protective events and conduct criminal investigations. as you are aware there are multiple ongoing investigations of the attack and security failures that occurred that day. i pledge my full support to those inquiries so the secret service, your committees, and the american people have a

thorough and complete understanding of what happened leading up to and during july 13th. i will not wait for the results of those findings to assess where we failed that day. i have taken and will continue to take immediate steps to insure we do not repeat those failures. since my appointment as the acting director one week ago i identified gaps in our security on july 13th and have implemented corrective actions. one of my first actions as acting director was traveling to the butler farm show site to better understand how our protection failed. i went to the roof of the agr building where the assailant fire shots and laid in a prone position to evaluate his line of sight. what i saw made me ashamed. as a career law enforcement officer and 25 year veteran with the secret service i cannot defend why that roof was not

better secured. to prevent similar lapses from occurring in the future, i directed our personnel to insure every event site security plan is thoroughly vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before it is implemented. it is clear to me that other protective enhancements could have strengthed our security at the event. i have directed the expanded use of unmanned aerial systems to help detect threats on roofs and other elevated threats and directed resources to facilitate protective site communications particularly our communications with state and local partners. in addition, i have instructed the asset request for secret service protective details to be approved expeditiously and ordered the maximum use of requested personnel at protect i had sights to address this heightened security environment. i've heard your calls for

accountability and take them very seriously. given the magnitude of this failure the secret services office of professional responsibility is reviewing the actions and decision making of secret service personnel in the lead-up to and on the day of the attack. if this investigation reveals that secret service employees violated agency protocols, those employees will be held accountable to our disciplinary process. with respect to congressional investigations and requests for information, i instructed my staff to provide full cooperation and respond expeditiously on a cofounding basis to insure you have the information you need to conduct your critical oversight. in my testimony before you today i will provide details on the secret service's advance security planning for the butler farm show sight. facts -- and corrective actions the agency is taking to insure

that nothing like this happens again. but i do not believe that inadequate time to plan for this event was a factor in the failure. as you saw in my written statement i am prepared to provide an overview of the security planning leading up to and during the july 13th attack. i would like to point out that based on what i know right now, neither the secret service counter sniper teams nor members of the former president's security detail had any knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the agr building with a firearm. it is my understanding those personnel were not aware the assailant had a firearm until they heard gunshots. prior to that they were operating with the knowledge that local law enforcement was working an issue of a suspicious individual prior to the shots being fired. i regret that information was not passed to congress in the public sooner with greater frequency and i fear this lack of information has given rise to

multiple false and dangerous conspiracy theories about what took place that day. i want to debunk these theories. let me address one conspiracy directly. the secret service counter sniper neutralized the assailant within seconds after the assailant fired his weapon. that counter sniper had full discretion to use deadly force to stop an attacker and did not need to seek authorization to fire. i am immensely proud of the selfless dedication of our employees to the mission. every day across the globe the men and women answer the call to protect our nation's leaders and the standard is no fail for a reason. during our current high operational tempo i want and i need to insure that the secret service workforce are uplifted so they can focus on carrying out the mission. they have my full support and

i'm confident in their abilities to insure the safety and security of the people we protect. they are worthy of trust and confidence and they deserve your support as well as the support of the american people. chairman peters, durbin, paul, graham and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this joint hearing. i will submit the remainder of my statement for the record and i will answer your questions. >> thank you, mr. rowe. second witness is the deputy director of the federal bureau of investigation at the department of justice. in this role deputy director oversees investigative and intelligence activities. prior to his appointment as deputy director he had a three decades within the f.b.i. leading counter terrorism efforts and most recently as the associate deputy director of the f.b.i. where he is responsible

for the management of all f.b.i. personnel, budget, administration, as well as infrastructure. thank you for appearing before the committee here today. you are recognized for your opening remarks. >> thank you, sir. good morning, chairman peters and durbin, ranking members paul and graham and distinguished members of the committee. it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the f.b.i.'s investigation of the attempted assassination of former president trump on july 13th in butler, pennsylvania. before going further, i want to again offer my and our condolences to the victims of this heinous attack. to the family and loved ones of heroic firefighter and father corey comperatore, to mr. dutch and mr. copenhaver who continue to recover and also to former president trump. our thoughts and prayers are with each of them and their families and loved ones.

