on that senator. but what we can provide is the actual road map that the iaea put out. and the iaea has issued a full road map of what their expectations are. >> i understand that but i'm talking about the secret document -- >> it's a confidential agreement. it's being postured as this -- it's a confidential agreement which is the standard procedure of the iaea. and we have lived with the iaea senators, and relied on the iaea for years and years, and historically they iaea always creates what is called a comprehensive safeguards agreement, which they negotiate with the country. and that is not shared with the world. there are reasons it is confidential it has to do with what you can get out of that country, but we do get briefed on it. we're aware of it. secretary muniz has actually made recommendations to the iaea

for them to tighten it up a bit. i think secretary muniz you certainly have got confidence in it -- >> my time has expired. but i would say to the chairman it's incomprehensible that we didn't have full access to that. >> senator nelson. >> thank you, gentlemen, all. thank you for your public service. mr. -- secretary lou, i want to go down a different road. we have heard so many different commentaries about how much of a winfall the sanctions relief would be for iran. we have heard 100, 150 billion, the chairman is speaking of 50 or 60 billion. you tell me if this is correct, that basically sanctions relief of what has been withheld is

about 100 billion, but in that 100 billion there are contractual obligations of iran to pay some 50 billion, and therefore, the net that would approximately come to iran would be about 50 billion. is that somewhere in the ballpark? >> senator that is roughly correct. i'm happy to walk down the numbers to the best of my knowledge -- >> you don't need to. i'm trying to get concepts here. >> the one thing i would add is there is between 50 and 60 billion that is accessible but that money is not sitting in u.s. banks -- >> right. in that money is sitting in foreign banks; is it not? >> it is sitting around the world in countries like china, and india, and many other places. >> china, india, japan, even

taiwan and uae, those banks? >> correct. >> therefore, if we denied the lifting of economic sanctions, that money is in the hands of foreign banks. what in your professional opinion is the likelihood that that money would be released to iran. >> it's iran's money that is tied up because of sanctions. they have sold oil, the money has gone into these foreign accounts and it's sitting there. if this agreement, this deal were to be rejected the question is what do those other banks do? i don't think they will feel bound to hold that money the way they have held it in an escrow away from iran. and i think without an nuclear agreement some of that money will start going back to iran if this agreement is rejected.

>> so to recapitulate then if we were to reject it the money is likely to flow because it's in the hands of foreign banks that would not be compelled to adhere to the united states wishes at that point; is that correct? >> right. we do obviously have sanctions that we could impose in other ways but this money is not sitting in u.s. banks. we cannot lock it up directly. we need the cooperation of other governments and central banks and banks to keep this money from iran. and i think the notion that somehow a 50 $60 billion check gets writ sen wrong. they can't spending all of this money. this is the foreign reserve that they need to settle their foreign transactions. they are always doing transactions in some of those countries that are permitted. using their foreign reserves as exchange.

they will still need to buy things overseas. they can't just spend all of this money. and as i said before they are hundreds of billions of dollars of competing domestic needs, so i think the magnitude of resources available is highly exaggerated by the notion of thinking that it's some $50 billion transfer. >> mr. secretary muniz, can you explain to the committee the incite that you, we the united states government will have as a result of this agreement on their uranium centrifuge program, number 1? and number 2 on their plutonium program as a result of the agreement stating there has to be modifications and/or dismantlement of the plutonium reactor? >> yes, senator, on the uranium

centrifuges. the iaea will have daily access and the use of advanced technologies to make sure that all of the idle ones are locked up, and used only as replacements for broken ones and they will confirm that they are broken. in addition for 20 years, we will have contain and surveillance of all manufacturing of key centrifuge parts. so it's -- as -- as general clapper said we have tremendously enhanced incite into their program. on the plutonium, they will be required to take out the core part of the reactor, fill it with concrete and with international collaboration, and we will be part of that we will make sure that the replacement reactor is the one that reduces plutonium production by about a factor of ten. so it's way below the amount needed for a weapon.

