in myanmar, the country's military is facing fresh accusations that it has launched deadly attacks against civilians, this time not against the rohingyas in the west of the country, but against the kachin people in the north. for decades, they have been calling for independence from myanmar. fresh eruptions of the fuego volcano in guatemala have prompted a new wave of evacuations of residents on the slopes below. the official number of people killed in sunday's eruption has risen to 73, with many more missing. no evacuation alert was issued before the volcano erupted on sunday. voting has ended in eight us states in primary elections. they are being watched closely ahead of the mid—term polls in november. california is particularly important to their hopes of taking back control of the house of representatives. now on bbc news, it is hardtalk with stephen sackur. welcome to hardtalk,

i'm stephen sackur. it is hard to imagine how the us—russia relationship could be any more dysfunctional. each accuses the other of consistently malign action and intent. "worse than the cold war" was the way it was recently described to me by russia's foreign minister. and yet the two presidents, trump and putin, appear to have some regard for each other. so what does it all mean? well, my guest is former us ambassador to russia, and obama adviser, michael mcfaul. how deep does the poison in this relationship run? michael mcfaul, welcome to hardtalk.

thanks for having me. going back to your student days, you have long had an affection with, a connection with, russia. but would it be fair to say that you have always wished and believed that russia would ultimately become more like the united states of america?” ultimately become more like the united states of america? i wouldn't wa nt united states of america? i wouldn't want them to become more like the united states, especially today's american democracy. but i did think that it was possible that russia could be part of the west, could be pa rt could be part of the west, could be part of europe, could be a democratic place, could be a place where capitalist institutions, market institutions, function. and most certainly there were periods in their history where they were moving

in that direction. more like us was your basic approach, because you are a student there, then you turn into a student there, then you turn into a sort of activist there for some time, you worked with the national democratic institute, and that was your overarching ambition, was it? to do your little bit to make them more like us? well, to make them more like us? well, to make them more free. i don't think we have some monopoly on what the definition of freedom or democracy is. certainly we americans don't. but the idea that most people want to have leaders that they vote in the office, the idea that people should have economic liberty, i think those are universal values, and most certainly those were values that i thought many russians wanted to embrace. you don't think, now that we have seen history unfold over the last two decades, you don't think that there was a degree of naivete in that view, and also perhaps a misunderstanding of some vital elements in the russian character?” wouldn't call it that. was i overly

optimistic about the transition process ? optimistic about the transition process? may be that. you know, i lived there in 1992, at the height of optimism about russia joining the west. and if i look back then, and i actually write about it in the book, we didn't do enough to try to help them make that transition. i think that was our greatest mistake, we in the west, because we did have a bit of triumphalism back then. we thought it was the end of history, as my colleague wrote, he is at sta mford as my colleague wrote, he is at stamford now, but he wrote it back then, and so he thought everybody was going tojustjoin then, and so he thought everybody was going to justjoin the liberal democratic world, and there was no alternative to that. and that, i think, was misplaced optimism. but one word you haven't used so far, andi one word you haven't used so far, and i haven't thrown it in there either, but it seems very relevant to me, is nationalism. russians have a very, very strong and proud sense of their own history. sure. their own power, and the reach of their own, one could say, empire, over not just the soviet period, but of

course the imperial, czarist period as well, going back many centuries. that's right. is in that very important, and isn't that an ingredient that your youthful take on what russia should be missed out? i wouldn't put it that way. i am a very proud american, i am a patriotically american. that doesn't meani patriotically american. that doesn't mean i have to be a non— democratic american. in the same way, russians i knew back in the early 90s were also nationalists. boris yeltsin was also nationalists. boris yeltsin was a nationalist. they wanted to be a proud russia, a great power. but they thought to be a great power meant to be a democratic russia. so other russians came along later. mr putin has a very different definition of what it means to be a great power. but i want to remind people that russians earlier, and russians in moscow and saint petersburg and vladivostok today, also think of themselves as proud patriots, but they also want to be a pa rt patriots, but they also want to be a part of the west, they also want their country to be a democratic

