channel so that everyone has situational awareness of it. what i was -- the point i was making in the closed door briefing is that we have to get to a point now where we're using our radio systems to have that collective awareness of this. i think one of the things that i have directed is that in addition to the interoperability we'll roll out common operating platform we utilize for national security events. the ability to roll it out to the field that was a blue force tracker in it where you can put where all your state and local assets are. where the federal assets are. in addition to that, i want people using the radio. so it is great that the tactical elements are talking to each other and the shift is talking to each other.

we have to be able to make sure that whenever we come across the situation, that everyone has situational awareness of this. in my time when i was operational on the president's detail, you know, we were given the explicit instruction hey, if you are going to pass it, if it's relevant enough you feel like you need to pass that information, do it over the radio. that was the protocol that we had and i think over the years perhaps with the advent of technology and smartphones perhaps we have gotten away from that. we need to get people back on the scope and mission and what they need to be responsible for. >> the next question i will put in writing. thank you very much. it is pointing out that we've seen this rise in threats against members of congress, which of course is relevant to this, 8,000 just last year, more than four times over the past seven years, i want to ask you in writing about the steps the justice department is taking to

prioritize these cases. there have been some changes made. >> yes, senator, it's of the highest priority and urgently working on it 24/seven every day to protect every one of you here. >> appreciate it. thank you. >> senator carper. >> thank you for joining us today. i have the privilege of representing delaware, the first state created by the constitution. we did that over 200 years ago and the constitution is without lines how we elect our leaders. it changes with respect to technology over the years. but there is for as long as we've been a country, threats to our leaders when they pursue elective office. we'll be gathering in chicago in just a few weeks. we'll be getting together in other parts of the country to make sure what was depted in the constitution is carried out. those who aspire to elected

office are protected and their families are protected as well as those that surround them. i share with my colleagues my prayers for those who have been killed or injured on july 13th. we're grateful that one of our presidential candidates is okay. but i have a question about what -- i can't get over how a 20-year-old loaner could somehow outsmart two of the smartest federal agencies and state agencies in law enforcement within odds of a thousand to one and be able to almost pull it off blows my mind. hopefully we will get to the truth and all of that. i'm a navy guy. many years of my life in the navy as a midshipman. when the ship runs aground at sea the commanding officer is held responsible, awake asleep

at the helm and at the end of the day. i'm sure finding out who was responsible and making sure that they account for their responsibility. might have question is what policies are in place to have realtime information sharing between secret service and local law enforcement during an event and information sharing practices will the secret service make in light of the apparent breakdown in communications on july 13th? >> thank you, for that question, senator. we are looking at our procedures. we rely on a counterpart system and the radio interoperability is a complex challenge. it is not just about being able to find whatever frequency the local counterparts are on and piping it in. there is some technical

challenges that have to be there. to alleviate that we have always relied on a security room where we have representatives from the local agencies, those individuals are there to one, bring their own radio and then relay relevant information that would impact our security plan. i think what i'm looking at and again what in looking at this situation is there was a unified command post and we had our security room and we had communications that day at the butler farm site were challenging. not only for the secret service but also locals. cellular issues, there were radio issues, and so you saw that with the testimony from the colonel from pennsylvania state police last week in the house. as i'm thinking about this, i

think we need to consider what is our model moving forward? i think we need to be where the greatest amount of partners are when that information is being discussed. the other thing that i'm looking at is we need to also make sure that we have redundancy as far as cellular on the ground and directed our chief information officer to do that and rolling assets out now supporting campaign sites. >> thank you for that. based on the initial information you gathered from the investigation, do you believe there are any actions taken by the shooter in the weeks, days or hours leading up to the shooting that should have caused alarm and grabbed the attention of law enforcement? >> he did not have any interactions with law enforcement leading up to this, senator. we haven't found anything yet that would have alerted law enforcement or f.b.i. or secret

service to his intention activities in advance of this event. i will note to your prior question that we have a very strong relationship and integrated relationship between f.b.i. and secret service and every other federal, state, local agency you can imagine. we have constructs like the joint terrorism task forces and violent crime tax forces where we're cross embedded with each other. when it comes to this event and others like it we always talk in advance. we did have a meeting between u.s. secret service and f.b.i. for this event on the days leading up to the event to determine and assess whether there was any information or intelligence pertaining to a threat against the rally or to former president trump or anyone else there. there was an absence of that in the lead-up specifically. none of us had any information or holdings with regard to the ultimate shooter. >> thank you very much, both of

