the use of coercive technique methods regularly resulted in fabricated information. sometime the cia actually knew detainees were lying. other times the cia acted on false information, diverted resources and leading officers or contractors to falsely believe they were acquiring unique or actionable intelligence and that the interrogations were working when they were not. cia often called into question the effectiveness of the cia's interrogation techniques, noting how the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation, or produce accurate information. the report includes numerous examples of cia officers questioning the agency's claims, but these contradictions were

marginalized, and not presented externally. the second set of findings and conclusions is that the cia provided extensive inaccurate information about the program and its effectiveness to the white house, the department of justice, congress, the cia inspector general, the media, and the american public. this conclusion is somewhat personal for me. i remember clearly when the director briefed the intelligence committee for the first time on the so-called eit's at that september 2006 committee meeting. he referred specifically to a quote tummy slap end quote among other techniques and presented the entire set of techniques as minimally harmful and applied in a highly clinical and

professional manner. they were not. the committee's report demonstrates that these techniques were physically very harmful. and that the constraints that existed on paper in washington did not match the way techniques were used at -- said that blood testing is more precise in the past two decades, but restrictions would stay in effect because only allowing men to donate blood if they haven't had sex in more than a year. >> joining us now is damon -- 21st and included multiple forms of deprivation and physical assault. the description of this period, first written up by our staff in early 2009, while senator rockefeller was chairman, is what prompted this full review. but the inaccurate and

incomplete descriptions go far beyond that. the cia provided inaccurate memoranda and explanations to the department of justice, while its legal counsel was considering the legality of the coercive techniques. in those communications, the cia claimed the following, the coercive techniques would not be used with excessive reputation. detainees i would always an opportunity to provide information prior to the use of the techniques. the techniques were to be used in progression, starting with the least aggressive and proceeding only if needed. medical personnel would take sure that interrogations wouldn't cause serious harm and could intervene at anytime.

interrogators with carefully vetted and highly trained, and each technique was to be used in a specific way without deviation, and only with specific approval for the interrogator and detainee involved. none of these assurances, which the department of justice relied on, were consistently or routinely carried out. in many cases important information was withheld from policy makers. for example, mourn intelligence committee chairman bob graham asked a number of questions after he was first briefed in september of 2002, but the cia refused to answer them. effectively stone walling him until he left the committee at the end of the year.

in another example the cia in coordination with white house officials and staff, initially withheld information on the techniques from secretary of state colin powell, and secretary of defense donald rumsfeld. there are cia records stating that colin powell wasn't told about the program at first, because there were concerns that, and i quote, powell would blow his stack if he were briefed. source, email from john rizzo, dated july 31, 2003. cia records clearly indicate and definitively that after he was briefed on the cia's first detainee, the cia didn't tell president bush about the full nature of the eit's until

april 2006. that's what the records indicate. the cia similarly withheld information or provided false information to the cia inspector general during his conduct of a special review by the ig in 2004. incomplete and i inaccurate information from the cia was used in documents provided to the department of justice, and as a case us for president bush's speech on september 6th, 2006, in which he publicly acknowledged the cia program for the first time. in all of these cases, other cia officers acknowledged internally -- they acknowledged internally, that information the cia had provided was wrong. the cia also mislead other cia white house officials. when vice president cheney's

counsel asked cia counsel general in 2003 about the cia's videotaping the water boarding of detainees, muller deliberately told him that videotapes, quote, were not being made, end quote, but did not disclose that videotapes of previous water boarding sessions had been made and still existed. source, email from scott muller dated june 7th, 2003. there are many many more examples in the commit tease report. all are documented. the third set notes the various ways in which cia management of the program from its inception to its formal termination in january of '09, was inadequate and deeply flawed. there is no doubt that the

detention interrogation program was by any measure a major cia undertaking. it raised significant legal and policy issues, and involves significant resources and funding. it was not, however, managed as a significant cia program. instead it had limited oversight, and lacked formal direction and management. for example, in the six months between being granted detention authority, and taking custody of its first detainee, the cia had not identified and prepared a suitable detention site. it had not researched effective interrogation techniques or developed a legal basis for the use of interrogation techniques outside of the rapport-building techniques that were official cia policy until that time.

