by his own party that he has 48 hours to resign as south africa's president. he faces a number of corruption charges after nine years in power, but so far has resisted pressure to quit. after meeting the high—level delegation that returned to the north korea after their three—day visit in the south for the winter olympics, north korea's leader kimjong—un has said it is important to boost the "warm climate of reconciliation and dialogue". and this story is trending on bbc.com. london's heathrow airport has said a duty free promotion at the weekend where chinese customers were asked spend more than non—chinese customers to receive the same discount was "unacceptable". that story is popular on bbc.com. that's all from me now. stay with bbc world news. now on bbc news it's time for hardtalk. welcome to hardtalk, i'm stephen sackur.

in the spirit of marking his own homework, president trump has already declared his foreign policy an outstanding success. so—called islamic state vanquished, iran put on notice, the middle east reminded that america sticks by its friends and stands up to enemies. my guest today is andrew peek, deputy assistant secretary of state with responsibility for iran and iraq. is the trump presidency really changing the rules of the game in the middle east? andrew peek in washington, dc, welcome to hardtalk.

thanks so much, it's great to be here. if i may, i'm going to begin with some words of yours, written right after donald trump's extraordinary election win back in november 2016. you said, "america's role in the world will be fundamentally altered by this election and in the middle east, most of all". well, now that you are inside the state department, do you stand by that? and in what way do you think this fundamental alteration has happened? oh, i think there is a lot of common threads that run through american foreign policy, from one administration to another. i think one of the alterations that we saw was that in 2016, there was a fundamental choice between a more hawkish foreign policy that, for the first time, really in a long time, was offered by the democrats. and a more restrained foreign policy

that was offered by donald trump, who sought to conserve american resources while still accomplishing our vital aims, kind of in the wake of the excesses of the iraq war in 2003 and perhaps, the libyan and syrian interventions and non—intervention, you know, respectively in 2011. so, you know, i think there's been a different approach to the region. i think there has also been a reassurance of our traditional allies — israel and the sunni gulf countries — of their security and america's commitment to regional stability. and also, i think there is a genuine focus on perhaps strengthening some of the holes or the, you know, challenges that are inherent in the iranian nuclear deal that the 0bama administration left behind. 0k, well, there's plenty to unpack there. i'm just very struck by another turn of phrase of yours — you said, "we are going to see the end of america as a crusader

and the return of america as a great power". what exactly did you mean by that? well, i think this goes back to 2001 where, in the republican party, there's always been these two competing poles. there's been the kind of 19905 america as a great nation with a unique moral message, but not necessarily a proselytiser. and then i think after 2001, there was a definite shift to america the proselytiser, america the country that spread democracy while wearing combat boots — which was a turn of phrase which in the last, you know, the bush administration, was quite common. and i think that really the election of trump and some of the people that he's brought into office on the foreign policy side, reflect that slightly older republican tradition, the 19905, the h.w. bush. america the realist, not necessarily america the evangelist. but you can't be a great power if the rest of the world doesn't

really understand what you're doing. so let's get into your areas of responsibility and talk in some detail. iran, first of all. i think it is fair to say that the rest of the world is somewhat confused and, indeed, alarmed by your policy — that is us policy — towards iran today. can you try and assure me that you know what you are doing? well, i'm not sure i would make that general statement. you know, i'm not sure that when you say "the rest of the world", i know who you are talking about. ok, i will be clearer — fair point, i will be clear. the european union, the russians, even the iaea — the nuclear watchdog authority — all believe the us is mistaken, fundamentally mistaken, in its current approach to the nuclear deal with iran which, of course, was struck by the 0bama administration amongst the other great powers with iran, and which donald trump now seems intent upon tearing up. well, let me offer that

in the countries that i most often deal with — israel, the sunni gulf countries, saudi arabia, the emirates and others — there's no confusion at all. and in fact, they are greatly reassured by this administration's approach to iran, because they are living at the front line with the challenges that iran and its regional behaviour plays. from my interactions with the european union and western european countries, i would say that i have found great interest in trying to address some of the challenges of the iranian nuclear deal. surely what matters — if i may interrupt for a second — surely what matters most is the thinking in those partner countries that you did the deal with iran with. and of course, that is the europeans, the russians and to quote the eu foreign affairs spokeswoman, federica mogherini, she says "the deal is working, it is delivering on its main goal, which means keeping the iranians nuclear programme in check".

