road. you'll not only be giving iran a free pass to double the pace of its uranium enrichment to install new and more efficient centrifuges, but they will do it all without the transparency measures that we have secured. everything that we have tried to prevent will now happen. now what is worse? if we walk away we walk away alone. our partners are not going to be with us. they'll walk away to the sanctions that brought iran to the table in the first place, and we will have squandered the best chance he had. president obama has made it clear that he will never accept a nuclear-armed iran and he is the only president who has asked for and commissioned the design of a weapon that has the ability

to take out the facilities and who has actually deployed that weapon, but iran has already mastered the fuel cycle. they have mastered the ability to produce significant stockpiles of fissile material and you can't bomb away that knowledge any more than you can sanction it away. i was chair of the committee when we -- a lot of us joined together and put most of the iran sanctions in place, and i know well as you do that the whole point was to bring iran to the negotiating table. even the toughest sanctions previously did not stop iran's program from growing from 1 -- 163 to 300 to 5,000 to more than 19,000 now, and it didn't stop iran from accumulating a

stockpile of enriched uranium. now sanctions are not an end to themselves. they are a diplomatic tool that has enabled us to do what sanctions could not without the negotiation, and that is to reign in a nuclear program that was headed in a very dangerous direction and to shine a spot light on it to watch it like no other nuclear program has ever been watched before. we have secured the ability to do things that exist in no other agreement. now to those who are thinking about opposing this deal because of what might happen in year 15 or 20 i ask you to simply focus on this if you walk away year 15 or 20 starts tomorrow. and without any of the long-term access and a very indication safeguards that we have put in place. what is the alternative? what are you going to do when

iran does start to enrich which they will feel they have a right to if we walk away from the deal. what are you going to do if we walk away from a deal that our five fellow nations accepted. i have heard a suggestion that this would somehow legitimize iran's nuclear program. that is nonsense. under the agreement, iran's leaders are permanently barred from securing a nuclear weapon and there are permanent provisions to guarantee that. and i underscore if they try to evade that obligation we will know it. because a civil nuclear program requires full access 24/7, requires full documentation, and we will have the ability to track that as no other program before. the iaea will be continuously

monitoring their centrifuge production, so centrifuges cannot be developed to a covert facility. the iaea will continuously monitor uranium, from the point it is produced all the way through production so it cannot be converted to another facility. for the life of this agreement, however long iran stays in the npt and living up to its obligations, they must live up to the additional protocol and that additional protocol greatly expands the ability to have accountability. i'll close by saying this agreement gives us a far stronger detection capability more time to respond to any attempt to break out towards a bomb, and much more national support in stopping it than we would have without the deal. if we walk away from this deal

and then we decide to use military force, we're not going to have the united nations or the other five nations that negotiated with us because they will feel we walked away and make no mistake, president obama is committed to staying with the policy of stopping this bomb. so in the 28 years -- a little more -- that was prevalenceivileged to rep sent massachusetts, i had a 100% voting record on israel. i have others there who care enormously about israel. i understand the fear. i understand the concerns that our friends in israel have. but we believe that what we have laid out here is a way of making israel and the region in fact safer, and i emphasize, we do not lose any option in 15 years,

10 years, 20 years, 5 years, that we have available to us today. we will push back against iran's other activities. we have laid out a very detailed policy for working with the gulf states and others and we look forward to working with israel in the effort to do that. our current security cooperation with israel is at an unprecedented level, and that's why we have a robust military presence in the region and why we're working so closely with the gulf states. so mr. chairman we will continue to push back against iran on every front available, but the fact is it's a lot easier to push back against an iran that doesn't have a nuclear weapon rather than one that does. that's been our principal strategic objective, deal with the nuclear weapon and then you

have an easier time dealing with the other issues too. the outcome here is critical. we believe this deal makes our country and our allies safer. it will guarantee that iran's program is under intense scrutiny. it will ensure the world community is unified in backing this up and in the end it will guarantee iran's program has to be peaceful and therefore is a good deal for the world, a good deal for america, a good deal for our allies and friends, and we belief it richly deserves your support. >> thank you secretary kerry. secretary kerry has been very thorough, dr. muniz if you could be brief, we can get back on time. >> thank you. and thank you for the opportunity to discussion this agreement. the jcpoa prevents iran from

getting a nuclear weapon provides strong verification measures to respond if they violate the terms, and takes none of our options off of the table. i was backed up in the negotiations by the nuclear competency built up over decades. america's leading nuclear experts at due labs and sites were engaged throughout the negotiations nine labs and sites in seven states took part in supporting our negotiating position. these experts, again, were essential, and as a result of their work i am very confident that the technical underpinnings of this deal are solid, and the department of energy stands ready to assist. the jcpoa will extend for at least ten years the amount of time iran could have to produce

nuclear material to at least one year. reducing the material from 12,000 to 300 kilograms. stringent constraints on the enriched stockpiles as i said for 15 years. a strong containment and surveillance measures on all centrifuge manufacturing, and the uranium supply chain for 20 and 25 years, verification that iran is following the agreement is forever stronger than it would be without the agreement. the iraq reactor redesigned so it's not a plutonium factory, and it's plutonium, bearing,er raided fuel sent out of the country. thus the parameters are maintained and all paths to a bomb's worth of nuclear weapons material are addressed. in fact lason is materially strengthened in the p5-plus-1 vienna alg agreement. one important area of that

strengthening is that iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive devices. these commitments are indefinite. in addition iran will not pursue plutonium or uranium for 15 years. weaponization requirements especially for missile launch add to the breakout time lyon -- line. i cannot agree it does not dismantle iran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon. the iaea will be permitted to use advanced technologies technologies that due national laboratories have in fact developed. much has been made about a 24-day process for ensuring inspectors getting access to undeclared sites.