but secondly they have also agreed that belt and suspenders that suspend fuel for life will be sent out of the country, so we have very very good containment there. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank all of you -- again, you are watching live coverage of the senate armed services committee hearing on the iran nuclear deal. we're going to take a short break and be right back with more questions and answers during this important hearing.

welcome back to al jazeera america. y are watching our live coverage of the senate armed services committee on the iran nuclear deal. in that is senator jeff sessions speaking now. we're going to rejoin that live coverage in just a moment. but first a quick question for our guest, we have heard a lot about some of the money that is going to be freed up potentially by the deal. tell us more about that. >> sure paul as it was discussed some of the rough numbers, it is roughly let's say

around $100 billion that iran has had in assets. about 50 billion is going to go back to iran and like they were discussing some of those are sitting in foreign banks, and it's just money that iran has been -- iran needed to pay some of these foreign countries for the oil they have been trying to sell. so it's just a matter of how this money is going to get back into the iranian hands, and where it is going to be spent inside of iran. the republican senators have a lot of concern as far as this going back into military activities. and the obama administration is saying the rouhani government because of their economic promises will have to spending a good deal of this money on the iranian economy and getting it back on its feet. >> the concern from the republicans is it might be used for as we heard sort of -- >> malign activities.

>> thank you. malign activities throughout the region funding hezbollah and so forth, but as you mentioned the administration pushing back saying no they made promises about the economy. >> exactly, and the moderates who are trying to get back into power, they have most of the power from the support of the iranian society. so if they don't get that economy back on its feet they won't be able to survive for a very long time. the moderates in iran. >> thank you. libby casey is with us on capitol hill. libby give me your take on that last exchange. a little testy at points. >> absolutely. the money is important, but what we have heard from white house officials is that a lot of this money will get freed up regardless of how congress votes and how the u.s. acts because this is an international agreement, what the administration officials have said is the u.s. will essentially get left behind.

other sanctions will lift international activity will move forward, and the u.s. will be the ones out in the cold. we have heard some important exchanges this morning. this is the third hearing in just a week on this nuclear agreement, but we are threading on fresh territory today. one i want to point out is that general dempsey said this deal reduces the short-term threat of military action but allows the u.s. to pay more attention to the activities. another thing we're hearing a lot of focus on paul is the question of agreements with the iaea. republicans are calling them side deals or secret side deals. the administration says this is standard procedure. it's what every country does when they are in this kind of process of having inspections

done but this has been a big point of contention this morning. >> libby, thanks. we're going to rejoin the hearing now. secretary of state john kerry fielding some questions from senator sessions of alabama. >> we have executive order of the president of the united states which allows him to sanction anybody who is providing any materials whatsoever for missile construction. we have the prolive nation agreement with a hundred countries which allows us to block materials for missile construction. we have the non-proliferation act, so we have huge tools available to us way into the future -- >> seems to me this agreement would trump that. >> no. there is no trumping of anything. these are all existing. we also have -- >> i don't know what the language is in the agreement for if it has no meaning mr. kerry.

>> these are additional agreements which allow us to continue to protect from missile development. we also have additional u.n. sanctions that prohibit the flow of weapons to hezbollah, prohibit the flow of weapons to iraqi shia -- >> well they are flowing now, are they not? >> indeed. because they haven't been enforced. which is why in three days i momenting with the whole gcc in doha to lay out the very specifics of the proposal for how we can going to push back against iran. i'll leave you with one thought senator, you have adequately and appropriately pointed to the rhetoric of the leader and to the things they are doing. simple question if that's what they want to do are you better off preventing them from having a nuclear weapon or do you want

to go right back to where we were when they had 19,000 centrifuges, 12,000 kilograms of material enough for 10 to 12 bombs? so don't be looking 15 years down the road. right now they have this ability. and we're taking that away from them and providing a lifetime -- >> the senator's time has expired. how did that north korean deal work out for you? senator mccaskill -- >> well senator i can give -- >> your time has extired. >> i didn't cut the deal. >> general dempsey is there anything in this agreement to constrain us from taking any military action we thought was necessary against iran? >> no senator. >> secretary lou i'm concerned about the alternative to the deal. and one of the things that

