>> the government is prepared to carry out mass array... >> if you want free press in the new democracy, let the journalists live. ♪ hello and welcome to al jazeera america. i'm del walters in new york. the house oversight and government reform committee set to hold hearing at this hour. they have called the security service to testify, specific about this man who got much further into the residence than anyone thought we would manage to do so.

julia pierson is going to be on the hot seat today. lisa you have been inside that building. how surprised were you when you found out how far mr. gonzalez was said to have gotten? >> i think it has shocked everyone. first of all, as you know the first reports were that he got inside the building at all. and then the first reports were that they apprehended him right inside the door. now we're learning he got all the way past that guard. the guard was not able to stop him, he made it into the east room where events are held, the president often gives speeches in there. and then finally on the way into the green room he was tackled. he was carrying a 3.5-inch knife, and it's astonishing he got past all of the supposed layers of security designed to prevent someone from getting into the house.

so there will be a lot of very tough questions for julia pierson who just took over the top job about 18 months ago. and she truly will face a lot of secureny about this department and what needs to be done to straighten up what has been a problematic agency over the past few years. >> there are two concerns involving ms. pierson when she testifies. one is the security breach, but the other involves that it wasn't properly recorded. and there was bipartisan anger about this, which is rare in washington these days. >> reporter: there is anger. the first reports was that he was stopped right inside the white house. okay. that's bad enough. but now we're hearing -- the "washington post" first reporting, and indicating that he got much further into the

white house. so people are wondering is there another shoe to drop? what don't we know yet? i think it doesn't look good that this information is coming out peace meal like that. and that it is worse the more we hear about it. >> this is julia pierson being sworn in to testify. that is the committee chairman and the ranking member greeting her. but now we go back to 2011, and we're finding out that that other breach at the white house was far worse than once thought. >> right. the "washington post" said it took four days to realize someone fired a high powered rifle at the white at the time that sasha and her grandmother were home. and it was when someone finally

noticed there was a bullet whole. so that is another blemish. >> for our audience, we should point out there are two sides to the secret service. the uniformed division, the people we see usually in the picture, the ones with the white shirts, but there is also the other side of the secret service and both sides will be looked at. >> absolutely, about 6,500 members are in the secret service. should we listen in del? >> yes. this is darylize daryle 's sill. we take you live to washington. >> our duty is to protect these rights. our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers. it is our job to work tirelessly

in partnership with citizen watchdogs to bring genuine reform to democracy. this is our mission, and today's hearing follows one of the most important parts of that mission. with 1.5 billion dollarsing spent by the secret service, nearly a billion is spent on protection of the first family, the second family, former presidents and presidential candidates. the united states secret service was always considered to be the elite law enforcement agency, made up of men and women who were highly regarded, highly respected and highly trusted. the country has placed great faith and trust in the secret service. the agents of the uniform division, their officers, and the secret service agents have a

monumental task. that of protecting the nation's presidents, past, present, and future. they do so honorably and not without considerable personal sacrifice. they ensure the safety of the first and second family, yes, and the safety of foreign dignitaries throughout washington and at times around the world. they ensure the safety of every man and woman who enters the white house and accompanying buildings. but a history of misbehavior, security failures, has clearly blemished that record. on september 19th, omar gonzalez jumped the north fence, ran across the white house lawn, up the steps of the north protocol and into the front door of though white house. he was armed with a 3-inch knife. he entered through an unlocked

door, past the staircase, and into the east room of the white house. ladies and gentlemen, that was the part of my opening statement that was changed last night when the early false report that in fact he had been apprehended just inside the front door was turned upside down by a revelation that in fact he penetrated much further into the white house. secret service officers only subdued him after he was clearly well inside the white house. an intruder walked in the front door of the white house and that is unacceptable. common sense tells us that there were a series of security failures, not an instance of praise-worthy restraint. inexplicably omar gonzalez breached at least five rings of security on september 19th. the white house is supposed to

be one of america's most secure facilities, and in fact one of the world's most secure facilities, so how on earth did it happen? this failure was once again tested -- has tested the trust of the american people in the secret service, a trust we clearly depend on to protect the president. after allowing a paparazzi crazed reality tv star to crash a state dinner, after engaging prostitutes, after excessive drinking and an agent falling asleep outside of his room in the netherlands, and yes, after the mishandling of the 11-11-11 ing event, a gunman who sprayed bullets across the white house and it is recorded caused over

