threats, a number of strategists here in the united states argued that we had to take military action against the soviets to hasten what they saw as inevitable confrontation. but the young president offered a different vision. strength in his view included powerful armed forces and a willingness to stand up for our values around the world, but he rejected the prevailing attitude among some foreign policy circles that equated security with perpetual war footing. instead he promised strong principaled american leadership on behalf of what he called a practical and attainable peace. a peace based not on a sudden revolution in human nature, but on a gradual evolution in human

institutions, on a series of concrete actions, and effective agreements. such wisdom would help guide our ship of state through some of the most perilous moments in human history. with kennedy at the helm, the cuban missile crisis was resumed peacefully. under democratic and republican presidents new agreements were forged and a non-proliferation treaty, allowing countries to access peaceful nuclear energy. the salt and start treaties which bound the united states and the soviet union to cooperation ons control. not every conflict was perfect, but the world avoided nuclear catastrophe, and we created the

time and the space to win the cold war without firing a shot at the soviets. the agreement now reached between the international community and the islamic republic of iran builds on this tradition of strong principled diplomacy. we have achieved a detailed arrangement that permanently prohibits iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. it cuts off all of the pathways to a bomb. it contains the most comprehensive inspection and verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program. as was true in previous treaties, it does not resolve all problems, certainly doesn't resolve all of our problems with iran. it does not ensure a warming between our two countries, but

it achieves one of our most critical security objectives. as such, it is a very good deal. today i want to speak to you about this deal. and the most consequential foreign policy debate that our country has had since the invasion of iraq. as congress decides whether to support this historic diplomatic break through or instead blocks it, over the objection of the vast majority of the world, between now and the congressional vote in september, you are going to hear a lot of arguments against this deal, backed by tens of millions of dollars in advertising. and if the rhetoric in these ads, and the accompanying commentary sounds familiar, it should. for many of the same people who

argued for the war in iraq are now making the case against the iran nuclear deal. now when i ran for president eight years ago as a candidate who would oppose the decision to go to war in iraq, i said that america didn't just have to end that war, we had to end the mind set that got us there in the first place. it was a mind set characterized by a preference for military action over diplomacy. a mind set that put a premium on unilateral u.s. action over the painstaking work of building national consensus. a mind set that exaggerated threats beyond what the intelligence supported. leaders did not level with the american people about the costs of war, insisting that we could

easily impose our will on a ward of the world with a profoundly different culture and history. and of course those calling for war labeled themselves strong and decisive, while dismissing those who disagreed as weak, even apiecers of a malevolent adversary. more than a decade later, we still live with the consequences of the decision to invade iraq. our troops achieved every mission they were given, but thousands of lives were lost, tens of thousands wounded. that does count the lives lost among iraqis. nearly a trillion dollars was

spent. today iraq remains gripped by sectarian conflict, and the emergence of al-qaeda in iraq has now evolved in isil. and the single greater beneficiary in the region of that war, was the islamic republic of iran, which saw its strategic position strengthened by the removal of its long-standing enemy, saddam hussein. i raise this recent history, because now more than ever, we need clear thinking in our foreign policy. and i raise this history because it bares directly on how we respond to the iranian nuclear program. that program has been around for decades, dating back to the shaw's efforts with u.s. support in the 1960s and '70s, to develop nuclear power.

the three accuracy that every through the shaw accelerated the program after the iran, iraq war in the 1980s, a war in which saddam hussein used chemical weapons to brutal effect. and the program advanced steadily through the 1990s, despite unilateral u.s. sanctions. when the bush administration took office iran had no centrifuges. but despite repeated warnings from the united states government, by the time i took office, iran had installed several thousand centrifuges, and showed no inclination to slow, much less halt its program. among u.s. policy makers there has never been disagreement on the danger posed by an iranian

nuclear bomb. democrats and republicans alike have recognized it would spark an arms race in the world's most unstable region. and turn every crisis into a potential nuclear showdown. and pose an unacceptable risk to israel, which iranian leaders have repeatedly threatened to destroy, it could ungravel the noble commitment to non-proliferation that the world has done so much to defend. the question then is not whether to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but how? even before taking office, i made clear that iran would not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon on my watch. and it has been my policy throughout my presidency, to keep all options, including possible military options on the table to chive that objective.

