that the the americans didn't learn about it, of because در مقابل مخالفت. i've also talked to number of people.

march 2nd, 1974, the rastaris or resurrection party was formed at the shars instance, all legal parties and trade unions had to be merged into it. soon after, membership in the party became mandatory. in one of his speeches, the shah noted, "all people are required to join the party if they want to show their good faith to the throne. otherwise, they have to leave the country, and if they don't leave the country,..." will be sent to prison, the regime announced that passports would be issued for those not interested in the party. the vice president of party who was once involved in communist activities said it doesn't make any difference to be leftist or rightest if you're going to be disloyal to your country. shah seemed to be reasonably in control, he had started new political system there called resurgence. party, the idea was you have one

party, but different views could be expressed in the party. the revolution was still in its early stages and the authorities attacked religious and secular opponents on every occasion, but taking down the opposition groups got the regime really in trouble. show was immensely unpopular within the iranian uh within iran uh he was sick he was dying of cancer he wasn't at the end of he didn't have perhaps all his faculties the way he governed was flaught with everything centralized control so if anything happened to him the government was paralyzed to do anything uh i think i think he was he had serious problems no matter what happened his his son was uh was in no shape to take over after. and nor

did the iranian people really want that, i think, i think it was a popular revolt. i've read professor zonas's book and i, i think it's a fascinating psychological portrait, but i've also talked to number of people who dealt with the shaw, iranians and american government officials, and their experience was of a an extremely arrogant figure who uh simply did not brook any kind of opposition uh whatsoever uh and was in control. of every meeting that he walked into, and so i don't have to reconcile these images, and it's certainly possible that this forceful, proud presentation might have crumbled in the face of unprecedented popular unrest, in the face of his own illness, of course, having been diagnosed with cancer. in november 1977,

the shah made made a visit to the united states. the police had to use tear gas to disperse anti-shaf protesters during president carter's speech in front of the white house. the media captured the shah and the president shedding tears, a scene many revolutionary groups liked. during the visit, carter fully supported the shah, and the shah announced his agreement on fixing the price of oil, to make decisions himself based on no knowledge of anything, uh, how serious he was, uh, and what would that have actually happened, have happened, it's hard to say, it's clear that he, he was not friendly toward the shah, in fact we refused it.

admission to the united states, even to seek medical treatment uh, and whether the us would have ceased arm sales to any dictatorship, probably would... not have happened since there are so many and they depend down, the us depends heavily on arm sales, but who knowszinski? well, that will be very, we have to announce it on the air so it doesn't look peculiar. your majesty, are you being sold weapons in the united states in part so that you can defend our point of view? well, i can't really... uh see what that means, but if you say that we are allies, i can say yes, we are allies. in his official visit to iran, president carter of

the united states said, the military alliance between iran and america is indestructible. just a week later, itala art newspaper, published insult to ayataini an article by ahmed rashidi mutlaq. the article hurt public feelings and rocked the country. the epicenter was the city of qom.

one of the most staggering things to me about the revolution and the american attitude to the revolution was the failure of american policymakers to understand just... how weak the shaw of iran was, i'm not talking about weak militarily or weak in a sense of not having a good police force, i'm talking about weak in terms of a character structure. let me give you an example, so jimmy carter is the president of the united states and jimmy carter thinks that the shavan is really tough guy, and so how we going to deal with this really tough guy, i mean how do you deal with guy who's you know walking around these medals right? now do you deal with tough guy? well, the united states has this ambassador in the philippines, and this ambassador in the philippines, william sullavan, he's been dealing with marcos and he's been doing a great job, and everybody knows marcos is really tough dude, so let's send sullivan

from the philippines to tehron, because he knows how to handle tough guys, we don't have anybody else who's as good with tough guys, so sullivan, who doesn't know anything about the middle east, who doesn't know anything about iran, and he admits this... he wrote a book, then he says this in his book, didn't know anything about iran, he had never served in the middle east, he had always been out there in asia, he shows up in terron. now, what was the style with which american ambassadors dealt with the show? this was the style, american ambassaster would go to see the show once a week, there was always a fixed time for a meeting, and the show would welcome him in the show, and they'd chat a little bit of small talk, and then the shaw would say, i have come up with this brilliant plan for the future of my country, we are going to build a super high... way fromshad all the way across northern tehron and it's going to cost us such and such and it'll take so long to build us and that's what's going to happen and the american ambassador would say something like your majesty this is a brilliant plan only you could have thought up the strategy for prosp making your country prosperous it's going to be great but i have