$100,000 in damage that was not properly reported or understood in real time, it is understandable that morality agency appears to be in decline according to news reports. in light of the recent break in, we have to ask whether the culture at the secret service and possible declining morale have an impact on operation. and those are some of our questions today. the appointment of director pierson brought new hope that the agency would reclaim its noble image, but recent events have so troubled us that in fact we have called the director here to face some tough questions. how could mr. gonzalez scale the fence? we understand that. that happens often. people try to scale that fence. but how is it that as would ordinarily happen, agents didn't

immediately apprehend him. how was he able to sprint 70 yards without being intercepted by guards inside the fence. why didn't security dogs stop him in his tracks? what about the s.w.a.t. team and sniper rifles? why was there no guard stayed at the front door of the white house? and yes, how much would it cost to lock the front door of the white house? the secret service must show us how there is a clear path back to public trust. the purpose of today's hearing is to gain answers to these many questions plaguing the secret service. today we will hear from experts on both -- on both the agency's protocol, foreign and domestic, but more -- most importantly, we will hear from the secret service director herself on her plans to improve the agency's performance.

americans face real danger as we serve interests abroad. especially those stationed at our embassies. it's a time of great peril. we are engaged in a battle against isil as we speak, but that is not limited to foreign soil. americans know that the next attempt to take the white house may not be by a crazed solo, knife-wheeling, veteran with ptsd. it could well be a planned attack from a terrorist organization. the fact is, the system broke down on september 19th. as it did when the solahes crashed the state dinner 2009. as it did when the white house was shot on november 11th, 2011.

as it did when agents paid for prostitutes and compromised security. as it did in the netherlands in 2014. we cannot further allow this. but more importantly, as i said to the director before today's hearing, the secret service relies on two important facts. their skill, their capability to protect the president must be at the highest level, because they cannot succeed 99%. because 1% failure is not an option. but they also rely on a good faith belief by most people that they shouldn'tn't even try. that this is the hardest target on earth. we need to make that that second hardest target on earth is true again both in reality and in the minds of anyone who might take

on the secret service. with that i recognize the ranking member for his opening statement. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. we begin today's hearing with an obvious premise. no individual should be allowed to scale the fence of the white house, sprint across the north lawn, and burst into the residence of the first family with a weapon. no one. our goal today is also clear. to determine how this happened, and make sure it never happens again. this is our watch. this recent incident, unfortunately causes many people to ask whether there is a much broader problem with the secret service. last night the "washington post" reported that omar gonzalez made his way into the east room, much further than the secret service

previously disclosed. another report in this weekend's post about a shooting incident in 2011, raising even more questions about the competency and culture of this elite agency. what concerns me most about this report is that agents said they were hesitant. agents in this agency said they were hesitant to raise security concerns with their supervisors. ladies and gentlemen, something is awfully wrong with that picture. the secret service is supposed to be the most elite protective force in the world. yet, four days went by before they discovered that the white house had been shot seven times. then in 2012, there was the prostitution scandal in

columbia. although it has little to do with tactic call protection issues. it seriously damaged the agency's credibility. the secret service must not only carry out its duties with the highest degree of excellence and effectiveness, but it also must maintain a reputation which matches that performance. as the chairman has said, much of what deters people from trying to pierce the protective vail of the secret service is the reputation, and that reputation must be one of excellence and effectiveness. today's witness, ms. julie pearson was appointed as the director of the secret service last year to help restore the agency's standing. she has had a distinguished 30-year career with the agency, and to her credit she immediately ordered an internal

review and agreed to testify. with respect to the most recent incident, i have see questions for the director that i know are shared by many people across the country. did the secret service have specific protocols for handling this type of perimeter breach? if so, were those protocols followed in this case? and if they were, do they need to be changed in light of what happened? if the protocols not followed, why were they not followed? and how can we have confidence that they will be followed in the future. i alsoing want to understand what happens prior to the incident. gonzales was arrested in virginia two months earlier on july 19th. mr. chairman, i would like to enter into the record an inventory sheet that was provided to us by the virginia state police. it lists the contents of this

