expected to grow into a billion dollar business. >> and a reminder there's more news and features as well as analysis on our website. usual address is aljazeera.com. >> hello, i'm ray suarez. one of the ways car companies know a product they're making isn't working very well is

customer feedback. earlier the last decade the word came in from birse there wer buyers that there were problems. consistent reports that the car would shut off. shut off while moving in traffic. germ motors didn't redesign the ignition, didn't recall the cars for repairs. just told drivers not to overload their key chains. now that the cars have been recalled, the details with the problems of the cobalt and related automobiles are come to go light. >> mr. chairman, i have a copy of the ignition switch assembly for one of these vehicles, this is that. a spring inside the switch, a piece that costs

pennies failed. g.m. new about this problem in 2001. they were warned again and again over the next decade but they dinothing. i just want to show how easy it is to turn this key when this switch. >> do you swear the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. >> congress demanded answers specifically why did g.m. take so long to recall 2 million cars when they knew there were problems with the ignition. >> my sincere apologies, especially family and friends who lost lives or were injured. i'm deeply sorry. i've asked former u.s. attorney to conduct a thorough and unimpeded investigation. i've received updates to him, and he tells me he's well along

with his work. he has free range to go where the facts take him regardless of outcome. the facts will be the facts. >> g.m. is not alone in the congressional finger pointing. the national highway traffic administration or nhts a. >> there are legitimate questions we need to ask whether n tsa did enough to uncover the problems and missed red flags. >> this is the first of who knew what and what was done about 2.6 faulty g.m. cars now directly linked to 31 crashes and 13 deaths. the recall includes all versions

of the chevrolet cobalt and hhr and the solstice and saturn ion. the cars are prone to a problem where the pair bags could switch off involuntarily when the key jiggles, now there is evidence that they did not react immediately when they learned of problems. according to the notes of agency records ntsa decided not to pursue investigation into g.m.'s faulty cars in 200 2007 and 2010 even though it's own investigators found 29 formal complaints. and according to the documents handed over to g.m. they cropped plans to fix the problems because it would have taken too long to solve and cost too much money to repair. instead of issuing a recall, g.m. sent a bulletin to dealers

explaining the details . there are documents that shows that they knew in 2001 and 2004. >> do you think this is a cover up or a sloppy work. >> that is the question that i'm anxiously awaiting for the results of the study. >> does it have anything to do with the auto bailout. >> again, i need to get the results of the study to make all determinations. >> thfirst of all, i again wanto reiterate we think the situation is tragic and we apologize for what is happened, and we're doing a full investigation . >> for some apologies are not enough.

>> what have they done? how much more lives had to -- >> i feel g.m. needs to be held accountable for the deadly and tragic consequences. it is clear that g.m. is only concerned with their bottom line and not the safety of our loved ones. >> mary barra announced last month she will personally direct the recall. it's her first major test as leader of the company that went through bankruptcy restructuring in 2009. >> when the ignition slips into

that auxiliary position, the airbags don't function properly. >> those are the questions that i want to answer, it has taken way too long, we'll make changes and we will hold people accountable. >> general motors is not alone in this story. the national traffic and highway administration is the government organization that oversea see recalls. >> the indicate at a was not

sufficient to warrant a formal investigation. what does this mean? it means that ntsa was concerned and engaged on this issue. this was a difficult case where tools and expertise over the last decade have resulted in 1,299 recalls including 35 recalls on airbag non-deployments. these tools have served us well and we'll continue to rely oh upon them and improve them. we've advanced computer tools to improve airport to spot defects and trends and we we're planning to expand that effort. what we know now is we need to challenge our assumptions, we need to look at how we handle difficult cases like this going forward. >> what did g.m. and when? and was the federal government asleep at the wheel? the house had its shot. next the u.s. senate. right now it's our turn. joining us to discuss what went wrong with g.m. cars and what

can be done to prevent situations like this in the future from providence, rhode island, shawn kane, and and from washington ray lahood, u.s. secretary of transportation from 2009 to 2013. he's now co-chair of the building america's future education fund which advocates investment in infrastructure. secretary, as head of the department of transportation, ntsa lived under your department umbrella, correct? >> that's correct. >> when people below you were considering getting these field reports, taking a look at the data, is this something that would come by your desk that you would be aware of? >> the experience that i had, ray, was with toyota. when i learned of the complaints that were coming in from our