and as i said, the iaea, which is the watchdog authority overseeing it, says, "i can quite clearly state that iran is implementing its nuclear—related commitments". these people's views matter, don't they? they sure do. i'm not sure that i would be so bold as to say that the views of the countries on the front line of iran matter less than the countries in western europe. i think that would be a strong thing to say. i would bet that israel and saudi arabia have very, very strong feelings about the iranian nuclear deal. indeed, i know they do, because i talk to them. i know they do too because i read what they say, but nonetheless, the point of that deal was to try to rein in iran's nuclear programme. all of the experts who are given the responsibility of monitoring it say it is working. and i just want to figure out what you think donald trump is going to do next because again, in terms of my point about confusing

signals, we've had mike pence recently indicate that as far as he's concerned, the trump administration is going to trash the deal, the deal is pretty much over. but we've had other members of the trump team suggesting — and rex tillerson, the secretary of state is one of them — suggesting that there is much more talking to be done. so what is going on right now? well, i think the president has been reasonably clear. i think he wants, by may 12th, an agreement with the europeans that will address some of the weaknesses that are inherent in thejcpoa, the iran deal, that we inherited from the 0bama administration. these are weaknesses like the linkage between sanctions and inspections. how quickly sanctions come back on if iran doesn't comply or doesn't comply fully, or pushes back on inspections. 0r on icbms — why does a country make icbms,

if not to carry a nuclear weapon? thus, shouldn't icbms be considered part of a nuclear programme? that's a question we're working on with the europeans also. and lastly, this issue... crosstalk. i'm hang on one second... the iranians, on the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the iranians aren't going to give ground on that — they've made that quite plain. they are not interested in giving new assurances on permanent restrictions on uranium enrichment. so there's really no wriggle room here and donald trump has put himself in the position where he says he won't certify the deal again. he has basically asked the europeans to do the impossible and if they can't do the impossible, ijust wonder, are you clear — is the united states clear — that come may, sanctions will be reintroduced and, as far as the us is concerned, the deal is over? again, there's a couple of different areas that we're working on. a third one is the

sunset clause, right? i think there's broad agreement that it's concerning that some of these safeguards begin to be lost after years eight, ten and so forth. i will say, with the europeans, that there has been great interest in working to strengthen elements of the deal. the president has said, as you note, he's not going to waive sanctions again — he wants a follow—on agreement with the e3. and i think that's pretty clear. itjust comes to my point about the united states being a great power. if you are truly a great power, you would be showing the sort of leadership on this issue that would have your partner countries come with you. but they are not coming with you. in the end, it could well be a humiliating situation where the us is out on its own on this issue? but i think it is being a great power because other countries are greatly reassured by our approach to this issue. and the fact that one administration has a slightly different policy focus — or a greatly different policy focus,

as in the case of this administration — than the past administration, being a great power doesn't mean consistently doing exactly what was done the administration before. these are real concerns we have that are broadly shared by a lot of americans. they're broadly shared by a lot of the international community. and the fact the iranians don't like them, i don't think mitigates the fact that we need to address them. again, i am just wondering what you mean, or what donald trump means by some of the words he uses. for example, during the recent spate of street protests in iran, which mostly seem to be about issues of costs of living, but they became deeply political, some people calling even for the end of the islamic regime, donald trump said in his tweets, "the world is watching", he said, "it is time for change." so what is the united states doing in terms of engineering change and what sort of change do you realistically expect to see? you know, i thought the protests that broke out in iran were so interesting. you know, they were fundamentally different than in 2009. this was a different demographic. it was many working—class iranians, it was more regional. they broke out in iran's most conservative, or one of its most conservative cities, in mashhad.

you know, i would say that we want to see a change in iran's behaviour. i think some of the economic hardships that are faced by iranians, which contributed to the unrest in iran, came from sanctions and responses by the international community to iran's destabilising behaviour, and i think reinforcing that link on behalf of the us is something we are quite committed to. you saw protesters chanting, "no to lebanon", "yes to iran". that sort of thing is a real undercurrent in iran. yeah. in addition to the basic weaknesses of the regime and the economic structure that it's trying to impose on its people, we want...

interesting that... yeah, go ahead. yeah, sorry — interesting that in your iran policy, and you mentioned it in this interview, working and feeling that you are echoing the feelings of allies in the region like saudi arabia and egypt. egypt being described by many independent human rights organisations as more repressive now than at any time in its recent history. you are lining up with extremely repressive authoritarian regimes against a country where, frankly, at least protesters feel they‘ re able to take to the streets and voice their concerns. i am struggling again to see what sort of values or principles the trump administration is applying here. well, what i would offer to you is that as it has in the past, the us makes its feelings on democracy, on pluralistic government, on basic rights, well known across the board. this is not an iran—specific

issue, this is regional. hang on a second, please. with respect, if we're talking egypt and president sisi, the united states is signally silent and there is no condemnation. in some cases where we have a good relationship with countries, we do it in private. in other countries, we do it in public. there is not a one—size—fits—all to how we make our concerns about human rights known. simply, that would be untenable. it would be — we would have a galaxy of different hues of relationships with these countries. we address this issue differently in many cases. a final point on iran and then we will move on. the former uk ambassador in the country and one of the uk negotiators involved in the iran deal says of donald trump's interventions — rhetorical interventions in iran — he said, "to try to insert yourself into the middle by too overt and too activist an approach actuallyjust plays into the hands of the hardliners in iran". it's counter—productive. yes.