car, which included an arsenal of 11 firearms, including sniper rifles, and a sawed-off shotgun. it also >> without objection the entire report will be placed in the record. >> thank you very much. it also included the contents of his car, which included a small arsenal of 11 firearms and sawed-off shotgun. it also included map of washington, d.c., with and i quote, a line drawn to the white house. according to the virginia state police, the bureau of alcohol, tobacco, and firearms concluded that there was no information in gonzales's history that prohibited him from owning these firearms. yet he was severely mentally ill, and a military psychiatrist

reportedly treated him for posttraumatic stress disorder, and paranoid schizophrenia. mr. chairman, i hate to even imagine what could have happened if gonzalez had been carrying a gun instead of a knife the whit. that possibility is extremely unsettling. today our world faces two challenges. first the secret service has not yet completed its internal review. i understand the director will provide a status update, but the final results are not yet in. second, some of the information is classified, so we cannot discuss it in public. the very last thing we want to go is give people like gonzales a road map for how to attack the president or other officials protected by the secret service. this does not mean the committee cannot obtain the information. the director sent a letter on

friday, offering not only to testify here today in the public setting, but also to provide all of us with classified briefing. the chairman has agreed to hold this classified session in a separate room directly after this hearing concludes. let me close by making this very final point. this, ladies and gentlemen, is not a democratic issue. this is not a republican issue. this is an american issue. this is also an issue of national security. the vast majority of men who serve and women who serve in the secret service are dedicated, experienced public servants who are willing to lay down their lives for their country. and on behalf of a grateful congress and a grateful nation, i thank every one of them. they have an extremely difficult job, and like others in similar positions, they are required to make instant life or death

decisions in extremely stressful situations. last year, for example, the capitol police shot and killed an unarmed woman with a one year old girl in the back seat of her car. some praised their quick responses, others criticized their actions, but they acted based upon their firsthand experience right here in the capitol when another deranged individual burst through the doors and killed two capitol police officers. the secret service has a high profile job. but it is critically important, and it requires accountability, so that the spotlight is rightly on their actions today. mr. chairman i look forward to the testimony. i thank you for bringing us back for this hearing, and i look forward to the questions that i have already raised and others being answered. with that i yield back. >> thank you, mr. cummings. i now recognize the gentlemen

from utah, the subcommittee chairman on national security for his opening statement. >> i thank the chairman and the ranking member mr. cummings. he is absolutely right. this is an american issue. i don't want it to be a political football, but we are self-critical, it's one of the beauties of our nation is we hold ourselves accountable. we have wonderful men and women who serve this country. they walk away from their families and spouses and don't know what the day is going to bring them. and they do so in a very, very honorable way. but i have serious concerns about the current leadership. i have concerns about training, and protocol. since the current director has taken on this role, it's also important to note she was chief of staff since 2008.

so the last several years it's not simply good enough as this was something we were trying to clean up before, because she was the chief of staff starting in 2008. i'm concerned about her leadership. the secret service was very quick to put out a statement after the fence jumping incident, that honored the agents for their tremendous restraint. tremendous restraint is not what we're looking for. tremendous restraint sends a very mixed message. the message should be overwhelming force. in one person can hop that fence, and run unimpeded all the way into an open door at the white house, don't praise them for tremendous restraint. that's not the goal. that's not -- that's not what we're looking for. if there were alarms that were inside the door that were muted or silenced, i want to know why

that is. who makes that call and decision? that to me is a heard ship decision. i think we need to review the 2013 inspector general's report that has over a thousand indications of security concerns. in the opening statement we say we have to be 100% right all the time. and yet the inspector general's report is pretty damming. very concerned about the 2011 incident, and i'm thankful for the "washington post" in their reporting there. as best i can tell from the spot report as well as the article in the "washington post," the cent in 2011 where eight shots were fired at the white house you had no less than five secret service agents report that they thought they heard shots fired. you had somebody on twitter report that they saw somebody shoot at the white house. there were two people in two

different shuttle vans who reported that they saw somebody fire at the white house. blocks away, somebody crashes the barricades, and there is a shotgun in the car, and nobody ties those two together. later the arlington police detained this person. he has been positively identified but nobody put it into a system to put him on the watch list. consequently when the police pull him over, they take his picture, and let him go. and the pennsylvania police actually found this person. now he is serving 25 years in jail, but he could have done a lot more damage. i think your opening statement and the goals you have should also talk about leadership, because as i talk to the whistleblowers at the secret service and others, they are

concerned about leadership. i'm also concerned about training. as i look at the 2015 budget request, on page 39 there is basic class totals. and i want to run through these numbers. under special agent basic classes in 2009 there were eight classes, 2012 there were no classes. 2013 there was one class. in the uniform division basic class, 2009, 11, 2010, 11 classes. in 2011, there were six classes. 2013, one class. and you look at the budget line for this, it didn't go down. why did that training diminish. and then finally mr. chairman, i worry about protocol.