but i have also made clear my preference for a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the issue. not just because of the costs of war, but also because a negotiated agreement offered a more effective, verifiable, and durable resolution. and so in 2009 we let the iranians know that a diplomatic path was available. iran failed to take that path, and our intelligence community exposed the existence of a covert nuclear facility. now some have argued that iran's intransigeance showed the futility of negotiations. in fact it was our very willingness to negotiate that helped america rally the world to our cause, and secured international participation in

an unprecedented framework of commercial and financial sanctions. keep in mind, unilateral u.s. sanctions against iran had been in place for decades, but had failed to pressure iran to the negotiating table. what made our new approach more effective was our ability to draw upon new u.n. security council resolutions, combining strong enforcement from volunteer agreements from nations like china, india, japan, and south korea to reduce their purchases of iranian oil, as well as a total oil embargo from our european allies. winning this global buy-in was not easy. i know. i was there. in some caseings our partners lost billions of dollars in trade because of their decision to cooperate. but we were able to convince them that absent a diplomatic

resolution, the result could be war. with major disruptions to the global economy, and even greater instability in the middle east. in other words it was diplomacy, hard, painstaking diplomacy, not saber rattling, not tough talk, that ratcheted up the pressure on iran. with the world now unified beside us, iran's economy contracted severely, and remains about 20% smaller today than it would have otherwise been. no doubt this hardship played a role in iran's 2013 elections, when the iranian people elected a new government that promised to improve the economy through engagement with the world. a window had cracked open. iran came back to the nuclear

talks. and after a series of negotiations, iran agreed with the international community to an interim deal, a deal that rolled back iran's stockpile of near 20% enriched uranium, and froze the progress of its program so that the p5-plus-1, the united states, china, russia, the united kingdom, germany, france, and the european union could negotiate a comprehensive deal without the fear that iran might be stalling for time. now let me pause here just to remind everybody that when the interim deal was announced, critics, the same critics we're hearing from now, called it an historic mistake. they insisted iran would ignore its obligations, they warned the

sanctions would unravel, iran would receive a windfall to support terrorism. the critics were wrong. the progress of iran's nuclear program was halted for the first time in a decade. its stockpile of dangerous materials was reduced. the deployment of its advanced centrifuges was stopped. inspections did increase. there was no flood of money into iran. and the architecture of the international sanctions remained in place. in fact, the interim deal worked so well, that the same people who criticized it so fiercely now site it as an excuse not to support the broader accord. think about that. what was once proclaimed as an historic mistake is now held up

as a success, and a reason to not sign the comprehensive deal. so keep that in mind when you assess the credibility of the arguments being made against diplomacy today. despite the criticism, we moved ahead to negotiate a more lasting comprehensive deal. our diplomats kept our coalition united. our nuclear experts, including one of the best in the world, ernie munoz worked tirelessly on the details. in july we reached a comprehensive plan of action that meets our objectives. iran is never allowed to build a nuclear weapon, and iran is allowed to access peaceful nuclear energy, the agreement strictly defines the manner which its nuclear program can

proceed, ensuring that all pathways to a bomb are cut off. here is how. under this deal, iran cannot acquire the plutonium needed for a bomb, the core of its heavy water reactor in iraq will be pulled out, filled with concrete, and replaced with one that will not produce plutonium for a weapon. the spent fuel will be shipped out of the country, and iran will not build any new heavy water reactors for at least 15 years. iran will also not be able to acquire the enriched uranium that could be used for a bomb. as soon as this deal is implemented, iran will remove two-thirds of its centrifuges. for the next decade, iran will not enrich uranium with its more advanced centrifuges.

