investigations with the july 13th failure being done by congress, the department of homeland security's office of the inspector general, and the independent review directed by president biden. additionally, the secret service's office of professional responsibility is currently conducting a mission assurance review. as i stated, i am not waiting

for the completion of those reports, and i've directed the secret service to take immediate steps to ensure our protectees are indeed safe, and i will summarize those steps in a moment. i am committed to pursuing accountability for the secret service's failure in butler, pennsylvania. but let me be clear, if policy violations by secret service personnel are identified by the agency's mission assurance review, those individuals will be held accountable. and they will be held accountable to our fair and thorough disciplinary process. the first part of the process is an investigation to identify whether policy violations occurred. potential policy violations are referred to our office of integrity and appropriate discipline is administered under our table of penalties. the facts will drive the outcomes of those investigations. and i promise accountability. and i will not rush to judgment nor ignore due process.

every single person within the secret service feels the weight of what happened. we are in an unprecedented threat environment and high operational tempo during this presidential campaign. the men and women of the secret service are working incredibly hard and doing their jobs under difficult circumstances. they need to focus on their work, and they need to know that i have their backs, and that is my commitment to them. i want to thank our state and local partners, the secret service relies on local law enforcement for every protective event. there's valeant men and women work tirelessly protecting their communities. they know the people, places and terrain that we operate in. we owe them our thanks and simply put, we cannot do our jobs without them. and i know how important this relationship is. i spent four years in local law enforcement before joining the

secret service. i know the long hours these men and women put in and the professionalism they bring to this partnership. in that capacity, i was always proud to support the secret service's protective mission when called upon as a municipal police officer. in no way should any state or local agency supporting us in butler on july 13th be held responsible for a secret service failure. typically, the secret service refrains from commenting on ongoing investigations, but we know these are extraordinary circumstances. please understand that the information provided today is based on what i know know to a degree of certainty. we will know more as further evidence is analyzed, and i'll share more information as it becomes available. i can saying without a doubt heroism was present. secret service rushed to the

stage to shield the form erp president with their bodies with within three seconds of bullets ringing out. the sniper who neutralized the threat with a single shot undoubtedly saved countless lives. we're in a high operational tempo. and i need and i want our secret service work force, the dedicated men and women of the secret service, i want to know, and i want to make sure that they are uplifted so they can focus on carrying out the mission. they are worthy of trust and confidence, and they deserve your support. and let me take a moment to speak to the american people that are counting on us to do our job, to have a vote for the candidate of their choice. the secret service's successes are largely unknown. you will only know of our failures, and those have been documented and all of them are

undeniably dark days in our nation's history, but let me tell you about the dedicated patriots of the secret service. these public servants are the quiet professionals, working in the background, day in and day out. they are standing watch. the people that work in the house to the thousands of people who attend political rallies and nominating conventions. to the thousands of american citizens who line pennsylvania avenue every four years on inauguration date to see the new president and vice president. and they are out there right now doing this mission. they are focused and they live their professional lives committed to the values of this agency. justice, duty, loyalty, courage, and honesty. this is who we are. and this is what we do. and we will earn back your trust.

i now provide a time line of the visit to butler, pennsylvania. the agency's pittsburgh field office conducted planning meetings and law enforcement partners and campaign staff. on july 10th, secret service counter sniper, and technical service personnel arrived in pittsburgh and advanced planning teams. july 12th, the build out of the campaign rally site began and continued through the early morning hours of july 13th. in the morning of july 13th a site briefing was conducted with secret service personnel, and law enforcement partners supporting the event. secret service personnel took their posts and a technical security sweep commenced prior to the site's opening to event staff, vendors and to the public. 12:30 p.m., the secret service

opened the site to event staff and vendors, and at 1:00, mag notometer screening began. at 5:30 p.m., former president trump arrived at the campaign rally by a secret service motorcade, and at that time, he met supporters in a secure backstage area within the protective site. at 5:45 p.m., a local butler county emergency services unit counter sniper service texted the secret service sniper leader about a suspicious person and sent two photos of the individual, later identified as the assailant. at 5:53, texted the counter sniper teams that local law enforcement was looking for a suspicious individual outside of the perimeter lurking around the agr building. at this time, secret service personnel were operating with the knowledge that local law enforcement was working on an