tremendous restraint is not the objective. if you project weakness it invites attacks. if a would-be intruder cannot be stopped by a dog or intercepted by a person, then perhaps more force is necessary. and i want those agents know at least this member has their back. don't let somebody get into the white house ever. and if they have to take action that is lethal, i will have their back. in this day and age, we don't know what is going on underneath that person's clothing. if they want to penetrate that, they need to know that they are going to perhaps be killed. that's the message we should be sending every single time. and that's the kind of secret service that i expect. i thank them again for their service, their deck indication, we love them, we care for them, but we need better leadership.

it's not happening. yield it back. >> thank you. now we go to mrs. norton. >> thank you mr. chairman. my respect for the secret service goes back to when i was growing up as a child in the district of columbia and continues profoundly to this very day, but today we must ask, recent events call for a recent unprecedented event, call for an unprecedented response. first an increasing number of white house jumpers including the most recent this month, before that in 2011, multiple shots into the living quarters of the first family, discovered only four days later, not by

secret service investigation, but by white house staff. beyond these failures in the core mission of the secret service to protect the white house and the first family is an unsettling failure to disclose perhaps even understand what has occurred or to promptly investigate. together this combination of failures suggests strongly that the time is right for a 21st century makeover of the secret service. i do not regard this matter as a mere question of personnel. i believe it goes far deeper than that. moreover the stunning events have occurred during a period when the united states and by definition the white house and even the president are being targeted by domestic and

international terrorists. according to threat assessments, this president has had three times as many threats as his predecessors. just as troubling have been indications of unwarranted secrecy in the secret service. the secret service is not a secret society. if there is a willing avoidance of needed transparency, that in itself poses a danger to the white house. for example, when noise is heard that some believe could be gunfire at the white house, others believe is automobile backfiring, still others believe is gun -- gun -- gang gunfire, isn't it the job of the secret service to presume, presume,

such a sound is gunfire until an immediate investigation shows it was not? when line officers close to the sound have to become whistleblowers, has active suppression of information become yet another threat to the white house? worse do such failures show that some in the secret service are in denial of danger, perhaps posing the greatest risk to the white house? particularly troubling, in light of such unanswered questions, would be the rush to quick fixes such as suppression of public access to the area around the white house without a thorough

investigation. the white house and lafayette park just like the congress are first amid areas, and the public must be allowed to express their grievances as they also have been. in light of the seriousness of recent breaches, the investigation at the first instance by the department of homeland security should go well behind the details of these events. they are merely the most recent raw data for a top to bottom investigation of the operations at the white house. s this is not a question of personal, changing people at the top or in between will not solve the issue, i think we are presented.

we must learn whether today's secret service as structured for example could stop five or six fence-jumpers, jumping at the same time. intent on harm to the white house and the president, not just a demented war vet who even alone might have succeeded. at no -- no scenario should be off the table for the needed 21st century study of secret service operations in the age of terrorism. director pierson has shown accomplishments in her 18 months as director. the her roarism of the secret

service is not in debate. but the white house and the president have been thrust into a new era of danger. the secret service should welcome an outside investigation to ensure that the necessary resources and the expert backup and the structure for the 21st century is necessary for it to do its job. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i thank the gentle ladies. members may have seven days to submit opening statements for the record. i now ask that our colleague from texas mr. jackson lee be allowed to participate. so orders, and the gentlemen from missouri, mr. long be allowed to participate in today's hearing. without objective so ordered.

