and that is to concentrate all our effort on the bad guy, iran. and speak with unity as much as we could in the united states. so our negotiators could concentrate on vienna and not on washington in dealing with getting the very best possible agreement. and i must tell you, mr. chairman i looked at the framework that was agreed to in april and looking at the final agreements that we have gotten today and our negotiators got an awful lot particularly on the nuclear front which is beyond my expertise. we got things that there were many rumors during these last couple months of what was going to be in this agreement and how it was going to be taken in the april framework that had been strengthened since the april framework so i just want to applaud our negotiators for taking the strength of our unity and turning it into results in

vienna and we will be talking a little bit about that as we go forward. [switching captioners] >> we know who we are dealing with. this is a state-sponsor of terrorism. this is a country that abuses human rights. that violates the ballistic missile area. we know all of that. but we are trying to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power, because we know that is a game changer in the region. that's the objective of this agreement. and the standard that we have to use, because there is no trust in iran for us in iran the supreme leader on friday after the agreements were entered into

today we will trample upon america. we don't trust iran but we have to leave emotion out of this. we have to look at the agreement, and determine whether the compliance with this agreement by the united states will put us on the path that takes it less likely or more likely that iran will become a nuclear weapon power. that's got to be the test that we use. so mr. chairman i have many questions that i hope we will get answers today. i hope those answers will provoke a debate among us in congress and the american people and help us make the right decisions. since there is no trust. the inspection enforcement regime is particularly important. do we have sufficient time to discover if iran is violating the terms of this agreement in order to take effective action to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power.

we need to know the break out times. are the inspections robust enough to deter iran from cheating and if they do will we discover and be able to take action. you raised the 24-hour window. i think all of us recognizes there would be a protocol for inspection but we need to know whether the 24-hour delay, does that compromise our ability to have effective inspections? and i hope our experts will deal with that today. because we need to know. have we cut off all pathways for iran to obtain a nuclear weapon?

particularly the oh -- covert nuclear operations. that's where the work that the iaea, our international inspectors they have great credibility in this area. will they have the access that we need. because we do need to know about their prior military dimension in order to be able to go forward to make sure we can contain any covert operations. these are questions that we are going to ask. we have read the agreement, and we still have questions, and we hope we'll get answers as to whether we have effectively prevented iran the ability to

make nuclear weapons. are the snapback proposals adequate? that's an issue that i hope we will have a chance to talk about. at the end of the time limits in the agreement, iran will have the capacity to expand -- as the chairman rightly pointed out, to an industrial capacity. they can get to their uranium enrichment. that they can do. do we have sufficient capacity knowing their commitments for non-proliferation, knowing the requirements of the additional protocols, do we have a sufficient-enough break-out time that if iran tries to become a nuclear weapons state after the time frame, there will be sufficient tools to prevent them from becoming a nuclear power.

these are questions we need answers to. i want to be reassured that the united states still has the flexibility to impose sanctions on iran for its support of terrorism, human rights abuses and a ballistic weapon's program. we know who we're dealing with! will we be able to use the powers we have used in the past and build upon them to take action against iran particularly in light that they will have additional resources? can we do that? and can congress work with the administration to strengthen those tools without violating the jcpoa. i want to know how the administration is updating its regional deterrent strategy against nefarious activities. the chairman mentioned the

lifting of the international arms embargo. that's of great concern as to how -- what impact it will have on our regional partners. how will it impact an arms race in that reason of the world. this is information we need to make our decisions. and lastly let me mention this what are our options? if the united states walks away from this? how will we will perceived internationally. and iran come back to a negotiating table with a country that has walked away from an agreement? these are questions that we need to understand. we need to know that the options are right now, do we go forward or not? and what are the consequences if we don't go forward. mr. chairman we have a full plate, and i look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and i hope that the members of this committee will use the

information that we get today to debate the issue, take the time that we have and do what is right for the american people and ultimately make the decision that we think is best to present iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power? >> thank you senator, i appreciate so much the way we worked together on so many issues and the entire committee. request that i know that our witnesses here today need no introduction, they are well-known not only here but around the world, in spite of our policy differences, i think each of us deeply appreciate -- that make this there may not be policy differences in this some cases -- but we deeply appreciate the tremendous effort that you pout on behalf of our country. we thank you for being here today. we thank you for being willing to be here today as long as it takes for everybody to get their answers, and with that i would like to introduce collectively

secretary john kerry, secretary onice, who has been incredibly helpful to all of us. secretary lou who served in multiple positions here has been certainly affirmed by this committee and several -- several times. we thank you all for your great service to our nation in spite of some of the concerns that we have here today. i think you all understand the drill. take five minutes or so to explain as -- as i have looked at your testimony, i know it's very brief, just to warn people in advance, i'm going to defer my questions, ben, and move to you immediately thereafter and use my time to interject as things move along. with that secretary kerry. >> thank you, mr. chairman and ranking member carden.