issue of a suspicious individual. the concept of local law enforcement working on such issues is common at sites. and on july 13th, there were over a hundred calls for support. at 6:00 p.m., former president trump took the stage to begin remarks. and based on what i know right now, neither the secret service counter sniper teams nor members of the former president's security detail had any knowledge there was a man on the roof of the arg building with a firearm. the personnel were not aware the assailant had a firearm until they heard gunshots. at 6:11 p.m., a member of former president trump's protective detail, to inquire about the radio update. there was an issue local law enforcement was looking into near the perimeter: at 6:11 p.m., the assailant's first volley of three shots was fired and within three seconds, the

former president's detail rushed the stage and covered former president trump shielding him with their own bodies. the fourth through eight shots took place over the next several seconds, 15 1/2 seconds after the first shot, a secret service counter sniper fired a single round that neutralized the assailant. that concludes a quick brief summary of the time line and with that, i'll turn it over to our staff here to begin any questions. >> thank you for doing this. you said earlier this week to congress that you don't want to tip anything on the scale as far as disciplinary action is concerned. since you testified, has anyone been suspended with or without pay, has anyone been fired, and will you tell us as people are disciplined along the way or is

this something we're going to need to constantly be asking or will you update and tell us, five people have been fired, six people, seven people, what can you tell us? >> sure. thank you for that question, david. so as i said in my opening statement, there are going to be -- there's the mission assurance review. if that mission assurance review is looking into if there were policy violations. at that point now, if, in fact, there were policy violations, at that point, now it will go into a parallel path of a disciplinary type of investigation. those are internal investigations that deal with employee parties so we're not going to be able to provide realtime updates or continuously to provide you updates on that. but what i will tell you is that these are very thorough investigations and if, in fact, there were policy violations and they are substantiated, those employees will be held accountable.

>> i think if i may, sir, people want accountability, you may not be able to tell us names, but will you be able to say that people have been disciplined? people want to hear there's some accountability here. >> i will be able to at least at a high level provide at least some type of statement that people are being held accountable. >> and i appreciate this. fox digital has seen video on the roof, we believe the assailant, running back and forth, while president trump was speaking. how does that go with the time line? >> it affirms to me, and you heard this from the fbi, they're conducting interviews and looking at this. it even just affirms to me this was a failure. we should have had better protection for the protectee, we should have had coverage on the roof line. we should have had some other set of eyes from the secret service point of view covering that. that building was very close to

that outer perimeter, and we should have had more of a presence, and so as far as the time line of him running back and forth, i know the fbi has provided a bit of a chronology as well, and so i'd have to go back and look at that. but the bottom line is this, david. this was a secret service failure. that roof line should have been covered. we should have had better eyes on that. >> thanks, director. we're going to the "washington post." >> thank you so much for doing this. i have just a quick follow up. can you describe -- you said there were 100 calls for support. who those calls came from and what those looked like, and also moving forward, do you anticipate, and if so, would any different changes in protocol between how secret service communicates or works with local law enforcement specifically as they work to secure events or other things? >> thank you for that question. so with regards to calls for support, it was a very hot day

that day. there was a lot of not only ems type of calls to address people, but, you know, there were people that needed some other type of law enforcement assistance. this happens, candidly, it happens a lot at outdoor rally, especially on hot days. so there was a lot of traffic, radio traffic on the local net about, hey, i need an emt here. so there was a lot of people that were needing assistance. with respect to the inner op -- oper ability, i have commissioned a task force. it will be co-chaired in all likelihood by from the secret service and someone from cisa, and i think we're also going to bring in state and local law enforcement. the inner operability, it

requires a substantial technical fix. until the meantime, before we can get to that, what i need to have is i need to make sure that our folks when they're out there, we use a counter part system. on the day in butler, we had a pennsylvania state trooper in our security room. they also had a unified command post that had some of the other agencies that were on site that day. it is plainly obvious to me that we were not -- we didn't have access to certain information. not by anybody's fault. it just so happened there was a sense of urgency, there might have been radio traffic that we missed. we have to do a better job than that. moving forward, in addition to this task force, we'll provide more information on next week as we begin to set that up. i've directed our special agents

in charge of field offices to reevaluate where we put our security rooms. if a state or local sets up a unified command post, maybe we need to be in that room as well, as opposed to just being in another room and relying on that counter part system. it was so apparent to me that in this incident, in the final 30 second, which has been the focus of what happened before the assailant opened fire, there was clearly radio transmissions that may have happened on the local radio net that we did not and so we have to do a better job of co-locating, leveraging that counter part system, and this is going to drive our operations going forward. >> [ inaudible question ] >> it did not make it over to us. i go back to the opening statement, the members of the