we now welcome, the honorable julia pierson, the director of the secret service. the honorable ralph basham is the former director of the secret service, and cur recollectly a partner at command consulting group. the honorable todd keel is the former assistant security at homeland security and currently an advisor to touch stone page. i would ask that you all rise and raise your right hand to take the oath. so you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth. please be seated. let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the

affirmative. please limit opening statement to five minutes. your statement will be made a permanent part of the record. and with that director pierson is recognized. >> good morning, general, ranking member, and distinguished members of the committee. i'm here to address the concern that we all share. it's clear that our security plan was not properly executed. this is unacceptable and i take full responsibility and i will make sure that it does not happen again. as director, my primary concern is ensuring the operational readiness of my work force. i have been aggressive in addressing our human capitol challenges, ensuring professionalism and developing leaders. through active engagement i have made it clear of my expectations for professionalism and personal accountability. much of what we do to protect the president and the white house involves information that

is highly sensitive or classified, sorry be limited in what i can say in a public hearing. on september 19th a man scaled the fence, crossed the lawn, while ignoring commands, entered through the front door and was subsequently arrested. immediately that night i ordered enhancements around the complex, and initiated a comprehensive review of the incident and protective measures to ensure this will not happen again. all decisions made that evening are being evaluated including those on tactics and use of force in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting those officers. i am committed to the following, a complete investigation of the facts of this incident, a complete review of all policies, and procedures in place that govern the security of the white house complex, and based on the results of that review, a coordinated informed effort to

make any and all adjustments to include training and personnel actions that are necessary to properly ensure the safety and security of the president, the first family, and the white house. the white house emergency action plans are multi-fasz setted. the secret service have apprehended 16 individuals, including six this year alone. in fact on september 11th, 2014, a week prior to the events, officers apprehended an individual seconds after he scaled a fence and ran into on the grounds. in addition to fence jumpers hundreds of individuals have approached the white house perimeter verbalizing threats or acting in a suspicious manner. officers routinely leverage their experience to arrest or transfer these individuals to appropriate facilities. protecting the white house complex is a challenge in any threat environment. in addition to being a national icon, the complex consists of

public spaces, executive offices, and the private residence of the president and first family. ensuring the safety of all who work and live in the white house, requires a unique balance. in this environment we are never satisfied by the status quo and constantly reviewing our security protocols. with the help of congress, we have enhanced our security features at the white house. in the past five years the secret service has upgraded perimeter cameras, and command and control systems along with enhancements that have made the president and the complex more secure. we have generated many of these new enhances in direct response to known terrorist tactics. beyond technology, approximately 75% of our annual budget is dedicated to payroll costs. the agency rewe relies heavily

experience. with respect to the many questions that have been raised, i do not want to get ahead of the investigation that is underway. the secret service has had its share of challenges in recent years and some during my tenure. i intend to lead the secret service through these challenges and restore our reputation to the level of excellence that the american public expects. as director as i'm proud of the work force and serve each day with honor and distinction. last week we implemented security measures u.n. general assembly. they have completed over 5600 successful protective missions, it is my responsibility to ensure these men and women have the resources and training that they need to succeed. i have worked with the

department of homeland security, secretary johnson, the administration and congress to include members of this committee to develop a strategy to further enhance the secret service's work force and operational capabilities. we remain dedicated and committed to protecting the president, the first lady and the sanctity of the white house. i thank you for the opportunity to appear and look forward to your questions. >> thank you. mr. bash em. >> mr. chairman -- >> could you pull the mic closer please. >> mr. chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my perspective today on the recent events at the white house. let me say at the outset, i look forward to discussing how the

recent incident highlights some of the challenge the secret service has long faced at the white hart lane complex, in balancing desired levels of security. along with the functional needs of those who work and live in that complex. the practical realities of the city it resides in and historic imagery of the people's white house house. the steps the secret service got right and those they got wrong. and will identify collective measures and resources. it poses difficult questions for all of us on issues like the use of lethal force and our tolerance for additional fortifications around the white house. the long-term potential consequences must be thought through. while our analysis of actions and shortcomings have the benefit of days of hindsight and consideration, anyone who has

served knows the decision making in an actual event with life and death consequences is measured in milliseconds. those on duty during this incident had a much harder job in trying to get it right than we do today. my perspective is shaped by a career of over 30 years, but also my experiences at the head of three other components and now from five years in the private sector, i remain deeply involved in the implementation of international best practices as it relates to individuals and high value assets. i had the honor of joining the secret service in 1971 and enjoyed challenging and very interesting career, including being on protective details of henry kissen jer, president bush, and countless others.