we really do appreciate the chance to discuss with you the comprehensive plan that we in our p5-plus-1 partners have developed with iran regarding the future of its nuclear plan. this isn't just the united states of america. these are other nuclear powers france britain, russia china. they have a pretty good understanding of this field, and of the challenges and i appreciate the way in which they and germany, which was the plus 1, all came together all contributed, all were part of this debate. so you are not just looking at what this table negotiated. you are looking at what the international community, the p5-plus-1 under the auspices of the united nations negotiated.

and they are not dumb. they are experts every one of them smart people who spent a lifetime on this. and they have signed off on this agreement. i'm joined by two cabinet secretaries and i thank all of you for the role that congress played. i was privileged to be the chairman of this committee when we passed the effort. we passed it unanimously, and it played a very significant role in bringing iran to the table and help make it clear we needed to bring about a serious and productive negotiation with iran. from the day that those talks began, we were crystal clear that we would not accept anything less than a good deal. and we defined it up front as a deal that closed off the four pathways to a bomb. the two uranium pathways the

plutonium pathway, and the covert pathway. so we set our standard and we believe we have achieved that standard. after almost two years of intensive talks, the facts are crystal clear, that the plan announced last week in vienna is in fact a deal that does shut off those pathways and provides guarantees through the lifetime of the mpt and the participation of iran that we will know what they are doing. now the chairman mentioned in his opening comments some praise about unless we give iran what they want. folks, they already have what they want. they got it ten years ago or more. they already have concurred the fuel cycle. when we began our negotiations iran had enough material for 10 to 12 bombs. they had 19,000 centrifuges, up

from the 163 that they had back in 2003 when the prior administration was engaged with them on this very topic. so this isn't a question of giving them what they want. it's a question of how do you hold their program back in how do you dismantle their weapons program. not their whole program. let's understand what was really on the table here. we set out to dismantle their ability to be able to build a nuclear weapon and we have achieved that. nobody has ever talked about actually dismantling their entire program, because when that was being talked about, that was when they went from 163 centrifuges to 19,000. everybody here knows what the options are for stopping that. it's called military action. because they are not going to

stop it otherwise. they have already proven that. they proved it through all of those years. so under this agreement, iran has agreed to remove 98% of its stockpile, destroy 98% of their stockpile o enriched uranium,dy install two-thirds of their centrifuges, and fill a reactor with concrete. iran has agreed to refrain from purchase purchasing weapons grade mru tone numb for at least 15 years. and if they begin to do that we will know it immediately. iran has always agreed to accept the additional protocol which is an outgrowth of the failure of the north korea experience, which put in additional access

requirements precisely so we do know what iran is doing, and they have to ratify it before the u.n. sanctions are lifted at the end of this process. they have to have passed it. they have agreed to live by it from day one. they are going to live by the additional protocol. in addition there are in additional transparency measures we can go into in the course of this hearing. if iran fails to comply we will know it and we will know it quickly, and we will be able to respond accordingly, by reinstituting sanctions all the way up to the most draconian options that we have today, none of them are off the table at any point in time. so many of the measures that are in this agreement are therefore not just for ten years, not just for 15 years, not just for 20 years, not just for 25 years, of

which there are measures for each of those periods of time but they are for life forever, as long as iran is within the npt. by the way, north korea pulled out of the npt, iran has not pulled out of the npt. remember that two years ago when our negotiation began, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground, and they were rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium, they were building a heavy reactor, that could produce one to two bombs a year and experts assessed that the breakout time as a result the integral required to produce one nuclear weapon was about two to three months. if this deal is rejected we return immediately to this

reality. accept that the diplomatic support that we have built with all of these other countries, that we have disappear overnight. let me underscore, the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not what i have seen some ads on tv suggesting it isn't a, quote, better deal? some sort of unicorn arrangement, involving iran's complete capitulation. that is a fantasy, plain and simple and our own intelligence community will tell you that. every single department of our intelligence community will reinforce that. the choice we face is ensuring that iran's program is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and wholly peaceful or no deal at all. that's the choice. the fact is there are 189

nations that live by the npt. five of them are as we know the main nuclear powers of the u.n. and 184 of them are non-nuclear in power, but they live by it and we have lived by what the iaea does with respect to ensuring what all of those 184 nations with doing, including 12 that enrich. now if the u.s. congress moves to unilaterally reject what was agreed to in vienna the result will be the united states of america walking away from every one of the restrictions that we have achieved and a great big green light for iran to double the pace of its enrichment proceed full speed ahead with a heavy reactor, install more centrifuges and do it all without the transparency measures that we have secured.

