e than 1700 new words were added to merriam wek webster's addition dictionary. if you don't know what these words mean, you will soon be able to look them up. i'mi'm antonio mora. good night. good night. >> it appears obituaries written for the armies of the islamic state of iraq and levant may have been a little premature. the footprint of i.s.i.l.'s hoped for state is still pretty large. it's racked up major victories in syria and iraq recently and leaves you wondering what the next of the world's next move is against a murderous and resilient opoftenlt the

continuing fight against i.s.i.l. -- opponent. the continuing fight against i.s.i.l. is tonight's "inside story". [ ♪♪ ] welcome to "inside story", i'm ray suarez. in recent weeks authorities in western capitals were reciting a list to the setbacks to the so-called islamic state of iraq and levant. the i.s.i.l. fighters were thought to be in decline as more countries joined the battle. weeks later there's plenty of fight in the group. i.s.i.l. ran successful campaigns in syria and iraq. the biggest surprise was the capture of ramada in iraq the u.s.-trained security forces have been criticised, evaporate evaporating in the face of the

army. jamie mcintyre has a closer look. >>reporter: pentagon painted a confusing picture. 800 truck bombs, an ambush overwhelming a small patrol and sand storms limiting air support. thousands said to have been driven out in the advance of hundreds of i.s.i.l. fighters. it's what defense secretary ash carter was talking about when he told cnn about the forces fighting. >> they withdrew from the site. and that says to me to most of us that we have on issue with the will of the iraqis to fight i.s.i.l. and defend themselves. pentagon sources say the

iraqi forces in ramadi outnumber i.s.i.l. 10-1, enjoying what the pentagon term a substantial combat advantage over the enemy. there were 10,000 troops holding ramadi including 7,000 security forces, and 3,000 federal police and special operations troops that folded in the face of 1,000 i.s.i.l. attackers. the pentagon said after more fighting, the ramadi defenders were war weary, feeling ignored and badly led by iraqi commanders who were not communicating with each other and had a flawed understanding for a battle space. there was an argument that they hadn't cut and run, but some elite troops pulling out turned into a stampede. >> morale stripped. they believe they were not receiving the support.

they went to a meeting in brussels the ifs was not driven out of ramadi they were driven out - meaning they left by choice not force. none of the fighters abandoning ramadi were among those trained by the u.s. >> we would expect forces august meanted by the u.s. -- augmented by the u.s. and coalition trained troops and augmented by local fighters were the local sunni tribes and the popular mobilization force, will be able to improve the performance of the iraqis on the battlefield against i.s.i.l. the pentagon is rushing 2,000 antitank weapons to iraq. to mound demoralizing attacks. despite complaints from iraqis on the ground they are too few to be effective. the pentagon is putting american troops on the front lines, to

call in air attacks, would make little difference. >> the post saddam iraqi forces are an american creation, is this criticism coming from the department of defense, a kind of verdict on the job the united states did in building the force, or really just judgment on one bad battle or one bad series of battles? >> we have to look at two parts of this. one is the forces the united states left behind when it left in 2011, the ones that folded in the face of the initial i.s.i.l. assault. the pentagon assessment is the will to fight, of a corrupt deposit. nouri al-maliki back in those days. now there has been a change to the government with haider

al-abadi in charge. the pentagon's assessment was the will to fight was broken by a number of factors, including the idea that some sunni fighters feel they are not being adequately support the by the government in baghdad. i mentioned antitank a t4 weapons that could be used stopping the vehicle born truck bombs and vehicle bombs. there were none of those in ramadi. they are rushing some to iraq. that's the weapon that might have blunted the offensive. ut never know because of factors involved in the fall of ramadi. could have been a tipping point. the series of explosions demoralized and spooked some of the troops. might have started some of the despollution of what happened. >> they look at the factors. the troops in ramadi had been there for a while.

they were suffering low moral, they did not have the leadership that they should have had. they are more hopeful that the troops going in including forces recently trained by americans may have more success. >> if there were doubts at the pentagon about the effectiveness of iraqi security forces and the willingness to defend their own country, does that change american calculus as it looks at the battle space and the resources it brings to bear against i.s.i.l.? >> the pentagon would say there's a limit to what the united states could do. as defense secretary ash carter puts it we can give them the training the equipment. they believe the will to fight the political situation in iraq they say that they find the willingness of individual units was to stand and fight, has to do with the sectarian nature of the environment they were in.