you. >> senate judiciary committee is senator grassley. >> i want to introduce my oversight letters and investigating documents into the record. the information i've already made public. >> no objection. >> thank you. i would also like to call my colleagues' attention to a legislation that senators have introduced requiring senate confirmation of the director of the secret service. i think this is a very important because no other agency has a no-fail mission. mr. rowe, in your written testimony you stated that to prevent similar lapses like the one on july 13th from happening again, you will insure every event site security plan is thoroughly vetted by multiple experienced supervisors before it is implemented. based on your testimony, the

security plan for the butler event deviated from the secret service standards. how would vetting by multiple experienced supervisors fix that? >> senator, i think having many eyes on a particular problem set helps. that way you are not -- you don't have tunnel vision. that's why i think it's important not only at the field office level but also at the detail level, and part of what we had started doing with the former president's detail is having them send out site agents and having them send out supervisors. and i think having that collaboration and having additional eyes to examine the problem will make sure that we're not missing anything. i think i want that surety for myself and i think -- >> you've answered my question.

also to you in your written testimony you stated that you, quote, regret that information wasn't passed to congress and the public sooner and with greater frequency. what is your communication plan going forward to insure that the american people and congress are fully informed? >> senator, we just started a rolling production that is by cam rail. we'll continue to do that and my view is that sunshine is the best disinfectant and we intend to provide information to congress as it carries out its oversight function. >> also i made public documents that show secret service deployed a counter unmanned aerial system operator on july 13th, according to the secret service. the drone system was supposed to

be operational at 3:00 p.m. that day. however, we've been told by secret service that because of cellular bandwidth problems it wasn't operational until about 5:20 of that day. if the system was operational, secret service would have had the ability to detect the shooter and his own drone use. why is the secret service dependent upon local cellular networks? does the secret service have a backup plan in place? >> yes, thank you, senator. that is something that i briefed in a closed door and again something that has cost me a lot of sleep. because of the eventual outcome of the assailant. the what if we had geo located him because the platform had been up. it is something that i have struggled with to understand.

and i have no explanation for it. it is something that i feel as though we could have perhaps found him. we could have maybe stopped him. maybe on that particular day he would have decided this isn't the day to do it because law enforcement just found me flying my drone. people fly drones all the time on the periphery of our site and we talk to them and ascertain what their intentions are. on this day in particular because of the connectivity challenge as you noted there was a delay and he flew his drone at 3:51 approximately. moving forward, we are leveraging resources from the department of homeland security and others to make sure that we have dedicated connectivity so we aren't reliant on public domain. so that we can insure that whatever assets we have in place, those assets are operational and that is my

commitment to you that we will make sure we'll do that and that is something we're moving out on. >> thank you. i hope that you will answer some of my other questions in writing. >> senator johnson. >> mr. chairman, acting director rowe in our security briefing last week i made the point if you don't want conspiracy theories to spread, you need to provide information. i appreciate these photos today. these things could have been released within days and a whole lot more information as well. so congress needs to provide oversight. we don't have certain investigatory tools like you have but what we can do is do interviews. acting director rowe, did you receive our letter from july 25th requesting interviews with 13 individuals of the secret service? >> we are in receipt of that letter. >> director, have you seen that letter as well and know who we

are requesting interviews with? >> i have not seen the letter. >> have those individuals submitted to interviews. >> we're in the process. those employees are being interviewed if they haven't already been interviewed. >> are they being transcribed, the interviews? >> the f.b.i. interviews, sir? >> we have 302s on those. >> yes, senator. >> when will congress get the 30, the transcriptions. >> when will they be made available to congress? >> we'll make them available. >> how soon? memories are short. they can be influenced by events. we need these transcribed interviews as soon as possible. >> we'll get it done, sir. >> does secret service use encrypted communications at events? >> on our radio neats. >> are knows saved? >> we did not have recordings

