than light, while giving our adverses in ways that we may not though, the task, is more than preventing more disclosures from taking place in the future. instead we have to make some important decisions about how to protect ourselves and sustain our leadership in the world while upholding the civil liberties that our ideals and our constitution requires. we need to do so not only because it is right but because the challenges posed by threats like terrorism and proliferation and cyberattacks are not going away any time soon. they are going to continue to be a major problem. and for our intelligence community to be effective over the long haul we must maintain

the trust of the american people and people around the world. this effort will not be completed overnight. and given the pace of technological change, we shouldn't expect this to be the last time america has this debate. but i want the american people to know that the work has begun. over the last six months i created an outside review group on intelligence and communications technologies to make work of reform. you've listened to foreign partners, privacy advocates and industry leaders. my administration has spent countless hours considering how to approach spellings in this era of diffuse threats and technological revolution. so before outlining specific changes that i've ordered let me

make a few broads observations that have emerged from this process. first: everyone who has looked at these problems, including skeptics of existing programs, recognizes that we have real enemies and threats and that intelligence serves a vital role in confronting them. we cannot prevent terrorist attacks, or cyber-threats, without some capability'capability to penetrate digital communications. whether it's to unravel a terrorist plot, to intercept malwear for the stock exchange, to ensure that hackers do not empty your bank accounts. we are expected to protect the american people. that requires us to have capabilities in this field. moreover, we cannot unilaterally

disarm our intelligence agencies. there are reasons why blackberries and iphones are not allowed in the incident room of the white house. constantly probing our government and private sector networks, in accelerating programs to listen to our conversations and intercept our e-mails and compromise our systems. we know that. meanwhile a number of countries including some who have loudly criticized the nsa, privately acknowledge that america has special responsibilities as the world's only superpower. that our intelligence capabilities are critical to meeting these responsibilities and they themselves have relied on the information we have obtained to protect their own people. second: just as ardent civil

libertarians recognize these capabilities those are with capabilities for or with capabilities, more and more private information is digitized. after all the folks at nsa and other intelligence agencies, are our neighbors. they're our friends and family. they've got electronic bank and medical records like everybody else. they have kids on facebook and instagram and they know more than most of us, the vulnerabilities to privacy that exist in a world where transactions are recorded and e-mail and text messages are stored, and even our movements can increasingly be tracked through the gps on our phones. third, there was a recognition by all who participated in these reviews that the challenges to our privacy do not come from government alone. corporations of all shapes and

sizes track what you buy, store and analyze our data, and use it for commercial purposes. it's how those targeted ads pop up on your computer and your smartphone periodically. but all of us understand that the standards for government surveillance must be higher. given the unique power of the state, it is not enough for leaders to say: trust us, we won't abuse the data we collect. for history has too many examples when that trust has been broached. our system of government is built on the premise that our liberty cannot depend on the good intentions of those in power. it depends on the law. to constrain those in power. i make these observations to underscore that the basic values of most americans when it comes to questions of surveillance and privacy converge a lot more than the crude characterizations that

have emerged over the last several months. those who are troubled by our existing programs are not interested in repeating the tragedy of 9/11. and those who defend these programs are not dismissive of civil liberties. the challenge is getting the details right. and that is not simple. in fact, during the course of our review, i've often reminded myself, i would not be where i am today were it not for the courage of disdents like dr. king who were spied upon by their own government. and as president, a president who looks at intelligence every morning, i also can't help but be reminded that america must be vigilant in the face of threats. now, fortunately by focusing on facts and specifics, rather than speculation, and hypotheticals, this review process has given me and hopefully the american people, some clear direction for

change. and today, i can announce a series of concrete and substantial reforms that my administration intends to adopt missile or will seek to -- administratively or will seek to codify with congress. both home and abroad this which strengthen our intelligence requirement, also our alliances our trade and investment relationships, including the concerns of american companies and our commitment to privacy and basic liberties. and we will review decisions about intelligence priorities and sensitive targets on an annual basis so that our actions are regular reply scrutinized by our -- regularly scrutinized by

our regular security team. second, we will provide greater transparency oour surveillance activities and fortify the safeguards that protect the privacy of u.s. perception. since we began this review including information released today, we've declassified over 40 opinions and orders of the foreign intelligence surveillance court, including the section 702 program targeting foreign individuals overseas and section 215 telephone metadata program. going forward, i'm directing the director of national intelligence in consultation with the attorney general to annually review for the purposes of declassification any future opinions of the court, with broad privacy implications. and to report to me, and to congress, on these efforts.

