it’s difficult, but it’s possible, it’s possible, well, by helicopter , of course, there’s no other way, that’s it, thank you very much for this detailed, almost philosophical conversation, thank you. hello, international review is on air, in the studio fyodor lukyanov. today on the program is an international review. event of the week. chronicle, facts, comments. macron promised troops to ukraine. europe is on the warpath, but this is still not certain.

decisive artificial intelligence. in an unclear situation, launch rockets. materials of our program. european the farmers went wild. tire fires , scuffles with police. report from the scene . french troops land near the vietnamese settlement of phu, exactly 70 years ago, in march 1954 , a battle began there, the result of which predetermined the withdrawal of france from indo-china and the independence of vietnam. actually, paris was ready for negotiations with the vietnamese communists, but counted on military successes to strengthen its negotiating positions. it turned out

the other way around: in may the french garrison capitulated, in july the geneva agreements were signed agreements that ended the war on vietnamese terms , the decline of the french colonial empire began , ất rồi. emmael macron has excited the entire collective. west. he said that russia's defeat is a necessary condition for security and stability in europe. and although there is no consensus on sending western troops to ukraine. nothing should be ruled out, because whatever is required must be done to prevent russia from winning. said after international conference in paris to support ukraine. over the next 3 days , the allies took turns disassociating themselves from the french president. there are no such plans. and

it won’t, the germans have already disowned several times, scholz three times. berlin is especially angry with paris. the germans allocated almost 10 times more to ukraine than the french. and france accuses them of indecisiveness, and even frames them like this. burkhart mohr and his drawing, a risky game. the controversial german artist depicted emmanuel macron in quality. his promise to send troops to ukraine, the image of the bear is completely traditional, in the background in the corner of the president’s colleagues in the european union, apparently in bewilderment. from the section, we warned rutis daukantas with a drawing from 2019, which was published in a politician’s magazine. here's another one on the right. angel, on the left

emman macron. the image of russia is perfectly recognizable. another cartoon from the baltic states. gatja s sluka from latvia reveals the topic of helping ukraine on the battlefield. ammunition from the west. it's written on many boxes. blah blah blah. patrick chapat from switzerland continues the theme. situation in ukraine. grandma asks, what’s broken there? washington - the tankers answer. macron's statement, cunning deceit or, excuse me, the language of bonelessness, what did the head of france mean? the first reason, i think, is to really send a signal to putin, to remind russia that ukraine is important, we will not surrender ukraine, and as for macron personally, there is probably another subconscious reason, but to atone for something. ukraine,

before the pro-ukrainian public in france for the fact that he had long advocated dialogue with russia. there is also a moment of improvisation, this must be understood, this is in macron’s style. for the sake of a catchphrase, make a bright, so to speak, statement that the whole world will discuss. the world is really discussing, wondering. maybe at least the french liked it? in france, the first reactions were mostly negative, not to say very negative, people realized that they realized that the debate about ukraine was changing here. what happened in the last 2 years, people generally supported the very idea of ​​supporting ukraine, well, a victim, an attack by russia, and so on and so forth further, that is, sanctions and economic support, this was supported, i would say, well, two-thirds of the french population

rejects the idea of ​​​​sending troops to ukraine, well, approximately 7-95%. 76. a second poll shows that 82% of french people are against such an idea. can the french, especially the military, imagine a war with russia? no, i can’t even imagine. the french president's statement is baseless. the main thing that is shocking is the fact that the war in ukraine is lost. for some reason the idea is spreading that russia is going further attack... the situation in cuba in 1962, when america did not accept the deployment of missiles there. ukraine is cuba today,

russia’s task is to get rid of the danger in its neighborhood. the top brass thinks differently. the head of government, jacques ottal, repeated the president word for word, not to allow this to happen. victory for russia at any cost. and former prime minister manuel valls clarified, even despite the risk of world war iii. macron himself insists that he spoke of sound mind and good memory. the old guard, brought up in the golist tradition, domenic dovepin, jean-claude chevenman, pierre louche, horrified by irresponsibility. very different formative experiences across generations. it is tempting to attribute everything to macron’s personal characteristics, but... that would be too simple: europe is going deeper into a funnel. the higher the stakes get, the harder it is to back down. and the senior partner and guarantor is reconsidering priorities away from european ones. no, of course, america is also determined to win, but