russia. well, let's examine that in some detail, and let's talk about your own role in russia policy in washington through the period of barack obama's washington through the period of ba rack obama's two washington through the period of barack obama's two terms, but particularly as you are his advisor to the white house was sometime and then sent to moscow to be the us ambassador to russia. this, of course, is now fast to the period roughly from 2008 to 2012, and then in moscow to 2014. by then, you had had vladimir putin become clearly the predominant politician in russia. yes. he was winning elections by huge margins. he was also saying things like, in his view, the collapse of the soviet union was the greatest catastrophe of the 20 century. were not listing to of that? well, i was listening very closely, of course. i have written a lot about vladimir putin, well before i joined written a lot about vladimir putin, well before ijoined the government, most of which he doesn't like, by the way. and ifirst most of which he doesn't like, by the way. and i first met him most of which he doesn't like, by the way. and ifirst met him in most of which he doesn't like, by the way. and i first met him in the spring of 1991. so i had known him and had followed his career for a long time. what i would say is this.

he did say those things. he also said, the coder to that was only a fool would try to recreate the soviet union. that's the part that people forget about. because he's missing out the communist element, but is not missing out the territorial influence element. well he has, in my view, a very outdated definition of what it means to be a great power. he thinks kind of realpolitik spheres of influence terms. i disagree with him, and by the way, so did his former president, president medvedev. those two gentlemen used to disagree about the nature of what it meant to be a great power in russia, and what it meant to be a great power in the former soviet union. and you, if i may say so, you backed the wrong horse then. because in that period, when putin, for constitutional reasons, had to step down from the presidency, he in essence levered his man medvedev into the presidency while he was prime minister, clearly still pulling the strings. but you, it seems, working for mr obama at

the time, naively believed that medvedev somehow was this independent actor, a moderniser who truly could take russia in any direction. right. and you were wrong. well, we were choosing horses, we were working with the president of russia. and when you are the present of the united states, you don't get to choose who is president of russia. medvedev was there, you met him. he met him at there, you met him. he met him at the gs, you there, you met him. he met him at the g8, you met him when you have a summit with him. he is the one sitting in the kremlin, not the prime minister. but i suppose you, asa prime minister. but i suppose you, as a diplomat, had to answer this question. did you not realise at the time that he was, in essence, still subordinate to putin? of course we realised that. we are not fools. we analysed the situation, and yet, i would say to you, while medvedev was president, on certain issues that matter to us, not whether it mattered inside russia, that is for them to decide, but matter to us on foreign policy, there was a difference. so let's talk about

spheres of influence. putin wanted to shut down our air base in kyrgyzsta n. to shut down our air base in kyrgyzstan. in 2009 he offered $2 million to the president to do that. when obama met with medvedev to talk about it and dismissed the spheres of influence ways of thinking, medvedev kept it open, vital to our war effort in afghanistan. number two, sanctions on iran. prime minister putin was not a big advocate of that. president medvedev was, and signed up to the most contented sanctions against iran ever, in may 2010, and then added a little bonus for us. he can still be as 300 contract, the anti—missile system that the russians had sold to the iranians. putin had negotiated a contract, medvedev cancelled it. and then three, and i think this is where medvedev got in trouble, and maybe it was the end of his time, most certainly it was the end of the reset, as we called it, with russia.

the reset was really your idea. well, it was a collective idea. in your book you describe yourself as the architect of the reset.” your book you describe yourself as the architect of the reset. i was the architect of the reset. i was the russian adviser to the white house, it was our idea, it was my idea, and in 2011, the arab spring was happening. we decide, we... not just the united states, but our allies, but that we need to use military force in libya to stop what we thought was going to be genocide in benghazi. medvedev supported us. he abstained on those two security council resolutions. i was in the room, in the kremlin, when he made clear to us that he thought we were doing the right thing. putin two days later publicly criticised it. so was he the public? yes, he was. putin was the main decision maker. but on occasion he did things that we thought were good for us. well, thatis we thought were good for us. well, that is an interesting way of looking at it, but let me be blunt.