from there? >> do you normally? >> not on the road outside of d.c. of a presidential or vice presidential stop. >> communications between secret service agents will be available like we've gotten communications from local law enforcement. we won't get those communications, you didn't save them. very unfortunate. >> it is, sir. moving forward i directed we'll now start recording those so that we'll have them. moving forward. >> i will ask for a number of things at the end to the entered in the record. one of my findings the secret service did not attend the 9:00 briefing the day of the event. in your testimony you said that the site briefing was conducted with secret service personnel and law enforcement before the event. local law enforcement don't believe secret service was present at the 9:00 briefing. were they or not? >> with respect to the snipers that went on national television and gave an interview said they

didn't get a briefing from the secret service, they were not -- they were supporting through mutual aid and our personnel briefed the tactical team leader that was leading that element that was providing the counter sniper. >> you said the secret service provides explicit instructions to the locals. were explicit instructions provided to cover the roof of the agr building and locals just not follow it or were those explicit instructions not provided >> the locals had a plan and had been there before. >> an awful lot of the chatter on social media has to do is there partisanship in the secret service providing coverage for some individuals and none for others, about secret service coverage or additional coverage enhancements being denied. was there ever requested additional coverage for mar-a-lago? >> senator, we have provided

additional resources to the mar-a-lago residence. >> was coverage asked for and denied ever? >> i will have to research that, senator. but i'm happy to tell you we have made significant investments since the former president has left office. over $4 million of technology resources and alarms. >> documents will come out eventually to make the point one way or the other. >> yes, sir. >> this is an important piece of information that congress needs to have. >> i'll make those available to you what investments we've made. >> report today from real clear politics saying you denied sniper coverage outside of driving distance of d.c. >> that's a false statement. >> that is incorrect. >> that is incorrect. >> that's the kind of information you need to refute with documentation. deputy director, you said this was an assassination attempt and domestic terrorism.

it is obviously assassination attempt. why make the distinction. what's different about that? >> we think it's important to cover all the possibilities here in the reality of what we're dealing with and all seen, senator. we've learned lessons on the past, the baseball, the tragic shooting at the baseball field was referenced here. we've learned a lesson from that. that was not opened properly. we've made changes in the bureau and it is reflected here in terms of how this investigation is being approached with a completely open mind and inclusive of all the possibilities including domestic terrorism. >> i fear that makes investigation partisan. mr. chairman, i would like to request that my july 14th letter to attorney general garland, mayorkas and wray be entered in the record. asks a lot of questions and for documentation. my findings of july 21st and 23 including time lines, a bunch of questions be into the record and our updated timeline dated today. this goes not only by minute by

second and we'll continue to update this timeline as more information comes public. this is the way you do investigations. we need to find out second by second what happened so the american public understands the truth. >> without objection so ordered. >> senator butler. >> thank you, mr. chairman, thank you to both of our chairmen and ranking members for holding this incredibly important hearing critically for the american people to understand the safety and security that is being provided to our national leaders. thank you both for being here and for again answering the hard questions. this is a time of i think heightened attention. deservedly so. not only for our national leaders but for the teacher who decides that they are going to go and participate in their

democracy or the firefighter who wants to hear the voice and vision of the potential next leader of this country. my thoughts and prayers really are with those pennsylvania families who have lost loved ones or have been critically injured. as i offer my questions today, it would be in service to those to preventing future incidents. but in the one question of looking backward to the event on the 13th director, can you just talk a little bit about how did the -- how did mr. crooks, how was he able to get an ar-15 onto the roof of that building? does your investigation illuminate anything that we have learned to help make that point more clear. >> we don't have definitive evidence how he got the rifle up

there. based on everything that's been collected thus far, photos, video, eyewitness accounts, we do believe he likely had it in the backpack. >> broken down in the backpack? >> we're still assessing that. our laboratory has taken and looked at the rifle itself and measured that against the backpack itself and if placed in this backpack it would extend outside and been visible. we don't have anyone who observed him with the backpack with a rifle barrel or other part of it sticking out of the backpack. but the rifle would not have fit fully into this backpack to be concealed in whole. we have video that was recently found of the shooter walking in the distance from his car just before 6:00 p.m. 5:56, i believe. based on everything we have, we assess that he returned to his