eventually i returned to washington after the september 11th attacks to help startup the transportation security administration. i rejoined the secret service in 2003 where i was honored to serve for over three years. i was app pointed by president bush to serve as a member of the border protection. i remained in that position into the obama administration. upon retiring from the government in 2009, i helped found a security company that works for private sector and government clients. therefore, the viewpoint i will share on the subject before the committee today is informed largely with my experience with the secret service, but with the benefit of having worked for many elite security oring niedzations around the world for almost # 40 years. let me come mend the members of

this committee for the time and interest you are showing on this issue. it goes without saying that the recent incident with the individual jumping the white house fence, running across the north lawn and making it inside the white house is unprecedented and unacceptable. this is not just my view but as the director has stated, it is her view and other senior management of that agency as well as rank and file. again, perspective is critically important. we could easily be sitting here why an iraq veteran possibly suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder was shot dead on the front lawn while the president and first lady were not at the white house. in the end, the secret service will learn valuable lessons as they have been doing throughout their history of protecting the

president and his family. this is an agency which has never been reluctant to red team incident those of high consequences and those of less importance. to find opportunities for improvement, and the way it conducts business, trains its people, and tools it uses to accomplish its incredibly important mission. my confidence remains extremely high that this aspect of the service's culture remains as strong today as it has ever been. and i know the agency will learn valuable lessons that it can apply immediately. i would urge the committee to keep in mind when examining any incidents that the broader context in which the secret service operates is not one which is valued on security alone. the service has to ensure that the president and other protectees and the facilities in which they work and live are safe and secure. but they do so on the context of

important values like freedom and openness. in close coordination and almost also in negotiation with a myriad of other stakeholders and decision makers who have diverse priorities responsibilities and viewpoints. this dynamic is in fact more view when it comes to the area surrounding the white house complex than any others. as much as i may have wished it when i was a director, the secret service cannot unilaterally when it comes to any security feature in and around the white house. stakeholders with a voice, the national park service, white house historical society, gsa and others all provide input into architectural changes and improvements, new structure and changes in appearance.

security impaired entrance to the white house, that was politically impossible until oklahoma city bombing made the impact to a vehicle-born explosive could have on a government building. no less a 200-year old sand stone mansion made it very vivid and undeniable. even on the it was not until 2004 that we were able to complete the project to convert this road into a pedestrian mall. there are those to this day who believe the avenue should be reopened in spite of the extreme risk such a move would put the first family and hundreds of employees who work there. there have been numerous studies conducted at the secret service's request to test and explore options to address vulnerabilities at the white

house, complex, motivated in part by concerns about the inadequacy of the current white house fence as a perimeter, given the ability of individuals to quickly scale it and be on the white house grounds. while notable changes have been made, many unnoticeable to the public, there have been several improvements that have not been possible given the level of funding provided to the agency. let me be clear i am not in any way trivializing these other situations. there are always things i would like to do for security purposes but could not given the factors and limited funding and that will always be the case. the white house like the united states capitol is an

important symbol for the american people. it's obviously critically important that it will kept safe, but it must not jeopardize the values we seek to protect. i ask that you keep this in context when looking at this incident, and examining how something could have happened or how it could and should be prevented in the future. finally i want to make sure the committee is aware of another fundamental principle in which the secret service protective methodology is based. in the military it's called defense in depth. in law enforcement it is usually referred to as multi-layered security. there are many levels of protection in which a person can pose a threat. a breach of a for instance --

>> mr. bashem, could you s sum -- summarize. >> having said that, i'm ready to take questions. >> thank you. >> you are listening to the house oversight committee. they are holding a hearing on the secret service, specifically in which omar gonzalez jumped over the fence on september 19th. we now know he made it much further into the white house than further revealed. the budget $1.5 billion, they want to know what happened to the money and how that money was spent. let's show you a graphic right now. gonzales going further into the white house than thought. and in the testimony we learned that five rings of security were breached. the committee chairman asking the simple question, how much

does it cost to put a lock on the front door of the white house. pointing out that the next attempt to take over the white house could be a planned attack by a terrorist organization. and the most disturbing piece of information coming from mr. cummings who reported when gonzales was arrested, he said, quote, he had a small arsenal of 11 firearms, and also included when they searched his car a map of washington, d.c. with a line drawn to the white house. lisa stark right now in washington, d.c. with us. lisa your reaction so far to what is coming out of this hearing, specifically the fact that there was information that this man was a very, very severe threat. >> well, and in fact there have been reports, and it will be interesting to see if the secret service is asked about this. there have been reports that the