in fact, there is no indication the cia reviewed its own history. that's just what hellgerson was ways in '05 with coercive tactics. the cia had engaged in ruffin -- rough interrogation in the past. inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence, and will probably result in false answers, end quote. that was a letter from john hellgerson, cia director of congressional affairs dated january 8th, 1989. however, in late 2001 and '02,

rather than researching practices and coordinate with other parts of the government with extensive expertise, the cia engaged two contract psychologists, who had never conducted interrogations themselves, or ever operated detention facilities. as the cia captured, or received custody of detainees through 2002, it maintained separate lines of management at headquarters for different detention facilities. no individual or office was in charge of the detention and interrogation program until january of 2003, by which point, more than one-third of cia

detainees identified in our review had been detained and interrogated. one clear example of flawed cia management was the poorly managed detention facility retered to by the code name, cobalt to hide the actual name of the facility. it began operations in september of 2002. the facility new few -- excuse me, the facility kept few formal records of the detainee's house there. and untrained cia officers conducted frequent, unauthorized and unsupervised interrogations, using techniques that were not and never became part of the cia's formal enhanced interrogation program. the cia placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in

charge of the site. in november 2002, another wise healthy detainee who was being held mostly nude and chained to a concrete floor died at the facility from what was believed to be hypothermia. in interviews conducted in 2002, cia's leadership acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of operations at this specific cia detention site. and some cia officials -- excuse me -- senior officials believed erroneously that enhanced techniques were not used there. in the june 2013 response to the commit tease report agreed that there were management failures in the program, but asserted that they were corrected by

early 2003. while the study found that management's failures improved somewhat, we found they persisted until the end of the program. among the numerous shortcomings identified in the report are the following. the cia used poorly trained and non-vetted personnel. individuals were deployed in particular interrogators without relevant training or experience. due to the cia's redact shuns to the report is there are limits to what i can say, but it's a clear fact that the cia deployed officers who had histories of personal, ethical and professional problems of a serious nature. these included histories of violence and abusive treatment of others, and should have called into question their employment with the united states government, let

alone their suitability to participate in a sensitive cia covert action program. the two contractors that cia allowed to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation operations conducted numerous inherently governmental functions that never should have been outsourced to contractors. these contractors are referred in the report in special pseu pseudonyms, they developed a list of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that the cia employed. they personally conducted techniques, using the water boarding of three detainees. the contractors provided the official evaluations of whether

detainees psychological states allowed for the continued use of the enhanced techniques. even for some detainees they themselves were interrogating or had interrogated. evaluating the psychological state of the very detainees they were interrogating is a clear conflict of interest, and a violation of professional guidelines. the cia relied on these two contractors to evaluate the interrogation program they had devised and in which they had obvious financial interest, again, a clear conflict of interest, and an avoidance of responsibility by the cia. in 2005, the two contractors formed a company specifically for the purpose of expanding their work with the cia from '05 to '08, the cia outsourced

almost all aspects of its detention and interrogation program to this country as part of a contract valued at more than $180 million. ultimately, not all contract options were exercised, however, the cia has paid these two contractors and their company more than $80 million. of the 119 individuals found to have been detained by the cia during the life of the program, the committee found that at least 26 were wrongfully held. these are cases where the cia itself determined that it had not met the standard for detention set out in the 2001 memorandum of notification, which governed a covert action.

detainees often remained in custody for months after the cia determined they should have been released. cia records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many other detainees. due to poor record keeping, a full accounting of how many specific detainees were held, and how they were specifically treated while in custody may never be known. similarly, in specific instances we found that enhanced interrogation techniques were used without authorization in a manner far different and more brutal than had been authorized by the office of legal counsel and conducted by personnel not approved to use them on detainees. questions about how and when to apply interrogation techniques were ad hoc and not proposed

evaluated, and approved in the manner described by the cia in written descriptions and testimony about the program. detainees were often subject to harsh and brutal interrogation, and treatment because cia analysts believe often in error that they new more information than what they had provided. sometimes cia managers and interrogators in the field were uncomfortable with what they were being asked to do, and recommended ending the abuse of a detainee. repeatedly in such cases they were overruled by people at cia headquarters, who thought they knew better. such as by analysts with no line authority. this shows, again, how a relatively small number of cia personnel perhaps 40 to 50 were

making decisions on detention and interrogation, despite the better judgments of other cia officers. the fourth and final set of findings and conclusions concern how the interrogations of cia detainees were absolutely brutal. far worse than the cia represented them to policy makers and others. beginning with the first detainee, and continuing with numerous others, the cia applied its so-called enhanced interrogation techniques in combination, and in near stop fashion for days and even weeks at a time on one detainee. in contrast to cia representations, detainees were subjected to the most aggressive techniques immediately. stripped naked. diapered, physically struck, and

put in various stress positions for long periods of time. they were deprived of sleep for days. in one case up to 180 hours, that's seven and a half days, over a week with no sleep, usually standing or in stress positions. at times with their hands tied together over their heads chained to the ceiling. in the cobalt facility i previously mentioned, interrogate fors and guards used what they called rough takedowns in which a detainee was grabbed from his cell, clothe cut off, hooded and dragged up and down a dirt hallway while being slapped and punched. the cia lead several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave cia custody alive. suggesting to abu that he would only leave in a coffin-shape box. that's a cia cable from