detail, all they knew is the locals were working an issue at the president's 3:00, which would have been off to his right, which is where the shot came from. >> to clarify on the hundred calls that you got roughly that day, i understand a lot of them were heat related, how many specifically were suspicious people? was this the only call, the eventual shooter that was a suspicious character? and then also can you clarify, did you guys have a drone on site? did you try to use it? and if not, like why did you not use the local's offer of a drone? >> sure. as i understand it now based on information i have. there were other calls of suspicious individuals, and your ore question was about drones. >> did you have a drone on site, was it a secret service drone, and what was the reason you didn't use it, and also there was an offer from the local -- somebody had a drone.

>> we did not a drone on site. we did not put a drone up. based on the information i have right now, i am aware that there was a request from a local agency to offer to fly a drone on that day, and that is also part of the mission assurance review that i have asked to get some better insight in. one of the other changes i implemented when i became the acting director is we are now going to leverage the use of unmanned aerial systems at sites now. so we are putting those assets out, and, you know, we should have had better line of site on high ground concerns. we thought we might have had it covered with the human high. clearly we are going to change our approach now, and we are going to leverage technology and put the unmanned aerial systems up. >> thank you so much for doing this. you mentioned that there were

text messages from butler esu to u.s. secret service counter snipers. i'm curious if that is routine. there were two communication channels at the butler rally, and you referenced earlier this week, it appears the information was stuck or siloed at the local channel. what was the plan to relay information from the locals to secret service initially? what is the protocol and, i just have one follow up. >> we use the counter part system. the teams, especially on the tactical side, when it comes to the tactical -- our counter assault team, they actually had an embed with them from the local tag team, and they had that radio net as well with pennsylvania state police. with respect to the counter snipers, they were using cellular, at this point forward, everybody should be using the radio net. if we don't have the ability to

pipe in or leverage that counter part system, that's one of the things we're looking at now. we should be able to have direct calms with the people supporting us, and moving forward, that's what i have directed. >> to clarify, u.s. secret service counter snipers did not have radio communications? >> not with the local cs folks that were providing support, had an area responsibility independent from where our counter snipers were secured. >> and just the last thing, did the u.s. secret service counter snipers teams that arrived on site on july 10th ever relay line of sight concerns, what came of that, and can you confirm this was the first 2024 event that counter sniper teams were assigned to the former president? >> sure. as part of their advance, they identified those line of sight, and there's a division of labor. with respect to -- whether or not this was the first time, it was. it was the first time secret

service counter snipers were deployed to support the former president's detail. >> hi, thank you so much for doing this. i have a question about the review that you did. the picture that you showed the senate the other day of the vantage point that the local snipers had. how do you know that that's the window that they were actually posted at? because they're saying that they're on that completely other side of the building. and related to that, has the secret service actually interviewed the snipers that were in the agr building? >> once the fbi released the butler farm show site, we were able take custody of it and we sent the full resources of our office of investigations, which included the forensic services division. we did a full site reconstruction, and this is part of our ongoing mission assurance

review. and as part of that, that also included the plotting, and also trying to identify where not only our personnel were but also where state and local law enforcement were. and then the second part of your question was? >> how did you identify where they were, and have you interviewed the local sniper? >> so the mission assurance, we will start -- we're starting with our federal personnel and working out. we will get, if they're willing to be interviewed, we will ask for the local law enforcement on site to be interviewed that day. how we went back and reconstructed that was based on what we had based on the ops plan, and then also based on what our own folks as they understood it on the day of. >> you talk about how you may not have been as specific as need be. how do you know they were in that window, if they could have left, they could have seen something. they're saying there's no way they could see anything.