vehicle at that time, got the backpack and then proceeded back to the area and to the agr building. and then he is observed, of course, on the roof just minutes later holding the backpack in front of him. in fact, there is dash cam footage from a police vehicle that shows him briefly traversing the roof with the backpack in front of him and it's minutes after that that he is actually seen by the officer who i described with the rifle on the roof. it is possible that he broke the rifle down but we don't have conclusive evidence of that. and took it out of the bag on the roof in the moments before appeared reassembled it there. that's one of the theories at we're looking at right now. >> thank you for that. you take me right -- thank you for your years of dedicated service and jumping in at a hot time. take me to the point of communication. there is a lot of communication

and even if your written and verbal testimony you have talked a lot about the communication and the desperate nature in which it is happening across the different channels. one foundational question that i have is are all elements of an event communicated on the same channel? if i lost my kid at a big rally, are local law enforcement talking about the same channel about me losing my kid as about a suspicious individual? >> when it comes to the locals, they likely have some type of common channel that they work off of in a county or an adjoining municipality. when it comes to the secret service, we do have various channels for various agents and our uniform division officers working specific aspects of that advance. >> so it's not possible that the

delay in communication or the losing of the thread of tracking this individual was lost in the commotion of all the other communications that could have been or maybe was separate from the communication channels that were happening? >> senator, i can only speak to the secret service lines of communication, and we did not have anything beyond suspicious person that was communicated to us. >> last question quickly because i'm out of time. acting director, is there -- was there any communication with the secret service that was talking directly with the president, the former president's detail? that feels like there has been some question about colleagues about why the call wasn't made to delay the event. help us understand the communication that either was or was not happening directly with the former president's detail to

make the call to delay 10 minutes when we've all been to these events. they never happen on time. but to delay while this was being investigated. >> so the detail, all they -- they were operating on their net, which our security room was monitoring, but again having information of a suspicious individual, there were other calls that day of individuals that came to the attention of law enforcement, of people that needed medical attention, so that particular -- regarding the assailant, that never really rose to a level of we should not put him out there. had we known that there was a dangerous individual out there we would never let a protectee go out on stage. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator, recognized for your question. >> thank you very much.

i want to thank you for holding this joint hearing today. thank you to our witnesses not only for being here but for your careers of service to our country and to the men and women you lead. i am really grateful that former president trump is safe and extend my sympathies to the family of corey comperatore fatally shot at the rally and my sympathies to everyone who was injured. on july 13th major failures nearly led to the assassination of a presidential candidate who is also a former president of the united states. the secret service has to be fully transparent about how this happened and how it is going to change moving forward understanding there is also a need to balance congress's engagement in oversight with allowing law enforcement to conduct and ongoing criminal investigation. i want to thank the agents of the secret service for selflessly protecting elected officials and their families and our former presidents. we're grateful for their

sacrifices and service and thank all law enforcement and law enforcement officers and first responders who worked to minimize harm to the crowd on july 13th. mr. rowe, i want to start with you. new hampshire hosts many political rallies, protecting the speakers and attendees requires extensive coordination between the law and secret service and campaign staff. i have experienced some challenges that this type of coordination can create but it is essential to public safety. it is clear that there were significant coordination failures on july 13th. you said the local swat team told the secret service that local law enforcement had eyes on the agr roof but there are reports that members of a local swat team never met with the secret service in the days before the butler rally. what steps does the secret service take prior to political

rallies to insure that the agency is effectively coordinating with the candidate security details, with state and local law enforcement and campaign event staff. >> as part of the advanced process as happened in butler as well, there is a police meeting. basically that initiates to add advantages and bringing in not only emergency management officials but all the state and local law enforcement agencies that may have aspects of supporting or assisting in that advance on that visit. the focus of that police meeting, one is to exchange numbers and business cards and coordinate times for walk-throughs. there were walk-throughs of the butler farm site with local law enforcement agencies that were supporting that visit. and that was directly as a result of having that police meeting to begin the process of figuring out, dividing up the

