people, we are only used to having a short text that means itself. yes , but i have to say. that's what i have to say that i myself read on the screen on the big screen. i can't on the phone. yes, these yes on the big screen, uh, and i must say that few people care about the convenience for me, so that i can read bad fonts, the inability to expand and make a larger one some kind of simplification. everything is also shown to students what format the book is. remember, you were a proofreader. yes? remember some kind of format corrector. i was a junior editor more matter on the salary of the proofreader. moreover, well, yes, a work book. here, sorry for the expense, but i remember some kind of format, and i remember it's 84 by 188 in 1/32 of a share. while they again, as they say, because all this is gone, the text that we go on the screen is freed from so many of this enjoyment from this, this is a runner. and this is and this is captal, and this is

the title page and typefaces. well, we are with you, e helvetia, we will separate from academic, and m-m simplification leads to what we see, as if only the text is not burdened by anything burdening the complication itself, but such that it was sweet. this is the complexity, in general. here, i would still draw in books. these headpieces are medieval initial letters, so that some birds of the girl's ribbon are intertwined there. yes, well, i know that you love it for years killed. in general, the book edition agrees, oh well. well, after all, we started with journalism and said that journalism is something incomprehensible or too general, but you really have texts that hmm well, on the verge of fiction, but it's fiction. yes, this book in particular is one of my favorites. this felt age also came out some time ago, but seven years ago, but nonetheless. perceived as fresh, but uh, how do you

feel about it? this is what this memoirs are sketches, there is a lyrical hero, that one is just a story about a person who, uh, shares his everyday experience, there is no through plot, what kind of book is the felt age tatyana nikitichny tolstoy here i have collected different texts from different times, and which connected by more or less one theme uh, stagnation. this is how we lived, how i lived in the seventies years, and the seventies with the beginning of the eighties, perhaps, but overbody. but stagnation, no, dates, here some moment has stagnated and you live, what is there, the main thing is the absence of a deficit is not simplicity. there everything is the main stiffness of movements. there is little you can do abroad does not exist does not exist. just some weird people. sometimes some komsomol workers. yes, they go abroad, but not for us. here we are ordinary people, we do not understand.

you can't even do this in bulgaria. well, what else is incredible hmm dexterity and the survivability of people, the wit they use to survive in this situation. well, for example, a person will need a large plywood plywood. yes, yes, how they took it out yes, no one will give you anything, so, uh, the engineer thinks hmm goes to the director or there is some boss and says and holds such a small plywood. yes, and he says, semyonovich is there. here, i need to take the plywood home here . well, uh, you tell me at the watch that they missed me from the plywood, so let kozlov pass with the plywood there. hmm, which means he is coming huge plywood. it's astry smart. do you have a certain reality in the life science magazine was wonderful, but the section for the home master advice, right? a toothbrush could

be made into a refill for a ballpoint pen refill for a ballpoint pen, a paint sprayer from a paint remote second shirt. yes , a mop can be made from some even rubbish. and that's it. eh, the felt age is just such a book. that's exactly how i perceive it. this is a woven portrait from scraps. eh, a decade and a half, it would probably be right to say so in one word. uh, it was forever until it ended, uh is called one of the books about this time and uh, we talked about a recent comparative book and about an older time and we, of course, will hope that you will give us new books. we are waiting for this. yes, but if there are some circumstances that interfere with some things, for example, i had such a collection of completely food and i just don’t have enough volume. uh, so that it turned out like this. well, i have to think about it some more. do you have now

i'll deal with it, i don't know, uh, i have one plan, then i have another, in which i will not speak, and not to jinx it, because i will say everything as i say. it doesn’t work out that way and a book will soon be published, uh, dedicated to the memory of alexandrovich timofeevsky, we are his friend, who came up with the name felt age, he is the son of the wonderful poet alexander pavlovich timofeevsky book. it consists of two parts. it consists of conversations about culture, which i mean with him there are about five of them. uh-huh. and i think this is a unique genre. you say publicist not a publicist- no, this is generally a new genre of some kind. this is a correspondence from two angles. so let's say about 30 people. so i found one who agreed and were able to write memoirs, and somehow we fixed some kind of image of him. already there is a bright person. it is a pity that he is not there, he is missing.