everything that we have prevented will then start taking place, and all of the voluntary rollbacks of their program will be undone. moreover if the u.s. after lab borously negotiating this agreement were to walk away from our partners we're on our own. our partners will not walk away with us. instead they will walk away from the tough multi-lateral sanctions regime that they have put in place, and we have squandered the best chance we have to solve this problem through peaceful means. president obama has meat it crystal clear that we will never accept a nuclear weapons iran. he is the only president who has developed a weapon to deploy that. and iran now has -- we all don't like it but whether we like it or not, iran has developed

experience with a nuclear fuel cycle. they have developed the ability to produce the material for a bomb. and we can't bomb that knowledge away. nor can we sanction the knowledge away. remember sanctions did not stop iran's nuclear program from growing steadily to the point that it had accumulated enough material to produce those ten nuclear weapons. by the way they didn't choose to produce them unlike north korea that created a nuclear weapon and exploded one, and pulled out of the npt, iran has done none of that. the truth is the vienna plan will provide a stronger more comprehensive, more lasting means of limiting iran's nuclear program than any alternative that has been spoken of. and to those who are thinking about opposing the deal because

of what might happen in year 15 16, or 20, remember if we walk away, year 15 or 16 or 20 starts tomorrow. and without any of the long-term verification or transparency safeguards that we have put in place. over the past week i have spoken at length about what exactly this deal is. i also want to make clear what this deal was never intended to be. first of all as the chief negotiator, i can tell you i never uttered the words anywhere any time nor was it ever part of the discussion that we had with the iranians. this plan was designed to address the nuclear issue. the nuclear issue alone. because we knew that if we got caught up with all of the other issues we would never get where we needed to stop a nuclear program. it would be rope a dope. and the highest priority of

president obama was to make sure that iran couldn't get a nuclear weapon, so we were disciplined in that. we didn't set out, even though we don't like it and i have extensive plans that i will lay out to you if you want them, about how we're going to push back against iran's other activities, against terrorism, its contributions to sectarian violence in the middle east all of those are unacceptable. but i got news for you, pushing back against an iran with a nuclear weapon is very different from pushing back against an iran without one. and we're guaranteeing they won't have one. so we're working very closely with the gulf states. just today in saudi arabia, ash carter was there yesterday, the foreign minister said that iran's nuclear deal appears to have all of the provisions

necessary to curtail iran's ability to obtain a nuclear weapon. the foreign minister of iran is going to be in the emirates this weekend. so i would suggest that we are going to continue to press iran for information about the missing american, about the immediate release of americans who have been unjustly held and there isn't a challenge in the entire region that we won't push back against if iran is involved in it but i will tell you, none of those challenges would be enhanced if iran gets a nuclear weapon. so the outcome cannot be guaranteed by sanctions alone. i wish it could, but it can't be. and by the way, it also can't be guaranteed by military action alone. our own military tells us that. the only viable option is a

diplomatic resolution of the type that was reached in vienna. and that deal will make our country and our allies safer. it will ensure that iran's nuclear program remains under intense scrutiny forever, and it will ensure that the world community is united in ensuring that iran's nuclear activities will remain wholly peaceful even as we state united in pushing back against the other activities which we object to. we believe this is a good deal for the world america, our friends and allies and we think it does deserve your support. >> thank you. you are watching live coverage of secretary john kerry's testimony before the senate foreign relations committee, which has 60 days congress does to review the iran nuclear deal. secretary kerry saying that the

deal is a good one, and that it is crystal clear that it closes off the four primary pathways for iran to pursue a nuclear weapon. we're going to take a short break here we'll be right back with more live testimony including from jacob lou, and energy secretary who also happens to be a nuclear scientist. we'll be right back. >> just because you're pregnant

welcome back to live coverage of the senate foreign relations committee on the nuclear deal with iran. right now testifying the earn give give -- energy secretary who is also a nuclear physicist. let's listen in. >> they acknowledge the break rage rate of the r-1. in addition iran will have no source of weapon's grade pollute tome um, the transformer will be changed to produce far less than it is designed for, and essentially immediate recognition if they try to deviate from that practice. furthermore, all of the radiated

fuel goes out of that country for the life of the reactor. one area iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device including multiple explosive systems, these commitments are indefinite, and in addition for 15 years, iran will not pursue plutonium or uranium. because iran will not engage in activities needed to use weapon's grade material an additional period should be added to our stated time line. the deal is not built on trust. it is hard nosed requirements that will limit iran's activities and ensure transparency. i can guarantee you this is not what iran wanted. it's a substantial dialing back

of their program. in addition inspectors will be given access to all facilities. and any -- other sites of concern, as well as the supply chain. and this access to the uranium supply chain comes with a 25-year commitment, and beyond 25 years, even after a quarter of century of compliance, we still have as we have said many times, the additional protocol in police to monitor iran's nuclear activities but another thing that we have also in perpetuity is their adherence to code 3.1, which means that they must notify the iaea even before they start building any nuclear

facility. this eliminates kind of a loop whole where one could do something covertly and then say, oops we were planning to notify. they must do this now in a planning stage. so that's another thing that we have beyond 25 years. the iaea will be permitted to use advanced technologies including things like real time enrichment technology. if the international community suspects iran is trying to cheat, the iaea can request access to any suspicious location. much has been made about a 24-day process of ensuring access. i would say that i would say unlike secretary kerry, i did say the