to ensure that the court hears a broader range of privacy perspectives, i'm also calling on congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates from outside government to provide an independent voice in significant cases before the foreign intelligence surveillance court. third: we will provide additional protections for activities conducted under section 702 which allows the government to intercept the communications of foreign targets overseas who have information that's important for our national security. specifically, i'm asking the attorney general and dni to institute reforms that place additional restrictions on government's ability to retain, search and use in criminal cases communications between americans and foreign citizens

incidentally conducted under section 702. fourth: in investigating threats, the fbi also relies on what's called national security letters which can require companies to provide specific and limited information to the government, without disclosing the orders to the subject of the investigation. now, these are cases in which it's important that the subject of the investigation, such as a possible terrorist or spy, isn't tipped off. but we can and should be more transparent in how government uses this authority. i've therefore directed the attorney general to amend how we use national security letters so that this secrecy will not be indefinitely, so that -- indefinite, so it will terminate within a specific time, we will

also enable communications providers to make public more information than ever before about the orders that they have received to provide data to the government. this brings me to the program that has generated the most controversy these past few months. the bulk collection of telephone records under section 215. let me repeat what i said when this story first broke. this program does not involve the content of phone calls or the names of people making calls. instead it provides a record of phone numbers, and the times and lengths of calls. metadata that can be queried if and when we have a reasonable suspicion that a particular number is linked to a terrorist

organization. why is this necessary? the program grew out of the desire to address a gap identified after 9/11. one of the 9/11 hijackers, khlid al mendar made a phone call from san diego to a known al qaeda safe house in yemen. nsa saw that call but was not seeing that the call was coming from an individual already in the united states. the telephone metadata program under section 215 was designed to map the communications of terrorists so we can see who they may be in contact with as quickly as possible. and this capability could also prove valuable in a crisis. for example: if a bomb goes off in one of our cities and law enforcement is racing to determine whether a network is poised to conduct additional attacks, time is of the essence. being able to quickly review phone connections, to assess

whether a network exists, is critical to that effort. in sum, the program does not involve the nsa examining the phone records of ordinary americans. rather, it consolidates these records into a specific area if it has a specific lead. alesa consolidation of records,e review group turned up no information that this database is abused, and i believe that the program this data is designed to meet is preserved. having said that, i believe critics are right to point out that without proper safeguards, this type of program could be

used to yield more information about our private lives. and open the door to more intrusive bulk collection programs in the future. they're also right to point out that although the telephone bulk collection program was subject to oversight by the foreign intelligence surveillance court, it has never been subject to vigorous public debate. for all these reasons i believe we need a new approach. i am therefore ordering a transition that will end the section 215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists and establish a mechanism that preserves the capabilities that we need without the government holding this bulk metadata. this will not be simple. the review group recommended

that our current approach be replaced by one in which the providers or a third party retain the bulk records with government accessing information as needed. both of these options pose difficult problems. relying solely on the records of multiple providers, for example, could require companies to alter their procedures in ways that raise new privacy concerns. on the other hand, any third party maintaining a consolidated database, would be providing a government function, with more ambiguity, less accountability, all would have a doubtful impact on increasing public confidence that their privacy is being protected. during the review process some suggested that we may also be able to preserve the exaibles

capabilities that we need by recent technological advances but more work needs to be done to determine exactly how this system might work. because of the challenges involved, i've ordered that the transition away from the existing program will proceed in two steps. effective immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization, instead of the current three. and i have directed the attorney general to work with the foreign intelligence surveillance court, so that during this transition period the database can be queried only after a judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency. next: step two, i've instructed the intelligence community and the attorney general to use this transition period to develop options for a new approach that

can match the capabilities and fill the gaps that the section 215 program was designed to address, without the government holding this metadata itself. they will report back to me with options for alternative approaches before the program comes up for reauthorization on march 28th. and during this period i will consult with the relevant committees in congress to seek their views and then seek congressional authorization for the new program as needed. now, the reforms i'm proposing today should give the american people greater confidence that their rights are being protected. even as our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain the tools they need to keep us safe. i recognize that there are additional issues that require further debate. for example: some who participated in our review, as well as some members of

congress, would like to see more sweeping reforms to the use of national security letters. so we have to go to a judge, each time, before issuing these requests. here, i have concerns that we should not set a standard for terrorism investigations, that is higher than those involved in investigating an ordinary crime. but i agree. that greater oversight on the use of these letters may be appropriate and i'm prepared to work with congress on this issue. there are also those who would like to see different changes to the fisa court than i proposed. on all these issues i'm open to working with congress to make sure we build a broad consensus on how to move forward while upholding the civil liberties of every american. let me now turn to the separate set of concerns that have been

raised overseas. and focus on america's approach to intelligence collection abroad. as i've indicated the united states has unique responsibilities when it comes to intelligence collection. our capabilities help protect not only our nation but our friends and our allies as well. but our efforts will only be effective if ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the united states respects their privacy, too. and the leaders of our close friends and allies deserve to know that if i want to know what they think about an issue, i'll pick up the phone and call them. rather than turning to surveillance. in other words, just as we balance security and privacy at home, our global leadership demands that we balance our security requirements against our need to maintain the trust and cooperation among people and leaders around the world.