labor areas of responsibility. >> what you are telling me is that at that meeting the secret service, did first meeting led to the walk through that the secret service does with local law enforcement and at least some members or directors of the local swat team would have been part of that process. >> the beaver county, they were asked to assist butler but the butler esu team were part of the advance process. >> okay. how many agents did the secret service provide to plan and secure the event and how many people from state and local law enforcement supported the security of this event. >> between state and local and federal there are 155 personnel at the butler farm site that day. all combined secret service it's in the 70s. and then we had support from homeland security investigations that were providing post

standers and we had approximately 70 or so various pennsylvania state law enforcement. >> i want to go to one other issue before my time expires. you talked today and in our secure briefing about the interoperability of the secret services counter drone capability. that it failed early on so it didn't catch the drone floating over the site by the shooter. first, what changes are -- you have addressed a little. what changes is the secret service doing to have backup technology and what efforts did the secret service coordinate with other law enforcement with counter drone ability at the rally site? >> we're working to determine that right now, senator. we are getting the redundancy in

place. counter uas authority it is a little complex. state and locals don't necessarily have this ability to do that. it does require coordination with the faa because it could impact commercial travel. >> thank you. mr. chair i will follow up and one of the things that you are hearing from a lot of folks but i'm not sure we're really clear on yet is how is it that somebody who clearly is arousing concern from law enforcement isn't identified as suspicious and how is it that that information doesn't get to the president -- the former president's detail? i'll follow up in writing. thank you. >> senator cornyn. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director rowe, can you explain why the shooter's drone worked? >> there was no counter uas

present, sir. >> you had a drone system but you had bandwidth problems. the bandwidth was adequate for the shooter's drone but not for the secret service. can you explain that? >> i have no explanation for it, sir. >> we also know that in the military context, electronic warfare or jamming capabilities are commonly used on the battlefield. does the secret service have jamming capabilities for drones? >> we have drones, sir, and when it comes to -- i have to be very careful how i answer this one in an open forum. we have technical security measures to address what you are asking me. >> the question is can you take down a suspicious drone because this can be used not only for

surveillance by the shooter, which it was here, but also drones can be weaponized and be used as a threat to the president or in this case the -- president trump. do you have the capacity to stop a weaponized drone? >> what i will tell you, sir, is that we have technical security measures that we utilize that permanently protective sites and also have ability in a limited fashion at temporary sites. what i can tell you is that on this day the counter uas system had technical difficulties and did not go operational until after 5:00. >> so in this case the shooter had a rifle but somebody who wanted to kill a president, former president, or candidate for president would not need a rifle. they could use a drone, correct? >> it is a potential threat

factor. >> so this individual was identified as a suspicious person. can you explain to us when a suspicious person becomes identified as a threat? >> i think it's also when a weapon or some other dangerous item is then presented. >> a range finder would not render someone a threat as opposed to somebody who was under suspicion. >> the range finder is what brought him initially to the attention of local law enforcement. >> and why would the president be allowed to take to the stage while a suspicious person had been identified and before the secret service or local law enforcement were able to investigate the circumstances? >> at that time senator s

suspicion had not risen to the level of harm. >> he ultimately did become a threat. if the president had been asked not to take the stage during the time it took to investigate, to eliminate that suspicion, that -- wouldn't that have been the appropriate way to deal with it? >> it is one way to do it. this is a challenge for law enforcement in general is being able to -- you identify somebody that comes to your attention and trying to determine what are their intentions? this is challenge for law enforcement. he is on the outer perimeter adjacent to the secured site. law enforcement is circulating for him but again without additional information at that point, we're not rising to the

level yet where perhaps we should pull him off or delay him. >> i'm just suggesting that maybe, just maybe, president trump's appearance should have been delayed while that suspicion could be adequately investigated. i thought of the secret service as the best of the best when it comes to their willingness to put themselves in harm's way to protect the life of their person they are detailed to, and i think you described the very rigorous process that people are screened and 2% standard people interested in serving, only a very small fion of those individuals are actually accepted in the secret service because of the high standards that your agency has. but explain to me why the secret service, being an elite law enforcement agency, would delegate to local law

enforcement or others who did not meet that same 2% standard? isn't that something that secret service should have covered as opposed to delegating it to local law enforcement? >> senator, again, this is where i went back to earlier when i said it was a failure to challenge our assumptions. we assumed state and locals had it. by no means do i want to diminish the commitment. state and local law enforcement protect the communities that you represent every day. >> no doubt about it. >> so i think what we made an assumption there was going to be uniform presence out there. that there would be sufficient eyes to cover that. that there was going to be counter sniper teams in the agr buildings. we won't make that mistake again. moving forward i have directed our office of protective