>> i think what we'll do is let the mission assurance play that out, and we look forward to interview them, and definitely getting their side of the story. but what i also want to reiterate is this was a secret service failure. and so they should not be blamed. we're not trying to shift blame to anybody. and that's the important take away, that we need our state and local partners out there, doing this with us every day. >> director, thank you for taking the time. just a couple of questions, if you could wake us through some things to help us better understand. have you gotten to the bottom of why there was no one stationed on the roof from a law enforcement perspective, and why there was no one there to secure the building to make sure no one could get up there. have you gotten any clarity on why those two lapses in security were in place? and i have a couple of quick follow ups. >> sure.

it's something that again, having been there, the day after i was named the acting director, i wanted to put eyes on and go up there and see it, and looking at that site, you know, it really, seeing how close that site was to the stage, seeing where it was, it definitely raised a lot of questions in my mind, there should have been physical presence, if not on the roof, there should have been better security to prevent anyone from getting up on that roof. so moving forward, i've directored our office of protective operations and special operations division now, that when we are operational, and we have counter snipers out there, that we are working with locals, and that they, in fact, will also be out present, you know, at the very least, the presence of a law enforcement officer can deter a lot of bad activity. having been a local police

officer, i will never know how many crimes i prevented just by being there, walking the street and being out there. so moving forward, one of the things that we want to do is we want to deter people from even thinking about trying to do something like this again, and the only way we can do that is leveraging not only the resources we have but the resources of our state and locals and putting them out there in an overt presence. >> two very quick follow ups. you talked at length at the hearing the other day about the system that did not operate that could detect drones. can you describe a little bit how that works. does that go in the sky itself to detect the drones, and then finally, the inneroperability, i'm clear in terms of secret service radios were not communicating with the locals, but you had people in the command post who in theory could hear and know basics of what was going on. am i understanding that

correctly? >> so with respect to the counter uas, peter, i don't want to get into too much sensitive information. what i can tell you is it allows -- that asset allows the geo location to plot where a drone is within a certain distance of how we set up. think of it like geofencing and being able to pinpoint and detect where that is. and with respect to the agency that was, you know, we had pennsylvania state police. but it appears that there was really a big sense of urgency going on. and the state and locals were doing everything they possibly could to try to find the assailant. he had come to their attention. they were actively trying to find him and i believe everyone was doing their level best to try to locate him. there could have been other agencies that were putting out radio transmissions, and this is something that we'll work with the fbi to get, you know,

further on. but those radio transmissions might have back to the unified command post, and may not have made it over the pennsylvania state police there, but that's something that we're going to look into, and definitely something that we are moving forward, we definitely want to remedy this going forward. >> the secret service had some sense that something was going on, based on what they were being told? >> yes, that they were working an issue at the 3:00 of the stage. >> thanks for doing this. i wanted to ask you about changes moving forward. former president trump has said he wants to continue having outdoor rallies. what specifically will be different at the netflix rally that wasn't the case in butler. and i could ask a follow up, too. do you have information in the 30 seconds after the gunman was confronted on the roof by a local law enforcement, that there were local law enforcement trying to communicate with the

secret service, there was someone on the roof with a gun and that transmission is the one that was missed? >> so with respect to the former president wanting to get back out there, listen, it's a campaign season, right. candidates want to be out there. they want to be -- whether it's an indoor site or outdoor site, it's on the secret service to make sure that we create a secure environment, and, you know, listen we identify challenges, we identify concerns, and then it's on us to figure out what we need to do to mitigate that. there for going to be future campaign rallies outside, it's going to be on us to make sure that we are providing all of the assets and resources to make sure that those sites are secure. with respect to the radio transmissions, you know, based on what the fbi, my colleague from the fbi testified the other day, and they are working on isolating some of those radio frequencies from the state and locals that there was somebody who did, in fact, radio out that

they had seen the individual with a weapon. what i can tell you is that that piece of information, that vital piece of information, and by no fault of anyone, it was a very stressful situation, it did not make it over. our detail, our counter snipers, everyone that was there that day were operating under the assumption and under the last bit of information they had received that there was an issue that the locals were working at the 3:00. that's a bit of information that we had. not anything about a weapon. >> i wanted you to address or, if you can, describe the pittsburgh field office and their level of experience, especially in preparing for events like this, and also have they explained their thinking in how they defined the perimeter that day? >> sure. thanks. our pittsburgh field office, i don't think there's anybody in

the secret service who is feeling this more than the men and women of our pittsburgh field office. and i've met with them. and they are down right now. when i've met with them, the other day, it was very difficult. it's difficult for them. they feel like they let their colleagues down. they feel like they let the country down. and they are wearing this and it is -- it's open. you can see it. it's an open wound that they are carrying. they are a very experienced office, and what i will say is, they are cooperating with the mission assurance. they understand the gravity of this situation, and they are definitely, definite down right now. >> one follow up, you testified