we will wait for your new books , both this and others, and i can only rejoice, how much we have coincided today, and we have coincided in the main, we have coincided in what modern man needs to maintain brain activity and normality must be read. uh, we had another edition of the literary podcast. let them talk, let them read, and i am his host dmitry bak, we are their interlocutor. e was tatyana nikishina is fat, and our modern wonderful writer and i don’t know, maybe a publicist in part. eh, i tell you what i always say at the end of our programs , read with pleasure.

to paraphrase a little bismarck politics, like diplomacy, is the art of the possible. hello, today we gathered our thoughts about what is happening with international relations fedor alexandrovich lukyanov international observer andrey andreevich sushentsov. i am vladimir legoyda, a political scientist and historian of the house of culture of the faculty of international relations at mgimo. hello gentlemen. hello there is such a concept of historical distance and it is customary to say so a little academic looking up that until some time has passed it is very difficult to assess the situation in which you find yourself. how much is the law. as far as the lack of historical distance. today allows us to answer the question, which i so boldly took out the name of our podcast. what is happening with international relations? it seems to me that the historical distance, uh, allows you to look just differently, but this does not mean that

being, uh, inside the process, it is impossible to analyze it differently, well, as the inhabitants of the roman empire of the era of its collapse say, i have no idea that it is disintegrating the ancient greeks didn't know they were ancient. and even the participants of the first world war. they didn’t know that it was global, they called it later, and therefore, of course, understanding, uh, which builds events into a historical lineup happens later probably, but on the other hand, here we are now if that's how we live here and now it seems to me that at least for people who are professionally involved in this. now it is more or less clear where we are going to build. we do not know how it will end, that is, we do not know the consequences of the consequences, we do not know what it is more or less. it's clear. i think that the period of uncertainty, which has been disturbing many specialists, including the last 20 years, has ended and has come

some clarity, at least the dynamics of international events have high inertia. and the fact that in the future there will be history there in half a century, let's say textbooks on the history of international relations of this period will be written and some date will be named the starting point of the current processes. there in the mid-nineties of the last century. the beginning of the formation of a polycentric order, russian-chinese relations are american, the bet on the expansion of nato at a unipolar moment and the accumulation of contradictions, which eventually third decades, and the xxi century first in ukraine a. then, somewhere else, they began to abscess in the form of such a systemic crisis, which who knows, may last not a single decade . edward carr describes retrospectively. true, the interwar period between the first and second world wars called it a long crisis , and it is possible that we

are entering such a long phase into a phase in which there are no events of such jerks that change qualitatively and quickly. ah, international relations. how did, say, the second world war in a relatively in a historically short period of time, a sharp re-laying of all the foundations of international relations, the military, economic, legal, ideological and the formation of a stable framework for several decades. and we are in the middle of a slow process in which all these foundations are also under question under certain pressure and inertia of these processes. god forbid, it would be a slow , long, yet fast reloading means some kind of catastrophe. uh, slow transformation allows you to gather up already. i mean hmm so slow. i think here you can argue. i agree that it has been accumulating for a long time, but when the accumulated has already detonated, now everything is happening

extremely quickly, much faster than one would think. also, i thought about, uh, the historical distance question . distance does one important thing that we can't do today. it removes the unnecessary, because these are three things that are happening now and we think are extremely important at a historical distance. they will disappear, they just won't exist. well, somewhere there small letters. and now we can't estimate. this is what makes a historic event. i want to offer you, but a certain cross -cutting thought, which for me seems extremely important and expensive, even let's say in life, as a theory it lends itself to rational construction of life, how reality does not lend itself to rational ones. so you said that well , more or less, everything is clear, in the late eighties in the early nineties it also seemed that everything was clear. a period of historical optimism towards the collapse of the bipo. on the system of international relations , the confrontation is over everything means democracy won the world will become stable predictable wonderful bright end

