especially in a worldhe congress has to provide the agency with the expressed authority to car t stute into operation with the effective law. now we can debate wth they drew the right lin in identifying exactly when these delegations have occurred. ihink they got that right for all the reasons that i tried to explain th morning. but i think it is important to recognize that that debate doesn't have a constitutional dimension to it th will fall out of the equation and that it is just a question o whether theyre that right line. if you recognize that and what iseft over are the practal concerns that have been raised about cheonnd i don't want to show you the forcef the concerns that some members have articulated. but those cces are manageable. the court could do in this case what it d in kaiser and it coul clarify and articulate the limits without taking the drastic step andhat is the right thing to do there andha they will be calling a part of the rules here. in this case, they will decide to council in favorite of retaining chevron. i welcome the court's questions. >> and h doe see the

and of course texas had that in mind in the stute and specifically said, we essential have to do businessn texas and can't discriminate against users bad their. >>> yo graphic -- geographic location inning to. if we lose this includinghe idea that we could be forced to engage in prsive activity in texas we would fdantally have to change the way we provide our service in order to engage -- in order to provide anything like the service we want to while not engaging in viewpot scrimination we basically have to eliminate certain arias of speech entirely. so we just cldt talk about suicide preventi anymore because we're not goingo lk about suicide promotion. i guess we couldn'tave pro-semitic spee bause we're not gng to have anti-semitic ee. we have to figureut some way to try to engage in even more content moderation or editorial discretion to try to get us to a lel ere we're more benign and somehow we n'run afoul of texas' law and theoh the -- then on the disclosure provisions the record reflecks that youtube wouldav to basically increase its disclore and appeal process basicall 100-fold in

they say that a single function of the trigger, as it appears in e stute, is directing consideration of whether the trigger is moving only once. i think you are saying no, when it says the futi of the igger, it's not how the trigger operates. thfunction of the trigger is what it achieves. and the function you are saying is by sing operation, meaning sing mement of the pso you can achieve firing multipl shs without multiple manual movements, that covers the function of the trigger. is that atou are saying? mr. fletcher: exactly. the thing that makes this clearest is e pothetical on page 30. imaginsoone builds a black box with a butn andhe shooter pushes the button and by the -- and bullets come out at a hi re. that is a machine gun. in my friend's view, if after the shooter presses the button, the button keeps moving up and down on it own, he says that's not a machine g because the trigger is functioning each time a shot is fired. we don't think that is plausible. justice jackson: we will ask him about that. euros accounts for automatically more than one shot being in definition. exac

i thk e focus is much greater on the text of the stute. once you recognize that you cognize the problem deferring at aceain point to the agencies. let's look at the track record of the agencies before this court. if they are soexrt they should be able to persuade you in case after ca tt they are getting the statues right. by my count and catostitute and their amicus brief brief since the court last id chevron the administration is batting about 300. expertise is not all it's cracked up to be. that is true even in the most complicated cases. look at the american hospital association case. i don't think you will find a statue that is more complicated. this court had no trouble unanimously say that you cannot ha hospital chain specif pricing without first doing a survey. >> i don't know rather you can say we have none. >> i wagog to say that. no one was trouble write a dissent. t put it that way. i can use other examples. in the case where the court says chevron wasn't applicable beuse of a procedural defect. it split the core 5-4, but how di

by my count and cato stute and their amicus brief brief since the court last frid chevron the administration is batting about 300. exrtise is not all it's cracked up to be. that is true even in the most complicated cases. look at the american hospital association case. i don't think you will find a statue that is more complicated. this court had no trouble unanimously say that you cannot have hospital chain specific pricing without first doing a survey. >> i don't know rather you can say we ve none. >> i was gog say that. no one was trouble to ite a dissent. let p it that way. i can use other examples. inthe case where the court says chevron wasn't applicable beusof a procedural defect. it split the core 5-4, but how did you dethe case? it had a definitive cannon. do you think the labor department is the expert on distributive canon or do yo think the courts are? >> thank you, mr. clement. the answer from mrmainez on several questions about what happens when you get rid of chevron in this case with skidmore. if gilmore isgog to occupy a more prominent role going forward, i would like to know

the stute in theory could apply to them. it is going to be powerfully effective in terms of how this case gets litigated in the district. >> just want to push back a little bit on private versus public distinction. i think we agree that the government would make editorial judgmentbo what they can say in the public square but what you do with the fact that the internet is the public square? i appreciate that these companies are private mpies but if the speech is occurring in this environment -- why won't e concerns about censorship apply? >> i think censorship is only something the governme c do the. it is not -- it is just category mistake. but you would worry about this if wsis like the cable companies in turn has someor of control where they could limit your ability to go to some other website ande in speech. the way websites worked -- faceould limit you to only 19th websites. facebook could dictate which 20 websites you saw. this would be a lot more like turner. this courtai that t internet is like the opposite of turner.

it is stute about -- it excludes youtube and facebook. the facebook newsfeed. direct messangthen mow. those kinds of things -- we are not going to let you exclude on the basis of race and sex and we are also notoi to let you exclude people on the bas of viewpoint. >> i don't think the first part of that statute my clients would even challenge. whether there is an abstract first amendment right to have a black authors table for black history month -- >> also viewpoint. >> when you throw viewpoint in would have to ask my clients whether they challenge that but that is not the statute we have here. >>ha i'm saying is in part it is the statute you have here. that gives you your plainly legitimate suite. when you run a service when you e not speaking, unlike a facebookeewhere you are -- your editorial discretion argument is good because the platform is engaged in speech activities. when you are running vmo you are not engaged in speech activies when you have to serve everybody irrespective o whether you like their political opinions are not , it seems you have a muc

>>o if we think that the stute does target expressive activity in some respects, and we affirm in this case whats left to justice gorsuch's question, what is throaft happet means it can't go in place until a final judgment. what will happen in the lititi? >> there will be litigation on the merits. i don't think they are past the point where we could amend. the poi ithe litigation will go o there will be dcovery unless florida dede that the writing is othe wall and it tries to pass more narrow statute. otherwise there would be discovery. the whole nine yards. in the interim, i can't emphasize enough particularly that $100,000 civil penalty provision. >> all that's before uss at should happen in the interim before final judgment and it comes back to us a year or two from now. should it be in effect or not be in effect until it comes back t us, correct? >> yes. >> if it came back to us or goes to the courtf appeals. and what will happen -- you have alluded to it, but what will pp in that year do you think because i don't think we have heard much about exactly what you are conceedbout. you