is it not the case that vladimir putin is brilliant at ruthlessly exploiting weakness? and what he saw in the course of the obama administration, in terms of foreign policymaking, directly relevant to russia, by laterally, but also in the wider sphere of the middle east and elsewhere, he saw a president whom he believed to be weak?” and elsewhere, he saw a president whom he believed to be weak? i don't think of it that way. i mean, he looks for weakness, you're absolutely right about that. he pushes what he believes to be russia's national interest, as defined by him, right? iwant russia's national interest, as defined by him, right? i want to make that clear. there is no red book sitting in the kremlin that says this is russian national interest, just as there is no blue bookin interest, just as there is no blue book in the white house saying that. it is in the eyes of the beholder, in the eyes of the president at the time. with respect to us... one example, if i may, syria, 2013. after a lot of to—ing and fro—ing about whether the united states should intervene, and having her barack obama should intervene, and having her ba rack 0bama say should intervene, and having her barack obama say that it was not a cce pta ble barack obama say that it was not acceptable for bashar al—assad to remain in power, the chemical

weapons issue came up in 2013, it was a red line, said obama. in the end, he did not use military intervention. vladimir putin is watching that. he takes one message away from it. that barack obama ultimately is not prepared to put his presidency on the line for issues abroad. to quote robert gates, his defence secretary for sometime, i think putin saw the us was withdrawing from around the world. the problem has been that 0bama's actions have not matched his rhetoric. yes, it is all compared to what? i mean, we were withdrawing them, compared to now? i would say absolutely not. number two, with respect to syria, just to remind you of the history, 0bama respect to syria, just to remind you of the history, obama said we were ready to use force, and then he showed up in st petersburg and he met with vladimir putin, and instead of that, putin said what about we co—operate to get rid of the chemical weapons. now, it co—operate to get rid of the chemicalweapons. now, it turned co—operate to get rid of the chemical weapons. now, it turned out that we didn't get rid of them all, that we didn't get rid of them all, thatis that we didn't get rid of them all, that is true. but that is a deal

that is true. but that is a deal that was cut because of coercive diplomacy up to that point. either way, i was for the use of military force. i write about it in the book. i thought president obama made a mistake. but remember, putin was not just sitting on his hands at that time. he went to assad and said get rid of these weapons, otherwise you are going to have military force.” wa nt to are going to have military force.” want to bring it up to the present day because there is so much that has happened in the us russia relations after you left office yes, yes. but one more question about you and your accountability, if you like, for what happened. you were ambassador in moscow 2012 to 2014. i believe pretty much the day you left vladimir putin sent his forces into the crimea, annexed crimea. yes. you appear to have had no inkling that that was about to happen. with all your fast intel stuff, your resources , your fast intel stuff, your resources, your monitoring of everything that was happening both covertly a nd everything that was happening both covertly and overtly in russia, he seemed to be completely out of the loop. i wouldn't describe it that way. did we sit in the white house

situation room and talk about scenarios, including that one? the a nswer to scenarios, including that one? the answer to that is yes. did we predict it, did i predict it, i do know about other people. the answer to that is no. because you would not have had annexation of crimea without viktor yanukovych leaving the country, without him leaving, and nobody predicted that when that happened. remember, there are other actors involved here. it is notjust the us and the americans. there are these ukrainians... given what we have seen in georgia, for example, in 2008, when russians rushed in, we knew that putin was prepared, in the end, to violate international norms and send the troops in, and yet you seemed to be utterly surprised. utterly surprised cost, who was utterly surprised? the administration was certainly on the back foot. i wouldn't describe it that way. i remember us all being shocked but so what. what would you

have done about it differently. you would have known three weeks earlier, what would have been different? nothing, because no american president and there i say, no prime minister of the uk would go to war with russia over crimea. interesting you put it as bluntly as that. isn't that a truth which vladimir putin knew then imposed today, in so many spheres that matter so greatly to him, whether it be ukraine or syria or a bunch of others, he ultimately holds the cards because it matters more to him and he is prepared to act decisively ina way and he is prepared to act decisively in a way the us is not. i would describe it somewhat differently. if you look at the history of russian and soviet relations in eastern europe since world war two, at the end of the day, when they sit in the kremlin, and i have thought about this, there must be an american advice of their like i am the russian adviser in the white house, and they say, should be going to