hasn't been covered enough i got the point that senator nelson was trying to make that the money is not in our control, and it appears looking at it if all of the other countries walk away from us if we reject this deal, that they are going to get the money one way or another, either because they are entitled to it if we do the deal or get the money because we can't control it. but i don't know that that's completely accurate. and i think it's important because this is not about is this a good deal? this is also about what happens if we don't do this deal? and i think it's important to uk ta about whether the power the united states would have if this deal was rejected to in fact force our will on these countries that hold this money. we have a lot of tools at our disposal as the major economic power that we are. a lot of these are our nato allies obviously japan, so i

think it's fair that we shouldn't just say if we walk away from this deal they are going to get all of the money and -- i think it's fair to drill down and you try to give us a picture -- let's assume -- i know none of you want to assume that this deal is rejected. let's assume it is. at that moment what power do we have as a country to keep this money from flowing to iran and its nefarious activities. >> that's a very fair question. and obviously nobody can give you an entirely precise answer. if they buy chinese goods they can pay with the money held in china. so they can chip away at those reserves. the question of what unilateral sanctions very multi-lateral

sanctions can do is a complicated one. the dollar is the reserve currency transactions that go through u.s. financial institutions are within our grasp. but that doesn't give us the ability to reach out to all foreign banks and transactions and i think that it's at our own peril if we have a sanction's regime where we are enforcing sanctions which the rest of the world is rejecting. we have worked bilaterally with countries around the world to do things against their own economic interest because they agreed with us on the imperative of stopping iran from getting a nuclear weapon. if they see us walking away from this agreement, i think the degree of cooperation goes down considerably. it's not that we go from being able to do everything to doing nothing, but it's the fact that we have had the international

cooperation. india and china have been buying less oil from iran than would have been good for their economy. how do you enforce bilaterally by saying we insist so there are things we can do. >> i think -- >> but it gets much harder. >> i appreciate that answer but i really think it would be helpful for those of us who are really trying to analyze both scenarios, if you would try to the best of your ability to put in writing what you envision what would be our best effort of keeping iran isolated if in fact this deal is rejected. because i don't think it's fair for us to assume we have no power. because clearly we are still going to have a lot of power. i'm almost out of time. this is an takt question, i think for secretary muniz. do you believe that if we walk away from this deal iran has a

nuclear weapon by christmas? >> i can't really answer that question but -- >> do your best. >> well they are a nuclear threshold state today. they could certainly generate the nuclear materials within months which is before christmas, and what is then the unknown is the degree to which they have completed -- which we can't discuss right now, other weaponization requirements. that's what -- of course the iaea in building up its dau er -- do see yay, has certainly labeled iran of having a structured program of activities relative to nuclear weapons in the past. it's a threshold state. the deal will walk them back

from that threshold and give us permanently more incite into their -- in to any weapons program they might choose to pursue. >> thank you. >> senator [ inaudible ]. >> they are a nuclear threshold state and they have denied all along that they had any intention of doing so up and to the prevent time. i think that is destructive. i think senator mccaskill might be on to something here with regard to all of the options before us. my friend senator reid asked a question about are we better off with a negotiated settlement or a military strike as if those are the only alternatives. of course we know that those are not the only two alternatives. i wish our european friends had not been so eager to -- to leave the sanctions regime but they were. the united states could go it alone, and as the secretary pointed out, we do have

unilateral tools that would be effective. to continue trying to get a good deal continued unilateral tools on the part of the united states making people choose between banking with america and banking with iran those tools are there. let me say to you senator -- general dempsey, i appreciate your service, and i appreciate the many times you have come before this committee, we have disagreed and agreed from time to time. it would seem to me that your brief, nine-sentence opening statement to this committee amounts to damming this agreement with faint praise. you mentioned there are six areas in which iran is a bad actor, and you say five -- five of these malign activities give us real concern and you list them but then you end and give us these words of assurance. ultimately time and iranian