its agenda is broader, its own affairs are more important. the old world realizes that it may have to rely on itself, but there is something to rely on. army absolutely not ready for war. 30 years ago we began to reduce the army, cut the budget and effective expenses, reduced weapons, and curtailed logistics. it was wrong, but we are just starting to get better. returning to the nato structure under sarkazy is a mistake. we have lost sovereignty, independence and strategic thinking. today the french army is drained of blood and cannot make independent decisions, only those that america offers. after all, in terms of the quality of military generals, we are one of the leading armies in the world. from here there are two paths: to peace, through recognition of mutual interests and negotiations, or to war through accelerated capacity building. for example, by curtailing social benefits in favor of

security needs, which has already been called for by the danish prime minister, matte fredrickson. concede something to russia and discuss a new european balance? there can't even be any talk. it is surprising, of course, that it is france that is at the forefront of escalation, but history is capricious. on the day when macron did not rule out nato participation in the ukrainian conflict, german chancellor olaf schulz said germany would not hand over to kiev long-range taurus cruise missiles. the decision is final. winged. the taurus rocket began to be developed in the mid-nineties. it was a joint german-swedish project between daimler bends air space and the swedish concern bofers. the missile can hit protected command bunkers, ammunition depots, and naval targets at a distance of over 500

km. they can be launched from various platforms, land, sea, and aviation. the main carrier is the f-16 fighter. the length of the rocket is 5 m. the launch weight is more than a ton. it is equipped turbojet engine of small size and thrust. the main part of the flight takes place at low altitude, which makes it difficult for systems to detect it early. the air defense warhead has two charges: the first penetrates the concrete mount, the second hits the target. the mass of the warhead is 480 kg. when installing a multi-mode fuse, the rocket can detonate both upon contact with the target and inside it. it is believed that the german air force has about 600 of these combat missiles, similar to the taurus. these are british-french stormshadow missiles, which have already been delivered to ukraine. in nato armies they can be carried by the f-16, tornado, mirage or eurofighter, but in ukraine their main

carrier is the su-24 front-line bomber, which was specially converted for this purpose. this missile is a fire-forgot type. once launched , it cannot be controlled, commanded to self-destruct, or modified in the target's information. all data about it, as about air defense, is laid down earlier. the rocket is flying, guidance. scholz terribly angered his partners; he referred to the fact that the missiles supplied to ukraine by the french and british, and guided by their specialists, he handed over to in general, allies, but the germans say they can’t send their personnel, let everything take its course, especially the ukrainians. he is now spraying moscow with a product received from the bundesweir. scholz and

his social democratic fellow party members understand that the historical trail forces germany to be more cautious than others. other german parties, greened before the cdu, no longer seem to think so. they paid for the past. in russia, meanwhile, they remembered the relatively recent past. almost 34 years ago, it was signed in moscow. final settlement agreement regarding germany. the agreement on the final settlement with respect to germany was signed on september 12, 1990 in moscow, as a result of lengthy negotiations in the 2+4 format. on the one hand, it was signed by the winners of world war ii, the ussr, great britain, france and the usa, who renounced their rights in relation to germany, and on the other, by the federal republic of germany and the gdr. the 2+4 treaty, in essence, documented the hour of birth

of a sovereign united germany, defining its status, borders, membership in foreign policy blocs and numbers armed forces. the preparation took 7 months and four rounds of difficult negotiations in beaune, berlin, paris and moscow. their outcome remained in doubt until the last moment. initially, the parties considered the option. the union was inclined towards the 2+4 option, which provided that the two germany themselves would discuss

the unification scheme. the final text included 10 points. the first two are about borders and the renunciation of territorial claims to other states, the subsequent ones are about reducing the bundeswehr from half a million to 370 thousand people, the withdrawal of soviet troops by the end of 94 year and the final liquidation of the occupation institutions of the victorious powers. in addition, the agreement emphasized berlin’s complete sovereignty over internal and external affairs and germany’s refusal to fight with anyone or produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. for americans, traditionally for the british, the german-russian rapprochement has always been seen as a challenge, a threat, as an encroachment on... the role of historical britain, then the united states of america, so this connection was

destroyed, literally physically destroyed, so if we talk about the symbolism of the destruction of the nordic stream, now germany is separated from russia, cut off from russia, deindustrializing, will this germany play the role of, well, if you like ... the engine of europe, which must take on more responsibility, a greater burden, confrontation with russia, that’s what it’s all about now, as it seems to me. german question. article two of the 2+4 treaty proclaimed: the government of the two german states, the german democratic republic guarantees that only peace will come from german soil, and a united germany will never use the weapons it possesses except in accordance with its constitution and the

charter of the united nations. you can quibble for a long time about compliance with the constitution and the un charter, but...