it will not enrich in its underground facility for at least 15 years. iran will get rid of 98% of its stockpiled enriched uranium for the next 15 years. even after those 15 years have passed, iran will never have the right to use a peaceful program as cover to pursue a weapon. and in fact, this deal shuts off the type of covert path iran pursued in the past. there will be 24/7 monitoring of iran's nuclear facilities. for decades inspectors will have access to iran's entire nuclear supply chain from the mines, to the centrifuge facilities. for iran to cheat, it has to build a lot more than just one building or covert facility, it

would need a secret source for every single aspect of its program. no nation in history has been able to pull off such subterfuge when subjected to such inspections. and under the terms of the deal, inspectors will have the permanent ability to inspect any suspicious sites in iran. and finally, iran has powerful incentives to keep its commitments. before getting sanctions relief, iran has to take significant concrete steps like removing centrifuges and getting rid of its stockpiles. if iran violates the agreement over the next decade, all of the sanctions can snap back into place. we won't need the support of other members of the u.n. security council, america can trigger snapback on our own. on the other hand, if iran abides by the deal, and its

economy begins to reintegrate with the world, the incentive to avoid snapback will only grow. so this deal is not just the best choice among alternatives, this is the strongest, non-proliferation agreement ever negotiated. and because this is such a strong deal, every nation in the world that has commented publicly with the exception of the israeli government has expressed support. the united nations security council has unanimously supported it. the majority of arms control and non-proliferation experts support it. over 100 former ambassadors who served under republican and democratic presidents support it. i have had to make a lot of

tough calls as president, but whether or not this deal is good for american security is not one of those calls. it's not even close. unfortunately, we're living through a time in american politics where every foreign policy decision is viewed through a partisan prism, evaluated by head-line-grabbing sound bites, and so before the ink was even dry on this deal, before congress even read it, a majority of republicans declared their opposition. lobbyists and pundits were transformed into armchair nuclear experts, challenging

experts like secretary muniz, challenging his arguments. but if you repeat these arguments long enough, they can get some traction. so let me address just a few of the arguments that have been made so far in opposition to this deal. first there are those who say the inspections are not strong enough, because inspectors can't go anywhere in iran at anytime with no notice. here is the truth. inspectors will be allowed daily access to iran's key nuclear sites. if there's a reason for inspecting a suspicious undeclared site, anywhere in iran, inspectors will get that access even if iran objects. this access can be with as

little as 24-hour's notice, and while the process for resolving a dispute about access can take up to 24 days, once we have identified a site that raises suspicion, we will be watching it until inspectors get in. and by the way, nuclear material isn't something you hide in the closet. it can leave a trace for years. the bottom line is, if iran cheats, we can catch them and we will. second, there are those who argue that the deal isn't strong enough because some of the limitations on iran's civilian nuclear program expire in five years. let me repeat, the prohibition on iran having a nuclear weapon is permanent. the ban on weaponed-related research is permanent. inspections are permanent.

it is true that some of the limitations regarding iron's peaceful program last only 15 years, but that's how arms control agreements work. the first salt treaty with the soviet union lasted five years. the first start treaty lasted 15 years, and in our current situation, if 15 or 20 years from now, iran tries to build a bomb, this deal ensures that the united states will have better tools to detect it, a stronger basis under international law to respond, and the same options available to stop a weapons program as we have today, including if necessary military options. on the other hand without this deal, the scenarios that critics warn about happening in 15 years could happen six months from now.