of history then nothing worked with all the stops, and then somehow wonderfully said historical optimism was replaced by misanthropic pessimism. yes and then it exploded, an abscess. that's all the same, how rational is the design of forecasting. in general, perhaps you correctly remembered the turn of the eighties and nineties, and indeed then an excellent feature of er perception was that it seemed that we understand what will happen next. well, because not just to a we just know that nothing else can be, she has laid a track, than regardless of the relationship, whether we like her or not, there is nowhere to go. and the same phenomenon. uh, apply globalization has long been thought to be globalization. here it is, and that's all. and there can be nothing more, we can hate, but it is there, but it is necessary. due that not to us, but there were people who already then said something else and it is easy

to find people who said no. e lord , it doesn’t happen like that and it won’t happen like that, but then further next question. and uh, how should intellectual and scientific and other communication be built in general, so as not to succumb to this wave, because this is also relevant now fedor very aptly noted that uh, we need certainty and this intellectual construction of our life is in the late eighties and early nineties drew on the experience of the end of the second world war , when for the first time humanity consciously approached the results of a catastrophic conflict. and it would seem that now we will come up with a stable world that will work according to the rules that we will propose in the key document of the united nations and stabilize this framework. perhaps for a long time. this is an alliance of the five main countries, they will support this framework and indeed.

uh, except for the periphery, uh, international relations, this framework held on for quite a long time in the late eighties, there was, apparently, the same mm hope that now we will build the same stable world on a slightly different basis. the base of liberal ideology means american values, universal values, american financial other infrastructure is universal and we will now live in peace and happiness, we must remember that the episode of the end of world war ii is exceptional for world history, if you look at the previous episode, let's say the end of the first world war. such an attempt was unsuccessful , we could not rationally build a system that would work and be stably maintained, previous similar attempts were consciously and conservation, established order. they were extremely short-lived international relations. i just wanted to ask you about my norm of rivalry or the leader, yes, here is this idea that you have already met. he says that the world today is returning to international

relations to its historical norm. yes, that is, but do i understand correctly that, relatively speaking, i recently listened to the lectures of our wonderful antiquity scholar. surikov about the peloponnesian war. and that's what i thought. and what time is it now, is it really that same ancient greece or some, but are there really such things in which this is normativity on the material of the peloponnesian war. actually, the classics about the theory of international relations derive the main maximums. this is the concept of its realism in international relations, when countries compete with each other for their interests, their national understanding. it is in each case a very individual criterion of common sense is also very individual to treat them. eh, respectfully. uh, that is, our concept of common sense is not at all necessary. such the same in germany, the same in the usa, the same in china , in india, and this requires respect. and i think that cognitive

realism allows you to more, or something, firmly stand on your feet, comprehending , that's what's happening, what do you think, well , anyway, it creates the illusion that you 're standing there on your feet. i would like to develop this. i think andrei said a very important thing. it is important for today's understanding that the second world war really greatly influenced our consciousness, meanwhile it really was in many ways unique and it ended too, unusual, in general, in the history of mankind there are not so many wars that would end in the complete defeat of one of the parties, complete annihilation, germany in its former form did not become japan in its former form. well, you can say, too, there she is later , well, this left a very big imprint on further understanding, when the cold war ended, the feeling arose the same , only this complete rout, as they thought. i comprehended not a country, but a certain system of thought, a certain worldview, let's say all worldviews, except for one, and here

now here is the number of the view. it didn't even win. it just proved that others are not needed. that's all that we have today is a consequence of such an end to this very or there interruption of the cold war, but this, after all, began to change quite quickly. this is an idea of ​​the victory of the worldview - this is what will provide. that's what, we have already said, yes to change. it has become. rather , the idea that the worldview did not defeat others began to change later than the signs of this appeared. well, for a very long time tried to pretend it was something. well, costs in the way of the right goal. well, although i don’t know yet, there, if we talk about the academic space, then already in the sixties the concept of political culture appeared there, yes , which simply told us that institutions and processes. they will be completely different. work political institutions in different political cultures, what you said. yes, i hope, well, you know me here. er, maybe i'm not quite. here i understand, here is