behavior will determine if a nuclear agreement is effective and sustainable. that sir, does not give me a confidence level, and i have to tell you that based upon your very brief and i think tepid endorsement of this -- of this agreement. with regard to the convention alarms embargo, as late as this spring we weren't hearing about this. when -- general dempsey, when did you become aware that there would be this -- this huge relief from the convention alarms embargo, and isn't it a fact that it caught you by surprise. >> first senator i would ask you not to characterize my statement as tepid, but rather pragmatic. and i said from the start that

relieving the risk of a nuclear conflict to iran diplomatically is superior to doing that militarily. as to your question about timing i was consulted or asked for my advice episodically when military implications became part of the conversation and probably about a week or two before the -- the agreement was finalized i gave my final recommendation regarding sanctions. >> well, that's very late in the agreement, and i would just say, it seems to me -- the -- the advice that we have been getting on the other side of this agreement down through the months and over time this -- this massive retreat from -- from convention alarms embargoes is something new and -- and something very

troubling. let me just say, mr. chairman in the minute i have left that the -- the assessment of -- of the facts and the assessment of the effect this agreement will have by neighbors in the region i think should be so destructive to this congress. and i don't blame my friends on the democratic side of the aisle for having concerns also. the -- it is striking that from right to left every ideology within the country of israel is opposed to this agreement. it's striking that the arab neighbors, the saudis and others are alarmed at this deal and i would submit to the record mr. chairman in the closing seconds, an op-ed by ari shavet

for israeli newspaper in which he says the iranian negotiating team succeeded in destroying completely the sanctions mechanism. he points out the united states european union and others recognize again and again iran's right to develop advanced centrifuges, which could be five to ten times bigger than the capacity of the old ones. this means, mr. shavet concludes, that the international community is not only enabling but actually ensuring the establishment of a new iranian nuclear program, which will be more powerful and dangerous than its predecessor. i submit this article for the record mr. chairman. >> without objection -- >> senator shaheen.

>> thank you very much. secretary carter you were in the middle east last week. can you tell us what you heard from our allies in the middle east about how they felt about this agreement, specifically saudi arabia and israel. obviously we have heard from prime minister netenyahu has had to say. >> sure -- sure senator. beginning with israel prime minister netenyahu was very clear as he has been clear publicly in its opposition to the deal. we discussed that but then we discussed many other things as well. hezbollah's activity up on the border with lebanon. in fact i visited there our missile defense activities cyber security coordination and intelligence coordination and we discussed many topics but he was very clear --

>> and excuse me for interrupting, but would you agree with senator wicker's characterization about the israel's opposition to this? >> i only spoke to the prime minister. >> and what did you hear from some of our arab allies in the middle east? >> i spoke to the king of saudi arabia who repeated to me a statement he had issued a few days before supporting the agreement. he referenced that -- again, i don't think this is violating any confidence that the verification and as he put it snapback provisions were particular important to him. so he referenced those things. and we went on to talk about other things that are more -- related to the defense

agenda including the -- his air forces munitions, cyber concerns that saudi arabia has, and something that we started to discuss at the gcc, namely, saudi arabia's role in countering isil which is a whole other subject. >> and did you hear from any of our other arab allies in the middle east, that they support the agreement? >> i spoke to the jordanians about it. again, this wasn't a major topic with them. we had a lot of other things to talk about, but did not express any opposition. i don't recall. it wasn't really the subject of our meeting there. those are the three places that i met. >> thank you. general dempsey is there a military option short of invasion that would roll back

iran's nuclear program more substantially over the next ten years than the jcpoa does? >> i would have to make assumptions about how often we would be compelled to conduct air strikes or stand up munitions. but the military options that exist would disrupt the program by several years, but there's nothing to say we couldn't repeat it if necessary. >> and is there any intelligence information to suggest what iran's response would be should we engage in an air strike against them? >> i wouldn't say it rises to the level of intelligence but the analysis suggests that they would counter our presence in the region at every opportunity and use these other malign activities that they have available to them. >> thank you. secretary muniz, there has been a lot of discussion about the