about one of the secret service -- [ inaudible question ] >> when i said it's a failure to challenge our assumptions, meaning the assumption that, hey, that's going to be addressed or that's going to be covered by state and local. so earlier this week, i convened a call with all of our special agents in charge, all of our field offices and expressed to them, we need our state and local counter parts but we have to be very direct, very clear about what our expectations are about what we need from them. whether it's a particular asset or numbers of personnel, we need to be clear, so they have an understanding of what we need from them. that's on us. we need to be better communicators, and articulate exactly what we need to mitigate

any challenges, concerns or anything that we identified during that advanced process. and so i have full confidence in our sacks in the field in our state and local counter parts that moving forward now, we're not going to have this assumption that, oh, we think we're going to have it. we're going to work together. we're going to have good, hard, fierce conversations about what we're going to do, and then we're going to go out there and make all of these venues secure moving forward. >> thank you, acting director. i was hoping you could elaborate on a portion of the time line, that you address a communication between the secret service detail, and the personnel with the field office, it struck me as vague, and i was curious if you could elaborate on what that communication was. >> the former president's details, they had an advanced person on the ground who was responsible for the site.

the radio transmission goes out about locals working an issue at the 3:00. the member of that detail called their pittsburgh field office counter part, hey, what do you know about this. in the middle of that phone conversation, the shots begin firing. so that's the context of it. >> and sorry if i missed, can you say how they become aware of the locals working an issue in the first place to event have that conversation. >> that was the radio transmission put out by our security room. >> i got it. okay. just to follow up. curious about -- you mentioned this was the first event where secret service counter snipers had been assigned as part of the security for former president trump. to what extent do you think that factors into what were ultimately shown to be the failures, just that this was a first time, at least in a while in his capacity as the former

president that they were there on the site, the novelty of it, i'm sorry. >> sure. let me just clarify one thing. this is the first time that secret service counter snipers, but the former president at campaign rallies has actually been getting state and local resources so tactical assets, counter snipers from state and locals. so with respect to why they were there in butler, listen, we evaluate our threat landscape every day. we calibrate based on that threat. we evaluated a threat stream that we have, and we put our secret service counter sniper out there. and looking back, it was very fortunate that we did. but coverage moving forward, as well, the president, the vice president, senator vance, and then we'll await the eventual democratic vice presidential nominee. we are going to put full

resources out there to make sure that, you know, our campaign cadence now is obviously picked up and we're going to make sure we have all the resources out there to address any challenges that we have. >> we'll go in the front. >> thank you, as you're doing this review, are you looking at the days leading up to this event and the instructions that you gave to state and local and federal partners, i know in the past there used to be a power point presentation that was given before events like this where people who were part of each unit of the secret service would stand up, go through the mission, who was assigned to them, what they would be doing. i understand this is not been happening in this case, and for some prior. is that something you think was missing here? is that something you might review and bring back? and did you also think the secret service is too reliant on state, local and federal partners. you have almost 2,000 hsi events

helping in events coming this fall. that's a third of their work force, and it takes a lot from state and locals as well. first, would you bring back the power plant, do you think there should have been more planning, and are you too reliant on state and local and other partners. >> the communications and what was leading up to it. what i can tell you now based on information i have, what you're referring to is a police meeting, we bring all of the agencies together that will be directly supporting a particular visit. we know there are police meetings, agencies from the various jurisdictions were present. and when i say that, the ones that were the primary ones identified with providing support and are going to be involved in the advanced planning process, providing a counter part, like you said, the power point. if you're going to be conducting the site, this is special agent so and so, and you know, here's

their contact info, and then usually at the end of that meeting, everyone goes off and they form up and they go over, you know, how they're going to go out and do the walk throughs and identify some of the things. >> you're saying that did happen? >> based on the information. i don't know about the power point. i can tell you there was a police meeting. with respect to the power point, i certainly think that visuals are always good. i think that if we're not using it, we certainly will. but that goes back to my direction that we have to be very specific about what we're communicating and what our expectations are moving forward. with respect to the reliance on state and local law enforcement, listen, there are 700,000 full-time law enforcement officers, over 700,000 full-time law enforcement offers in the united states. the majority of prosecutions in the criminal justice system in

the united states are done by state and locals. that's a result of criminal investigations that they do every day in their communities to keep them safe. over 135 officers died last year serving their communities. federal, state and local, 47 of them died by violent means, gunfire. there is not an over reliance on them. they're out there every day securing their communities. they know the terrain, they know the people. more importantly, they know the local laws. if you're in a state where it's open carry, we're going to rely on them to enforce local laws. i as a federal agent cannot go out there and enforce the laws of the commonwealth of pennsylvania. i need the state and local law enforcement officers so i would push back on that. with respect to leveraging other federal partners, when they were in the department of treasury, and i was a brand new agent, i would stand post with agents from atf, irs criminal