the question, when we associate with the same ancient greeks. yes, indeed, some basic things are basic patterns, they do not change, but this here is the context, life is about the context. yes, he was fundamentally different. well, that is, military operations there during the a war of athens and sparta. they did not lead to similar results at all, not in human casualties, in anything it was fundamentally a different world, it seems that the laws are different, but the consequences are for everything that hits the nerves. yes, what makes a person, uh, a person exists rational. yes, they were fundamentally different, some historians antiquity. it is said that even there there are hoplite battles. they are generally more of a sport, for example, they could have had victims there, dozens there. sometimes even a few and actually some others were pushed back, they ran away, we won. then and here they are, so to speak, running around there throughout civilization. it seems to me that brutalization and humanization developed simply along two tracks at the same time. they walked,

as it were, together at first. hmm, more and more cruel forms of confrontation and some kind of attempts to curb it. and about, uh, how the nature of war is changing. right now 23 year. there's a lot to discuss here on this subject. where it moves forward backwards sideways, because , well, those, uh, you actions that we are now observing, generally speaking, no one has been preparing for them for many, many years or even decades , they thought that this was impossible. it remained in the 20th century. well, please. today we have gathered our thoughts about what is happening with international relations in the modern world fedor aleksandrovich lukyanov, international observer andrey andreevich sheshentsov to the kants of the faculty of international relations hero. i am vladimir igorievna, we continue andrey andreevich when you talk about the school of realism. yes, there are other schools, but some kind of productive

dialogue is possible between them, and how practical it is for real diplomacy. i believe more meaningful for real diplomacy. this is the experience of the national experience of the experience and individuals of existence in the international environment that is given to them. in reality, we observed a lot of experiments in the nineties and 2000s, especially from small countries that recently gained independence, who tried to import foreign policy along with sometimes diaspora textbook professors, there the individual caucasian republics suddenly presented themselves as some kind of small western european country with a different neighborhood zone with a different economic environment, with different security threats and tried to behave somehow differently. yes, countries invent themselves in their own circumstances, but hmm, remember that each side is an experiment, and the final is open for it and the elites, testing the border. perhaps they are this experiment. here they check for

strength of the state. how did the experiment survive if it went through a series of major trials of intrusions of the revolution of economic er, turmoil. uh, some catastrophic natural events, and so on and so forth, and there are from the side of the state with , for example, what kind of micron is a completely special foreign policy environment there is a state in africa there is a state of southeast asia latin america for each of them the whole world looks like a little different and for them, uh, some universals, about which we are talking here, now they can wear their own shade, but if we talk about the basic, er, postulates of the struggle for influence for the status of military-political rivalry, then in general they develop approximately according to the same rules. there are laws there, like, uh, there is current in an electrical outlet, if something is there, it means to climb with a sharp nail, then from there a current will strike small countries, some of them had the misfortune to experience it for themselves. what is it exactly, or tok e, in the 21st century, is still

going through the outlet. yes, it's still getting worse. and this invention of the bicycle is a little returns them, uh, to reality and to the tradition of a realistic understanding of what your foreign policy potential is, your resources. you must articulate your interests. and this is always very subjective. you can put it in so many different ways and together it puts us all in. well, in terms of the degree of realism of your policy, there is, for example, a small country in the middle east, israel, which, in terms of the totality of its foreign policy resources and foreign policy experience in its short period of existence, falls into some such line. can give head start uh, many long-standing countries. yes, they went through a lot of crises on their own, from them they came up and continue to lead such a rather active line of external political and what is called they play for their own e, for their vital interests constantly on the eve, e, and the measure of their e is such a tendency

to fall into an illusion , it is very low, strange in a different international environment. and where there are less threats, they can afford the experiment. but tell me, but, uh, again, the changing context and conditions in which we we exist here is the information society, yes , about the influence. e of the new information space on domestic politics, well , dissertation diplomas are already being defended, with some i even had a chance to get acquainted. and in general, with all the critical attitude to what they are trying to analyze, so to speak, but this influence exists. here is the changed information environment. what influence does it have, and again on international relations, if at all, it has to what andrey just said in many ways, but if in the very applied, then let's say the work of diplomats has become absolutely unbearable, that is, the classical approaches, that is, these means, yes, because we know from books, but this is nothing and there is no discreteness and