secret service turned that information over, after he was arrested for reckless driving earlier this summer. and then there is additional information we heard in the past that he was always spotted near the white house and stopped in august. so there were two opportunities to stop him before he got over that fence. and i want to mention briefly that we heard for the first time obviously from the head of the secret service, ms. pierson saying she takes full responsibility for what happens. she says it is unacceptable and will never happen again. but it is clear our security plan was not executed properly. and that is the question, why not? as you know the committee members, praising the members of the secret service, the individual men and women, saying these folks get up every day. they put their lives on the line for the president and the first family, but questioning does there need to be a change at the

top, are the procedures not up to date, what is wrong that something like this can happen? >> lisa stand by we will come back to you shortly. as you listen to the testimony, you realize that every speaker so far has been saying the same thing, and that is that this is a bipartisan issue. it is an issue of safety and protecting the first family of the united states. you are watching the testimony right now before the house oversight and government reform committee in washington. i'm del walters in new york. we'll take a short back and be right back. the news has become this thing where you talk to experts about people, and al jazeera has really tried to talk to people, about their stories. we are not meant to be your first choice for entertainment. we are ment to be your first

♪ i'm del walters in new york. you are watching live testimony right now, taking place in front of the house oversight and government reform committee in washington, d.c. they are talking to the head of the secret service asking about reports of security breaches at the white house among other things. specifically an incident that happened back on september 19th when omar gonzales managed to leap the fence and make it inside. take a listen. >> this group should be tasked with providing advice and formal mreng a decisions to the secret service. mr. chairman the panel i was on, on benghazi was chaired by -- i have been proud to work with my

colleagues at every level of the agency. i'm confident they will learn from this most recent and related incidents, and innovate, strengthen and improve as they keep your leaders safe. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. kyle. i'll recognize myself now. i think the first question, if you can put a map of the white house up there. if you look at the lower portion, the first question the american people want to know was, is there a crash button and had it been pushed, would it have locked the front door, what is marked as the entrance hall? >> the front door at the time did not have an automatic locking mechanism. it required an individual to hand lock the door. >> okay. so we have an automated system that can lockdown the white

house. $800 million a year. millions of dollars more during your tenure each year, at the president's request, and that door was unlocked with no one standing at it when mr. gonzales came through it; is that correct? >> the door was unlocked at the time of mr. gonzales's entry; that's correct. >> okay. and earlier there was a report and in the indictment of mr. gonzales that he was apprehended at the end transhall. isn't it true today that we understand that is not true. he was actually apprehended at the green room, is that correct? >> if i may clarify my first answer. the front door consists of two doors. there is an outer door, which is a glass, almost described as a storm door. and an inner door.

the outer door, the glass storm door was not locked. the internal wood door was in the process of being hand locked. >> bottom line is automated locking is a capability of the white house but not at that end transat that time. >> not at that time, but it has been installed today. >> your agency previously reported in an indictment against mr. gonzales asserted that he was arrested in that end try area, isn't it true he penetrated that area. >> referring to your map on the wall -- >> yes. >> as i have been briefed, the -- mr. gonzales entered the front double doors -- >> ma'am i want a short answer. i have very little time. the federal complaint said he was apprehended in one place.

isn't it true he was apprehended in another place. >> as he entered the door, the knocked back the officer standing at the hallway. they then crossed the eastern transhall together. made the left turn down the cross hall. stepped momentarily into the east room. another officer rendered aid and he was placed on the ground. on sne rz drz [ technical difficulties ] >> i think the original complaint is accurate that mr. gonzales scaled the fence. >> ma'am, hold it, i have very little time, and i'm not -- the american people want to know is the president safe. i want to know if we can rely on reports from your agency. going back to mr. hernandez

during your watch as chief of staff to the director, is it true that in fact as reported agents falsely assumed that they were not gunshots, when there were gunshots, there was standown orders to people who pulled shotguns out. and bullets were not reported to have hit the white house within 24 hours by the secret service. >> you are referring to the ortega shooting that occurred in 2011. >> yes. >> at that time it is my understanding that there are reports of shots being higher inned -- >> ma'am, stop, please. i want to be considerate to you. you have a hard job, but you head an agency who's morale has gone down, it is lower than