within minutes of the attack the field office in pittsburgh, pennsylvania received notification of the assassination attempt and responded to the scene immediately with a surge of resources quickly moving forward on the investigation. from the outset the f.b.i. has been investigating this attack as an assassination attempt and an act of domestic terrorism. our team continues to conduct a full, thorough and objective investigation and will continue to follow all leads and avenues of investigation to logical conclusion leaving no stone unturned. it is not typical to provide details of an ongoing investigation, this as we all know is an extraordinarily tragic set of circumstances of the utmost national importance making it essential to inform the american public and congress what is known right now with full transparency. the investigation remains focused, of course, on determining motive, identifying

potential co-conspirators or others with knowledge of the attack and building a timeline of the shooter's actions in advance of and during the attack. thus far though absolutely nothing has been ruled out, the investigation has not identified a motive nor my co-conspirators or others with advance knowledge. to date the f.b.i. team conducted more than 460 interviews, executed search warrants including at the shooter's residence and seized electronic media phones, laptops, hard drives and thumb drives. legal process has been issued to dozens of companies and we received more than 2,000 tips from the public. the full resources of the f.b.i. have been brought to bear in further answer of the investigations. agents and professional staff experts. i personally visited the site of the attack and seen the work of f.b.i. pittsburgh and our partners on the front line and want to thank all involved for theron going and tireless efforts to get the answers that

we need and to deliver justice. specialized resources were victim services specialist. technology division resources to process physical and digital evidence. shooting reconstruction team. our explosive experts have analyzed the three ieds recovered, two from the shooter's vehicle, one from the family residence and behavioral analysis unit is building a profile of the shooter to include his mental state. i want to provide a brief highlighted overview of the timeline established to date through witness interviews and other information. again this is our understanding at present and is subject to change and further refinement as more facts are collected. on july 3rd the rally in butler pennsylvania was announced. july 6th the shooter registered to attend the rally and performed a search for quote how far was oswald from kennedy.

on july 7th the shooter traveled from his home to the butler farm show grounds and remained there for approximately 20 minutes. we assess this shows advance planning and reconnaissance on his part. on july 12th the shooter traveled from his home to the sportsman club where he practiced shooting. on the morning of july 13th at 10:00 he returned to the ground and remained there for 70 minutes before returning home again. at approximately 1:30 p.m. while at the residence the shooter's father gave him a rifle for the purpose he believed of going back to the sportsman club. about 25 minutes later the shooter purchased ammunition while en route to the butler farm show grounds. the subject then arrived at the scene and moving around the farm show and close to the agr building. shortly there after at 3:51 he

flew a drone 200 yards from the farm show grounds for 11 minutes. the drone and controller were later found in the subject's car. analysis has not revealed any photos or video taken by the drone but we can confirm he was livestreaming at the time and would have been able to view it on his controller. the first reported sighting of the shooter by local law enforcement was at 4:26 p.m. at approximately 5:10:00 p.m. the shooter was identified as local law enforcement as a suspicious person around the agr building. 5:14 p.m. a local swat operate or look a photo of the shooter. 5:32 p.m. local swat observed the suspect browsing news sites and with a range finder. at approximately 5:38 p.m. the photo of the shooter taken

earlier was sent to local swat operators in a text message group. 25 minutes prior to the shooting the u.s. secret service command post was notified of a suspicious person. officers lost sight of the subject from 6:02 to 6:08 but continued to communicate with each other in an attempt to locate him. recently discovered video from a local business shows the shooter pulling himself up onto the agr building rooftop at approximately 6:06:00 p.m. approximately 6:08:00 p.m. the subject was observed on the roof by local law enforcement. at approximately 6:11:00 p.m. a local police officer was lifted to the roof by another officer, saw the shooter and radioed he was armed with a long gun. within the next 30 seconds the shots were fired. the evidence recovery team found eight shell casings at the scene next to the shooter's body.