in fact the iaea can request access to any suspicious location with 24-hour notice. the jcpoa goes beyond that baseline recognizing that disputes could arise, and provides a crucial new tool for resolving such disputes within a reasonable amount of time. again, this is the first time that there actually is a cut off in time. but of course most important is environmental sampling provides extremely sensitive measurements of micro skropic traces of nuclear material. the combination of the

agreements technical measures and the coherence of the p5-plus-1 dramatically increase the ability to detect movement towards nuclear material. the -- blocking the covert path i should emphasize will also rely on the work of the american intelligence community and those of our friends and allies. the deal is based on science and analysis carried out largely by our highly capable deal, i'm confident this is a good deal. this is nicely summarized in the recent letter to congressional

leadership by seven former u.s. ambassadors to israel individuals dedicated to strengthening the bonds between israel and the united states. and i quote this landmark agreement removes the threat that a nuclear-armed iran would pose to the region and israel specifically. we see no fatal flaws, and have not heard any viable alternatives. as has been stated by many thoughtful analysts the big gamble would come in turning away from the agreement. so thank you for this opportunity to be here. i look forward to our discussion. >> thank you, secretary of the treasury. >> thank you, mr. chairman ranking member members of the committee for the opportunity to be here. this is an important issue, one where i think the full discussion will make it clear this will strengthen our

national security and that of our allies. this constitutes the most effective measure in history. cutting iran off from world markets and crippling their economy. today iran's economy is about 20% smaller than it would have been had it remained on its pre2012 growth path. the united states government stood at the forefront of this effort. together we established a web of far-reaching u.s. and international sanctions that persuaded iran's leadership to come to the table prepared to roll back its international program. international consensus and cooperation was vital. the world's major powers have been and remain united in preventing a nuclear-armed iran. that produced two security council resolutions and sanctions in many countries.

the point of these sanctions was always to change iran's nuclear behavior while holds out the prospect of relief if the world's concerns were addressed. accordingly once the iaea verifies steps, phased sanctions will come into effect. there is no signing bonus in this agreement. there will be no immediate changes to u.n. e.u. or u.s. sanctions, only if iran fulfills the necessary nuclear conditions will the u.s. begin suspending sanctions on a phased-in basis. of course we must guard against the possibility that iran does not uphold its side of the deal that's why if it violates its commitments we'll be able to

promptly snap back u.n. and u.s. sanctions. and the united states has the ability to effectively force the reimpotion of those sanctions. even as we phase in relief we will maintain significant sanctions that fall outside of the deal including our trade embargo and other measures. with very little exception, iran will continue to be denied access to the world's largest market and we will maintain powerful sanctions for support of hezbollah, backing of the assad regime its missile program, and its human rights abuses at home. just this week treasury sanctions several hezbollah leaders. and we will not be relieving sanctions on iran's revolutionary guard corps, any of their subsidiaries or senior

officials. some argue that sanctions relief is premature until iran ceases these activities. and i understand that concern. but iran's ties to terrorist groups are exactly why we must keep it from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. the combination of those two threats would raise a nightmare scenario. if we cannot solve both concerns at once we need to address them in turn. jcpoa will address think nuclear danger freeing us and our allies to check iran's regional activities more aggressively. we must also be realistic in understanding what sanctions relief will mean to iran. iran's $100 billion in restricted reserves which many fear will be directed for that

fair rows purposes constitute it's savings not budget. we estimate iran will only be able to freely access just over $50 billion. that's because over $20 billion is committed to projects with china, where it cannot be spent, and 10s of billions in additional funds are in non-performing loans to iran's energy and banking sector. iran can't simply spend the usable resources as they will likely be needed to meet international payment obligations much as financing for imports and external debt. the president was elected on a platform of economic revitalization and faces a political imperative to start meeting those promises. he faces over a half trillion dollars in obligations. iran is in massive economic

hole. we will aggressively target any attempts by iran to fund hezbollah or support militant proxies, including enhancing our cooperation with israel and partners in the gulf. backs away from this deal to try to obtain a broader capitulation from iran would be a mistake. even if one believed that extending sanctions pressure was a better course than resolving threat of iran's nuclear program, that choice is simply not available. our partners agree to impose costly sanctions on iran for one reason, to put a stop to its nuclear program. if we insist that these countries now escalate those sanctions, and apply them to all of iran's objectionable activities, they would balk. and we would be left with neither a nuclear deal nor existing sanctions.