investigations. we were all one big happy family. customs. customs moved over to dhs just like we did. so we do this every four years. we rely on those partners. we use them during national special security events like the democratic national convention, the united states general assembly, the presidential inauguration. those are whole of government security operations which is the secret service is the lead planning for. we're going to bring in partners from across the government. i don't feel it's an over reliance. it's something we have done since our days at treasury, and we're going to continue to do that. we need those partners, and we need the state and local officers. >> something i didn't understand, when you're talking about the time period where locals understand this person is a threat, it's before secret service finds out. were they not standing next to them. >> so we had our security room, and they had a unified command

post, and we had pennsylvania state police officer, representative, in our security room. >> there was no secret service in the unified. >> there was no. >> are there time two command center. >> that's an emergency model they use. as i mentioned in that conversation with our special agents in charge in the field, i directed them, hey, we need to rethink where we put our security room. if the large majority of our partners are in a unified command post or a different location we need to probably be there too. we have to rethink how we, you know, where we put our security rooms, and we are, in fact, doing that now moving forward. >> thanks so much. appropriators in congress this week delayed consideration of dhs's budget for fiscal '25.

they want to know more about what secret service needs. every agency is going to say they need resources. can you be specific about what resource needs there may be, particularly when we're looking at technology issues, uas system. >> following this, we have had tremendous support from the department of homeland security and from the secretary, and we have, in fact, looked at all of these needs, given this dynamic high threat environment that we're operating in. we can meet this now. but it is going to require additional investments in resources and we are having those conversations. we have had great support, not only from the department, but also our appropriations committees, and we are working through kind of what our need are right now. we will have future conversations about this and we are appreciative that everyone is coming together to make sure

we have what we need to meet this high threat. >>. [ inaudible question ] >> listen, that's not for me to weigh in on. why should the secret service do criminal investigations, and what i will say is this, we were founded in 1865 as an investigative entity. it's in our dna. i firmly believe that the best protect agents learn those skills being criminal investigators. you learn how to interact with people. you learn organizational skills. you learn to be analytical. those are all trait that is you need to have when you're on a detail. moreover, if you look at where we are today, buildings, communities, everything is interconnected, so we have a particular expertise in siber and -- cyber and cyber criminal

and critical systems protection. when you overlay that investigative skills set we have, it's more than securing our president in a brick it and mortar setting. it's protecting them from things that make them vulnerable due to cyber. the only way to learn the skills to be able to analyze, to be able to make sure we are hardening not only cyber systems but hardening a building that is fed by cyber systems. the only way gain the experience and knowledge is to do criminal investigations. additionally, it is within our investigative authority to follow up on threats. people make threats to the president and the people we protect every day. we need to have that domestic and international network of field offices to be able to track down those threats, and if necessary, bring those people to justice and present them to a u.s. attorney's office. i know there's been a lot of

talk, should we or shouldn't we. should we do this, should we be in dhs, the bottom line is this, if you want the secret service to continue to be the secret service and be effective at what it does, it need to be during investigations and it probably needs to be in the department of homeland security until congress or others have an opportunity to weigh in. >> there's a report that a whistleblower alleged you directed cuts to the counter surveillance division that led to the threat assessments team failing to perform duties that it typically would before the butler rally, is that accurate, is that allegation accurate? >> so i have recently become aware of this. we got a congressional letter on it. what i can tell you is the counter surveillance operation, they do a fantastic job. they have a very specific mission settle. a lot of that mission set is

here in the national capital region, focused on permanent protective sites. that go out and support former details. there's been allegations that i personally cut or that i -- let's see, that i denied requests. the counter surveillance division has been out there supporting the former president's detail at very high profile events. they continue to provide that support, and they're out there providing support right now, so we're going to respond to the later we received and share the response when the committee says it's okay to respond. >> is that a no, did you cut funding personally. >> i did not. >> did you figure out how he got the gun on the roof, did it fit