we believe that the shooter fired eight rounds. while the investigation has not determined motive, the investigative team continues to review information from legal returns including online and social media accounts. something just very recently uncovered that i want to share is a social media account which is believed to be associated with the shooter in the 2019, 2020 time frame. over 700 comments posted from this account. some of these comments, if ultimately attributable to the shooter, appear to reflect anti-semitic and anti-immigration themes to espouse political violence and described as extreme in nature. while the investigative team is still working to verify this account to determine if it did in fact belong to the shooter we believe it is important to share and note it today particularly given the general absence of other information to date from social media and other sources

of information that reflect on the shooter's potential motive and mindset. these are the facts in part that the investigation has revealed to date. while the shooter is dead, our work is very much ongoing and urgent. thank you and i look forward to answering any and all questions. >> thank you. we'll now proceed, chairman durbin and ranking member graham will ask the first questions. i will ask question, ranking member paul and after that we'll alternate between members of the judiciary recognized by chairman durbin and members of homeland security committee recognized by me. >> i would like to begin by making a statement it is not in the form of a question and you will understand why when i say it. in 20 days, we will start the democratic national convention in chicago. i have been briefed by law enforcement agencies plans for security for that event.

tens of thousands of people will be there, including some of the highest ranking politicians in the united states. i trust that both of your agencies can answer in the a firmtive if i ask you whether you are actively engaged in working with the development of security plan taking into consideration the lessons of july 13th? >> senator, that is 100% yes from the secret service. >> yes from the f.b.i. as well, sir. we've been working on this for well over a year in preparation. >> i won't ask for details for obvious reasons. i want to ask a question about the secret service staffing. congress has nearly doubled the budget for the secret service over the last ten years from 1.8 billion in fiscal year 2014 to 3 billion in fiscal year 2024. despite this large increase in funding, the number of agents and protective operations has fallen from 4027 to 3,671 during

the same time period, 9% reduction. acting director rowe. what accounts for protective operations losing 356 agents over the past ten years? >> senator, with respect to where we are today on staffing and i'll address the ten year where we were. in this year alone we will end the year on the positive of 200 plus agents. that's the first time in a number of years we've been able to do that. part of it was gaining efficiencies in our hiring process. we have not dropped standards. only 2% of every applicant actually makes it through the hiring process. we are filling our classes at the federal law enforcement training center. we are doing this ramp up as part of what lies ahead of us with the l.a. olympics in 2028.

with respect to what has happened in years prior, this is a difficult and challenging job being a secret service agent. living your life by somebody else's schedule. constantly away from your family. constantly having to meet increased operational and investigative demands, which we gladly do. but it is not for everyone and i think there are times where people have to make tough choices and they decide to leave the agency. but that doesn't mean they were any less of an agent or that they weren't committed to the mission. because we're all committed to being patriots and serving our country and protecting our nation's highest leaders. i think there was a variety of factors, some was the pandemic. some was the economy or other opportunities. we have people that are very skilled in cyber that often leave the job. some of the protective skills they acquire are in demand in the private sectors.

some of the mechanism we put in place is retaining our workforce and that's what we're focused on now. >> government accountability office the restaffing have been slow during a number of factors during the years' long background checks and assignments agent must work for being assigned to protection. what steps have you taken to improving recruitment? >> we're putting out targeted recruitment opportunities. we've recently put it out for within our uniform division or our counter sniper unit. hazardous agency medical response unit. counter assault team on special agent side. we're trying to gather the best and brightest. we're having great success with a lot of these vacancies. what i want to reiterate is, for

example, on the counter assault vacancy we had 700 applicants that applied for this. really what we will glean after they make it through the process. they have to be able to hold a top secret sci clearance. if we realize 15 out of that it is a 2% rate. it is very competitive and we try to get the best and brightest without dropping standards. >> one last question. what is the purpose of a range finder and once this assassin was identified as using a range finder wasn't that proof he was a dangerous individual? >> i will say, senator, obviously somebody is trying to determine where they are in proximity to a location, a fixed location. i will defer to my colleague here but i believe it was a

recreation or sports-related. i thought i had read it was a golf range finder. nonetheless, it still would have provided him the ability to provide the distance that he was away from his intended target. >> wasn't that enough? >> as far as raising suspicion? he was identified as being suspicious by local law enforcement. >> and nothing happened. >> i know that local law enforcement was attempting to locate him. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, member graham. >> thank you. let's go back to the resources. do you need more money? >> senator, listen, there isn't a sing agency in the executive branch that needs more money. everyone would take more resources. we have had a great relationship