24-day delay. you testified in the foreign relations committee that to the extent to which we would be able to detect nuclear activity so uranium, in an extended period beyond the 24-day delay. what if the activity does not include nuclear material? to what extent are you -- do you believe we could detect other activity other than uranium or nuclear-related activity. >> first of all permit me to reinforce the fact that having the 24-day period is in it's a new. again to repeat on nuclear materials we have very very centered capabilities and those have been proved and we can add more in a classified context. with regard to non-nuclear

materials it gets more difficult. however, when one has nuclear weapons specialized activity such as explosively driven neutron activators we could detect activities in that kind of time period but clearly as one gets father and father away into just explosive testing, then it's a question of intelligence putting together the context for us ispy house activities. but nuclear material -- in the end you need to do nuclear materials to get to the weapon. and mr. chairman if i may add one more comment. to go to the comment on centrifuges. i don't know that particular article you quoted but it appears to have forgot to mention that their most advanced

machines are already operating at full cascade level, two different machines. and those are going to be dismantled before this is implemented. thank you. >> thank you. >> i'm informed that senator earnst is required to provide over the vital proceedings on the floor of the united states senate which is critical to our presence so i would ask the indulgence of my colleagues to allow her to proceed. >> thank you. gentlemen thank you for being here today. this will be one of the most significant votes that we take as members of congress moving forward, so i believe it is imperative that we get this right. not long ago, the united states discovered that we had had a data breach at opm, simple. data personal records had been tapped into. so that is just laying the ground work of where i'm going next.

secretary carter and secretary muniz, i am very concerned regarding the government's ability to detect deter and defeat cyber attacks on our government particularly by china, russia and iran. with respect to iran in particular according to director of national intelligence james clapper, iran has conducted cyber attacks on u.s. government officials involved in nuclear non-proliferation, hacking which compromised the marine corps internet sands las vegas casino and attacks against u.s. banks. in relation to the iran deal these attacks along with recent successful attacks against opm leads me to have less than full confidence in our own cyber capabilities let alone the cyber capabilities of the iaea. it is vital iaea has a lock-tight ability to protect its equipment and technology vital to ensuring effective

monitoring of iranian facilities under this agreement against cyber attacks. just simple yes or no secretary carter are you concerned regarding iran's ability to impact the effectiveness of iaea monitoring equipment through cyber. >> i'm sorry, i can't give you a yes or no answer to that. i'm very concerned about iranian cyber activity and you named three countries. i could go on with the ones. this is a big problem. and i -- sadly i share the lack of confidence you have in the adequacy of our defenses. in the defense department you would think with all that we have paid attention to protecting our own networks that we would be secure but we're not. and we know that. and it's not just iran but it's others as well and that's why we're trying to make investments

in that area and pull up our socks in the cyber area but i can't reassure you on the cyber -- >> i am very concerned yes or no? do you share a concern that this could be vulnerable. >> absolutely. but the iaea does have some robust technologies -- >> they are much more advanced than the united states. >> i didn't say that. cyber is tough -- general dempsey also mentioned, signer is something that keeps us up all the time. and we have to develop our capabilities. >> fantastic. i have no confidence that we would know if there was tampering activities going on. >> the iaea is quite aware of this and they do have measures. >> and i hope they improve those measures. i do believe we are vulnerable as we have seen with our own

infrastructure. and general dempsey, we have heard discussion today about the choices the president has with this agreement. two weeks ago, many of our news out lets usa today, others had quoted president obama as the choice is the iran nuclear deal or war. this seems to be a military decision. and i understand that you advice the president on these issues. is that what you have told the president, that we take this deal or go to war? >> no at no time did that come up in our conversation nor did i make that comment. >> who is advising the president, then that we must go to war if this deal is not signed. >> i can't answer that. i can tell you we have a range of options, and i always present them. >> and i thank you for that. and i think it's imperative for everybody on this panel to

understand that there are other options available out there, a mull tip tuesday of options. we're taught in the military about dime diplomatic operations and other opportunities. so for the president to outright reject everything but war is outrageous to me and i do hope that you are able to better advise him that he needs to be careful with his language because that seems to be the rhetoric we're hearing out there is we either go to war or accept this deal and i reject that premise. >> as long as we agree that military strikes on a sovereign nation is an act of war, but there are things between here and there. >> i agree. thank you very much. >> thanks mr. chairman.