hungary 56, czechoslovakia 68, poland 81, georgia 2008, and every one of those conversations, they turn to their american specialist in say, will be americans use force to thwart us? the answer to that is tragically note. it doesn't matter if it is george w bush, barack 0bama, dwight d eisenhower ordered lyndon b. johnson, that is a fact. the name you didn't use their was donald trump. he is now the president. you think trumpism and to go to warfor president. you think trumpism and to go to war for crimea? as a more general question about donald trump, and by the way, he is sending arms to ukraine in a way barack obama never did. and i support that, i think that's right. i'm not sure president trump supports that, by the way but the administration has at its the right thing to do. you now observe rather than play a part

in policy—making toward russia. now observe rather than play a part in policy-making toward russia. far away in palo alto, california. but your voice is still matters. when your voice is still matters. when you look at what trump is doing to the russians, is the administration's policy affected by everything that is happening with robert mueller investigation, collusion, russian interference, how much of an impact is that having? two things. one, there is this paradox that there is a trump administration policy towards russia which i support most of and it has lots of continuities with the obama administration and at times goes further. sanctions, as i mentioned, arming the ukrainians at a rate that 0bama wouldn't. donald trump tweeted, nobody is being cut from russia than i have. i think that's a bit... i would russia than i have. i think that's a bit... iwould not russia than i have. i think that's a bit... i would not agree with that but there is continuity. sanctions,

the obama administration did. no sanctions when russia when he did georgia in 2008 so when i hear that 0bama georgia in 2008 so when i hear that obama was weak, how many did george w bush put on the list? zero. we put hundreds of russians on the list as a result of that, i am on the list, i can't go to russia. the trump administration, and there are many i know well in the administration, it basically has the right approach towards russia and pushing back on putin and cooperating when we can. the right strategy. the president doesn't agree with his own strategy. i know it. he doesn't like the sanctions. he went along with the tough stuff on ukraine, he wants a different policy towards russia. how do you know that? that is easy to say. just that... i have lots of friends at very senior lenders, some who have been fired subsequently, you work in the administration. my

__ my you work in the administration. my —— my original question was time to the robert miller investigation, the 2016 election, russian interference, and only robert mueller can tell us whether there was active collusion between the russians and people in the trump camp. is that having an impact, particularly on the president's handling of vladimir putin? yes. this is my interpretation. because this investigation is going on, i think it has made the president less forceful in speaking about the truth of what happened in 2016 in the reason is, if he talks about the truth in 2016, it will make it look like the russians somehow deliver the election to him and he is very relu cta nt to the election to him and he is very reluctant to do that. i think it's a strategic mistake on his part. had he come out from the get go unsaid, yes, they did this, there is no evidence to prove that is the reason i won. and i agree with that. when

you have so many factors involved in an election, to somehow be able to isolate the independent causal force of the russian impact, it's an impossible social science question. that sally should have phrased it because he was so afraid of that kind of argument, he has been relu cta nt to kind of argument, he has been reluctant to say what i think is the truth about 2016 and it makes him look weak. let me ask you what i think -- look weak. let me ask you what i think —— what you think the trick is today, not just russian think —— what you think the trick is today, notjust russian interference in countries like the united states but also their long—term strategic intentions in your and elsewhere. here is what the national defence strategy latest review, the pentagon's updated document of global threats, this was january 200018. at countering russian and chinese, russian and chinese aggression is at the top of the pentagon's national defence strategy, i.e., whatever we have

said in the past about resets and whatever, we now regard russia as the most dangerous threat to the united states and the whole world. is that right? more or less. i know the paper you are referring to. i think the idea that we need to contain bad behaviourfrom the kremlin abroad is right. and i think thatis kremlin abroad is right. and i think that is what putin will understand, you won't understand anything else. what make you also said that putin will understand a whole range of issues, and that you will not use force when the world. it is the flipside of this calculation. that is the dilemma is so in my view, we do things like arming the ukrainians, that is the right strategy without getting involved in a conventional conflict in ukraine. above all else, we shore up nato to reduce any uncertainty including's

mind about what we would do if one of our nato allies were attacked and we push back on the soft power pieces. the biggest piece missing from that strategy is not understanding that putin believes he is in an ideological struggle with the west and the united states. invest a lot of money into it, maybe billions of dollars over the course of this time. and the seasonal final court he was one of america's most experienced high—level diplomats, do you think the united states should be countering russian's use of propaganda, misinformation, cyber methods by developing a much more coherent arm of its policy—making in that direction itself? the first thing i want is more resilience inside america. our computer systems that count votes are still highly vulnerable. dual identification when