career staff, i took very quick action and began regular daily meetings with our staff until we got to the bottom of what the problem was and ultimately we leveled the highest fines we could level under the law against toyota on two different occasions in the instance here of g.m. obviously i wasn't at the department. these incidents occurred well before i was part of the dot, but on a daily, daily basis every day the ntsa staff sits around the table and look at complaints. hundreds of complaints come to ntsa every day about problems people are having with their cars. also under the law the automobile manufacturers need to alert ntsa staff to problems they're having with their vehicles. as i've looked at the information that i've been able to see, it looks like g.m. did

not disclose during that time period to the ntsa staff some of the problems that they were having. >> but i am trying to get a better idea of where the threshold is for this as a question. obviously everyone who is unhappy with their car in america does not open a case with ntsa. >> that's right. there has to be an accumulation of complaints, and the severity. of it also comes into play. the thing that struck a cord with us with toyota was that four people were killed in an accident in san diego san diego in a toyota. and that to me struck a cor chod for me and our staff that there is more to this than meets the eye. it's more the severity that struck a courts.

>> in the case of general motors the second time they took further action you were secretary of transportation, is that something that would have crossed your desk, or does that get handled a lower levels. >> it gets handled at a lower level. but everyone in the agency knew that safety was my priority. i said that to the senate. i made it clear through all the distracted driving activities we took part in and all the safety activities--people knew that safety was my number one priority. i can tell you this, ray, i never ever heard of an instance involving g.m. and these vehicles during the time i was there. had i heard of it i would have paid attention to it. >> we're going to take a short break. when we come back we'll talk more about what triggers investigations, and the costs and benefits of recalls and how the decision to do one is made. this is inside story.

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>> welcome back to inside story. i'm ray suarez. general motors ceo mary barra took a grilling over faulty

ignition switches in millions of of. automobiles. but lawmakers want to know about old g.m. and what it knew and what it shared with customers and government regulators. when there starts to be reports from the field from repair, from customers themselves about a pattern of problems where should the alarm bell go off. is there nobody in detroit or washington who is taking that story and finding a pattern there. >> i have 21 years of experience in interfacing with ntsa anding i tell you it's not one pixel of information we are looking for. we're looking for millions of pixels to come together and form

a picture. what's particularly troubling when we look back at what was known and when it was known by both general motors and by ntsa we see that both parties are very culpable. we have an agency that is very small that has limited budget and limited time. when you look at the actual pixels that that agency had i in 2007 they include four deaths, 14 field reports and two special class . investigation. those aren't just singular pixels, they already knew that they identified the exact defect if stating what that defect can cause. so looking back it's very hard and very pusselled as to why

this was shot down as former investigation in 2007 >> looking at proposed class members in nationwide litigation. i think the responsibility for this ultimately rests with general motor. what i thought was very interesting was when asked whether or not they would accept responsibility , she read a very well prepared answer for everything but that she would not take responsibility. she said she was sorry and things like that, but she wouldn't step up. but earlier in her testimony she was saying the way she was willing to give customers could

yo coupons to buy more g.m. products. speaking as a lawyer, they didn't want coupons to be part of the settlement it's ironic that the head of one of the largest companies in the united states is trying to make the problems away by offering coupons which is it's sole purpose is to drive more business for general motors. that does not read to me like someone who with a is truly sorry for what happened here and someone who want to take responsibility for what we are learning may be the largest automotive cover up in history. >> is it clear in law that we're talking about the same company in 2014. when companies are forced into bankruptcy, reorganized, their old stock and old commercial paper becomes worthless. they can abrogate their union

contracts, they often get a full house cleaning at board levels, is it possible that they are as liable as the old g.m. for the problems of old g.m. >> that's a fair question but i don't think it's the right question exactly, ray, because obviously under the law the new entity is a post bankruptcy entity. that being said the question is which liabilities stay with the current enterration of general motors. even more than that, when it comes down to it whether they knew they were straight with the bankruptcy court and the american public. because you have to remember also that the american public that paid billions in taxpayer dollars to help in the g.m. bankruptcy are the very same

people that g.m. has been lying to for all these years to your question of what happens now we believe the claims asserted will be sustained against the current generation of general motors. >> you were a lawmaker for a long time. you were a lawyer and a member of the president's cabinet during the reorganization of the company. is it clear that the obligations from the old company follow through bankruptcy to this new one? >> i don't think it's that clear, ray, and i think this will be litigated for a long, long time. if we were to use an ounce of common sense which really doesn't apply in cases like this or in washington you would think that the old g.m. would be responsible. they are the company that manufactured these cars and in turn manufactured the defects and ignored what people were telling them about the defects