general dempsey -- first of all, let me thank everybody at this table for your service to our nation, and the hard work and dedicated service that produced this agreement whether we vote for it or not, and i have made no decision for myself. i think the nation owes you its gratitude for the hard work and -- that you have done. is it fair to say, general dempsey, that the breakout time for iran to produce enough fissile material to make a nuclear weapon will return to what it is now after the ten-year period? >> i don't know that it's fair to say that. because i think some of the additional protocols which are out of my area of expertise could inhibit them for a longer period of time. >> let's assume for the moment

that in fact the breakout time is reduced at the end of that ten-year period to essentially what it is now. will the united states be in a stronger or weaker position militarily if the military option is necessary for some future present? >> the chairman earlier correctly pointed out that iran could procure some weapons systems. it could make our military operation more difficult, but not impossible. and the answer to your question is it depends how we use the time between now and then. and we have to plan with our allies in the region to increase their capabilities over that period of time. so if we use the time wisely and have the resources necessary to do it we should not assume we would be in a weakened position. >> because the expectation has to be that the iranians will use that time to build their

conventional forces at the very least, because they'll have more revenue, is that correct? >> yes, but they are starting from an extraordinarily weakened position conventionally. but they are starting from a position of relative capability. >> what changes in military forstructure do you think the united states has to take both to make sure that our national security is assured, and also that our allies is as well. what specific changes should the armed services committee be supporting in the near and longer term? >> well that's almost a separate herring, but i would suggest to you that we really need to have the kind of budget security that the secretary of defense has articulated. and we should not consider

reducing our force presence in the middle east area of responsibility. >> secretary lou, let me turn to the economic sanctions that could be available, which my colleague from iowa has mentioned. can those be put back in place? can the united states alone even without our allies use its finance system and its banks to implement a severe sanctions system? >> senator we certainly have very significant tools that we have used unilaterally and we could use again unilaterally but what we have seen over the last several years is the impact of multi-lateral sanctions that have truly had a crushing impact on iran's economy. it has brought them to the table. i think the notion that we can unilaterally equal or surpass

that is something that is inconsistent with what we have learned -- >> but we can certainly make a significant and also severely damaging effort if we chose to do so. >> we can. >> and what i would say importantly is that the snapback provisions in this agreement make it so that both the u.s. and the international sanctions would be back in place. >> but the challenge will be to mobilize our partners -- >> i don't think it is a challenge. it is a very strong snapback provision. the international sanctions snapback in a way that we can work our will by exercising a veto if there's disagreement with us. >> secretary kerry did you have a comment? >> well there's a reality here and with all respect the senator

from iowa is not hear but the president of the united states is not mandating a war, it's not his choice and he's not advocating war, what he is saying is that if you analyze the alternatives when you say could the united states continue some sanctions? to what end? to negotiate? i mean with whom? you think the ayatollah is going to come back -- >> secretary kerry the time has expired. >> can i finish one thing senator? >> yes. >> the reason the president talks about the possibility of war is iran has already made it clear that if this is rejected they consider themselves free to go back in and enrich and go back to where they were with the 12,000 kilograms, et cetera. and the consequence will be what are you going to do about it? we will have lost the