one slight suggestion maybe instead of building the super highway you should pay some roads from the villages to the main road so that farmers. could get their crops out to market and that would increase the income of the poor villagers and the show it's exactly what i was thinking, this was what i was going to do, that's it, and so then the shah would go out and make some roads from the villages to the main roads, well that was the way the americans tried to influence the shah's behavior, and everybody understood this was a solovan comes to terron, and he tells this in his book and sits down with the shaw for the first interview and the shaw says, ambassador sullivan "this is what i think i'm going to do, and he gives this whole thing, and ambassador sullivan looks at him and he says, your majesty, you're the shah, whatever you think is right, that's what you should do. the shah was stunned, what do you think the shah heard when ambassador sullivan said, you're the shah,

whatever you want to do is you should do. sullivan was being honest, he didn't know what the hell to do in iran cuz he hadn't didn't know anything about iran, and he figured that shah's a tough guy, he had been there for a long time, if that's what shah was right." that's what he should do, the shah didn't hear that, what the shaw heard was, you should do whatever you want to do, meaning the government of the united states doesn't care what you do, we don't give a damn what, you do whatever you want. do meaning we don't care about you anymore, shaw was devastated, opinion is divided as to whether the shah was conscious of his illness, but one thing is for sure, during the last years of his reign, the shah was always in two minds, unable to

make right decisions. what's more was that he was half afraid that the americans would take him off the throne if they knew about his illness? پیام انقلاب شما ملت ایران را شنیدم. من حافظ سلطنت مشروطه که موحبتی استی که از طرف ملت به پادشاه تفییز شده است هستم. in the spring of 1978, political prisoners in kas prison went a hunger strike. as the new iranian year of 1357 came in, ayatollah komeini issued a proclamation, paying tribute to tabris martters and attacking the united states of america. he said, the us is the root cause of the hardship we're suffering, because it supports the despotic shah. the shah had kept his cancer secret even from his name. and dearest, but the symptoms of the disease were undeniable, the shar's inability

to make decisions was one, the shah was ill, we did not know the shah was ill, in fact i've got a thing going with gary sick, i learned from very good source, that the the americans didn't learn about it until october, now national security council person says that no, they never didn't hear about it till then, they didn't hear about it till almost six months later. clearly, if we had known the shaw was ill, we would have seen the problem not as one of political adjustment, but of regime survival, and we would have, everybody would have behaved differently in that case. there were rumors that the shaw was not well, but even after he left the country, he, he had pictures of him playing tennis uh, he he was a man who was very fit uh and uh he gave the impression of

being in perfectly good health and truly uh we didn't know about it and uh there are lots of people who say oh you must have known but we didn't it actually would have made huge difference and the fact is the shaw fully understood that if people knew that he had cancer they would change their policy toward iran because they would know. that he wasn't going to be there in a few years, so they would change their policy, and uh, they, and it's true, but in fact, this the cia formally concluded in august of 1978, that the shaw of iran was in no serious trouble, and that he would be around for many years to come, for the next five to 10 years, if we had known something about his condition, we could have gone to him and said, look, "you we're talking about regime survival here, do you want your son to be slaughtered in the streets after you're gone? well, then maybe

we better, so i told charlie noss, i could even write that, set of talking points, that you mentioned, but nobody, nobody fought the unthinkable until it was too late, you know, absolutely committed to the shot, at least through the jaal square riots, either in my book or in one of the other stories about the times." the the jolly the shah before the shaw moved against the jolly square riders, you want to know if it was all right with the american, if it was okay with the americans, and przinski told him on the telephone, it's a it's a problem of order, of course we would be behind you if you do that, and then i learn from my iranian friends later some said, well lashad didn't really believe him, he says yeah yeah, we'll go around and kill him and then we'll take the heat later, as marvin zonas says, he had no balls. on april 14th, 1978, asadullah alam died from cancer

in new york city. the shah lost his chief advisor. remember that the pillar of the regime, the really tough guy who really helped the shot to be strong and as tough as he needed to be, and i think we have to be very sympathetic here. it was not easy to be the shah of iran, and the shaw was a weak character found it especially difficult to be the shah of iran. which is what's wrong with hereditary monarchies? mean, his father was a real tough guy, the show wasn't a tough guy, so who was the guy that made him tough? asadola alam, his boyod friend, the guy who was primed. minister when i first arrived in iran and homani was arrested and the shahs didn't know what to do and alam said to the shago out and shoot these guys and you'll stay in power and he did it. alam died of cancer before just before the iranian revolution began. so the shah lost a tremendously important advisor. as the

revolution gained momentum in iran, the shah blamed the u.s. for withdrawing its support, having no idea how influential the clurgy were in leading the revolution. meanwhile, henry kissinger, the u.s. secretary of state, came to iran to meet with the shah, but neither the americans nor the shah's men had finger on the pulse of the revolution. barking. on the wrong tree, they had been focusing their attention just on leftest forces for several years.