in the backpack? >> that's something the fbi is working on. i don't want to speculate as to exactly how he would have gotten it up there? >>. [ inaudible question ] >> we have already trained numerous details to be able to mobilize, to pick up multiple candidates. most of the presidential campaign activity picks up coming out of the conventions, so we are prepared for this. it's just that now we are in such a heightened dynamic, we're actually making sure that we are probably putting everything we can to make sure we don't have a mission failure. it's incumbent upon everyone in the secret service, we all understand the gravity of the situation, and we are rising to meet this moment, and we are certainly, as we go into the democratic national convention, as we await picking up another

candidate with the eventual naming of a vice presidential nominee from the democratic side, we are going to staff that, and we are going to make sure that we have all the resources and assets necessary to provide that level of protection. >> director, thank you. >> thank you, everyone. >> you've been listening to the acting director of the u.s. secret service, in an extended news conference, lasting 45 minutes, detailing what he described as a secret service failure on july 13th, when a man fired multiple shots towards the stage with one of them hitting the republican presidential nominee, the former president. donald trump. i want to bring into the conversation, jim cavanaugh, msnbc contributor, charles marino, former dhs senior adviser. thank you for being with us.

quickly if i can, i want to update the audience. we heard a couple of headlines, one that he said local officials will not be blamed for agency failures. he also said specifically that agents who violated policy during the shooting will be held accountable and finally an important note he made is he has commissioned a task force. there is a mission assurance review taking place right now, and that they are reevaluating what they describe as security rooms that are often co-located, which is to say the local and state officials share a room with the secret service. on this occasion, there was more than one room, which as the secret service acting director described it, was a unique circumstance. charles if i can ask you first, we heard from the agency director there. i want to get a sense from you what struck you and what your biggest take aways are from what we have heard about their

actions going forward. >>. >> thanks, peter, it was good to see the secret service doing an independent press conference. i thought it was something they failed at very early on. that should have been out there, out front, and answering as many questions as they could. so that was good. obviously the acting director took overall accountability for the failure, and that's the right way to go. the secret service is responsible, not just for the protection of the former president, but also the creation and effective implementation of the security plan that failed that day. you also saw reference to state and local law enforcement, almost a make up, if you will, what's been going on between state and local law enforcement agencies in pennsylvania, and the secret service, via the media is not good for the secret service. the secret service relies on state and local law enforcement, as you heard the director say, around the country for all types of protection visits, though he needed to nip that in the bud

and take the overall accountability. this all served, as you could tell, for a morale boost for the agency and the employees. he ensured that they were going to have due process. i slightly disagree. i think the agents involved that day should have immediately been put on administrative leave. why? it's no different than a police-involved shooting. this was a significant event. there's going to be subsequent investigations, i think we're up to five now, and those employees should have been taken off of duty, given time to cope with what happened and be available for the interviews. so i do disagree with the director on that. but other than that, i thought everything else he covered, the updated time line, the communications failures was all very important to hear, and none of these answers at the end of the day, peter are going to be satisfactory to many people. these failures should not have happened. >> yeah, charles, stay with us. jim stay with us. i want to get to julia ainsley,

our reporter in the room for the news conference. thank you for hustling out to the camera to detail your reactions to what you heard. i want it play some of the first remarks from acting director. >> it was so apparent in the incident in the final 30 seconds which has been the focus of what happened before the assailant opened fire, there was clearly radio transmissions that may have happened on that local radio net that we did not have. and so we have to do a better job of co-locating, leveraging that counter part system, and this is going to drive our operations going forward. >> so to be clear, that's not what he said at the beginning. it is what he said later in the course of the conversation. there at the beginning he opened by saying every person in the secret service feels the weight of what happened. he details the pittsburgh office in particular, feeling down right now. what struck you from what you

heard being in the room right there and how this acting secret service director in the wake of kim cheatle, the former secret service director resigning had to say. >> reporter: peter, i know that bite is something i got him to expand on, and i think this is the biggest thing i took out of the room, is that the secret service was not in the same command post as local police when they learned that there was a man with the gun on the roof. we knew there was a mysterious 30 seconds between local law enforcement shouting about that on their communications and secret service actually acting. he's talking about how there was a problem with inneroper ability between the two services. you had a command post, wouldn't they have been in the room hearing the communications. as it turns out, there were two command posts and the secret service command post, they did have someone from pennsylvania state police, but they did not -- they were not in the same command post as those local