you get onto a system like that, basic computer security. we haven't done it. should american be playing a fence, because that is what the russians do? whether it's a fence or defence, which is least make clear and maybe this is a job to the private sector are not the government were i live, facebook, twitter, google, ideal government were i live, facebook, twitter, google, i dealwith government were i live, facebook, twitter, google, i deal with them regularly these days, which at least make the consumers of content on their platform is aware of who produced it. right now, that's not very easy to do. that and a minimum we should do. and number three, we shouldn't enforce our own laws for broadcast. and for political campaigns. you talk of the need to address soft power but then there is economic power that the fact is, when we are talking about responses to russia, the united states and

europe sometimes the very divided, not least because russia provides enormous supplies of energy to many countries inside europe and the european union. right now, vladimir putin is in austria. they consume a lot of russian energy. isn't that a huge bit of leverage that putin will continue to exercise? yes, absolutely. and you're right. he doesn't think of energy exports thing about markets, it thinks about it being about russian power and in my view, tragically, we do not have a common strategy for dealing with that right now. we, the transatlantic community, are divided and are becoming more divided and he is winning more and more. on that note, we have to win that thank you very much for being an hardtalk. they give having me. thank you very much indeed. hello once again.

it's variations on a theme, rather than a great change of weather type that many of you are experiencing just at the moment. blue skies on tuesday in the sheffield area. it didn't start that way but you got there eventually, like so many other places did. and even when there was some cloud in the sky, well, a number of our weather watchers in the worcestershire area, and in some of the surrounding counties, in fact, were rather taken by that pattern in the skies. now, what's driving our weather at the moment? well, high pressure very much the dominant feature, awayjust to the north of scotland. we'll speak more about that area of low pressure, because we can't discount it, even though it's just there, way down towards the southern parts of france. so wednesday, a lot of dry weather, quite a lot of sunshine for many from the word go.

that's probably not the case for the eastern side of the pennines, where yet again overnight, if you ever lost it, we'll see a fair amount of cloud coming in off the north sea, tending to thin as we get on through the day, and again, with a wee bit of sunshine in the skies, temperatures in a number of locations exceeding 20 degrees celsius. it's not all plain sailing, i have to say. many of you will know already that the pollen levels are very high, especially across the greater part of england and wales, so bear that one in mind if that's relevant to you. here we are through wednesday evening. a good evening for a barbecue, not too much in the way of breeze, pleasantly warm in a number of locations. the cloud just becoming a wee bit more extensive again to the eastern side of the pennines, and some of the low cloud just lurking there or thereabouts across these northern and eastern shores, on what is not going to be a particularly cold night. now, that pattern for thursday doesn't look an awful lot different to the one i showed you for wednesday, with the notable exception that we've just pushed that area of low pressure, and its attendant fronts and troughs, a little bit further

north in france. and that will have the effect ofjust thickening up the cloud across the some of the southern counties of england, maybe the south of wales too. and, from that, we could well see some showers. maybe the odd one or two could be really quite sharp. that mightjust be a problem for the channel islands. it mayjust come a little bit further north. elsewhere, just one or two showers close by to the donegal border there in northern ireland, maybe the odd one over the highlands, but essentially it's a fine and settled look to our weather. and even as the weekend begins to loom, well, do you know what? that high pressure is still there or thereabouts. yes, we still have these little mini weather fronts, if you like, just bringing a bit of instability into the mix, you couldn't rule out one or two showers. this particular moment, somewhere across southern or western parts more likely to see them, but again, many of you in for a dry weekend. and send the troops in, and yet you seemed to be utterly surprised. this is the briefing, i'm sally bundock. our top story:

fresh volcanic eruptions in guatemala. officials say nearly 200 people are still missing. primary fever. american voters choose more candidates ahead of november's midterm elections. what kind of welcome can england fans expect in russia? willa frosty relationship overshadow the world cup? raising tensions over trade, mexico hits back at the us and imposes nearly $3 billion worth of tariffs on american products. also, in business briefing, an expert view on the new government in italy. how worried are investors about their populist policies?