if they feel that they were part of an inclusive government that they are fighting for something to believe in they do have a will to fight. when they feel like they are not supported, and outside of the main stream that's where troops can decide "it's not worth it we are getting out of here." >> is this situation seen as one that is fluid, that can change until we see reports like from a couple of years ago. >> the battle will go back and forth and be over several years. they are saying "don't look at an individual battle or setback like ramadi. this will be a long battle. a multi-year effort. >> al jazeera's national security correspondent jamie mcintyre at the pentagon. thank you as i.s.i.l. armies continue to menace iraq draw iran deeper into the fight and destabilize a

chaotic syria, what is the next move for the united states and its international partners. the continuing fight against i.s.i.l. is tonight's "inside story".

welcome back to "inside story". tonight we are focussing on the resiliency of i.s.i.l. in recent weeks the group has taken control of ramadi and iraq. the historic city of palmyra in syria, and for the first time the group took credit for a suicide bomb attack on a mosque inside saudi arabia. joinings us on the programme is james jeffrey, the american ambassador in iraq during the george w. bush administration and is a fellow at the washington institute. also with us nyara hawk a state

department official during the obama administration. thank you both for joining us tonight. james jeffrey, you heard jamie mcintyre describing back and forth tempo of the battle. is it too soon to conclude something is working or not in this part of the world. >> first of all, it tracks with everything i heard. this is fundamentally different with mosul, where troops refuse to fight. the security forces have been fighting off the attacks for a year and a half. they weren't inexperienced. it was typical military problems that i knew in the army a lack of unity of command. logistical problems. one unit pulls out. it's like a couple of players go up the field, and the rest of the players think he lost a couple of guys. they have a tendency to go off

the field. this can be remedied and recognised as something serious. the president said tactical setback. i think it's more that that. some of the things we do out there, we have to see if we can do it better. >> troops that abandoned ramadi are an important place. these are some of the best troops the golden division in the iraqi army. >> there's a failure at the regional level to support in other ways and compliment the u.s. activities you mentioned the i.s.i.l. attack on a mosque in saudi arabia. the saudis have for months if not years, stepped back from this effort and supported war fair in yemen, but not supported the shia regime or the bridging sectarian violence in iraq. what you are seeing is a failure

of leadership within the region that the united states can only compensate for so far. >> is that a fair comment? >> absolutely. people look at this struggle. they look around the nuclear struggle and yemen, lebanon, through the prism of sunni, arab persian. that is hurting the fight. in the case of iraq and syria, you have mixed populations, if you give all the marbles to one ethnic or religious group. >> the interesting thing, let's look at a map showing the extent of i.s.i.l. control of eastern syria and western iraq. things were said to be horrific in many of these towns. it's hard to explain. it's hard to wrap your head around continuing support of the populations in these regions, look at the size of the

foodprint. it's an important player in the region. >> looking at the footprint. it will be false to say. this is a horrific group that has taken and wrested control with a barbaric attack. everyone has been caught off guard. we are struggling to understand the appeal of an organization looking to bring society and civilisation back to the middle ages. the first and fore most victims are the muslims and live in the reasons, declared apostates and the subject of mass executions. >> the propaganda forum made this boast. the "ultimate 8" has billions in the bank so they call on --

islamic state has billions so they call on others to make purchases through others in the region. fantasy, nightmare scenario. >> it's implausible. you have to take it seriously. it's brilliant propaganda. it refers to the final battle between christians and muslims before the final judgment and they play all these things well. >> it is the appeal of the ao pocko lips, and those that feel they'll -- apocalypse and those that feel 2450e8 rise to heaven. they need to understand it they'll be the first ones targeted by i.s.i.l. >> what happens near term. what can the united states and its partners in the region do near term? >> what the u.s. can do and what it does best is bring people to the table. we had a summit camp david

summit on iran nuclear negotiations. we have not been able to pull together the interest of the regional arab leaders, to talk about how to counter i.s.i.s. it will be a serious gain and a tactical gain to make sure we have the support on the ground to win in strategic areas. >> looks like a lot of countries would like to end the threat. >> if they can wake up in the middle of the night and say yes or no to would you like to see i.s.i.l. come away the answer is yes. are they willing to take risks, compromise and get together. it starts with the united states. this is a psych logical, historical religious problem. above all, it's a military problem. we have a totally different posture of military force, they are three times harder. we do it in afghanistan, the american people are not

complaining complaining. we are not doing it in iraq. what i saw on the ground is american advisors out with the troops tent to make it better. >> the obama announced they'd send advisors to iraq. they are on root. u.s. boots on the ground is not the answer to the problem, and hasn't been an announcement for the last six years. special operations command is working to involve qatari's emrarties actors in providing their people and local people that understand to do the fight themselves. >> they would disagree. i would put boots on the ground. >> you heard a former u.s. ambassador to iraq suggesting that the united states may be needed to get involved in order to address the threat. what do you think. we agree that the united states