there is no doubt. that ayatullah komeini was successful in extending his influence over the whole middle east, and not just iran. as an iranian religious scholar and political leader, he managed to make his country the world's first islamic republic. being an outspoken critic of the regime, ayatollah khumeini used to denounce the shah's programs. in a proclamation issued by him and undersigned by eight senior islamic scholars, the ayatullah specified the shahs violations of... the iranian constitution and condemned him for corrupting public morals and cowtowing to the us and israel. on the dawn of november 4th, 1964, the shar's commandos surrounded ayat komeini's house in kom. they arrested him and took him directly to mehrabad airport in tehran. soon after he was

flown out of iran to turkey. out of sight, out of mind. that was the rational behind his exile. the stay in turkey was not congenial, for turkish law didn't allow ayat komeini to wear the cloak and turbin of the muslim scholar. on september 5th, 1965, he left turkey for najaf in iraq, where he would stay for 13 years. on october 23rd, 1977, mustafa komeini. the ayatollah's son passed away in nazaretf. defending national independence, ayatullah komeini chastized the shaas regime, saying, "we witnessed that while muslims were in war with israeli forces, iran's government recognize the israeli state on the shah's orders. in 1978, mass protests were organized

to support ayatullah komeini. the regime as..." usual responded with iron fist, alarm bells had started to ring. i don't think on the part of official washington, there ever was a much understanding of the ayatollah, there were some few academics who had tracked his sermons were aware of his his views from for those years, he he was in exile in iraq. 'um and then that sudden appearance in the paris suburbs uh, it didn't really penetrate official thinking in washington, who he was, what, what he was, i mean the shah knew him as an enemy, and that that was, i think that was it, black and white enemy. ayat komaini

was in the neighboring country of iraq, and it was too close for comfort, at the... shah instance, the iraqi regime asked the ayatollah to give up his political activities, otherwise he had to leave the country. in october 1978, ayatollah komeini flew from iraq to new exile in a suburb of paris. by that time, the ayatullah had developed an international reputation as the spiritual and political leader of the iranian revolution. being thousands of kilometers away from his homeland, ayatollah. set the course of the revolution, urging iranians not to compromise and ordering work stoppages against the regime. during the last few months of his exiletullah received a constant stream of reporters, supporters and notable personalities, all eager to hear the leader the revolution speak,

was a journalist during the revolution. they said, oh, the ayatollah romani is coming to paris, it's a very old story, 41 years ago, are you right here? he just told me like a grandfather, you know, the the the interesting part of the story, it's not me, i'm not the one important, what is important is to continue what you have done in iran, someone called me telling me, you should come to paris quickly, because he... homani is going back to tehen and we want you to win the place. imam homani during the flight was sleeping upstairs when the imam arrived from

paris with a special plane. the first stop he made was here and it was a way to say now i am in charge. it's finished. the time of of the shah is over. it speaks with me, the saint of the soil,

from the blood and the ashes, it speaks with me the sound of the rain, from the battle and the victory. oh palestine. i free you, oh palestine, i free you, oh palestine, i free you, oh

palestine, i free you, my every breath is a cry to my enemy, and i cry out, cry out. cry out to the evil enemy, the flame within my heart will burn you, i cry out and the thunder in my voice will defen you, i cry out and the tornado within my soul, will rul you away. my bleeding wond

once felt those on forgotten but the aching sorrow in me never gone, i raise it will. my anger and love, love of my land, anger at your dead, raise it with my anger and love, love of my land, anger at your death. hey, wounded by hatred, i'm breathing, breathing, breathing, the magic perfume of my. homeland

palestine, wonded in love, my hands turn around the brandges of the olive tree, seeking peace, seeking peace, but as long as the pillows of our children are drenching blood, as long as you have the thought. sound of evil force i'm a flame and thunder the tornado and i cried out i cried out my son i pray you

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the headlines, us israely genocidal war on gaz is now in its fifth month with the un warning against attacks on rafa where half of the gaza population is taking shelter. hamas says that at once. to secure the release of as many palestinians as possible from israel detention as the movement submitted its response to the cease fire proposal and us army acknowledges missile attacks on two ships off yemen while the british frigate has been reportedly replaced due to damage by a missile strike.