this is an argument that has been made in the foreign policy community since the 19705, since the helsinki act. how do you encourage the growth of freedoms in autocratic countries? a novel we had this exact same di5cu55ion under the reagan administration and in later years the carter administration. had you engage with those countries? is it through the government? with the thought of improving the right of the people? would you engage through civic society, which is the traditional us platform. i think this is a continual policy debate in this is a continual policy debate in this town. this administration has chosen to differentiate itself from the 0bama administration by siding loudly and vocally with the people on the streets getting beat up.

ok, that's your template, "we are doing things differently from the 0bama administration". let's leave iran for a while and look at other parts of the region. you are responsible for iraq. donald trump made it plain that whether it be iraq, afghanistan, syria, he didn't want to see us troops on the ground anymore in these foreign entanglements. so just literally, specifically, how many us military personnel, trainers and whatever are in iraq right now? gosh, you know, for specific operational issues, i would urge you to bring a defence department person in here. you know, i'm happy to talk the foreign policy a5pect, i am happy to talk the need for... it's definitely part of foreign policy if you've got boots on the ground in iraq. several thousand. that will do — a ballpark, several thousand. we now learn you are going to keep 2,000 boots on the ground or pairs of boots on the ground in syria too and we understand that more than 15,000 us military personnel are either already in or going to be deployed to afghanistan.

so coming back to your opening point about the difference between 0bama and trump when it comes to these difficult foreign policy issues, the difference ain't so great after all, is it? well, in fact, i think there is a lot of difference. trump is halving at least the amount of people that we're going to be having in iraq. in afghanistan, there is a recommendation from the commander on the ground, nick nicholson, with whom i served when i was deployed there, that they needed to reinforce the existing train, advise and assist structure, to give the afghan government a better grip on the country as it moves forward over the next two or three years. hang on, donald trump tweeted literally dozens of times saying that the afghan policy was a huge mistake, the troops should never have been sent and that if he were president, those troops would be coming home right now. he's completely changed his policy.

again, this is my understanding, it was a request directly from nick nicholson to the president. afghanistan's not my area of writ. having served there myself, i can tell you it is a multifaceted problem set. of warfare, and so it's a decision that the white house is constantly looking at. i understand that afghanistan's not your specific bag and, indeed, neither is syria, but because iraq is, i am sure you take a great interest in syria because, obviously, they are neighbouring countries and some of the issues cross the border, not least the fight against so—called is and america's military strategy in both countries. 0bviously, they are interlinked. and in syria in particular, again it seems to me you have a massive problem because you have backed kurdish forces in northern syria, partly to eradicate remnants

of islamic state and the turks are now calling the force you've worked with, funded and trained, a terrorist army and mr erdogan in turkey is sending his forces in to fight them. turkey, of course, a fellow member of nato. the united states in syria is in a very big mess right now. well, listen, we are constantly reinforcing to the turks that we want whatever is happening in afrin right now, their operations, 0peration olive branch to limit civilian casualties, to be proportional and to be restrained. we're constantly reinforcing to the ypg not to provoke the turks, not to step outside of their boundaries and to concentrate on the fight that we all agree on against isis... your nato partners in turkey are accusing you of funding and training a terrorist army on their border. again, we're constantly engaging

the turks on this issue. we're constantly engaging the ypg to deconflict this and keep the focus on isis. i mean, that's the core of us policy, that's what we're doing. it takes a little bit of time sometimes, but we're constantly engaged on this. the country you are specifically responsible for, as well as iran, is iraq. there are supposed to be elections in iraq in may. do you have full confidence in prime minister abadi, are you backing him and you want to see him succeed in those elections? oh, gosh, you know, the iraqi elections are really interesting. we're not backing abadi specifically. we think that his leadership has been extremely positive for iraq, not least of which pulling it back from the brink in 2014. what i would offer is — i think it is a reflection on the progress that's been achieved in iraq,

that it is one of the few countries in the region where we genuinely don't know who's going to lead the country after may. there's a couple of main shia candidates. whoever wins will likely amalgamate a list with several, probably several smaller ethnic parties. but we think abadi's leadership has been positive for iraq, that goes without saying. interesting that just a very short time ago, mr abadi tried to bring in an iranian—backed shia militia into his governing coalition. it failed in the end, but it was an intent that he had and, certainly, if one looks at syria, the iranian influences huge, long—running and military and political. so going back to your point that you see iran as an overarching threat in the region, things really aren't going that well, are they, for the united states, if that is your overarching concern? well, i was encouraged by the fact that the iranians backed group you mentioned that tried to join