confidentiality. no, on the contrary, he spat out something so fried faster than you, like, how much more . and constructivism, which generally speaking is correct, andrey named a small country that he imagined himself an eastern european paradise, now, unfortunately, a long-dead, accidentally bright , witty person. such was an entrepreneur in socks and banduki, yes, who left for that very country in the middle of the 2000s as a minister, went on reforms. he then formulated brilliantly. here is this phenomenon, when relations with russia began to strain there, then they boycotted the embargo and so on, and he said at some meeting. listen, let's imagine that there is a sea there is no russia there is a sea. we don't look at it at all. we live like this

here are the squints. let's pretend that none of this exists. and it seems to me that this is the triumph of such an approach, which admits that one can imagine that there really is a sea. this is a product of the information age, because the information ira she actually constructs everything around us is already disorienting to a greater extent, it turns out. well, it’s further disorienting from the beginning, then you get used to it, you already understand what it is. and where is she not to start diving into this sea? just andrei andreevich correct me. if i misunderstood you, somewhere i met the idea that this is one of the characteristics of the information society, when you feel like a participant. yes, in terms of international relations, this is a complete illusion, because, of course, there is no actor in international relations. there, an ordinary observer is not here in domestic politics, after all, this is a little bit wrong. or i'm wrong. well, how else to interpret this wave, when people celebrate some event on themselves. uh, in social networks they put certain images on their avatar picture, they

perceive themselves as participants in this process. it touched my feelings of thought i imagine myself as a protagonist. then these many are not actions. many people on the dashboard. pressed the button sympathy solidarity. here in connection with something there are terrorist attacks, let's say, right? or vice versa, there is a celebration of some sort of a major conflict. here is the united states of great britain, some western others, artificial in the information war. countries. they are now, uh, very good at channeling, uh, the flow of emotional reactions of citizens, english speakers in the west and other regions. of the world to the image of perception they need, what is happening in ukraine, moreover, an intuitive person. maybe he understands that this is the picture that he contemplates, it does not correspond to his deep intuition about what is happening, but since there are very logical, seemingly such constructions in the synonymous row, he intellectually does not find. e opportunities to

disagree with this. and i think that this is just another one of the means of international relations that needs to be well understood. and gradually mastering this tool works. and swimming in this environment. well, that is, is it so or does it still affect. it seems to me that it affects more than we would like and than we think. i remember not so long ago there was such an incident. in general, at the g20 meeting in indonesia, this was filmed by a cameraman, so publicity was lagging behind, a very funny skirmish between chinese president xi jinping and, for example, canadian minister justin trud, but the day before they had negotiations. well, normal negotiations with closed doors and xi jinping contrary to chinese tradition in general. it's on the receiving end he approached the work and said what kind of disgrace this is, why what we discussed yesterday today in your newspapers is not done the way it is, as this and the trium look at it.

he sincerely does not understand that what is the grandfather’s problem in general, why why is this happening not because there is an idiot working there or he is a boor, just for him, like the whole generation of politics. especially. he is, well, quite young. well, as it were, well, he is so youthful. legitimation is commented - this is a constant reporting to the public, what am i doing? look here. so i talked to you see, here i am here it was discussed. this is for him and this one , contrary to the whole tradition. here, and the axis of the classic, but between us, we spoke with you, this is confidential, but in serious things, and this is a collision. and this is just a consequence of the fact that the very people who put up avatars, they influence, because they form a mass, which the politician somehow conditionally, china sounded. let's talk about the east a few words. let's say sergeevich lavrov speaking here, and at the un recently said yes to the western minority, which

should be more attentive to the majority. i i remember we were talking to you once, and on a similar topic, he said that we were all the time. well, it was a few years ago that we were talking with the west, but the chinese ideans do not understand this and do not really like it, what awaits us here. i think our challenge is. that the chinese and indians, other than the west, perceive the russian western confrontation as an episode of the struggle within the west, and we need to work with this perception to show that we are not the west, that we are there in the north let's say or what, we are the leader of this world majority or someone else the original state of civilization is written in the same new concept. well, let's say yes, but this is the perception in which they feel what is happening, in fact. this is a conflict of the white civilization within itself over, in general, not even ideological essences, but there is a dispute between economic entities. although uh, westerners are trying to present it as an ideological struggle. on the contrary, we will need to show that what is happening goes beyond the struggle. so inside western