for that reason, the new presidential directive that i've issued today will clearly prescribe what we do and do not do, when it comes to our overseas surveillance. to begin with, the directive makes clear that the united states only use signals intelligence for letting security purposes and not for the purposes of indiscriminately reviewing the e-mails or text messages of ordinary folks. not to collect intelligence to disadvantage people on the base of their ethnicity or race or sexual orientation or religious beliefs. we do not collect intelligence to provide competitive advantage to u.s. companies or u.s. commercial sectors. and in terms of our bulk collection of signals

intelligence, u.s. intelligence agencies will only use such data to meet specific security requirements. counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cyber-security, forced protection for our troops and our allies and combating transnational crime including sanctions evasion. in this directive, i have taken the unprecedented step of extending certain protections that we have for the american people, to people overseas. i've directed the dni in consultation with the attorney general to develop these safeguards which will limit the amount of time we can hold personal information while also restricting the use of this information. the bottom line is that people around the world, regardless of their national at, should know

that the united states is not spying on ordinary people. we take their privacy concerns into account in our policies and procedures. this applies to foreign leaders, as well. given the understandable attention that this issue's received i i've made clear to the intelligent community that unless there is a compel national security purpose we will not monitor the heads of state and government of our close friends and allies. and i've instructed my national security team as well as the intelligence community to work with foreign counterparts to deepen our cooperation in ways that build trust going forward. now, let me be clear: our intelligence agencies will continue to gather information about the intentions of governments. as opposed to ordinary citizens, rarnd tharound the world, in the way that the intelligence

services of every other nation does. we will not apologize simply because our services may be more effective. but heads of state and government with whom we work closely, and on whose cooperation we depend, should feel confident that we are treating them as real partners. and the changes i've ordered do just that. finally: to make sure that we follow through on all these reforms, i'm making some important changes to allow our government as organized. the state department will designate a sfer officer to coordinates our issues related to technology and signalize intelligent. we will appoint a senior official at the white house to implement the new privacy safeguards i've announced today. i will devote the resources to centralize and improve the process we use to handle foreign

requests for legal requests, helping foreign partners fight crime and terrorism. i've also asked john podesta to lead a comprehensive review of big data and privacy. government officials along with the president's council of advisoadvisors of science and technology, look at how the challenges inherent in big data are being confronted in both the public and private sectors. whether we can forge international norms on how to manage this data and how we can continue to promote the free flow of information in ways that are consistent with both privacy and security. for ultimately, what's at stake in this debate goes far beyond a

few months of headlines, or passing tensions in our foreign policy. when you cut through the noise, is what's really at stake is how we remain true to who we are, in a world that is re-making itself at dizzying speed. whether it's the ability of individuals to communicate ideas, to access information, that would have once filled every great library in every country in the world, or to forge bonds with people on the other sides of the globe, technology is remaking what is possible for individuals and for institutions and for the international order. so while the reforms that i've announced will point us in a new direction, i am mindful that more work will be needed in the future. one thing i'm certain of this debate will make us stronger.

and i also know that in this time of change, the united states of america will have to lead. it may seem sometimes that america's being held to a different standard. and i'll admit the readiness of some to assume the worst motives by our government can be frustrating. no one expects china to have an open debate about their surveillance programs or russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other places into account. but let's remember: we are held to a different standard precisely because we have been at the forefront of defending personal privacy and human dignity. as the nation that developed the internet. the world expects us to ensure that the digital revolution works as a tool for individual

empowerment, not government control. having faced down the dangers of totalitarianism, and fascism and communism, the world expects us to stand up for the principle that every person has the right to think and right and form relationships freely. because individual freedom is the well spring of human progress. those values make us who we are. and because of the strength of our own democracy, we should not shy away from high expectations. for more than two centuries, our constitution has weathered every type of change because we've been willing to defend it. and because we've been willing to question the actions that have been taken in its defense. today is no different.

i believe we can meet high expectations. together, let us chart a way forward that secures the life of our nation while preserving the liberties that make our nation worth fighting for. thank you, god bless you, may god bless the united states of america. [applause] >> you have been listening to the president of the united states for approximately the last 50 minutes talking about changes to the national security agency or the nsa. the president announcing that he would make five changes, five steps that he was taking, going on to say that the reforms i am proposing today should give the american people greater confidence that their rights are being protected. mike viqueria at the white house did he succeed? >> well, the president talking about what the united states can do versus what it should do and of course del that is the essential question, the premise that the president stepped into today in the wake of all the controversy over the p past yeas

and the edward snowden issues. the controversial issue the collection of millions if not billions of bits of metadata, the president at pains to point out, over the course of the last several months, this is not the content of calls being made between americans and internationally but it involves just where the calls are originating and where the calls are going. that way the intelligence service can extrapolate whether foreign nationals are in touch with those in the united states. the president wants the program to continue, that's the bottom line del. he wants to examine ways it can be farmed out to companies, the companies have spoken up in the run up of that saying they are not interested in that at all. he wants to reform the program. among the ways he wants to do it, two steps removed, he says two hops removed.

any inquiries on the part of the intelligence committee must now oanld go as far as two steps, from a number associated with the terrorist suspects. whereas before it was three. judicial review at the fisa court, this is also a new safeguard that the president is proposing. on the issue of foreigners the 702 program, international surveillance, perhaps the principal concern is the incidental collection of data on the american public while the intelligence committee is surveilling those oversees. he does say the heads of state of close allies of the united states and previously an official described that as dozens, could not be taken any longer. everyone remembers the controversy around angela merkel. unless there is a national security reason, the president put