operations when our counter snipers are up, theirs are as well. we do this all the time with our colleagues in the new york city police department when we cover the united nations general assembly. that's what we do moving forward. >> those assumptions can be lethal. >> senator scott, recognized for your questions. >> thank you, chairman. let me follow up with what senator cornyn asked. do you know who makes the drone that secret service uses? >> that secret service uses? >> the one that didn't work. who is the manufacturer, american made manufacturer? >> i believe that it. we'll provide it to you, sir. >> we talked about this is other day. in our -- very few times in

history do our presidents get shot at. you know this is something the american public is very interested in. so as senator johnson said, there are a lot of questions being asked. i was at church sunday and three people came up to me and asked me if there was a second shooter. so there is all this information that you guys are not responding to. when i was governor of florida i had the pulse nightclub shooting, i had the douglas shooting and we did two or three times a day local, state and federal law enforcement, everybody involved, we answered questions. i asked you the other day is ge aren't you doing that? what both of you have allowed, you have allowed the public to assume the negative. and sop which i don't get.

you should have been doing this all along at least once a day press conferences. you have to tell the public what's going on. having a hearing is really nice but i think we'll -- how will we do this? you will not do it here for another month and a half. so i asked you the other day why aren't you doing press conferences? are you going to commit to doing press conferences? you said you will ask secretary mayorkas and director wray if you guys can do the press conferences and start giving the public information. and what's the answer? >> senator, that's why one i'm here today. i'm here today to provide information and answer those questions and moving towards doing more frequent releases of information and we are willing to do that press conference once we get through this hearing today we are going to in all likelihood do one this week. >> what is the commitment to the public that you will do a press

conference? in is 17 days. we are sitting 17 days into this and i'm getting asked questions that i can't believe are true but the public believes it's true. you are ruining your reputation, impact the integrity of the federal government and it makes no sense to me. will you commit to me once a month, i mean, and the f.b.i. the same thing, not use you. what did director wray say? did he say he couldn't do it? >> first, thank you all for your guidance in this regard and in fact we have done -- we haven't done something every day, no doubt about that. but we are focused from the f.b.i. side on the investigation part as we laid out here today. we actually based on your guidance, we did a media engagement. not a stand-up type press conference, just yesterday and laid out in full everything that i've shared here and even beyond

that just in the interest of time. but we are, because of the intense interest in this, in the implications and the national importance, we have literally provided everything through media and journalists and here all the information that we have derived from the investigation. we remain committed to answer any and all questions and sharing any and all information we obtain. >> do you guys realize the value of going in front of the press and answering all their questions? you realize if you don't do it that way everything gets filtered, you get to put out all the information and you should be providing -- you should be every day saying this is what we know now. senator johnson put together a timeline. you should have put that together and immediately put out this is what we know right now and what we don't know. like you have said, you don't know how the gun got up there, right? you've said it.

but why have -- that should have been out all along. we're looking at it. it doesn't make sense. we've done this and this and this. i just don't get it why -- i've said this about the f.b.i. the people that work at the f.b.i., people who work at secret service are great people. you are a black hole. you lose the support of the american public because people don't believe you are being direct with them. i completely disagree with your approach. i want to finish. i did a letter july 18th. i haven't gotten any answers yet. i want to put it into the record and love to get the answers to this. this is what the public is asking for. they want more information. what happened, who will be held accountable and how will we make sure this never happens again. >> without objection entered into the record.