with abadi, engaged in an electoral coalition with him for i think a grand total of 20 hours before withdrawing. so from that perspective, i was greatly encourage. i mean, the reality iraq faces, as you know, is that it is adjacent to iran. it will be next to iran for the rest of the time that there is an iraq and iran. so it's going to have some kind of relationship with that country, and thus, iranian—backed candidates like amiri will — are allowed to participate in the elections. now, we think that hahram amiri is genuinely a negative force. but, you know, iraq is a sovereign country, we cannot force the prime minister to enter into electoral coalitions with people we don't like. all right, we must end in a sec.

before we do, a more general point. you have made a point to me of saying, you know what, we are rebuilding ourfriendships and partnerships with long—time allies in the region. how does that square with the fallout from donald trump's very personal decision to move the us embassy in israel from tel aviv to jerusalem, recognising jerusalem as the capital of israel? the fallout from that has been profoundly negative, not least in some of countries like saudi arabia that you've cited to me as your staunchest partners. for you, it makes yourjob so much more difficult, doesn't it? you know, i would say that saudis recognise that decision as one element in our relationship. i would say that the president was simply carrying out a law that had been on the books for over ten years, in doing that. and by the way, a campaign promise of his from 2016. so i think all of those countries that i referenced,

see the us regional relationship as composed of many things and aren't going to tank it over any single one of them. well, you may be confident, many others aren't. relevant to this, he wasn'tjust making a pointjust about the move of the embassy in israel, but he was making a point about the way in which donald trump's foreign policy has become so controversial in so many countries with his global approval rating, according to gallup, down at historic lows, much lower than barack 0bama's. in a response to all of that, it has to be said, conservative commentator, max boot, wrote this, he said, "trump has proved to be the worst salesman that america has ever had. farfrom winning over other countries, he's actively repelling and repulsing them." again, makes yourjob awfully difficult, doesn't it? not at all. i think the region has been greatly encouraged by donald trump's election. i can't stress that to you enough.

the sunni gulf allies and israel. all right, we'll leave it there. andrew peek, i thank you very much forjoining me on hardtalk. thanks so much, great to be here. hello. tuesday's weather is a wet, windy, and for some of us, rather wintery tale. the culprit — an area of low pressure swinging in from the atlantic that will bring some disruptive snow to the northern half of the uk. some wet and windy conditions further south. so here it is — this weather front pushing in from the west. a low—pressure centre to the north.

the low itself will keep the winds up right the way across the british isles. the worst of the snow will be through the morning in time for the rush hour, sadly, across scotland. with 5—10 centimetres possible across the highlands. but a good few centimetres possible through the centre belt, making for a dangerous rush hour. for northern ireland, perhaps the worst of the snow pulling away by sam, but not i think before we've had some significant accumulations. snow for the pennines and the higher ground of wales too. but even to lower levels for a while, even possible across the midlands. then further south, we've got some heavy rain and strong winds. so for the morning, a very messy picture. keep up to date with the travel on your bbc local radio station. this is the way the day then pans out. this whole weather front will push its way eastwards, clearer skies will follow on from the west, but some wintry showers for scotland and northern ireland. so you can see scotland clears considerably as the day goes by. it is mostly rain by the time that front gets into eastern england

in the second part of the day. a chilly story wherever you are, even with some sunshine. highs ofjust 4 or 5 degrees. this weather front away to the east through tuesday evening, overnight into wednesday, clear skies again. after that falling snow and widespread frost developing. ice a big risk first thing on wednesday. we are talking about a widespread frost and a hard frost as well. towards the west, though, noticed the blue easing somewhat by the end of the night. that's because we will see a weather front approaching, trying to bring in some cloud which is bumping into that cold air, so again, snow a potential problem for scotland. i think parts of northern england and wales. there is a milder air coming in turning into rain later on. temperatures in double figures for cardiff and plymouth through the afternoon. that weather system moves through pretty quickly in the small hours of thursday. then we're still left with a small

but centre driving our weather for the remainder of the week that will keep some showers pushing through. generally, things look a little milder by the end of the week. this is newsday on the bbc. i'm rico hizon in singapore, the headlines: north korea's leader speaks of a "warm climate of reconciliation" with the south after a delegation returns from the winter olympics. jacob zuma is reportedly told by his own party to resign as south africa's president within 48 hours. i'm sharanjit leyl in london. also in the programme: surviving in the big smoke. with more than half the world's population living in cities, we look at how urban life across asia can be made better. and dodging the dogs in india. fear on the streets where thousands die every yearfrom rabies bites.