police from beaver county as u who were talking about a man on the roof. 30 seconds makes a difference. that was interesting to me. he also would not say whether or not anybody had been on administrative leave or disciplined yet but did commit to trying to update the public with any actions they're taking on that. another thing, peter, i know you and i were talking about this this morning, will trump continue to do outdoor rallies? his response to that was really, it's up to trump, and they're just going to have to mitigate the threat wherever he goes. i pressed if they're overreliant on state and local partners. they had people from homeland security investigations there. he defended local police saying local police are the ones out there, putting people behind bars, they know their state and local laws. no plans to back off on how they use state and local police. my question was not just whether

or not that's a security risk to rely on state and locals who may not be as well trained, but whether they're strange the resources for places like butler, pennsylvania, that aren't ready for an event of that size of that kind of security risk. that's not the way he responded to the question. we're seeing a defiant secret service, and that's because of the new person they have at the helm with rowe. >> julia, thank you, i think you share the take aways that most of us have who have been watching this. i want to get to one of the first thoughts julia reiterated that i brought up about the reevaluation of the security rooms, co-locating. in this case, there were two locations, which may explain why the crucial 30 seconds passed between the identification of someone, a person of interest as it were, and actions being taken? yeah, that's right, peter, it's an abject structural failure. look, as a special agent in charge, i set up many what we

call jocks, joint operation center. the d.c. sniper was setting that one up. major bombings across the country. arsons always had all federal agencies, state troopers, local, county, deputies, we have a joint operation center, one place, where the commanders are, where all the communication comes in. none of these things will get missed, i find it intriguing when i watch the talk about, well, your radio doesn't talk to that radio. there's so many officers and troopers and agents, nobody can listen to all of those radios . that's why you have a joint operation center, and the service has failed in the structure here before. this might have been successful for them in the past to set up a security room with just, you know, one partner like the state police. it doesn't work. you can't do it that way. they need their quiet security room, their critical decision making, i understand that, but that's got to be just a little side room.

you have to have all the commanders, sheriffs t state troopers, hsi, atf, whoever is helping, they have to be together. that has not come out in the senate testimony, and i think it was critical. the other big point of course was, you know, some of the things that the acting director said about the police when he was saying, you know, in the building, they should have just looked out the window and so forth. that hit local law enforcement across the country in the gut. i mean, that really hit them hard because on the one hand he was saying we accept responsibility, on the other hand it looked like he was throwing shade. i think he cleaned that up. today, he's a strong leader. he's standing up, i give him credit for doing the presser. that's the way you need to do it. a leader needs to take the hit and not throw shade. it is their failure. i want to hear him strong saying we'll never give up the high

ground again. not that we can monitor a roof, i want had to hear him say there's going to be a uniformed officer or secret service uniformed officer on the roof so nobody else can take the room. you have to go all in real strong. i used to tell my subordinate supervisors, you know, if it looks like, you know, it might be something, if there's any doubt, there's no doubt, if there's any doubt, there's no doubt. if you've got a guy with a range finder, there's no doubt. don't bring the principle out, look everything out until you find the guy. don't treat the doubt like it may be nothing. >> thanks for your expertise here. one final thought before we close this hour. i'm struck by the fact that it has been less than three weeks since the shooting took place,

and three days from now, there will be a new protecte on the democratic side, meaning their responsibilities are growing. the secret service has zero time to play with here. can their satisfactorily protect their protecprotectees? >> he's going to be throwing the kitchen sink at everything. why weren't you already doing that, and that's a fair question. but he's going to be throwing all the special teams at all of these candidates, they also have the democratic national convention, which is a national special security event, which is secret service overseas, so as you said, peter, this does not slow down for them, and they're going to have to make sure that they succeed going forward. democracy counts on this. >> yeah, jim cavanaugh, julia ainsley, charles marino, i appreciate all of you for your reporting and being with us as our live coverage continued

watching the acting secret service director ronald rowe in his news coverage. ana cabrera is in for katy tur next. we wish you a good weekend. h yod for what they need. got it? [squawks] did you get that? only pay for what you need. ♪liberty, liberty,♪ ♪liberty, liberty.♪ [♪♪] did you know, how you feel can be affected by the bacteria in your gut? try new align yogurt coated probiotic fruit bites. with a delicious apple and blueberry-flavored fruit center and yogurt coating, each bite is infused with added probiotics, to help promote a healthy digestive system every day. plus, they're packaged in individually-wrapped pouches, for daily digestive support on the go. look for new align yogurt coated probiotic fruit bites online and in the digestive care aisle of your local retailer. brand power, helping you buy better.

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