>> thanks, mr. chairman. thank you for being here to both of you and more important thank you for your professional dedication, your personal bravery, and your devotion to the ideals of law enforcement. this moment is a painful one for both of you and acting director rowe i heard you speak in the private setting very emotionally and passionately about the need to take responsibility and take action that will insure accountability and i know you share a commitment along with director abbate to full public disclosure to the maximum extent possible. we can make speeches. one myself in that private setting but more disclosure to the public. but in the course of your investigation about what you know and feel you can disclose

without compromising your investigation. let me ask you, last week senator peters and paul, along with senator johnson and myself, sent requests to both of your agencies to produce documents. we have only received a handful so far. can you commit to when we can expect those documents? >> we'll get them to you as quickly as we can. we will work to meet that deadline this week, sir. >> and when can we expect all the communications, the text messages that agents have sent to each other? eventually all of it is going to come out, as you know. when can we expect all of those documents? >> we'll gather them up and get them to you, senator. >> you, i think, took the position as to the local law

enforcement responsible for the shooter on the roof, the snipers that were in place, that it was their job to take him out but ultimately doesn't the buck stop with the secret service? >> it stops with us, sir. let me just clarify. the perspective that they had on that roof when i show you the perspective from what our sniper saw, he is on the down side of that ridge roof. their perspective from the agr building looking out. their area of responsibility looking left they should have been able to see. you can see in the photo in

exhibit a, which we will make part of the record and turn over to the committee. he has already crossed over that bridge, or the walkway and stepped up onto that roof. i'm not saying they should have neutralized him but just held their post and looked left, maybe -- a lot of maybes there, a lot of maybes. >> somebody needs to be held accountable and i think senator graham hit the nail on the head. we need to know who specifically was responsible for doing what. who was responsible for saying to former president trump, sir, it's not safe to go out there yet. who was responsible for making sure that those local law enforcement were doing their job? who was responsible for tracking

down that suspicious person who fit the profile ten to 25 years old, young, male, the f.b.i. has warned us about it year after year after year. director wray has come before us and said the threat is from domestic extremist, the lone gunman. we're all aware of it in law enforcement. so i think we need individual accountability here and people need to be held responsible. in fact, lose their jobs if necessary to send a message that this massive intelligence and surveillance failure, as well as the enforcement fail cries out for accountability.

what is the nature of the iran threat? >> i'm sorry, senator, can you repeat the question? >> what is the nature of the iran threat, the threat to former president trump that has been mentioned? >> we know -- let me be clear. the terrorist regime of iran have been targeting people, our country, for many, many years now and we've talked about that here before. want to be clear about that. from the f.b.i. standpoint we know publicly they have put -- they have targeted former president trump. they've called for his assassination, along with other current and former officials. that's public information known to everyone. >> is there a specific or imminent threat on july 13th >> we have no information that there are any co-conspirators foreign or domestic including

iran related to this. we have no evidence of that. we aren't ruling anything out. we are looking into all possibilities and leaving our minds open to that. >> was that on the minds of the secret service on july 13th that there might be some threat from iran? >> sir, as deputy director said we're aware of the public sentiment and statements. government of iran to do harm to donald j. trump and we use a facts-based model. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman and both for your testimony today and for your service. mr. rowe, i want to begin discussing secret service staffing and the extent to which hsi or other personnel are backfilling inadequate secret service capacity generally and on the day of the assassination attempt. to what extent are hsi personnel

filling close protection roles that would normally be filled by secret service personnel? >> so thank you senator for that question. as we have done even back with treasury, we enlist the assistance of other law enforcement agencies in that department. so when we were in treasury we used itf and irs. when we transferred to the department of homeland security we brought the practice with us. during a national special security event like the united nations general assembly we'll enter into a memorandum of assistance for the campaign with hsi. they will provide post standers essentially federal agents, law enforcement to help secure a site when it comes to close protection. the only time that we will utilize them is during a united

nations general assembly and utilized to provide security at a hotel in new york city where the protectees are staying. >> on the day in question, all of the former president's close protection detail were full-time secret service personnel? >> they were and assigned to the donald trump detail. >> okay. interoperability with other federal and state and local law enforcement agencies, specifically on communications, what have you determined to date played a role in failures to swiftly communicate between agencies the suspicion or identification of a threat? >> i think there was a delay in reporting. not having that realtime.

as they were closing in on him as information is known >> be more specific. >> as local law enforcement were closing in on him as he is seen scurrying across the roof. that information -- we're getting to the bottom of that and working on trying to figure out why was the delay? why didn't we hear that coming out of the unified command? based on the information i have right now what i can tell you is apparent life not having the realtime information is what hindered us in being able to understand more than it was just the locals working an issue at the 3:00. there was something more urgent than that. >> does it appear that that is due to a lack of communication links between relevant officials and agencies? or poor communication practices and a failure to report? >> i don't want