and made a business decision to move on and people should be held liable for that. >> we're going to take a short break now. when we come back we'll talk about the cost benefit analysis that are made around automobiles, around the way they're built, around the way they're fixed. this is inside story. >> evey saturday, join us for exclusive, revealing, and suprizing talks with the most interesting people of our time. >> thinking differently is actualy punished... >> this saturday, is public education actually failing america? >> education is the biggest investment we make in our futures. >> but what are we really teaching our kids? >> i think it's a catastrophe that so many school disticts have cut arts programs back... >> could his reforms lead to happier, more fufilled lives. >> schools need to encourage the development of imagination... >> sir ken robinson talk to al jazeera only on al jazeera america

>> welcome back to inside story. i'm ray suarez. on this edition of the program we're talking about massive recalls of cars with bad ignition switches. the problem with the design from a decade ago, everyone is trying to construct a timeline of what the government knew and when. the acting administrator of the

national traffic highway administration faces tough questions on capitol hill. shawn kane and adam leavitt with grant and ice isenhoffer representing the victims of g.m. cars and ray lahood, secretary of transportation from 2009 to 2013. there were back and forth internal documents that have not been released to the opinion that shows how much it would cost to fix these switches, and how much it would save in warranty costs. when they found that it would cost $0.90 per unit and only save them $0.10 to $0.15 per unit, the decision was to stop making the fix. are these calculations often made in situations like these?

>> what happens is that the defect decision the cost benefit analysis are juggled, and they're played out in the political sphere. what we see it's not just happening there, but their calculation of risk comes into play how the government enforcement role comes into play. we can take for example the things like the toyota unintended acceleration problem where three-quarters of the vehicles were never fixed by any recall whatsoever, and the only solution was floor mats for sticky pedals. the same kinds of things we're starting to see with other issues, too. these are playing into the cost benefit analyst. we're seeing the government role and government management they're managed as political issues rather than technical oneones.

>> secretary lahood, admissions of fault like that are costly to the reputation of a company. and yet they also have to worry about whether the product is going to kill people, whether there is going to be liability. we see now that they decided not to do anything. weren't they just rolling the dice that this wouldn't turn into a bigger problem down the road? >> but twenty20 hindsight is perfect and it's obvious that they made very poor judgment calls. i talked directly with mr. toyota, and i told him the evidence that we had, i told him what we were able to find. he knew it they fessed up and paid two huge fines.

when companies do that and make the corrections, they become better companies for it. they also begin to trust again. >> this may have up front costs but save you money down the road? >> the buying public deserves the best possible information they can get before they buy a car. everyone wants to drive a safe car and everybody believes they're going to do that. between the car manufacturers and ntsa, the agency with jurisdiction over this, they need to get it right. both of them need to get it right for the driving public. this is what we owe them. >> adam leavitt, what comes into play when you're trying to build an argument against a company with a case like this one?

is it finding people who didn't do their jobs properly or well? the wanton di disregard that say was a priority. >> it's going to be a combination of all those things. this ongoing culture of ignoring a serious problem that was known at the company for years which results when these serious problems ultimately coming out recently after they were very carefully cabined off between various entities within general motors. i think we're going to--the way to build this case is to start at the bottom simply with the facts. what happened, when did it happened. who knew it happened, why wasn't anyone told anything about it. what was the extent of the problem. in our view the defect exists in every single one of these cars,

and the defect coul as clear as possible is not just the ignition switch itself, it's the placement of the ignition on the steering column as well as the fact that as far back as '05 that they could have put a cloud shroud or shield if not solve the problem it would cut down on the problem. they failed to do that. as a result we are where we are now. every single person who bought cars without knowledge of the defect, it would have paid a lot less money for them. >> adam leavitt from chicago p shawn kane, secretary ray lahood with us. thank you for being with us. stay with us for developments in the g.m. plan. in washington, i'm ray suarez.

>> >> good morning and welcome to al jazeera america. i'm thomas drayton r let's get you ought up on the top stories this hour. >> an 8.2 magnitude earthquake hit off the chest of chile. tsunami warns were issued. throughout the north landslides are blocking some roads. >> it didn't meat the expects for g.m. is that what you would consider acceptable. >> as we know today, it's not. >> general motors c.e.o., mary barra, tells a house committee that the house will find out why it took 10