there was one constant: the germans wanted unification, yes, we believed that the gdr was forever, but in the west they assumed from the very beginning that this was a temporary, incorrect situation, unification will take place if we recall the constitution of the federal republic of germany, written in 1949, the twenty-third article is already then she said that the east would unite with the west, the impulse to start negotiations, to start this movement.

allocated, if i’m not mistaken, i’m just calling it from memory now, 220 million west german marks, 20,000 tons of butter, 55,000 tons of canned meat and other other things were delivered to the soviet union, that’s how to achieve what you want in such conditions if you want at negotiations, please tell me, it’s clear that the story there doesn’t have all these. reverse inflections and so on, but will it be correct? to say that it was precisely in the process, in the model of german unification that was carried out, including with the active participation of the soviet union, that the acute crisis that has now broken out in our country was built, because the process of nato expansion essentially began with the consent of the soviet

union to the membership of a united germany in nato, which, as far as i remember, according to the memoirs too...

scholz, who seems to be maneuvering, but somehow in a peculiar way, does this surprise you, or did you actually expect this, but you know, he is in a terrible position as a politician, look at his coalition, it consists of god knows who, and to somehow reconcile different interests, this requires great skill, he doesn’t always succeed in this, for example, the greens, who criticize the loudest now when they are only were born, they had a goal, well , what they were counting on was somewhere 20 years in the future, now they are already talking about how they

will achieve their goals in the sixtieth year, well , if you look at this matter, that’s all this green economy and other things, because of which , in fact, everything turned upside down there, well, firstly, they will live, they won’t live , we’ll see, they proceed from the fact that they themselves don’t... live, that is, someone else will have to pay, these are temporary workers who only think about now to hold on, and then further, we’ll see further, and look how the same khabek, who is responsible for the economy and energy, treats them, he’s just running away from his voters, there were wonderful shots of how he tried to disembark from the ferry in front dying and how he was greeted there, nothing it turns out that he is a philologist by training, what does he even understand? in economics, the real economy, practically, probably, nothing , anna lena berbak, well , she has excellent results in trampoline jumping behind her,

what is she doing in the field of foreign policy, not only in relation to russia, no, in general, this is absolutely mind-boggling doesn’t lend itself, it’s not difficult to understand, and you know, there’s an interesting thing, she makes decisions that are implemented, in particular, we’ll close four consulates from the consulate general from...

it’s taking time, well, that is, we can say that now there is such an intermediate moment in anticipation of something that will happen, and that no one knows, no one knows what will happen, but we assume that everything that needs to happen will happen, but by the way, let’s say everything that needs to happen will happen, but what will happen the reaction, what the reaction will be, no one can predict now, of course, thank you very much, sergei borivich krylov was our guest, we can be sorry.

very much like a prussian state, although with marxist shoulder straps, such an east german began to pave the way there nationalism based on the fact that the territory of the gdr is essentially the territory of two large german states, well, not completely, but to a large extent prussia and saxony, dresden, that’s the southern part. gdr then, by the way, many who visited berlin paid attention to the equestrian statue of frederick ii in the center of untraden. this statue, after the second world war, was in the royal castle of sanssouci in potzdam for several decades; in 1982, if i’m not mistaken, it was transported to berlin. installed where

it stands now, and this was done on the direct orders of the then leader of the gdr , erich honecker, and against the opinion of major soviet party officials led by mikhalo antreevich suslov, who was responsible for ideology. the american-western occupation of germany during the cold war changed the face of the germans to a much greater extent than, say, the presence of the gdr in the soviet bloc. and west germany became largely americanized. for 30 years of being, well , 40 years of being part of the western bloc. the gdr was mothballed. it was on top.

it’s probably a thankless task to evaluate what was good, what was not done very well, what was done in this heap, in another key european country, poland , their passions for ukraine, after the truckers, farmers are rebelling, demanding to protect them from ukrainian dumping. prime minister donald tusk, a passionate defender of the ukrainian cause, even allowed for a complete shutdown.