international support, because the international community is ready to enforce this deal. if we're not unilaterally they walk away. so you have huge difficulty with the a choice the president wants to make but it's the consequence of them moving to assert what they believe is their right in the furtherance of their program. >> senator [ inaudible ]. >> i want to thank the chairman and all of the witnesses for being here. i also want to take this opportunity -- it is probably going to be the last time that general dempsey testifies before the committee, i want to thank you for your dedicated service and the service of your family. and i know general, when you appeared on july 7th, i was the person that asked you about -- there had been floated some views in the press that iran was pushing for lifting of the resolution on ballistic missiles and the resolution of

arms which we now know are in the agreement and five years and eight years. when you came before the committee then you said under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran on those issues. so was it your military recommendation that we not agree to lifting of those sanctions? >> yes, and i used the phrase as long as possible and then that was the point at which the negotiation continued. but, yes, that was my military advice. >> thank you. i also wanted to ask you about an issue that senator earnst talked about, in the iranian cyber activity. a number of years ago we saw there was an interruption of iran's nuclear program through some other cyber activity that was reported in the press, i believe. in this agreement, according to paragraph 10.2 of annex 3 of the

deal the united states is obligated under this agreement to help strengthen iran's ability to protect against sabotage of its nuclear program. it might be hard for americans to believe that with would agree to help iran protect against sabotage of its nuclear program in light of its prior intentions, and general dempsey, i wanted to ask your opinion on that do you think it's a good idea for the united states to help iran to protect its nuclear program against sabotage. >> i hadn't thought about that, senator, and would like the opportunity to do so. but i think next week this committee and the senate will consider cyber legislation that we have been eager to see passed. >> well when we know that iran

continues malign activity on the cyber front, the idea that we would help them protect against sabotage, and i think assume that would also include the israelis. at least if we're going to adhere to the plane language of this agreement. we have heard a lot about sanctions, and sanctions as i understand iran has written the united nations on july 20th about the sanctions regime and one of the issues that has concerned me about this agreement is that once the sanctions, a long list of mainly congressionally mandated sanctions that will be lifted under this agreement are

undertaken if iran for example, engages in terrorist activity which it is known to do separate from the nuclear program, iran seems to have taken the position in its letter to the u.n. -- and i have read the agreement, and i have been concerned that the agreement provides the same; that in fact iron says it is understood that re-introduction or reimposition including the sanctions will constitute significant non-performance which would relieve iran from its commitments in part and in whole. so as i read this i'm deeply concerned that if we want to reimpose the toughest sanctions on issues related to their terrorist activities and support for terrorism, which is another tool in the toolbox, general, aside from our military options, that iran can then walk away.

and if you disagree please tell me where in the plane language am i wrong? >> the language says we can't impose the nuclear sanctions. we have never given away any of our ability to use other sanctions regimes. terrorism or human rights -- >> but secretary lou the nuclear sanctions are the toughest sanctions that we would impose in other contexts too, including on crude oil, oil and gas -- >> senator we -- we reserve the right -- if there's a financial institution that is engaging in financing terrorism to put sanctions back on that institution. that is not a violation of the agreement. >> but iran seems to take a different position. >> what iran does believe is we can take the nuclear sanctions put a different label on them and put them right into place. and we would have to make the

case that institutions should be sanctioned for their behavior on terrorism, human rights and destabilization, and all of our sanctions that apply in that area still stand. >> thank you mr. chairman. and general dempsey thank you also. every time we say good-bye to you, you come back in another week -- >> you are watching live coverage of the senate armed services committee, their hearing on the iran nuclear deal a lot of questions and ground to cover. libby casey is live for us on capitol hill. are you getting the sense that we're getting here? there's a very different tone coming from the democrats and republicans particularly towards the chairman of the joint chiefs about possible military options. what is your sense of that? >> yeah they generally have a respectful tone for the leaders of the military.