>> i want to have a neutral opinion on that. i can tell you that the interoperability not being able to have that technical fix which is a lofty goal to be able to do that is something that has been a hindrance. that is why we use a counterpart system. >> they are in is not the capability when an intergovernmental, interagency team is deployed to secure a site like this and to mount if necessary a quick reaction, there is currently not that capability for example, state law enforcement, s.w.a.t. personnel or local law enforcement officers to communicate directly with secret service officers on-site? >> technically, you could do it. it would take a long time to get it done. for a one-day or 8-hour operation, it requires a lot.

it would be months of planning of knowing that we are going to go to this particular jurisdiction and we are going to need your frequencies, the keys, and load you into our radios and you will be need to be loaded into ours. >> this presents an opportunity for the homeland security committee. not in that protection context been any complex incidents response or counterterrorism or natural disaster context. the inability swiftly to link personnel from disparate jurisdictions at the local, state, and national level is a vulnerability for the nation. >> i would think and based on my experience being able to talk to other agencies in real time would assist in that response. >> do i have time for one more question? thank you. i know others have touched on this. one of the things that has been most baffling to the public has been the failure to fully secure this structure -- which even to

a layperson's uninformed eye. it had a particular characteristic that made it even more of potential value to an attacker. just walk us through one more time. is there not an established doctrine or practice toward checklist by which such sites are assessed for threat and determine whether or not to be within or without of the security perimeter? >> controlling high ground is something that is a must for us whenever we go into a location >> i know we are all eager for more information on why that task was not completed in this case. thank you for your testimony. each >> why was president trump

allowed to take the stage 17 minutes after multiple suspicious person reports were provided complete with photos and information suggesting that the assailant had a range finder, something that ordinary people don't use in this kind of circumstance? >> senator, again, it was this vision, not weapon. there was never a communication that there was an individual with a gun or threat rather bad intentions. >> how many suspicious person did you report that day? >> there were other individuals they came to the attention of law enforcement that day. >> where president biden allowed on stage with an unresolved set of multiple suspicion person reports provided including indicating that there was a range finder involved? >> senator, i can tell you that a suspicious person on the outer perimeter with local law enforcement attempting to locate is what happened. i would need more information as

far as whether or not we would allow the president to go on or off. for us, it comes down to weapon. a potential threat. it is the individual carrying an ied? is there a weapon? is there some other factor that now wraps up our attention. >> understood. if there were eight trans shell casings bound to the assailant's body but he was neutralized after the first shot of a to the other shots come from? where did the other shots go? >> as far as the assailants shooting? >> where those shell casings left from the day before? >> this shooter we believe fire. we have the shooting reconstruction team go out. we have bullet holes in bullet fragmentation taken back. still putting together a trajectory and ballistic analysis. we do have fragments of the bullets. bullets have been collected in the distance.

>> it is my understanding there was a sniper team assigned to a window with complete overlook and complete view of the roof. the same roof top the slope grouped off where the shots were fired. it's also my understanding according to some whistleblower accounts that the post was abandoned. what can you tell me about that? why was it abandoned? >> i saw that from the colonel's testimony. it is something that i have asked and our mission assurance team is getting to the bottom of. they were 2, two-man counter sniping teams they were in that agr building. >> at some point, they just l left? >> i don't have an answer for you on that. it seems to me if even one of them left, there should have been remaining some additional eyes left on the building. >> that seems like something that should be one of the very first questions. i'm surprised you don't know that already. i ask that you submit to us in writing is soon as you learn

what happened. will you commit to that? >> yes, sir. >> let me state it this way. multiple requests were made by trump's protected detail and trump's campaign team to the secret service for additional resources. i am told that those were denied. as i recall, the secret service spokesperson initially denied that such requests were made and denied. why not tell the truth from the outset? what were they trying to do there? >> senator, i don't think there was any intention to mislead. >> it seems like a pretty material fact. will you commit to me that you will submit to us in writing what requests were made by home and to whom and when they were denied? >> i will, sir. >> look, at the end of the day, we are looking at a situation in