has expertise, which is why the obama administration sent advisors, we've been involved since the larger troop drawdown in advising the capacity and support for the local troops. the united states population have vehemently supported a president in the last two elections, and his commitment to drawing out of two wars long wars that were painful for the american public would not be welcome to re-engage, nor would it be the effective way. if local population and leaders are not able to come together and bring the violence and gaffes it's not a solution that guys from kansas for kentucky are going to be able to bring about. >> americans don't want to go back to iraq so is it a military question. >> they don't want to go back to

iraq in their hundreds of thousands. my example is tonight we have 10,000 troops in afghanistan. we have them out with afghanistani units, fighting in everything but name. rules of engagement ear power and other combat power. the american people are not complaining. they extended the troops. why don't we try something like that in iraq. >> james jeffreys was the u.s. ambassador in iraq. a casual observer of the events in the middle east may wonder what it was about. it was a blink of an eye ago. where people laughed. sipped coffee. is the willingness to dry a departure from history.

the fight against i.s.i.l. was tonight's "inside story".

no matter who you are supporting in the wars large and small, burning out of control in the middle east, it's hard to see how it all ends amid the wholesale and lethal destruction in western iraq in ancient syrian cities. it's hard to imagine the losers in any conflict shrugging soldiers and heading home to work behind a shop counter, pushing a plough pedalling loaves of bread on a street. i want to look back and forward with a scholar with the carnegie middle east center in cambridge england. looking back at the last century, and forward to the settlement of these wars where does it end. is there a plausible scenario where the middle east is at

peace, where all the regional players live inside secure borders and have unremarkable even boring governance. >> well i mean it's a tricky question and what everyone is asking at the moment. looking back a further 100 years, so see if there were models of government or power-sharing that worked better given theeth nicks and religious and sectarian communities are that present in the middle east. and i mean the best examples to look at here looking at the ottoman empire is how a form of decentralized role will be all the provinces that they have. it had some power and local autonomy. what you see today is an area of

transition and it's a reaction to border constructed after world war i. and really pged by centralized government. they are beginning to be tested and you see it in several examples in the middle east. and they are contested. looking forward, those centralized states that were created after world war i need to - we need to question them and different forms of government that give autonomy making them feel part of the area. it would have to come from this critical analysis of the political situation. the longer it takes to defeat islamic state of iraq and levant. does it take on the trappings of a real state and become harder

to defeat? >> well yes, definitely. the longer that the islamic state is the reality for people's lives in areas of iraq and syria, the more entrenched it becomes. you already have babies born in mosul and other areas, that have islamic state birth certificates this is their certificate because they were born in the time of the united states. the longer it exists the more entrenched it becomes, it's hard to say at the same time particularly in the areas of iraqs, the "ultimate 8" remaining for - in the medium term at least. >> it's hard to imagine saudi arabia iran tolerating a long-term existence for the so-called islamic state. once it's defeated the tens of thousands of fighters - it's hard to imagine heading home to birmingham and taking up their

lives as they were before. is this going to be a long-term problem? >> definitely the foreign fighters is a long-term problem. there was different parts history, spain, years ago. foreign fighters fighting what was an ideological battle. it's important as well to stress the motivation as to why people are fighting. those local to iraq or syria had local issues of feelings of misrepresentation, grievances against the government. them going back to the society is less problematic if they are given an alternative to anticipate. the foreign fighters - the reason they come to the "ultimate 8" is ideological.

they think there's a calling. they are looking for citizens not just fighters. you have women, family. it's different than what al qaeda was earlier and now, in specifically looking for jihadi fighters. at the same time there is a battle of narratives when you had a month or two months ago. 100, 200 charges growing. the rate of foreign fighters dropped as the islamic state is losing a bit of the narrative. it will be interesting to see if that increases following the takeover of ramadi. >> a scholar with the carnegie middle east center. thank you for joining us. in a moment final thoughts on the young men, war and the predicament in the middle east. the middle east.

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i've spent time in casablanca algiers, tunis, cairo, jericho, ramallah.

one thing the diverse players have in common is there are so many young when that have nothing to do too little to do or too much to do for two little money. badly won or corrupt states rose from the end of colonialism and the state never delivered. too much of the modest resources of a country ending up in too few hands and a state valued with keeping up order. too many came to adulthood dissatisfied. hardly able to support a family unable to see a way their circumstances would improve. if the map is redrawn, the raw material, the recruits that kill on demand will be easy enough to define if they remain places to don't commute with the common people.

to serve their interests and enrich themselves the growing scandal surrounding world football. f.i.f.a.'s president says he welcomes the investigation into corruption. welcome to al jazeera, i'm louis jordon here in doha -- are daredon -- i'm darren jordan. 20 people may have been exposed to anthrax after a batch was accidentally