and this is a far cry from what we saw yesterday, where we saw john kerry getting hammered by the republicans. in the house it's usually more of a fistfight. in the senate they tend to ask more of the substantive line of questioning. it's considered to be more of an arena of subtlety. of course, also john kerry served in the senate for a long time so many of these are his former colleagues. we're hearing from some like claire mccaskill that she said i haven't decided how i feel about this. i don't know if i will vote to approve or disapprove of the iran deal. and she had some real questions for the treasury secretary, jack lew, about if the deal is jekted

by congress does that really leave the u.s. out in the cold. the u.s. is very powerful. the u.s. is the banking center the dollar is the reserve currency doesn't that do something? and secretary lou said yes, it is a gray area. so she is looking for what happens if congress votes yes or no. some republicans seem to be trying to push the military leaders to admit that they don't like this iran deal. they are not going there, paul. we're hearing the joint chiefs of staff and the secretary saying they do support the deal. and urge a vote for it. >> we also heard about that rather pointed question about whether iran would be able to come up with a nuclear bomb by christmas.

that was quite a moment. we're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back.

welcome back to al jazeera america. our live coverage of the senate armed services committee hearing on the iran nuclear deal started earlier this morning. we have been with it throughout the morning. a lot of tough questions there for secretary of defense ash carter. that's him we see speaking right now. we're going to rejoin that in just a moment, but first i want to a little bit with our guest here. one of the questions that keeps coming up is if the u.s. were to go it alone, and not approve the deal what -- what signal that

would send to the rest of the international community that has signed on to this deal. of course the u.s. still has a lot of sanctions that would be powerful at its disposal but talk a little bit about what would happen? >> that's a great point. it's something that i feel like the republican side of the u.s. power structure is ignoring to a great deal and the obama administration keeps trying to repeat and explaining how this is a group effort the u.s. has been in a pact with other world powers and they are trying to bring iran to the negotiating table and to have some sort of good faith from the iranian side which is what the iranians are showing, or have been showing so far, so it will be difficult for the u.s. to get out of this agreement with no apparent reason just because they don't like the agreement. this is an agreement that all of these countries came together to

get out of they will lose this collaboration and they won't be able to go back to the same sanctions regime. >> that's right. how do you restart the process, really was the question that was asked. let's say congress does not approve it and we decide to impose our own sanctions, and then how can you restart the process are when the world says we did this one before. how do we do it again? >> that's right. that's why it is called an agreement. the u.s. and iran weren't the only parties in those negotiations. you can't go back into an agreement and say i'm here to agree on another agreement. so it will just look really bad on the u.s. side and they won't be able to get the international community all together the same as before this agreement. >> talk a little bit about -- this process obviously is being watched all around the world, as people in iran get a

sense of this kind of questioning, this kind of tone what is the parallel process happening there? >> it's -- very interesting how the iranian administration the rouhani administration and the [ inaudible ] team is also dealing with the hard liners in the iranian parliament. it's a very mirroring image. they are watching the hearing live in persian on many channels. iranian state television has been airing these live statements and hearings so the iranian population is showing a lot of interest. they have made a lot of comparisons as far as how the two sides are operating, but the main difference that i see is the hard liners on the iranian side seem to be a little bit more contained as far as their opposition to the deal. it looks like the moderates have a little bit more of the power

right now, and that's just because the supreme leader has been on board with these negotiations and with the agreement. it might like sound like but he has been on board, and that's why they were able to break a deal. >> right. and i think that's one of the things when americans look at this from the outside, and they hear some of those statements is that the same political dance we hear in this country, there's a lot of tough language but everyone knows this is just to apiece the hard liners. >> exactly and for domestic purposes it's just there's no equivalent of the supreme leader in the u.s. so it's hard to make that comparison. but i would say imagine someone has the job of let's say president obama and senator mccain at the same time so he has to appeal to a broader more diverse audience but the

supreme leader has shown he has been on board with the negotiations, and supportive of the deal and just like john kerry has been saying we should look at what they are doing and not what they are saying because a lot of it is for domestic consumption. >> all right. we're going to rejoin the hearing, senator from nebraska. >> -- the supreme leader says access of inspectors to iran's military senators is forbidden. who is correct on that? >> i think we are correct. first of all i just might point out there were many statements made before lason, before vienna -- >> this was made july 21st. >> yes, but you can check them against the agreement.