it is impractical after turning down a deal or partners think is a good one. phased relief after iran fulfills its commitment to roll back its nuclear program, and a snap back of sanctions blocks iran's path to a nuclear bomb. it should not be put at risk when the prospect of on unrestrained nuclear program presents such a threat to the united states and the world. thank you. >> thank you. to get back to a point that was made as i read it the 24-day suspect site process does expire in 15 years. the iaea additional protocol

alone, wouldn't deter iran based on our past experience with their non-compliance with the iaea. so i think that point stands. the other question i would like to ask, secretary kerry relates to what the secretary of defense said in his testimony about the i in icbm he said standings for intercontinental. countries development icbm's to deliver a nuclear war head and these will be aimed at us not at moscow and at the same time that these missile restrictions are coming off, sanctions on the iranian scientists involved are also coming off. so how is that making us safer? it seems to me the winner here is russia which demanded and won on the lifting on iran's behalf

of -- of these icbm sanctions. why did he concede on that? >> we didn't concede on that mr. chairman in fact we won a victory, because the -- we have seven nations negotiating three of the seven thought that the sanctions ought to be lifted immediately, iran russia and chaiina china. and four of them thought they shouldn't. and what we succeeded in doing was keeping both the arms embargo, and the missile component, the missiles for eight years, the arms for five years, notwithstanding the fact that iran has a very legitimate argument, which they were making that the u.n. resolution 1929 which is what created the sanctions and structure we were negotiating under, said that if iran comes to the table and

negotiates, all of the sanctions would be lifted. now they didn't just come to the table to negotiate, they made a deal they signed an agreement, they came to an overall agreement. so they felt they were in compliance with the u.n. resolution, and we felt that their behavior in the region was such that it would be unconscionable notwithstanding to lift. so the compromise was the five and eight, but we don't feel we lost anything whatsoever in that mr. chairman for the following reasons. the u.n. resolution is a nuclear resolution. susan rice put the -- she was then at the u.n. -- she put the arms piece in at the last minute. it was a throw-in at the last moment into this nuclear -- nuclear resolution. and the nuclear resolution

always contemplated that if the iaea came to what is known as its brood conclusion that iran was not engaged in any illicit activities, then all of the sanctions are lifted so no matter what was going to happen here we were going to lose both the missile and the arms under the u.n. component. but here is what we have zone in the meantime that we believe actually takes care of this issue. first of all -- >> mr. secretary, i -- i followed the arguments that you have made about the laws that we have to defend against iran's missile program, and i understand the steps that you took here. i'm just saying big picture, big picture, when we end up with a bottom line where in eight years they get the missile, it

doesn't look like a victory. they may not get the missile at that time but they can buy the technology at that time. >> actually they can't, mr. chairman because we have several other protocols which prevent that. specifically the missile control technology regime prevents that from taking place. we have an executive order by the president of the united states that in fact prevents the transfer -- >> i would just point out there's a reason why russia pushed it. there's a reason we did not -- >> because russia didn't want the u.n. component of this but they know we have separate capacities, and we will apply them. >> i would hope we can strengthen our hand in this but the bottom line is iran is getting a financial winfall, it reingrates into the global

economy, it upgrades its conventional weapons, i think it upgrades its ballistic missile program. it has an industrial sized nuclear program in ten years, and that's the time frame only if they don't cheat. so when i look at this and i see that iran's neighbors who know it the best trust it the least, i just ask -- we're presuming iran is going to change its behavior. >> no we're not. >> and that behavior did not change last weekend when they were chanting death to america. >> chairman we're not presuming any such thing. there's no presumption in here about what iran will or won't do. there is one objective, make sure they can't get a nuclear weapon and on the backside of that we have a very robust initiative that will push back against iran's other a

activities. >> well my time has expired. >> executive order authorizes u.s. sanctions on efforts to manufacture, require, or transfer nuclear weapons, which any country concerned. that's just one of about four or five -- >> okay. my time is expired mr. secretary. i'm going to go to mr. engel. >> you are watching live coverage of the house foreign affairs committee hearing on the iran nuclear deal. we're going to take a short break and we'll see you on the other side.

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america's live coverage of the house foreign affairs committee hearing on the iran nuclear deal. right now the ranking democrat is presenting his case and he does have questions, challenging the obama administration's deal with iran. let's listen in. >> -- further destabilizes the region. i was very disappointed that these sanctions would eventually be lifted. we have been told that that was outside of the negotiations. and changes to the sanctions should have been outside of the scope as well so what that means when the arms embargo expires iran can shift to president assad so he can continue to torture and kill his own people? would the administration be open to further congressional consideration of new sanctions on iran's arms activity and ballistic missile program?

and finally because of embargo and ballistic missile sanctions are not specifically mentioned, only in the u.n. security council governing the jcpoa, would violations of the arms embargo be considered a violation of the jcpoa? does a snap back in sanctions happen if iran were to continue to shift weapons to hezbollah? >> well congressman there are so many questions in there, obviously we're very happy to come back to you on the record. i want to answer every single one of them. but first of all let me call to everybody's attention here the irgc opposes this agreement. so they are not sitting there thinking they are going to get the whole world and be