civilization. this is essentially such a long confrontation about the principles, e, on which international relations in the 21st century will build unipolar or polycentric here , of course, we are like-minded people from china and, of course, what is happening is the main new feature - this is that in 500 years, in reality , significant centers of economic political military gravity arise. in the east , the east becomes for us an important and large new value that we need to know. but the danger is the one that we identified here in this recent western projection. yes, when the world was offered some a single logic of life, yes a single system of values, or the only one more precisely, yes , here it is here on the way where it rises, so to speak, the sun in the east is not waiting for us. uh, it seems to me not, because this is a feature of the western world, universalism and

the belief that this cultural ethical system is the only correct one and therefore it should be extended to everyone, but it started. uh , probably from the crusades and the great geographical discoveries, where there was, so to speak , an economic subject element big, maybe the main one, but it was all packed. here is this civilizing mission. the east lives differently, the east is not a single conglomerate. it's a lot of different cultures, sometimes with each other. well, not at all, if not alien, then very far from each other, and the meaning of this very term is the world majority, which we have appeared as a western minority, here it should not be confused with the fact that this is some kind of consolidated one. yes, the essence of the world majority, as well as multipolarity, is that no one imposes anything on anyone. and we don't do anything to anyone either. we impose and not only because it seems

like we have nothing to carry now, but also because no one needs it, there is no demand, the americans have already encountered this. if someone tries to carry his torch, he will face the same thing. today we gathered our thoughts about what is happening with international relations in the modern world fedor aleksandrovich lukyanov, international observer andrey andreyevich sunzhentsov to kant, faculty of international relations to the hero. i am vladimir igorievna. we continue to talk about it often, but in this new the emerging system of international relations. what is the place of russia or what should be the place of russia, as theologians would say, but in fact i want to ask you what the place should not be. that's who we definitely don't need to become. here in this new, emerging system. we cannot become a power of order. we are in the current border, as a country has existed since about the period of peter i but here we are, as a large

large state, a large center of gravity in the north, eurasia must be in the top three of the top five, and world powers maintain subjectivity in the struggle of these great countries. we roughly understand how demographics will develop until the middle of the century, how will economic trends look like uh? we hope more or less predictable, now politics will line up on the horizon. there, for a decade or two, russia must retain its subjectivity. it must be a strategically sovereign country that excludes the possibility of dependence. from someone it was not possible to maintain this autonomy the ability to choose the possibility of laying own destiny of the twenty-first century. i would say the same thing a little differently, we cannot be anything addition to avoid dependence, it will always be impossible to depend on someone. dependence here is just a task, so that then there are already more of them, so that different dependencies balance each other, because if so to speak, well, in the most

caricatured form, the raw material appendage of the west is turning into a raw material appendage of china; this may be internally pleasant for a number of reasons, but this does not change the essence, but glory to the entrepreneurial west, god still did not become final, and the second will not happen. therefore, this is independence and the opportunity to always implement in some kind of maneuver. this is a must thing. well, this is actually what andrei said, but purely like this, uh, philistine. it seems to me that in no case should you fuss, because when such a country is gigantic, and in fact, possessing everything. whatever possible it starts to fuss about there suddenly react to the fact that in general such countries should never react and enter. for example, well, i don't know, but i'm always surprised when he calls me, journalists and start asking. and here is an example, the minister of slovenia said, this one, well

, baby, he or there is some kind of congressman , this is what we have. it is mainly related to the west. nobody ever asks. but in vietnam they said something, this is the elimination of a certain complex, which in fact already has no grounds, but it, apparently, has been laid down. that's it for years of confidence that our development can only be catching up, therefore, even if in slovenia blathered something, then we need to somehow, perhaps, sharply give an angry rebuff, but still, it seems to me, this is just a fuss. first of all, it is distracting. secondly, it is degraded. i don’t need to remember this wonderful one, what is it called? meme? yes, when two buddhist monks are sitting there. they say they say i watch the trees grow. he says you're all in a rush. yes, this is a very important and interesting topic for me. here in this new history, the emerging system of international relations. religion as a worldview what role can the basis play? we can probably talk.