manstein struck a new blow in the south parts of the kursk salient. here, near the village of prokhorovka, there was a huge field where german tanks had more room to maneuver. the germans had pulled all their reserves here. about 400 combat vehicles from the elite ss tank divisions. vatutin sent rotmistrov's fifth tank army to meet this armada. in view of these obstacles crossing the field, it was necessary to pass through several narrow corridors that prevented a large mass from acting, so approximately 50-70 soviet tanks, for this reason the battle took place in several waves, the first 50-70 come out, others, someone breaks through along the bank of the village, someone breaks through the forest belt, therefore the battle under the prokhokho... it was with some, so to speak, tank assumptions, that is, in it a large role, for example, was played by german anti-tank artillery, there self-propelled guns that fired from a place and could... and the machines burst into flames one after another, but the german troops also suffered losses. the most powerf

the remnants manstein's divisions took up defensive positions in the khaikov area. hitler demanded that the city be held under any circumstances, but the initiative was lost. rotmesterow's tanks bypassed kharkov from the west. any day now the red army could encircle all the remaining reserves of army group south. the germans had only one road left, by which they could still leave the city. on august 22, manstein, fearing a repeat of the stalingrad disaster, gave the order to leave kharkov. the next day, the city was liberated by soviet troops. this meant that including losses for the germans, of the equipment that was under repair. ferdinands exploded en masse there and there. ceased to be tank in the sense that the mobile reserves as tank divisions literally had dozens of combat-ready vehicles left, this precipitous drop in the number of tanks in service led to the fact that... in august 1943 it became finally clear that the germans had lost their strategic offensive initiative, it no longer existed, and germany was still far from being a defeated country, but it w

field marshal manstein later wrote.s was the last attempt to save our initiative in the east, with its failure the initiative finally passed to the soviet side, so the operation citadel is a decisive turning point. on august 5, 1943 , in honor of the liberation of orel and belgorod , an artillery rally was held in moscow. 124 guns installed in different areas of the capital fired 1,200 blank shells, the entire stock that was available at that time in moscow. this would be... in russia, and then under petrei, salutes already appeared, so let's make a salute in moscow, these salutes, a series of salutes, with a different number of guns, volleys, in depending on the importance of the settlement, have already gone in succession, in honor of the liberation of certain settlements by the red army. the establishment of several new soviet awards is associated with this victory, these were the order of glory, first, second, third degree, the order of victory. to the question of exactly when it will end , on what lines, under what

assumed that the outcome of the war would depend on the capture of donbass, german marshal erich von mansteino led the german army south, cited the fuhrer's words in his memoirs. for the germans, the loss of donbass donetsk coal, although of course they could not organize its... production as it should have been, but for them in any case it was a disaster, they had a very big problem with fuel, manstein understood perfectly well that if if he could not hold out on... then it was already a matter of technical matters. before the soviet the fighters had a serious line of fortifications, which the germans had been building for years. the offensive was complicated by difficult geographical and geological conditions, elevation changes, small rivers, it was difficult even for infantry to advance, because tanks were also advancing. starting from smolensk, further through bryansk, where the offensive also began, and further on to kursk and further to the sea of ​​azov, the soviet troops were advancing everywhere, and the germans were simply flattened, for exactly one simple reason, that they could no

here is what german field marshal erich von manstein wrote in his memoirs of a lost victory.41 , donbass played a significant role in the operational hitler's plans. he believed that the outcome of the war would depend on the capture of this territory located between the sea of ​​azov, the lower reaches of the don and the lower middle reaches of the donets and extending in the west approximately to the mariupol-krasnoarmeyskaya line. the commander of hitler's army group south, field marshal erich von manstein, who was called one of the most talented military leaders of the third reich, was preparing for a soviet offensive in the donbass and, to be on the safe side, sent hitler a question about what he should do, hold on to donbass even under the threat of encirclement or better to retreat, exhausting the forces of the soviet troops, the answer of the general staff was: the fuhrer wants both, hitler declared: it is absolutely impossible to give the enemy donbass even time, if we lost this region, then we would not be able to provide our military industry with force. however, t

assumed that the outcome of the war would depend on the capture of donbass, the german marshal erich von mansteino led the. quoted the fuhrer's words in his memoirs. after that, it was basically a technical matter. the soviet soldiers faced a serious line of fortifications that the germans had been building for years, the offensive was complicated by difficult geographical and geological conditions - elevation changes, shallow rivers, it was difficult even for infantry to advance, because tanks were also advancing. starting from smolinsk, then through bryansk, there too the offensive began and further. on kursk and further to the sea of ​​azov , the soviet troops were advancing everywhere and the germans were simply completely flattened for one simple reason, that they could not, this was clear back in 1941, we had enough to win a war of attrition, and the production capacity that produced tanks, there were about battalions a day, so to speak, yes , 25 tanks a day, well... and accordingly artillery shells, artillery systems, so there was enough prepared infantry. the culmination of the liberation

memoirs german. but for them in any case it was a disaster, they had a very big problem with fuel, mansteinerstood perfectly well that if if he did not hold out on the minus front, then further practically flat, flat as what steppes of donbass, almost to the dnieper itself, as soon as they broke through this, then it was already a matter, in general technical, the soviet soldiers faced a serious line of fortifications, which the germans. starting from smolinsk, further through bryansk, where the offensive also began, and further to kursk, and further to the sea of ​​azov, there was an offensive everywhere, the soviet troops, and the germans were simply completely rolled over. for exactly one simple reason, that they could not, this was clear back in 1941, we had enough to win a war of attrition, and the production capacity that produced tanks, there were about, so to speak, battalions in day, yes there 25 tanks per day, and accordingly artillery shells, artillery systems, and that was enough prepared by the infantry. the culmination of the liberation of donbass was the assault of the saur g

possible to return, by the way. again to the one who wants to survive in this history, by the way, look, manstein'sn meinstein, grand master, what was his name, yes, glory of the german wehrmacht, army group center, who opposed him, we have not written here, but there was, on the other hand there was nikolai fyodorovich vatudi, who opposed, yes nikolai fyodorovich vatutin, our forty-two-year-old military leader. and there nikolai fyozovich batutin funeral on and what did they do with his monument, remind us, sergey barovich, remind mike, and felix at the same time, at the grave, and what they did to the memory, to the memory, that is, what i want to say, and how he died too, remind him for one. he doesn’t watch anything that we advise him, you remember, i advised him at one time to watch the epic film the great war, yes, but he doesn’t watch anything, so he doesn’t know anything, but unfortunately, in the states they are exactly the same, now these guys, they don’t understand anything, so they don’t really, really... he feels this nerve of this symbolism, yes, yes, he he was ambushed by the ukraini