by killing this deal, congress would not merely pave iran's pathway to a bomb, it would accelerate it. third, a number of critics say the deal weren't worth it, because iran will get billions of dollars in sanctions relief. now, let's be clear. the international sanctions were put in place precisely to get iran to agree to constraints on its program. that's the point of sanctions. any negotiated agreement with iran would involve sanctions relief. so an argument against sanctions relief is effectively an argument against any diplomatic resolution of this issue. it is true that if iran lives up to its commitments, it will gain access to roughly $56 billion of its own money. revenue frozen overseas by other

countries. but the notion that this will be a game changer with all of this money funneled into iran's activities, misses the reality of iran's current situation. partly because of our sanctions, the iranian government has overhalf a trillion dollars in urgent requirements from funding pensions and salaries to paying for crumbling infrastructure. iran's leaders have raised the expectations of their people that sanctions relief will improve their lives. even a an oppressive regime like iran's cannot completely ignore those expectations, and that's why our best analysts expect the bulk of this revenue to go into spending that improves the economy and benefits the lives of the iranian people. now this is not to say that sanctions relief will provide no benefit to iran's military. let's stipulate that some of

that money will flow to activities that we object to. we have no illusions about the iranian government or the significance of the revolutionary guard and the cuts force, iran support terrorist organizations like hezbollah. it supports proxy groups that threaten our interests and the interests of our allies, including proxy groups who killed our troops in iraq. they tried to destabilize our gulf partners, but iran has been engaged in these activities for decades. they engaged in them before sanctions, and while sanctions were in place. in fact, iran even engaged in these activities in the middle of the iran, iraq war, a war that cost them nearly a million

lives and hundreds of millions of dollars. the truth is that iran has always found a way to fund these efforts, and whatever benefit iran may claim from sanctions relief pails in comparison to the danger it could pose with a nuclear weapon. moreover there's no scenario where sanctions relief turns iran into the region's dominant power. iran's defense budget is eight times smaller than the combined budget of our gulf allies. their conventional capabilities will never compare with israel's, and our commitment to israel's qualitative military edge helps guarantee that. over the last several years iran has had to spending billions of dollars to support its only ally in the arab world, bashar

al-assad, even as he has lost control of huge chunks of his country. and hezbollah has suffered significant blows on the same battlefield. and iran like the rest of the region is being forced to respond to the threat of isil in iraq. so contrary to the alarmists who claim that iran is on the brinking of taking over the middle east or even the world, iran will remain a regional power with its own set of challenges. the ruling regime is dangerous and it is repressive. we will continue to have sanctions in place on iran's support for terrorism, and violation of human rights. we will continue to insist upon the release of americans obtained unjustly. we will have a lot of differences with the ir iran -- iranian regime. but if we're serious about

confronting iran's destabilizing actives, it's hard to imagine a worse approach than blocking this deal. instead we need to check the behavior that we're concerned about directly. by helping our allies in the regions strengthen their own capabilities to count der a cyber attack or ballistic mismile. by improving the interdiction of weapons shipments that go to groups like hezbollah. by training our ally's special forces so they can more effectively respond to situations like yemen. all of these capabilities will make a difference. we will be in a stronger position to implement them with this deal. and by the way, such a strategy also help us effectively confront the immediate and lethal threat posed by isil. the final criticism, this is

court of a catch-all that you may hear, is the notion that there's a better deal to be had. we should get a better deal. that -- that's repeated over and over again. we need a better deal. one that relies on make promises of toughness, and more recently the argument that we can apply a broader and indefinite set of sanctions to squeeze the iranian regime harder. those making this argument are either ignorant of iranian society, or they are just not being straight with the american people. sanctions alone will not going to force iran to completely dismantle all vestiges of his

nuclear infrastructure. that oftentimeses is what the critics are calling a better deal. neither the iranian government, or the iranian opposition or the iranian people would agree to what they would view as a total surrender of their sovereignty. more over, our closest allies in europe or asia, much less china or russia, certainly are not going to agree to enforce existing sanctions for another five, ten, 15 years, according to the dictates of the u.s. congress. because their willingness to support sanctions in the first place was based on iran ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. it was not based on the belief that iran cannot have peaceful