with the department of homeland security and the office of budget. >> do you feel constrained to ask for more resources by anybody? >> no, we don't. actually we have a great relationship with our appropriators and obviously the authorizing committees and they have always looked out for the secret service. >> so i would encourage you to think big when it comes to resourcing the department in light of what happened here. at the time of the shooting, the iranians were threatening high level american officials, including president trump, right? >> senator, it's widely known that -- >> yes, senator. >> did that factor in to the security for trump? >> what i will say it is widely known that the iranians do not like us. i refer you to the national security. >> they threatened to kill

certain people and they named them. >> correct, sir. i can't publicly. i cannot pub politicly comment. >> they probably comment on it. >> i cannot publicly comment on what intelligence but i can assure you we do a threat-based protective model. >> i would like to have that model provided to the committee. could you do that? >> yes, sir. >> could you also give us the protocols that are in place to secure a site like this? >> yes, sir. >> okay. thank you. the protected detail around president trump i know them all very well. brave men and women and these questions are not to be little anybody but trying to find out how the system failed so badly. you say you are not reluctant to ask for more money. what do we do to make it easier to hire people without lowering

our standards? i know it's a hard job. can we do anything to help you? >> sir, i think we're willing to take that back, sir. we're working on our time to hire. >> if you had more people you would have more time off. >> that's true. >> let's get more people and more time off. these are tough jobs. people on this committee know. i don't know how they hold a family together doing what they are doing. it is the military on steroids. the encrypted app. can you tell us about these apps? have they been broken into. the guy had some apps that were encrypted. >> i think we have experienced a range of returns on this. some of the applications that he was using online were encrypted. some of the email accounts. >> have we broken into them. >> we have received returns. some haven't been able to get information back because of their encrypted nature. >> any way to solve that

problem? >> we need a solution that provides you aful access to law enforcement. >> you are telling me the guy that took eight shots at the president, former president, has apps that we can't get into that may, if you could get into, reveal some relevant information? >> that is correct, senator. >> so if he were talking to some foreign power. i don't think any information power would hire this guy, by the way. i'm not worried it is a plot by the iranians. however, there could come a day when something like this is very important. how do we solve this problem? >> senator, as we've been saying, we need a solution that provides lawful access where when we go to a company. >> i agree. i'm not blaming you. we have encrypted apps of an -- a murderer, and we can't get into them all that days after.

that needs to be fixed. i am all for privacy but to a point. what if in the future somebody is using these apps to communicate with a foreign power? we need to know these things and in realtime. lessons learned is that everything failed, corrective actions, seems to me you need more money and more people. accountability. at the end of the day how many people do you think will be relieved of their duties, mr. rowe, because of this? >> senator, i publicly cannot weigh in on that right now. it has to be a fair and neutral process. >> from a fair point of view, would you say this is a major system failure at every turn and those in charge of the system in question not only was it embarrassing, they failed? >> senator, again if there were policy violations, those

individuals will be held accountable and be -- >> policies if you could. >> they will be held to our table of penalties which will include up to termination. >> thank you. >> director rowe. in your testimony here today as well as in your written testimony you said very clearly that you can't defend why that building with the shooter on top of it was not better covered. you were very clear. you cannot defend that. my understanding is there is a detailed site survey that's done prior to an event to identify potential threat points. talk to me about that site survey. i'm sure you have had a chance to look at it after action. how did the site survey get approved? when it was clear it was a major threat from that building >> thank you, senator.

so our pittsburgh field office did the advance. during that advance not only were they discussing amongst themselves about mitigating the line of sight but also discussing with other agencies that were supporting it. our counter snipers met with their counterparts, the team lead and team lead met and walked the site, they identified the agr building, and if i may, senator, if i could point out something right now if i may. we'll place this for the record, but this is the point of view -- this is from the second floor of the agr building. this point of view is the point of view where the counter sniper team locally was posted. the gold arrow indicates where the shooter fired from.

looking left, why was the assailant not seen? when we were told that building was going to be covered. that there had been a face-to-face that afternoon. that our team leads met. this was the view. let me show you another view, senator. this view is a reenactment by one of my agents laying flat. there is a five inch rise in the middle of that roof. the assailant would have had to present his board over that to get his shot off.