august 12, 2002. according to another cia cable, cia officers also planned to cremate zubida should he not survive. source, cia cable, july 15, 2002. after the news and photographs emerged from the united states military detention of iraqis at abugreb, the intelligence committee held a hearing on the matter in may 2004. without disclosing any details, cia director testified that cia interrogations were nothing like what was depicted at abu gray, the united states prison in iraq where detainees were abused by american personnel. this of course, was false. cia detainees at one facility described as a dungeon were kept

in complete darkness, constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a budget to use for human waist. the bureau of prisons went to that prison in 2002, and according to a cia email, told cia officers they had quote never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, end quote. again, source, cia email, sender and recipient redacted december 5th, 2002. throughout the program, multiple detainees subject to interrogation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self

harm and self mutelization. the lack of human contact was the cause of the psychiatric problems. the summary includes far more detail than i am going to provide here about things in these interrogation sessions, and the summary itself includes only a subset of the treatment of the 119 cia detainees. there is far more detail, all documented in the full 6,700-page summary. this summarizes briefly the committee's findings and conclusions. i would like to thank the people who made this undertaking possible. first senator jay rockefeller. he started this project by directing his staff to review the operational cables that described the first recorded

interrogations after we learned that the videotapes of those sessions had been destroyed. and that report was what lead to this multi-year investigation, and without it, we wouldn't have really had any sense of what had happened. i thank other members of the senate intelligence committee. one of whom is on the floor today from the great state of new mexico, others have been on the floor who voted to conduct this investigation and to approve its result and make the report public. but most importantly, i want to thank the intelligence committee's staff who performed this work. they are dedicated and committed public officials who sacrificed and really sacrificed a significant portion of their lives to see this report through

to its publication. they have worked for years in some of the most difficult circumstances. it's no secret to anyone that the cia does not want this report coming out. and i believe the nation -- that is the scene right now in capitol hill. that's the chairman of the senate intelligence committee, diane feinstein, she was announcing the release of an extensive report on interrogation techniques used by the cia. it's in fact the committee's five-year review of the cia and detention program. just to summarize a little bit of what she said, she said that the report or the summary of the report that has been released aledges that the use of torture did not produce unique and life-saving information, and also suggests the cia lied about that covert program. crossing over to kimberly

joining us from capitol hill. listening in to diane feinstein, tell me your thoughts and what congress is expected to do now. >> i think the last sentence really revealed just how much pressure she was under not to release this report, and it's those contents you can see why. the findings of this report, that this was not a good way to gather intelligence according to the committee; that the enhanced intear gags techniques were more brutal than anyone ever believed and they were done with little oversight and really those involved with this program deliberately mislead policy makers. those are some of the findings coming out. but again, diane feinstein acknowledged at the beginning of our speech that she was under tremendous pressure by members of the obama administration, lawmakers on capitol hill, both

democrats and republicans not to release this report, and the reason why she acknowledged that she felt so strongly that this must happen, the argument that the u.s. and the world is in a period of instability and this will exacerbate the operation. and she says this is the situation no matter what, and those who argue against the release have unfounded arguments. the united states needs to restore its image, and this report will acknowledge that the u.s. can look at the ugly truth and this report was too important to shelve indefinitely. >> who exactly helped her and who on the hill opposed here? >> well, ultimately there was an agreement between those at the cia level and the administration, as well as here on capitol hill to do that.

john mccain who is a republican as well as lindsey graham were really supporting her. but again, there was a tremendous amount of pushback from the cia. even as she was speaking we had a statement from the cia director saying in fact he very directly disputes many of the findings that diane feinstein has presented, namely this program did in fact produce results. he said he did ward off attacks, save lives, and it is the basis of the anti-terrorism campaign today. and the committee didn't conduct interviews with those actually involved with the program. she says this was not necessary, because they looked at real time documents, emails, chats that were taking place, and it was from there that she believes that we can get the complete

picture of what actually took place versus perhaps interviews and recollections that can be up to ten years old. >> kimberly standing by for a second, we're going to listen in to john mccain speaking right now. >> -- from officials in two administration and from some of our colleagues. the truth is sometimes a hard pill to swallow. it sometimes causes us difficulties at home and abroad. it is sometimes used by our enemies in attempts to hurt us. but the american people are entitled to it, nonetheless. they must know when the values that define our nation are intentionally disregarded by our security policies, even those policies that are conducted in secret, they must be able to make informed judgments about

whether those policies and the personnel who supported them were justified in compromising our values. whether they served a greater good, or whether, as i believe, they stained our national honor, did much harm, and little practical good. what were the policies? what was their purpose? did they achieve it? did they make us safer? less safe? or did they make no difference? what did they gain us? what did they cost us? the american people need the answers to these questions. yes, some things must be kept from public disclosure to protect clandestine operations, sources, and methods, but not the answers to these questions. by providing them, the committee has empowered the american people to come to their o