the view underneath reflects the perspective that he would have had. again i call your attention back to the first exhibit if they would have looked left. give me c. this is what our counter sniper team saw. shooter, no elbows, you barely make out the crown of his head. below it the assailant up prone. let me just tell you our counter sniper, this individual i know him, i consider him a friend. he has covered me operationally in conflict zones and when i did my time on the president's detail, he exemplifies the courage, the skill, and the

ability to respond under great stress in such short time to neutralize the threat and prevent further loss of life. getting back to your question, senator, these were discussions had between the pittsburgh field office, local counterparts and everyone supporting that visit that day. and that's why, when i laid in that position, i could not and i will not and i cannot understand why there was not better coverage or at least somebody looking at that roof line when that's where they were posted. >> the secret service state local law enforcement were on multiple communication channels and as a result local law enforcement was only able to call in to a state command center relayed from the secret service. this seemed to be a recurring issue that we're finding with the federal government. not a seamless way to

communicate if you are relying on local law enforcement with a major vulnerability. they told my staff that they had no way of communicating directly with the secret service. if i listened to mr. bates saying there was 30 seconds when local law enforcement reported a man on the roof with a gun, 30 seconds if it's communicated directly to a counter sniper team would it be enough time to react prior to the firing of those shots? >> senator, if we would have had that information, they would have been able to address it more quickly. it appears that information was stuck or siloed in the state and local channel. i will tell you that there were -- our tactical elements had embeds with them but also had radios on the tactical net. it is troubling to me that we

did not get that information as quickly as we should have. we didn't know there was this incident going on and the only thing we had was that locals were working an issue at the 3:00. the former president's right hand side where the shot came. nothing about man on the roof. nothing about man with a gun. none of that information ever made it over our net. >> so that will change? >> yes, sir, we're working right now to figure out the interoperability and make sure we have access to those channels whether through a counterpart system or some other means. >> very good. ranking member paul. >> director rowe, i'm encouraged by your attitude and what you brought here today and talked about immediate changes you made and i hope you follow through with that. encouraged by the fact you acknowledge it is indefensible that the roof was unattended. would you say the roof being unattended breaches standard protocol for setting up a security perimeter?

>> what i would say, senator, is that roof should have had better coverage and we will get to the bottom of if there were any policy violations. >> i would think indefensible would go along with breaching protocol and how it would not be breaching protocol. what i would caution, though, i sense, you know, and you are secret service and these people are your friends and heroic people who do good things that we can't let our friendships blind us from responsibility. someone is in charge of the security at the zone. would the secret service be in charge of the entire operation and work with law enforcement? but the person in charge of the entire operation is the secret service, not the local police. >> you are correct, sir. this is a failure of the secret service. >> that's what i mean. i don't wish anybody harm. i appreciate the bravery of the capitol hill police. i was at the shooting at the ball field.

i have heard 100 shots coming my way. fortunately none came to me and i appreciate the bravery of all people that protect us. but also the idea there are certain mistakes that don't make you a bad person but they are inexcusable. if you made that mistake. let's say you determine local police should have been on there and told us and local police said they didn't tell us to do it and it is a he said/she said. the agent in charge should be walking the roof 100 yards from the stadium and somebody needs to be on the police. local police, get on the roof. ultimately the buck doesn't pass along to somebody. whoever is in charge is in charge. really, i think it would be helpful to all of us, the process has to be meted out but also a process for protecting the next trump rally. whoever was in charge of butler next week is not in charge of a rally in las vegas. and so i think you really should say that and simply say the

leadership from that event is going through a protest but until that process they won't be in charge of the democrat national convention. it would reassure a lot of people. >> i can tell you that the team planning the democratic national convention is a national special security event. that team has been on the ground from d.c. with support from our chicago field office. i want to reiterate that our pittsburgh field office staff, they are wearing this harder than anybody right now in the secret service. they feel completely demoralized and what i'm trying to do is also let them know that listen, they need to be focused on the mission at hand. i also have to walk a tight rope here and make sure that i am not tainting any future discipline

action. >> i understand and have great respect for the officers. ultimately someone had to be in charge and someone made a terrible error of judgment. the bigger orr is the roof. another big error we have 90 minutes of a suspicious person. range finder, they certainly you would think would be enough to stop the proceedings. that's where i think you get to the second major management or judgment error of this. now trump has done probably 100 rallies like this. how often at one of his rallies are there 90 minutes of looking at one person and at least a half dozen pictures of that person? how often does that happen? is it against protocol to let a proceeding go on when you have a suspicious person 90 minutes and we don't stop the proceeding. does that defy property call? >> while there is 90 minutes in

total from when he is first identified by local law enforcement we have a 30-minute window. in no time is there anything ever communicated about weapon or harm. that's where the threat. >> you shoot people with a weapon. without a weapon we are talking about people you stop and say he had a bad back which was probably big enough to have an ar-15 in it. the backpack probably had the weapon in it. the guy with a big backpack would never get through the perimeter. not having the perimeter wide enough. the thing is he would have never gotten through the perimeter, right? the backpacks are very suspicious and seen six times. you have 20 or 30 minutes knowing about it. the thing is there is all kinds of chatter going on about this. you would think the chatter going on is at a police radio

and you standing in the patrol tent to get communication. how often has this happened at other rallies where there is a half dozen pictures and 90 minutes of people talking about a suspicious person? i can't imagine it's common. >> at rallies there are people that come to the attention of law enforcement for a variety of reasons. and if they come to our attention for some other activity, that might, you know, put it a little bit hey, we probably need to check that individual out. this happens and that's why we attempt to locate them. that's why it is important for us to try to find them and important to have the information. so local law enforcement did their best to locate him. they did provide us the photos 30 minutes prior. just he -- >> it's a terrible management decision.

there was a chance to stop the proceeding and the question is not whether there is enough information to take down an individual, it's a much lower to standard so say we'll wait until we get this individual. the roof and 90 minutes of of it are a failure of your protocol. the person who is made these positions can't be in a position of authority again. >> senator klobuchar. >> thank you for holding this hearing. i appreciate, director rowe, when we had a classified briefing and also today taking responsibility for the agency and your own personal emotions and reaction to your visit and what had gone wrong. for the people in my state that keep asking me i just don't get how he got on the roof. we have gone through great details and a lot of examination. could you give a minute on what went wrong and how you think it can be fixed? i think it will help to dispel

the conspiracy theories. some people think it didn't really happen, which is completely ridiculous, it did. there are some people that think all kinds of conspiracies went on within the government, which is also false. but could you just tell them what went wrong so they understand? >> thank you, senator. i thought long and hard about this. i think this was a failure of imagination. a failure to imagine that we actually do live in a very dangerous world where people do actually want to do harm to our protectees. i think it was a failure to challenge our own assumptions. the assumptions that we know our partners will do everything they can. they do this every day. but we didn't challenge our own assumptions of we assume that someone will cover that. we assume that there is going to be uniform presence. we didn't challenge that

internally during that advance. so moving forward, i have directed that when we're talking to people and making requests, we are very specific about what we want. we are providing explicit instructions what we need and want them to do. that's the only way that we will be able to move forward beyond this. let me just tell you our state and local law enforcement partners are the best. so this belief that somehow they are less than federal law enforcement or less than the secret service, they are out there patrolling communities every day. they are the ones out there going into hazardous conditions every day. they know their commune tease and have the ability to enforce state and local laws. our advance agents don't. we need them to be partners with us and i think we need to be

very clear to them and that may have contributed to this situation. >> appreciate that. next one of the things you mentioned to me was -- and to all of us was in this other briefing was just the texting protocol. i think a lot of us think about this in non-security settings how people are texting all the time instead of talking and how it takes our eyes off in your case the target. could you talk about what might have gone wrong there and how you think things could change when there is the hope is that their eyes are constantly on the scene and on the potential targets and risks. >> thank you, senator. so again we need people focused on their area of responsibility. that communication needs to go over the net. it needs to go over a radio

channel so that everyone has situational awareness of it. what i was -- the point i was making in the closed door briefing is that we have to get to a point now where we're using our radio systems to have that collective awareness of this. i think one of the things that i have directed is that in addition to the interoperability we'll roll out common operating platform we utilize for national security events. the ability to roll it out to the field that was a blue force tracker in it where you can put where all your state and local assets are. where the federal assets are. in addition to that, i want people using the radio. so it is great that the tactical elements are talking to each other and the shift is talking to each other.